THE American POLITICAL SCIENCE Review

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The American Political Science Review

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FREE SPEECH: AT WHAT PRICE?*

Charles S. Hyneman
Indiana University

It is now 30 years since Mr. Felix Frankfurter, then law teacher, called upon the political scientists for help. I propose to consider in what manner we might respond to his appeal.

In a review of the first book by one of our now distinguished colleagues, Mr. Frankfurter urged political scientists and economists to quit trying to be lawyers and to act more like specialists in the study of human relationships. "What we have a right to expect from economists and political scientists," he said, "is an analysis of what true governmental problems are, in the light of what actually goes on in the world and wholly apart from the technicalities of American constitutional law. . . . Until the economists and political scientists attend to their special tasks and we lawyers to ours and each has awareness of the other's problems, we shall continue to have . . . cross-sterilization of the social disciplines."[1]

Last week Mr. Frankfurter terminated a quarter century of service on the nation's highest tribunal. From that tribunal come oracular pronouncements of profound significance, fixing bounds to the power of law-making assemblies. I have read many of these pronouncements with considerable care, and I am convinced that the men who utter them need a kind of assistance which the political scientists can supply. I propose, therefore, to give you my judgment as to how this profession may render a service which one of the nation's most eminent jurists called for 30 years ago.

I shall speak about the problem of putting meaning into the Constitution's declaration that Congress—and by extension the 50 state legislatures—shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. And my objectives will be to identify certain aspects of that problem most likely to be illuminated by the political scientist's kind of attack and, having found the site for our effort, to say enough about what we might do to convince you that we ought to move in with our tools.

The Supreme Court has not yet come to agreement on the basic presumptions which will underlie the decision of nicer issues of legislative authority relating to speech and press. At least two present members of the Court, Justices Black and Douglas, have declared their commitment to a presumption that the prohibitions of the First Amendment are absolute—that the prohibitions of laws which abridge the freedom of speech or press are absolute denials of power to impose restraints on speech and press. It will come out in a moment, however, that they favor a qualified absoluteness.

Opposed to the idea of absolute prohibition is the so-called balancing doctrine—the contention that the nation's interest in freedom of speech and press is in competition with its interests in some other valued things that sometimes are endangered by unrestrained expression, that the competing interests ought to be evaluated and balanced out, and therefore that a test of reasonableness ought to be applied in litigation where abridgment of speech or press is charged.

A third point of view about the fundamental character of the free speech guarantee has been pressed with great persistence by Professor Alexander Meikeljohn of the University of Chicago. The First Amendment, according to him, protects political communication only. It is designed to keep government from restraining what people say in their efforts to instruct, criticize, and control their government. As respects political speech, the prohibition is absolute. As respects all other expression, Professor Meikeljohn argues, government may abridge freedom of speech and press so long as it does not violate any of the constitutional limitations found elsewhere in the Constitution. When a restraint of non-political speech is challenged on due process grounds, for instance, a court should evaluate the gains and losses which can be credited to the act, and determine its validity by application of tests of reasonableness.

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* Presidential address, American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 5, 1962.

[1] *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 45 (1932), p. 764.

No matter which of these three basic presumptions controls judicial thinking about laws that have an impact on self-expression and communication, critical decisions will turn on tests of reasonableness. This is admittedly so, and obviously so, in the case of the balancing doctrine; reason inevitably must rule when choice is made among competing values. Reason, therefore, must rule under the Meikeljohn formula when the restraining act is found to encumber non-political speech.

It has been argued that the concept of absolute prohibition excludes a concept of reasonableness. Justice Douglas has stated emphatically and repeatedly that inquiry into what is reasonable is wholly inappropriate when a court is convinced that speech or press has in fact been restrained. Indeed, I think it likely that Justices Douglas and Black, and Professor Meikeljohn when he contemplates utterances that have political significance, endorse the idea of absolute prohibition because they expect it to remove controversy about what is reasonable from the judicial forum.

In my judgment this is a vain hope. The absolute prohibition doctrine runs squarely into issues of reasonableness at three points. When you examine what Justices Black and Douglas have said from the bench and in addresses delivered at other places, you learn that one of them or both of them has asserted: *first,* that the First Amendment does *not* protect *all* kinds of verbal expression: *second,* that expression which the First Amendment does protect sometimes loses protection because it is inextricably mixed up with other action; and *third,* that statements which ordinarily are immune from restraint by government may be forbidden if the words can be said to be the efficient cause of certain punishable actions.

Consider these statements by the two men who have, more than once, said that the prohibitions imposed by the First Amendment are absolute:

Justice Black in a public address, two years ago: "There is a question as to whether the First Amendment was intended to protect speech that courts find 'obscene'."[2]

Justice Douglas, speaking also for Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren in 1957: "Of course, we have always recognized that picketing has aspects which make it more than speech. . . . I would adhere to the principle . . . that this form of expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent that it forms an essential part of a course of conduct which the State can regulate or prohibit."[3]

Justice Douglas, speaking only for himself, in the Dennis case in 1951: "The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and immorality."

The bounds of legislative power to abridge speech and press on each of these three frontiers, can be fixed only after the judge has decided where a reasonable man would draw the line. I have not time to trace the reasoning which leads to this conclusion. Call to mind the consequences of John Marshall's effort to skirt around the morass of reasonableness inherent in the necessary and proper clause. Find out, he said, whether the act of Congress falls within the commerce power; if the act is an exercise of the commerce power we need not inquire whether it is necessary and proper for the regulation of commerce, for the power to regulate commerce is plenary, whole, complete. By this strategy the judges slipped away from questions of reasonableness at one point, only to walk straight into them at another—when does commerce begin and end?—what is a direct and what is an indirect impact on goods in movement?—and so on. I trust you have not forgotten the *E. C. Knight* case, *Hammer* v. *Dagenhart, Carter* v. *Carter Coal Company.*

Believing, as I do, that a rule of reason will control the decisions that mark the front of a developing constitutional law of free speech and press, I can tell the political scientist where he should stake out his claim and assemble his tools. The scholarly study which helps lawmakers and judges decide what government may *reasonably* do to regulate the speech and other expression of the nation—this is what God had in mind for them to do when he created political scientists.

This is a worthy and urgent mission. How shall we go about the job? I shall comment briefly on each of three gateways into this jungle of human relationships.

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[2] "Bill of Rights," *New York University Law Review,* Vol. 35, p. 865, at p. 867.

[3] International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U. S. 284, at 297 (1957).

One. There is need for a fuller and more careful ordering of communication and non-communicative expression, and their relationships to the values, beliefs, expectations, and behavior of men and women.

Two. It is obvious on a reading of judicial opinions and scholarly literature, that our best thought would profit from a few alternative analytic designs—models of analysis designed to identify and relate to one another the components of an issue of unrestrained speech versus restricted speech.

Three. There is need for a fresh look, and a hard look, at the intellectual supports for the grand presumption in favor of unrestrained verbal expression which underlies virtually every bit of our serious literature.

An equal attention to all three of these points would allow very little time for any of them. I prefer to expand my remarks on the first two. The scrutiny of intellectual foundations, which any of you, or Justice Frankfurter, might think the Number 1 assignment for political scientists will be disposed of right now in the few sentences I can allow.

A hard look at the intellectual foundations might reveal that the case for free speech, as it is made in contemporary American literature, rests mainly on a distrust of government rather than on a high esteem for a free flow of information and a lively combat among the ideas that compete to control action. Note the lack of acknowledgment in this literature that legal regulation of a communication problem, in many instances, may have as its result a freeing rather than a trammeling of communication—this result because enactment of a law on the subject gives the moderates in the community a talking point which restrains the more passionate part of the population from a do-it-ourselves job of policing. The hard look might help us put together more intelligently our supposition that the pen is mightier than the sword and our wish to secure and preserve certain cultural gains. Can anyone doubt that the communication of man to man facilitates the step backward as well as the step forward? Are we so committed to an idea of progress that we must believe that all social change is for the better—therefore that all argument and agitation for change must inevitably result in cultural advance? Contemplating the history of pogroms and genocide in our own time, I am unable to understand why there is so little support, if indeed there is any support in our literature, for governmental action designed to lessen or prevent the indoctrination of children which produces adults who seek relief in persecution. Do we believe that impregnation with hate ought to be tolerated so that all of us may be enlightened and ennobled by the debate it excites? Or are we simply overpowered by uncertainties, not trusting our elected officials to select for extirpation at the stage of character formation the evil which we will later demand that they destroy on the battlefield?

You will see why I believe we need a speculative attack on the free speech problem by a mind as disciplined as that of John Stuart Mill, and as free from compulsion by previous writing as Mill appears to have been. You may see, also, why I am reluctant to foreguess what I will be told when one of you writes that book.

I speak with more confidence about the other two enterprises I recommend—the careful ordering of situations in which issues of free speech versus restraint arise, and the development of models for analysis of such issues.

On the first of these assignments, the general survey which reveals where the problems lie, let us start with the forum. Most of our writing is about communication from man to man out in the open. If this be the ordinary situation, then there are special situations that ought to be brought into fuller cognition and recognition.

Citizen to His Government. Possibly this is where speech and press ought to be most unrestrained. But there must be limits as to when and where the citizen can speak to his servant. The judge must be immune from the helpful coaching which interested spectators can supply throughout the trial. And the Senators have a point when they say they hear enough if they listen only to one another when they sit in formal session. If we thought more about it, we might conclude that we ought to impose some further conditions on the forum when the individual competes with the great organization in pressing his interests on elected officials or administrative agents. I think this is a hard surface on which we should sharpen our ideas about equality.

Government to Citizen. When the President was elected, I stood firmly planted in a state of nature, determined to scrutinize the deeds of my servant and help remove him from office if he did not meet my expectations. By the time his first term was up I had been made over. When I voted to give him a second term, and a third term, and a fourth term, did my vote testify to a conviction that a public servant had fulfilled my expectations? Or did my voting merely prove that I had been sweet-talked into accepting anything he chose to give? If you think this is a dilemma only for fuzzy thinkers, ponder the uses of the bureaucracy. The Congressmen may not enact a law which forbids the individual or a group to conduct a propaganda campaign designed to terminate a social practice or uproot a moral commitment of the population. May the Congressmen set a bureaucratic force on a counter propaganda campaign intended to smother the reformers and make ineffective the communication which they are guaranteed a right to advance—and pay for the governmentally based campaign with money exacted from you, me, and the man who got buried?

Communication within Government. A few days ago Senator Hubert Humphrey, the majority party's whip in the Senate, introduced me to some of his friends from Minnesota—introduced me as one of his teachers. I told the Senator's friends that there was one thing I had failed to teach the Senator—that is, that a leader of the Democratic party can never be sure who is going to filibuster. I am sorry the Senator is not here tonight, for I would have reminded him that, throughout the decade before he was born, United States Senators who called themselves liberals, were chafing at gag rule. Abuses of speech and restrictions of speech within government are not likely to be litigated under the First Amendment. But they lie in that universe of expression and communication to which the nation must bring order, and in respect to which the political scientists must bring counsel.

Communication within Non-Governmental Organizations. I think Justice Holmes did us a disservice with his reference to yelling "Fire!" in a theatre. Speaking from the floor while the play is in progress on the stage ought not be governed by the rules which govern communication on the street corner. We have supposed that the presiding officer properly determines the order of speakers where all have an invitation to speak. Would anyone argue that the Constitution forbids lawmakers to empower presiding officers, school teachers, and football referees to impose silence on the many while one person makes himself heard?

The Carriers of Messages. Does the guarantee of free press deny government the power to impose an obligation to carry messages? Is the right of an editor to print his own crazy ideas a right to keep out of his publication the ideas of all other men he thinks to be crazy—or the ideas he thinks worthy but unsuitable for immature readers? Consider the public need for news in a one-newspaper town; the stranglehold on the flow of information and ideas that lies within the power of the great newsgathering organizations like Associated Press.

Finally, that special forum, *The Schoolroom.* What is the right of government to intervene in the development of character and the equipment of a child for a man's understanding? Does the wish of the constitution-makers and our own confirming determination to have a system of free speech deny us the right to use government to impose educational goals on unwilling parents? Silly question? Consider this confident statement by a man of considerable distinction in the literature of constitutional law as it relates to civil rights. Professor Milton R. Konvitz speaking:

> The state may compel parents to send their child to a public or private school where he would acquire the basic means with which to search for the truth *in his own way* . . . it would follow that the state may prescribe only the minimum number of subjects, study of which would be compulsory, such as English, spelling, arithmetic, American history and geography, and hygiene. . . . The state should not make *secondary* education compulsory as against the claims of religious objectors; for I do not see that a free, pluralistic society stands to lose in the long run if some people know their holy books thoroughly but are ignorant of Faulkner and Hemingway or even of Shakespeare, as long as they have acquired the basic tools for the pursuit of secular knowledge and there is a public library in their community to which they can go for books.[4]

I trust I have said enough to make clear what kind of assignment I recommend for political scientists when I urge them to provide an orderly array of the significant relationships between our verbal expression and our other interests and activities. My brief remarks do not disclose the magnitude of that assignment. A scholar's report of the significant relationships will attend to the content of expression and the ear that hears the message, as well as the forum in which the word is delivered. If tests of reasonableness are to determine whether government may impede or inhibit a particular expression, the judge will have to satisfy himself as to the importance of the message to the individual who utters it, to the individual who receives, and to the society which may profit or lose if such messages move freely among the population. When you put the values which support the application of restraint on the scales with the personal and social evaluation of the message, the outcome will vary according to whether the utterance is a groan or a grunt, a foul expletive, a blasphemous assertion of conviction, the idle chatter of a rattle brain, and on through a succession of categories up to the vital message that answers the question: What shall I do to be saved?

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[4] *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 122.

Intermixed with the importance of the message—perhaps inseparably blended—is the character of the audience. You would not allow adults to go about the playgrounds advising white children to beat up their Negro playmates; you might be reluctant to forbid the publication of a book which urged the same course of action on adults. The textbook intended for students in medical school may appropriately carry instructions which you would not permit in a book advertised as a do-it-yourself handbook of abortion. (Credit Mr. Malcolm Cowley for the illustration.[5]) The remark which is thought highly appropriate if whispered to an attractive companion may fall before the test of reasonableness if addressed to a group of old ladies.

I am confident that Justice Frankfurter will endorse the surveying job which I have described as eminently suited to the special competence of political scientists. He might insist that lawyers are better equipped than political scientists for the next assignment which I present for your consideration. I referred to it earlier as the development of models of analysis which have as their purpose to identify and relate to one another the components of a free speech case. How do you evaluate an act of government—legislative, administrative, or judicial—which imposes a restraint upon speech or press? This is what the judge must do in any litigation where the validity of the restraint stands or falls on tests of reasonableness. I am convinced that none of the judges to date—and this goes for Justice Black, Justice Douglas, Justice Frankfurter, and Judge Learned Hand—I am convinced that none of the judges has so far produced an opinion that stands as proof that his decision rests on a comprehensive, sharply discriminating, and systematic scrutiny of the known and probable social consequences of the act under consideration. I think that the interests and the training which mark the thoughtful and competent political scientist make our discipline a prime hope for fulfillment of this need.

We must presume that there is more than one rewarding way of going about the evaluation of a public policy. I would not venture even to guess what alternative approaches and procedures may be turned up in a generation of assiduous scholarly study. In order to make sure that you understand what kind of enterprise I have in mind, I will give you the outlines of my personal attack on this problem.

The structure which I have adopted to guide my own analysis rests on three foundations: value position; suppositions and beliefs about effectiveness of means to ends; and attitudes toward uncertainty.

I can handle value position when I view a thing, a matter, as instrumental; I can do nothing with value viewed as ultimate, self-fulfilling, esthetic. If you tell me that nothing, absolutely nothing, gives you more satisfaction than popping your knuckles, about all I can do to straighten you out is to call your attention to other things you might value more highly if you gave them a trial. But if you say you pop your knuckles because that is the best way you have found to attract attention and cause people to seek your company, I can make a display of evidence glued together by reasoning which may convince you that you had better look for another way of making friends and influencing people. Value, to be a useful concept in analysis, must be instrumental value.

You can fix a value for free speech and press by generalizing the utility of expression—by a conception that free expression is essential to an open society, or to maintenance of democratic government, or to some other end equally sweeping and inclusive. The generalized approach, in which the instrumental value of expression is seen as diffused rather than identified with particular goals, is helpful in fixing foundation presumptions concerning public policy. As I see it, the usefulness of the generalized approach ends with the fixing of presumption. I regret that the limits you fix for listening prevent an explanation of why I believe this.

The identification, differentiation, and evaluation of means to an end is extremely difficult in any social situation that we conceive to be a significant problem. It is especially so where the problem is the rightfulness of an act of government which impedes or inhibits verbal expression. Consider the simple case of courtship and the hospital. Value 1—Romance. Value 2—Quiet for hospital patients. Means to romance—the serenade from the sidewalk and the call to trysting place when the nurse sticks her head out of the window. Means to quiet for patients—a city ordinance which, admittedly abridging the freedom of communication, makes it a penal offense to play a banjo, sing joyfully or plaintively, or call out in a loud voice on side walk or street adjacent to hospital grounds.

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[5] In *Saturday Review* for July 7, 1962.

Two central points then, in the evaluation of means to valued ends. First courtship. Maybe the nurse will ordinarily or always not hear the call to romance. If she does hear, the public exposure of her availability may excite a disposition to mayhem which thwarts the swain's visions of fond embrace. Countless are the obstacles which obstruct the path of true love.

This is only one side of the end-means equation. Consider means for achieving Value 2—the quiet which promises rest for patients in hospitals. Maybe patients never hear serenades and yelling from the sidewalk because doctors and nurses make too big a racket. If heard maybe the sound is a reassuring connection with the outside world. Indeed, the behavior which the city fathers sought to frustrate may have therapeutic effects worthy of an appropriation for periodic serenades.

I choose this simple illustration because it presents the elements of decision which confront us in all cases of actual or proposed restraint of speech or press. Always, I am sure, there are differences of belief about what the particular speech or publication is good for—what valued end the speech or publication advances and how surely it advances that end. Always, I am sure, there are differences of belief about what the proposed restraint is good for. Will the law which forbids the address actually keep the message from being broadcast? Will the restraints which are imposed neatly excise the evil they are intended to combat, or will they spread their effects to consequences we are unwilling to incur? And so on.

This is only the start of analysis. Are there not other means by which the valued end could be achieved? The swain can make a call on the telephone or send a letter—with flowers. The hospital can be insulated against outside noises. We remove the jury temporarily from society so as to allow communication to proceed unconfined. Perhaps we should adopt the same policy for patients who need hospital care.

Beyond all this lies a complex of questions about what might happen if public officials do not attempt to regulate the speech or press that some people find offensive. Individuals or non-governmental groups may put their own regulations into effect and do greater damage to self-expression and public communication than a thoughtfully drafted legislative act could conceivably do.

Running throughout these imagined events and relationships is a disturbing uncertainty. Not always is the one who evaluates an abridgment of speech or press firmly set in his value position. Rarely, indeed, can he be certain that he estimates accurately the effectiveness of a means to an intended end. Perhaps never can he be wholly confident that he foresees the unintended consequences of an act. Faced with such uncertainties, one man may be loyal to his intellectual processes and do what his analysis recommends; another man, less willing to assume risk, may rush back to the cover of a basic presumption.

It may be that I should have knocked out a few paragraphs of what I have already said, to make room for some comment on the practical use of the analytic scheme I have described. I will say only that it has put in place, for me, some of the formulae which have dominated judicial opinions—clear and present danger, dangerous tendency, gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability. When you spread out in your conception the values which compete for aggrandizement, the complicated pattern of relationships between chosen means and other available means to valued ends, the uncertainties which beset every aspect of your problem—when you spread out all of this in your mind you see better what the familiar judicial formulae are good for and you are alerted to sectors of the social problem which they do not comprehend and put in place. This has been my experience with the particular analytic design which I have inadequately developed for my own use.

You have, in these remarks, one response to Professor Frankfurter's challenge. I have indicated the character of three inquiries which I believe political scientists eminently qualified to undertake. I do not see a more urgent call for our service. A social environment, cordial to self expression and hospitable to sure and easy communication, is essential to the free life we have fixed as our highest goal. But uninhibited self expression and unrestricted communication are not free gifts of nature; they come at a price. I see no more worthy task for this profession than the instruction of lay citizens, judges, and statesmen who must calculate the price and decide how much free speech and free press are worth—when, where, and for whom.

CONSTITUTIONALISM: A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION*

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In the 19th century what was meant by the term "constitution" was reasonably definite and clear. Paradoxically enough, if the word retained some ambiguity, this was because of the British constitution; that is, because the mother country of modern constitutionalism appeared to have an obscure constitution, or even—according to some of the standards that seemed very important elsewhere—no constitution at all.

I

Yet the very term "constitution" has acquired its modern meaning in English, in the course of the evolution of the English legal terminology. The Latin term *constitutio* meant the very opposite of what is now understood by "constitution." A *constitutio* was an enactment; later, after the 2d century, the plural form *constitutiones* came to mean a collection of laws enacted by the Sovereign; and subsequently the Church, too, adopted the term for canonical law. The terms *constitutio* and *constitutiones* were not frequently used, however, by the English medieval glossators (while frequently used, as a synonym for *lex* and *edictum*, by the Italian ones). This explains why, in the course of time, the word constitution became a "vacant term"—*i.e.*, a term available for a new employment—in English (this does not necessarily mean in England), and not in those languages which had retained the Roman legal terminology.

For terminological reasons also, then, we have to refer to an English meaning of the word constitution,[1] although the United Kingdom has a difficult and *sui generis* constitution, deriving from a tortuous sedimentation of common law, acts and conventional usage, partly legal and partly extra-legal, and despite the fact that, when one reads the British constitutional lawyers, one is often reminded of what was said in a review of Stirling's book, *The Secret of Hegel:* "never has a secret been better kept."

For one thing, English constitutional lawyers appear to take a particular pleasure in pointing out to foreign jurists and political thinkers (beginning with Montesquieu) that their understanding of the English system is quite wrong. To be sure, this has been and still is very often the case. But one remains with a feeling that the British find a special gratification in confounding alien scholars: there is an element of polemic coquetry in the emphasis they lay on the principle of the supremacy of Parliament (exhibited as being unlimited, arbitrary, omnipotent, *supra* and *contra legem*, etc.); in the somewhat provocative and bold statement that, according to the American and French meaning of the term, the United Kingdom does not have a constitution,[2] in the point that the British system is based not on the "division" but on the "fusion" of powers;[3] or in the way in which Sir Ivor Jennings puts forward that, "Since Great Britain has no written constitution, there is no special protection for 'fundamental rights'."[4] And one could quote at length.

All these statements are, to be sure, true. But they are "literally true," and one is brought to wonder why the emphasis is laid on the *letter* so much more than on the *spirit* of the law of the constitution. After all, constitutionalism has a prescriptive purpose; whereas English scholars appear more inclined to address themselves to an MP by saying "you could" rather than "you cannot."

Let us take, for instance, the principle of the supremacy of Parliament. Would it be far from the mark to say that if the principle is related to the historical circumstances of its establishment, it hardly carries with it the dangerous implications that British scholars somewhat proudly expound?[5] Parliament, in the English terminology, means the King, the Lords and the Commons acting together as the supreme governing body of the realm. Thus, if the principle of the supremacy of Parliament is translated into continental terminology, it amounts to what is otherwise called the "sovereignty of the State." Historically speaking, moreover, the principle of the supremacy of Parliament is the counterpart of the principle of the supremacy of the Crown, and what it really meant when it was affirmed was that the King had no power *outside* of Parliament, that his prerogatives could only be exercised according to the formula of the King *in* Parliament. If this be so, would it be very wrong to conclude, despite the contrary opinion of British scholars, that parliamentary sovereignty in England actually contradicts the idea of a "higher law" no more than any flexible constitution does, and that the conventions of the constitution hardly allow a parliamentary majority to pass *any* law whatever?[6] (The point being the "any." Let us remember that the difference between accepted political behavior and wicked Machiavellian politics is rendered by the difference between the sentence, "The end justifies the means," and "The end justifies *any* mean.")

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[1] Despite Jellinek's contrary opinion. According to Jellinek, "constitution" derives from the Latin phrase *rem publicam constituere. Cf. Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1914, 3d ed.), vol. III, ch. iv. However, no historical continuity appears to exist between *constituere* and "constitution" (see *infra* notes 21, 25), and this derivation is bound to give us a misleading start.

[2] *Cf., e.g.,* K. C. Wheare, *Modern Constitutions* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 21.

[3] *Cf., e.g.,* W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution,* ch. ii.

[4] *The Law and the Constitution,* 5th ed. (London, University of London Press, 1959), p. 40.

[5] Bagehot is no exception when he asserts that "a new House of Commons can *despotically* . . . resolve" [my italics]. *Op. cit.,* ch. vii.

Probably I shall be told that I am wrong. However, as I was trying recently to sort out the juridical features of present-day dictatorial systems, it occurred to me that some English constitutional textbooks would be of great help. "No higher law and limitless legislative power," "fusion of powers," "no special protection for fundamental rights," etc.—all these principles applied very nicely to dictatorships. What is more, the very definition given in Wheare's textbook, "The British constitution is the collection of legal rules and nonlegal rules which govern the government in Britain,"[7] appeared to be—but for the terms, "British" and "Britain"—the most fitted to describe dictatorial constitutions. (For "rules" applies to any kind of rule—including the rule of rulership—and the specification "non-legal rules" just gives the final touch of perfection to the concept of unchecked, uncontrolled and absolute exercise of power.) I have not made the experiment the other way around, that is, using the apologetic writings on dictatorial constitutions in order to get highlights on the virtues of the English one: but my guess is that, again changing but one word (the geographic referent), the English constitution would come out in brighter colors following this procedure than it appears, *e.g.*, to the reader of Jennings' *The Law and the Constitution.*[8]

So, I may well be wrong. But something must be wrong too in the way in which many English scholars understate their constitution, seem to make a particular point of not being helpful, and leave the alien reader with the feeling that the British constitution really amounts to the fact that, in the final analysis, the British people are clever and fine people who know how to go about in politics. I am personally convinced of this. But allow me to repeat that this conclusion is not very helpful.

I have drawn attention to the British habit (and perhaps coquetry) of understatement, for unless this element is taken into account, one is likely to miss some important points. To begin with, this point: that, despite the English "mystery," in the 19th century, all over Europe as well as in the United States, a general agreement prevailed as to the basic meaning of the term "constitution." In 1830, and especially during the 1848 revolutions, it was very clear on both sides of the Channel what the people were asking for when they claimed a constitution.[9] If, in England, "constitution" meant the system of British liberties, *mutatis mutandis* the Europeans wanted exactly the same thing: a system of protected freedom for the individual, which—according to the American usage of the English vocabulary—they called a "constitutional system." Having to start from naught, people on the Continent (as was first achieved by the Americans) wanted a written document, a charter, which would firmly establish the overall supreme law of the land. The British too, however, had, from time to time, relied on particularly solemn written documents: the Magna Charta, the Confirmation Acts, the 1610–1628 Petition of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, etc. The circumstance that these British "supreme laws" are not collected in a single document does not really mean that England has an unwritten constitution. I would rather say that the English do not have a codified constitution, *i.e.*, that Britain has a constitution which is written only in part (or, even better, unwritten to a much greater extent than "written" constitutions are), in a piecemeal fashion, and scattered in a variety of sources.

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[6] This is to deny that there is a substantial difference between the British and the Continental principle of parliamentary sovereignty. If the term of reference is the American Congress then, of course, there is a good deal of difference.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

[8] A comparison between Jennings' classic text and Vishinsky's *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1951), would be to the point. According to Vishinsky, Stalin's Constitution draws "ever broader masses of the people into the government of the State," constantly strengthens "the bonds between the apparatus of authority and the people"; and Soviet constitutions in general "confirm genuinely democratic rights and freedoms," "establish and emphasize material guarantees," etc. (pp. 88–89).

[9] In 1860, the formula for the Italian plebiscites said only: "Do you want to enter the constitutional monarchy of King Victor Emanuel II?" Evidently, the mere adjective "constitutional" was assumed to be understood as implying all the difference.

However that may be, and if it pleases the British to emphasize the fact that they have a constitution which is not written, this question is of secondary importance. I mean that the written, complete document is only a means. What really matters is the end, the *telos*. And the purpose, the *telos*, of English, American and European constitutionalism was, from the outset, identical. If the English vocabulary had not to this day refused to import the word (another paradox!), this common purpose could be expressed and synthesized by just one word: the French (and Italian) term *garantisme.*[10] In other terms, all over the Western area people requested, or cherished, "the constitution," because this term meant to them a fundamental law, or a fundamental set of principles, and a correlative institutional arrangement, which would restrict arbitrary power and ensure a "limited government." And during the whole of the 19th century and until World War I, "constitutions" remained, in the United States, in England, and in Europe, different means (technically speaking) which had nevertheless the same common purpose in view. That is, for almost 150 years "constitution" has been —on the whole—an unambiguous term.

II

In the 20th century, in the few decades following the first World War, this situation of over-all basic agreement has come to an end rapidly and radically. So rapidly and so radically that one must wonder why. The main reason (or, we might say, the specific agent of change) has been, I believe, the following: that legal terminology—to the extent that it affects what Rousseau would have called *droit politique,* political right—shares the same destiny as political terminology in general: that is, it tends to be abused and corrupted. And this is all the more the case in a time in which politicians have become ever more conscious of the "power of words."

In our minds, constitution is a "good word." It has favorable emotive properties, like freedom, justice or democracy. Therefore, the word is retained, or adopted, even when the association between the utterance "constitution" and the behavioral response that it elicits (*e.g.*, "The constitution must be praised, for it protects my liberties") becomes entirely baseless. More precisely, the political exploitation and manipulation of language takes advantage of the fact that the emotive properties of a word survive—at times for a surprisingly long time—despite the fact that what the word denotes, *i.e.*, the "thing," comes to be a completely different thing.[11]

To be sure, the agent of change has not only been insincerity and the political debasement of language. For technical reasons of their own, jurists too have been gradually covering up the *garantiste* feature of "constitution." This technicojuridical explanation cannot be pushed too far, however. It is quite true that Continental constitutional lawyers have never been at ease when confronted with the problem of putting forward the "strictly juridical" point of view. On the other hand, the fact remains that, more or less until the 1920's, they managed to combine the requirements of "pure law" with the *telos* of constitutionalism. If one reads, for instance, the *Leçons* of a representative figure of the pre-1848 period, Pellegrino Rossi,[12] one finds both the statement that "every State has a constitution" (*ex hypothesis*), and the statement that "a constitution is the law of the free countries." Let us face it: the two statements are not consistent. Nevertheless they introduce and represent an approach which received wide acceptance in the European juridical literature for almost a century. It is interesting to realize, therefore, why the Continental constitutional lawyers took this approach, and how they found a way of giving consistency to an inconsistency.

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[10] Of course the query, "What do the guarantees include?" (*e.g.*, a certain technique of allocation of power, a bill of rights, the rule of law, judicial review, etc.) receives different, complex and changing answers. This is all the more reason for adopting a general term, reminding us both of the goal, and particularly of the fact that unless we think that *somebody needs protection against somebody else*, there is no point in being concerned with constitutionalism.

[11] The extent to which political terminology is subject to this kind of abuse can be exemplified by the very term "politics." In the Middle Ages the expression *dominium politicum* meant (in contrast to *dominium regale*) government deriving from, or given consent by, the people (*i.e.*, by the *polites*, the inhabitant of the *polis*). That is to say that *politicum*, or *police* (in French), was coined—having reference to the Greek root—as a good word. Nowadays this originally pleasant word denotes the most unpleasant reality of politics: those who are entitled to arrest us. Let us hope that "constitution" may not have a similar destiny.

[12] Pellegrino Rossi (1787–1848) was professor of law in Bologna in 1814, the framer of the

Descriptively speaking, and having reference, *e.g.*, to the terminology of the Constitution of Pennsylvania of September 28, 1776, a constitution contains two basic elements: a "plan (or frame) of government," and a "bill of rights." For the framers of the 18th century charters it was self-evident that the two component parts could not be separated: both were needed for a constitution to be a constitution. They did not mean in the least that *any* plan of government amounted to a constitution: they meant that this was the case only when a frame of government provided for a bill of rights and the institutional devices that would secure its observance. Continental jurists, however, were anxious to put their rationalistically trained juridical consciences at ease by finding a "universal" definition of constitution. And for this purpose they found it expedient to separate the universal trait (the "plan of government" meaning) from the *garantiste* component. Therefore, often enough, they did come to say—*qua* pure jurists—that any "frame of government" amounted to a constitution. They said it, but—let me stress this point—they immediately denied it. For they went on to say that "it had become customary"[13] to use the term constitution in a more specific *garantiste* sense; and therefore that, according to this practice, it was improper to hold that every state was a constitutional state. *Every* state had a "constitution," but only *some* states were "constitutional."

Unquestionably, the distinction is very thin; and moreover it is hard to explain why the phrase, "It has become customary," should have been accepted by jurists as a juridical argument. The interesting fact is therefore that they did accept it. And they accepted it—among other reasons—because they fully realized that their "universal" definition had no denotative value: it indicated *everything*, not *something*. Thus, generation after generation, European public law went ahead riding simultaneously two horses: the constitution as any "State order," and constitutionalism as a specific "content" of guarantees.

It was an uneasy equilibrium, I grant. It made them vulnerable, exposed. But one can have an Achilles heel and nevertheless survive. So, despite this weakness, I believe my former assertions still hold good, namely: (i) that for almost 150 years "constitution" has been associated with *garantisme;* and (ii) that the primary agent of change cannot be located in the inner logic of development of the European juristic tradition. Continental constitutional lawyers were hardly in a position to resist change; but they did not start the change. What started the new trend was the impact of the political atmosphere of the 1920's. For a new look about politics was taking shape in those years. "Feeble politics," so to speak, was giving way to "intense politics"; that is, the peaceful-legalitarian approach to political relationships was giving way to a warlike view of politics.

I have said "political atmosphere." It is fair to add that in some countries it was not only a question of atmosphere. In Italy, and in the 1930's in Germany, jurists were somehow compelled to adopt a merely formal, "organizational," neutral definition of constitution. This is not surprising, and Italian and German constitutional lawyers can hardly be blamed for this. What is surprising is that in the meantime the British, too, had come to adopt very much the same position.

Let me refer again to Wheare's definition, according to which the English constitution is "the collection of legal rules and non-legal rules which govern the government in Britain." Or allow me to quote, as another instance, Jennings' definition, according to which a constitution is "the document in which are set out the rules governing the composition, powers and methods of operation of the main institutions of government."[14] The peculiar feature of these definitions is not only the unspecified use of the term rule (even games have "rules": are they the same kind of rules?), but the silence which covers the *telos* of constitutionalism. Actually they are purely "formal" definitions, in the sense that they can be filled with any content whatever. We are thus faced,

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1832 project of reform of the Swiss constitution, and subsequently a celebrated professor of constitutional law at the *Collège de France* in Paris.

[13] The wording varies, but this was, in substance, the invariable gist of their argument.

[14] Or, where no such document exists, simply "the rules determining the creation and operation of governmental institutions." *The Law and the Constitution*, pp. 33, 36.

nowadays, with this puzzling situation: that the very inventors of the constitutional solution provide us with a definition which amounts to saying that any instrument of government, any "traffic rule," is a constitution. And this according to the most authoritative yardstick. It is not astonishing, therefore, if the Continental theory of constitutionalism has shown, since World War II, very little evidence of recovery. For whenever somebody claims that "constitutional dictatorships" have proved that *garantisme* remains the core of constitutionalism, one is likely to be confronted with this reply: why should we be concerned with this problem more than the English?

My reply is—and this is the second point that I wish to stress, having reference to the English habit of understatement—that one must be very careful about importing the British constitutional textbooks. They have not been written for export. They have been written for a happy people whose constitutional system is liable to work nicely anyhow. If the alien scholar does not make explicit what often remains implicit, and does not say what is often left unsaid, the British case easily lends itself to bearing false witness.[15] Of course, English liberties remain protected even if English constitutionalists forget to mention that this is why Britain has a constitution. But the case might be very different elsewhere.

III

The foregoing *mise au point* has a bearing on what will follow, but it certainly does not alter the fact that nowadays "constitution" has become an ambiguous term, covering two very different meanings: a strict, substantive meaning (the *garantiste* meaning), and a formal, cosmic meaning. It follows from this that whereas in the 19th century a question such as, "What is the role of a constitution in a political system?", could be answered without asking first, "What is a constitution?", this is no longer the case.

It is equally clear—at least to me—that if a constitution is defined as "any way of giving form to any State whatever," then the question "What is the role of a constitution in a political system?" either cannot be answered, or can be answered only country by country, and even then in a very uninteresting and banal way. For in this case the answer is that the constitution plays no role, properly speaking: It is only a shorthand report which may describe—assuming that the constitution in question is applied—the formalization of the power structure of the given country. (This is not to deny that the conclusion, "The constitution plays no role," may not be reached also after applying the standards of the *garantiste* type of constitution. I am simply pointing out that the query is relevant only if we consider the constitutions which are supposed to play a role.)

On both accounts, then, we have to make up our minds and to look for a convincing answer to the question, "What is a constitution?".

In the first place, we may say: "This is what I understand when I use this term." This kind of answer, however, leaves untouched a very basic point, namely: What is the truth-value of this definition? Is it only a "stipulative definition"?

Therefore, and in the second place, we may also find it necessary to say: "The term constitution *ought* to be used in this way."

In the third place, we may have recourse to a classification. We may say: given the fact that we are now using the term constitution in very different meanings and to cover altogether different referents, then let us speak specifically of this and that type of constitution.

These three lines of approach are not mutually exclusive. The contrary is true. But in most cases political scientists either follow solution number one, or solution number three, or both. At any rate, they usually bypass step number two, that is, they usually refrain from saying that the term constitution *ought* to mean this and not that. I wonder, however, whether the "ought" can really be avoided.

When general agreement prevails—as was the case with "constitution" in the 19th century—"ought-propositions" (if I may call them so) are superfluous. In this case one need not discuss whether a definition of "constitution" is merely a private convention of the stipulator (*i.e.*, a stipulative definition), or a lexical kind of definition,[16] or something more, *i.e.*, a definition having warranted truth-value. Agreement automatically settles all these problems. But we live in a world—let me stress—

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[15] Or else to bear no witness. Thus in F. A. Hayek's *The Constitution of Liberty* (London, Routledge, 1960), the 12th chapter bears the title: "The American Contribution: Constitutionalism." To be sure, Americans have made an outstanding contribution to constitutionalism. But to say more than this is saying too much, even though Hayek's conclusion is hardly surprising if one is not cautioned against the British mood of understatement.

[16] See R. Robinson, *Definition* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 35–92. For an application of these criteria, see M. Cranston, *Freedom—A New Analysis* (London, 1953).

of terminological cleavage in which the "war of words" plays a very important role. Our first reaction has therefore been to make some fine distinctions (*e.g.*, the one between stipulative and lexicographic definitions), and to have recourse to a classification of the various meanings and referents of the word constitution.

On second thought, however, one is bound to discover that the stipulative approach is only a fire escape (and an unsafe one at that) which actually helps the fire to grow, and that classifications cannot, *per se*, solve our problems either. Classifications are only *prima facie* a neutral device. Classifications have a purpose in view, and differ according to their purpose. Therefore, classifications cannot replace definitions. They follow a definition of constitution, and imply that we have previously taken a stand *vis-à-vis* its nuclear meaning, so to speak. And this stand cannot be provided by the stipulative approach.

According to this approach, the speaker says: I propose to use the term constitution in this sense, and this is *my* definition of it. The emphasis is laid on the "my," for stipulations are an arbitrary choice. As Richard Robinson asserts in his valuable book "In stipulation we freely make any word mean anything we choose."[17] This is hardly a way out, however. Let us assume, for instance, that one meets with the following definition: a constitution is the will of the sovereign. In some cases one could hardly object that this definition is factually false. According both to the *Führerprinzip* and to actual practice, it would be quite realistic to say that during Hitler's decade the German constitution amounted to the will of the *Führer*. And Stalin's constitution can well be resumed in similar terms. As these extreme but very relevant examples go to show, if one wishes to retort that Hitler's or Stalin's regime was not a constitutional regime, this cannot be done on the ground that the sentence, "The Soviet constitution was the arbitrary will of Stalin," is factually false, but on the ground that one does not accept the meaning "will of the sovereign" as a permissible meaning of constitution: *i.e.*, because one refuses the definition.

Yet, if definitions are just arbitrary and private stipulations of each speaker, on what grounds may one discuss the definitions of constitution which differ from his own stipulation? Clearly, one can write a book of 500 pages to show that Hitler's or Stalin's so-called constitution amounted to a non-constitutional system; anybody can simply dismiss it by saying: This is your stipulation, but I have mine, and that is that. How easy, and how convenient!

I cannot develop here the criticism of the conventional approach.[18] In my view definitions are not private conventions of each speaker, but (whenever they have a historical referent) storehouses of past experience shaped by former practice. We bring them up to date, but their ultimate truth-value lies in the fact that they tell us how to behave *as experienced people* in matters regarding which each generation starts by having no experience. And this is precisely the reason why we are not condemned to a solipsistic conventionalism, and why we are entitled to discuss and to look for a "true definition" (touching on a basic meaning, of course) of equality, of liberty, of law, of constitution, etc. In particular, *the* definition of constitution which has objective worth is the one that appears to be the outcome of a long and painstaking process of trial-and-error concerned with the question: How can we be governed without being oppressed?

Implicitly I have already indicated why I attach a great importance to whether the sentence "This is the meaning of the term constitution" has a normative undertone or not. For if the speaker takes the view that his definition cannot be phrased as a normative proposition—*i.e.*, in the form, "This is also what 'constitution' ought to mean"—then, no matter how unwittingly, he is surrendering to the stipulative and conventionalistic approach.

To be sure, one may not be concerned with long-range consequences of this kind. Nevertheless, we must decide here and now the test, or the criteria, according to which we declare: This is the meaning given in this text to the word constitution. Now, are we going to ascertain what "constitution" means in the 20th century by asking the Russians, the Chinese, the Egyptians, and so forth, or by inquiring what the Italians and the Germans were taught to believe a constitutional system to be under Mussolini and Hitler? If so, then I grant that there is no "ought" about it. But otherwise (that is, if we do not believe that knowledge follows a majority principle), then the "ought" is inevitably there—no matter whether openly or not—for surely we are not speaking of what "constitution" actually means to all the people of the world in the 20th century, but of a correct meaning which we find advisable to propose for future observance.

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[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

[18] For my views on the truth-value of definitions, see G. Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit, Wayne Univ. Press, 1962), ch. 10.

I am acquainted with the sophisticated methodological reasons that are being brought forward to explain why the form "ought" should be expelled from the realm of science, and in particular of political science. Yet, my guess is that future historians will find a much simpler explanation for our "ought complexes." They will say that we have been unable to meet the challenge of the environment; and rightly so, I believe. For since the beginning of time the people entrusted with the development of learning have followed this very simple rule: to use the form "is" when they agreed with general usage, and the form "ought" when they did not. Yet now we refrain from saying "This is what the term constitution *ought* to mean," even though we are well aware of the fact that "constitution" no longer bears a common acceptance and even though we are in a good position to realize that a situation of ambiguity and confusion is being deliberately fostered by political double-talk and insincerity, with the precise purpose of deceiving the audience.

Let there be no misunderstanding. I am not advocating a behavioral "ought," but a terminological and logical "ought."[19] The meaning of "constitution" is neither an arbitrary stipulation, nor something to be discovered in the "popular mind" of semi-literate majorities. At least, if we believe that rational discourse and an intelligible vocabulary are to be maintained, then the meaning of "constitution" has been decided by historical testing, and has to be ascertained by adequate information and sound thinking. And if these criteria bring us to a definition which no longer receives common acceptance, then it is not only right but necessary to say: This is what the term constitution *ought* to mean (for otherwise it is meaningless, or superfluous, or deceiving, or whatever). This does not imply that people are being requested to respond favorably to a certain pattern of constitution defined as the "true constitution." I am only saying that terminological clarity is a basic requirement for any science, and that political scientists in particular have to take stock of the fact that the vocabulary of politics tends to be used for the purpose of beguiling the listener. I am not advocating, therefore, the preferability of one type of constitutional *telos* in relation to another. I am simply saying that it is a scientific requirement to discuss whether it is proper to use "constitution" where, in order that the public (and even, at times, the expert) be not deceived, we should *not* use this term.

IV

The objection will be that even if we reject the stipulative approach, even then "constitution" is, by its own constitution, an ambiguous term.[20] That is, even if one agrees that constitutions have been shaped by historical experience in order to protect the freedom and the rights of the power addressees, the fact nonetheless remains that constitution has always been a Janus-faced concept, hovering as it were between the idea of "political order" on the one hand and of "limit" on the other. I would however disagree with this statement.

The history of the word in its modern meaning only begins in the 18th century.[21] Let us not confuse the noun with the concept, or, we might say, the Latin *constitutio* with our "constitution," a homonymy with a homology. In its present-day conceptualization, "constitution" only emerges, perhaps, with Bolingbroke,[22] and the term really gained ground and acquired a definite connotation only in America during the years 1776–1787. (The French did not receive it directly from England, but from the Philadelphia Convention. This is not surprising for it was Paine, not Burke and the English writers in general, who gave the first explicit, complete account of the modern concept.[23])

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[19] The form "ought" is not necessarily related to ethical imperatives.

[20] I am no longer referring to the strictly juridical approach mentioned previously, but to the overall issue of constitutionalism as discussed in the history of political thought and in philosophy of law.

[21] Cicero's use, in *De Republica*, I, 45, 69, was quite casual, and left no trace in the following literature. Actually, this much-quoted Roman precedent cannot claim precedent status. This is so true that the 15th and 16th century commentators rendered Cicero's *constitutio* with the terms *status publicus* (Jean de Terre Rouge), *status Reipublicae* (Bodin), or *politicum* (Fortescue), *police* (Seyssell).

[22] I say "perhaps" on account of McIlwain's reservation: "Bolingbroke in fact is only restating views as old as the *Politicus* of Plato. . . . " *Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1947), p. 3.

[23] On Paine see esp. C. H. McIlwain, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–10. In Burke "constitution" was used much more loosely as a synonym for "commonwealth" (*Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents*), for "engagement and pact of society" (*Reflections*), for "frame" and "pattern" (*Speech on Reform*); all in all, it meant the substantive principles deriving from the British political tradition

Now, it is undeniable that the whole of the American tradition has understood "constitution" as a means for "limited government." The same is true, from the outset, for French constitutionalism (should one be reminded of article 16 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789? Or, for the following period, of Benjamin Constant?). And I have previously explained at length why I firmly hold—despite the possibility of exhibiting numberless quotations to the contrary effect—that English constitutionalism belongs entirely to the same tradition: the British advocate, and have advocated from the time of Glanville and Bracton, an "unlimited government" just as much, or, rather, just as little as the Americans.[24]

It is not unsafe to conclude, therefore, that, with the decline of the age of Absolutism, people began to cast about for a word which would denote the techniques to be used for controlling the exercise of State power. This term turned out to be (Americans decided this issue) "constitution."[25] And "constitution" was in no way born as a Janus-faced concept. The term was re-conceived, adopted and cherished not because it merely meant "political order," but because it meant much more, because it meant "political freedom." We may put it thus: because it denoted *the* distinctive political order which would protect their liberties; or—to paraphrase Friedrich's felicitous wording—because it not only "gave form" but also because it "limited" governmental action.[26]

The idea that this specific, *garantiste*, meaning derives from a pre-existing wide, unspecified meaning, is an optical illusion, which has been suggested—I believe—by the commentators and translators of Aristotle. As is well known, Aristotle's term was *politeía*, and, surely, *politeía* is difficult to translate. So occasionally, the authors having Plato's and especially Aristotle's writings in mind, found it expedient to render it by the term constitution. This, however, happened only occasionally (the relevant example is Montesquieu)[27] until the time when "constitution" acquired a specific meaning. It was only at this stage that "constitution" came to be used consistently as the proper equivalent of *politeía*. Wrongly, to be sure. For *politeía* only conveys the idea of the way in which a polity is patterned. And if Aristotle meant by *politeía* the ethico-political system as a whole, we cannot infer from this that "constitution" has in Aristotle a loose meaning. The only correct conclusion is that Aristotle has been mistranslated. For to us "constitution" means—a frame of political society, *organized through and by the law*, for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power. And surely nothing resembling this concept was in the mind of Aristotle.[28]

V

Having established the frame of reference (the historically valid "nuclear meaning" of constitution), we may now turn to the problem of how we should go about classifying the variety of present-day so-called constitutions. I shall deal swiftly with this problem, for I

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and to be inferred from the working of the institutions.

[24] *Cf., e.g.,* Burke: "In [our] Constitution . . . I feel both that I am free, and that I am not free dangerously to myself and to others. I know that no power on earth, acting as I ought to do, can touch my life, my liberty, my own property" (*Speech on Reform of Representation.*) Let it be noted that, according to the letter of the constitution, in 1782 the doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament was already established. Was Burke wrong, then? Or should we not question, instead, the validity—for a constitution largely based on *conventions*—of the "literal" approach?

[25] In this connection, recall that in the years of the Commonwealth and the Protectorate (1649–1660) the English made several attempts to establish a written constitution. However, they never called these documents "constitution": they made recourse to terms such as covenant, instrument, agreement, model, paramount or fundamental law.

[26] Carl J. Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective* (University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 220.

[27] In the famous ch. 6, Book XI of the *Esprit des Lois* the term *constitution* appears only in the title.

[28] I grant that there are a few passages in Aristotle's *Politics* in which the term *politeía* specifically refers to the way in which the *polis* magistracies are ordained. *Cf., e.g.,* 1278 b. However, this meaning appears in passing, and it cannot be denied, I believe, that (*i*) the ethico-political all-embracing meaning of *politeía* is by far the prevalent one, and, on the other hand, (*ii*) the term never appears in Aristotle in our juridical meaning, that is, in the sense of being an institutionalized way of controlling the dynamics of political freedom. Actually, I find it quite absurd to speak of a Greek "constitutionalism." Only the Romans indirectly tackled the problem, and only from the "rule of law" angle (as Jhering and Bryce have remarked), that is, very much in the same way in which—according to Dicey—the principles of the English constitution are inductions and generalizations resulting from judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons.

agree very much (in substance, even though not in terminology) with the threefold classification suggested by Loewenstein.[29]

Basically we are confronted with three possibilities: (i) *garantiste* constitution (constitution, proper); (ii) nominal constitution; (iii) façade constitution (or fake constitution).

I call "nominal" the constitutions that Loewenstein labels "semantic" (a difficult, and perhaps not quite appropriate labelling). Apart from this semantic divergency, I entirely underwrite his description of the specimen: "The constitution is fully applied and activated, but its ontological reality is nothing but the formalization of the existing location of political power for the exclusive benefit of the actual power holders" (p. 149). Nominal constitutions are therefore "nominal" in the very simple sense that they bear the "name" constitution. This amounts to saying that nominal constitutions are merely organizational constitutions, *i.e.*, the collection of rules which organize but do not restrain the exercise of political power in a given polity.[30] Actually, nominal constitutions do not really pretend to be "real constitutions." They frankly describe a system of limitless, unchecked power. They are not a dead letter. It is only that this letter is irrelevant to the *telos* of constitutionalism.

The façade constitutions are different from the nominal ones in that they take the appearance of "true constitutions." What makes them untrue is that they are disregarded (at least in their essential *garantiste* features). Actually they are "trap-constitutions." As far as the techniques of liberty and the rights of the power addressees are concerned, they are a dead letter.

I suppose that the labeling "façade constitution" will be criticized on the ground that it implicitly rules out the possibility of an educational purpose. But I do not think that a fake constitution has an educational *purpose*. It *may* turn out that it has an educational *effect*. But this is a very different matter. We are not historians dealing with past events and looking for their *a posteriori* justification. We are concerned with actual will and actual doings. And to credit with an "educational role" the instances that make forecasts all the more dubious (as in the case when we are confronted with discretional power) is very much like toying with wishful thinking. Moreover, and in point of principle, education is not the purpose of constitutions. I mean, this is not a sufficient (or sufficiently pertinent) criterion for singling out a special class of "educational constitutions."[31] A constitution may contain, to be sure, statements of "aspiration," and thereby provide "incentives," even pedagogic incentives. However, this occurrence does not indicate an essential constitutional feature; it merely indicates a possible content of any type of constitution.

There is often a considerable overlapping between nominal and façade constitutions. The distinction is nevertheless basic, for the two cases are indeed very different. Nominal constitutions actually describe the working of the political system (they do not abide by the *telos* of constitutionalism, but they are sincere reports), while the façade constitutions give us no reliable information about the real governmental process. In most cases one can clearly perceive, despite the overlaps, which is the prevalent aspect: I mean, whether a constitution is basically nominal or basically a disguise. At any rate, or otherwise, the distinction is serviceable for analytical purposes, that is, for dissecting the component parts of a "mixed type" (partly nominal and partly fake) of pseudo-constitution.

The distinction is serviceable from another point of view as well, for it goes to show that if we refuse the *garantiste* qualification, then no line can be drawn between "constitution" and "constitutional government." To be sure, if a constitution is not applied, this is an instance of constitution without constitutional government. But this argument applies only to the façade constitutions. What about the other possibility? In the case of nominal constitutions we no longer have a "prerogative state" that replaces *de facto* the "legal state"; we have instead a prerogative state legitimized by the constitution. In this latter case, then, we are confronted with a government which, by definition, will always govern according to the constitution. On what grounds may we maintain that this is not a "constitutional government"? Certainly not on the grounds of logical syntax. Therefore, either we adhere to *garantisme*, or the distinction between constitution and constitutional government really becomes meaningless.

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[29] *Cf.* Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), esp. pp. 147 ff.

[30] It is often held that the mere ordering, the mere existence of a definite and stable "form," is in itself a "limit." This may well be—but not a *garantiste* kind of limit. Armies are usually well ordered, but this fact does not necessarily protect subordinates *vis-à-vis* their superiors.

[31] Car accidents may serve the purpose of improving our driving. Would this be a reason for creating the category "educational accidents"?

Some troublesome problems arise when one focusses further attention on: (i) the *décalage* between the written and the living constitution, and on (ii) the frequent disregard of some of the constitutional provisions. In this connection the point can be made that a clear-cut distinction between real constitutions and façade constitutions is hardly realistic, since the real ones too come to differ widely, in practice, from their original formalization, or may not be fully activated (the former being usually the case with old constitutions, and the latter with recent ones).

Personally I am not dismayed by the first indictment. If a constitution is written, then, with the passing of time, the formal document and the living constitution inevitably come to be related much as the past is related to the present. (In this sense, then, written constitutions too become, in part, non-written.) However, as long as the spirit and the *telos* of the original document are maintained in the new circumstances, the *décalage* only affects the myth of a "fixed constitution"; and the American experience goes to show, if anything, that written constitutions can endure despite the anti-historical assumption upon which they have been conceived.

On the other hand, the remedy for this could hardly be found in a non-written constitution. The drawbacks and the dangers of this solution are so serious, that only the British can afford the luxury of not formalizing their constitution. And it remains questionable whether it is really true that the British constitution is unwritten. (I would be tempted to say that it is "written differently.")

The thorny point is instead the non-fulfillment of constitutional provisions not because of the time factor, because they have gradually become outdated, but with reference to norms that have never been activated owing to the unwillingness of the executive or of the legislative body to give them life. This problem cannot be dismissed lightly, if we consider that "delinquencies in the application" of the constitution (as Loewenstein calls them) are rather frequent in most countries. It is safe to ask: "Why?". Is it because the constitutional spirit (as well as the corresponding type of the constitutional gentleman) is withering away? Or is it because of other reasons?

It is well to remind ourselves that most countries have a recent constitution, either because they have re-written their previous charters, or because they have started anew. And contemporary constitutions are, as a rule, bad constitutions—technically speaking.[32] They have come to include unrealistic promises and glamorous professions of faith on the one hand, and numberless frivolous details on the other. Some of them are by now so "democratic" that either they are no longer constitutions (for a constitution limits the "will of the people" concept of democracy just as much as it limits the will of the power holders),[33] or they make the working of the machinery of government too cumbersome for government to work, or both. Under these conditions, non-application may well be a remedy for inapplicability. I mean by this that it may also serve the purpose of saving the constitutional system as a working system.

So we should not react dramatically in all cases, but only in those in which the disregard actually has a direct bearing on the withering away of the constitutional *telos*. This implies that we can no longer partake, in all instances, of the strict juristic view that "*all* the Constitution *must* be applied at whatever cost." Personally speaking at least, I take the view that we should always ascertain whether the non-application affects the machinery of government in its *garantiste* aspect and the basic purposes of constitutionalism, or not. In the former case it is proper to speak of "delinquencies"; in the latter I confess that I remain quite indifferent. And if we follow this rule of thumb, the difference between "real constitutions" and "façade constitutions" remains very firm, despite the fact that even in the context of the real constitutions a number of provisions may not be activated.

VI

Summing up my line of argument, I have tentatively submitted the following theses:

(1) That the word constitution has been re-conceptualized, if I may say so, for a specific purpose, and more precisely to denote a distinctive and unprecedented "technique of liberty" (as Mirkine-Guetzévitch would have said), the

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[32] Contemporary constitutions are being said to improve on the former ones in that they are no longer "negative" but "positive." If positive means that they are also an instrument for social and economic policy then let us be happy with this positive development. Under one condition, however: that the follow-up, *i.e.*, the "economic" tail, should not eat the "political" head.

[33] Among other reasons, because a constitution cannot effectively limit the will of the power holders if they can outflank constitutional impediments by making direct appeals to the will of the people.

features of which had already materialized clearly enough when, for instance, Montesquieu was visiting England in 1730.

(2) That this purpose has often been obscured by the complexity of the original model (the English constitution) on the one hand, and by a somewhat polemic isolationism of the British scholars on the other hand. Despite these unfortunate circumstances, however, the fact remains that the idea of limit is basic to the English prototype just as much as to the American and the French subsequent models.

(3) That the view that the *garantiste* meaning of "constitution" was preceded by a loose, formal meaning lacks historical proof, for this view actually goes back to a mistranslation, or to a casual way of referring to Aristotle's term *politeía*.

(4) That the equivalence "constitution = any state form" is therefore not the older but indeed a recent loosening up of the concept, reflecting either the juridic illusion of attaining a "purified," universal depoliticized right, or reflecting the purpose of exploiting the word constitution as a trap word.

(5) That on both accounts it should be pointed out that either the term is used in its specific *garantiste* meaning, or it is a meaningless (and deceiving) duplicate of terms such as organization, structure, form, pattern, political system, and the like.

(6) That, according to this view, the variety of so-called "constitutions" of our time may be classified in three categories: real, nominal and facade.

(7) That the existence of nominal constitutions implies that either we abide by *garantisme*, or we can no longer draw a line between "constitution" and "constitutional government."

(8) That the political scientist, in particular, is responsible for ruling out insincere language, for two reasons: the general reason being that the language of the observer is required to improve (whenever necessary) the language of the observed; while the specific reason is that terminological housecleaning is all the more necessary whenever the political scientist is confronted with terminological distortions that are deliberately fostered with a view to deceiving the audience.

Speaking of political scientists, a final question should perhaps be raised, namely: why should we, *qua* political scientists, be concerned with the constitutional problem?

Actually, constitutionalism is not a traditional subject matter of political science. To the extent that political scientists have been concerned with it, they have either leaned on a previous legal training of the individual scholar, or they have shown a tendency to underplay the role and importance of constitutional checks as compared with social and political pluralistic checks.[34] In the first case it could be said that their treatment of the topic constitutionalism belongs to the "old" political science. In the second case it can be shown, I believe, that the "new" political science is hardly equipped to discuss the problem at all. For one thing, political science is keen about informal processes, not about formal structures. In particular, the new generation of political scientists distrusts concepts having a high degree of abstraction (such as State), concentrates very much on elementary grass roots units (such as groups), and has developed a keen feeling for dynamics, for change, for "something doing," to use Bentley's telling expression. Now, clearly, from this platform constitutions appear to be: (i) the juridical counterpart and support of the abstract entity, "the State"; (ii) certainly not the "raw material" of politics; and (iii) the expression *par excellence* of a typically static view of the political process. (The foregoing are, of course, very broad and very rough generalizations.)

If these underlying premises are duly weighed, the present-day mood of skepticism toward the efficacy of constitutional devices and mechanisms was only to be expected. However, where is the error? In the purview of the observer, or in the constitutional solution? All in all, my feeling is that contemporary political science has not found, as yet, the strategic juncture in which and from which it can make a positive contribution to the understanding of constitutionalism. My own tentative suggestion is that, perhaps, this strategic point is to be found in the "role theory" approach,[35] that is, by examining the constitutional solution as a pre-ordained, binding technique of *role-enforcement* (in its difference from a spontaneous role-taking.)

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[34] This is not to deny that pluralism is a requisite condition for the proper working of constitutional systems. My own view, however, is that the relationship between societal pluralism and constitutional patterns of behavior is a two-way relationship, at least in the sense that it is very important, for pluralism, to have the constitution on its side.

[35] I have in mind, *e.g.*, the approach devised by Heinz Eulau and associates in a related subject. *Cf.* Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, *The Legislative System—Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York, 1962).

Within the limits of a preliminary perusal, I cannot push the argument further. I leave it as an open suggestion for discussion that the query, "What is the role of a constitution in the political system?" could perhaps be fruitfully approached from the following angle: what is the impact, or the role, of a constitution *vis-à-vis* the role-taking of the power holders? That is, does it help to enforce, and if so to what extent, a desired "role performance" upon the persons in office?

Whatever the merit of this suggestion, I do feel that political scientists should go back with a fresh look to the vital issues that constitutional lawyers have been neglecting. For the experience of the last 30–40 years has shown, particularly in Italy and in Germany, that when a political problem—and constitutionalism is, inescapably, a juridical solution of a political problem—is depoliticized, the real consequences of taking the juridical "neutral" attitude are (no matter how unwittingly) political. I mean that when the time of trial comes, one discovers that what the "pure" jurists have really been doing—under the shield of their juridical indifference to meta-juridical matters—was to pave the way for allowing unscrupulous politicians to make a discretionary use of power under the camouflage of a good word. Politics cannot be taken out of politics, so to speak.

THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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The threat of violence, and the occasional outbreak of real violence—which gives the threat credibility—are essential elements in peaceful social change not only in international, but also in national communities.[1] Individuals and groups, no less than nations, exploit the threat as an everyday matter. This induces flexibility and stability in democratic institutions.

I refer not only to the police power of the state and the recognized right of self-defense, but also to private individual or group violence, whether purposive or futile, deliberate or desperate. Violence and the threat of violence, far from being meaningful only in international politics, are underlying, tacit, recognized, and omnipresent facts of domestic life, in the shadow of which democratic politics are carried on. They instil dynamism into the structure and growth of the law, the settlement of disputes, the processes of accomodating interests, and they induce general respect for the verdict of the polls.

An effort by the state to obtain an absolute monopoly over violence, threatened or used in behalf of private interests, leads inexorably—as in a prison—to complete totalitarian repression of all activities and associations which may, however remotely, create a basis of anti-state action. A democratic system preserves the right of organized action by private groups, risking their implicit capability of violence. By intervening at the earliest possible point in private activities, the totalitarian state increases the likelihood that potential violence will have to be demonstrated before it is socially effective. On the other hand, by permitting a pluralistic basis for action, the democratic state permits potential violence to have a social effect with only a token demonstration, thus assuring greater opportunities for peaceful political and social change. A democratic system has greater viability and stability; it is not forced, like the totalitarian, to create an infinite deterrent to all non-state (and thus potentially anti-state) activities. The early Jeffersonians recognized this essential element of social change when they guaranteed the private right to keep and bear arms, in the Second Amendment. The possibility of a violent revolution once each generation is a powerful solvent of political rigidity, making such revolutions unnecessary.

The argument of this essay is that the risk of violence is necessary and useful in preserving national societies.[2] This specifically includes sporadic, uncontrolled, "irrational" violence in all its forms. It is true that domestic violence, no less than international violence, may become a self-generating vortex which destroys all values, inducing anarchy and chaos. Efforts to prevent this by extreme measures, however, only succeed in making totalitarian societies that are more liable to such collapses. Democracies assume the risk of such catastrophes, and thereby make them less likely.

Violence has two inextricable aspects: its actual use (political demonstrations, self-immolation, suicide, crimes of passion, property, or politics, etc.), and its potential (threatened) use. The actual outbreak or demonstration of violence must occur from time to time in order to give plausibility to its threatened outbreak, and thereby to gain efficacy for the threat as an instrument of social and political change. The two aspects, demonstration and threat, therefore cannot be separated. If the capability of actual demonstration is not present, the threat will have little effect in inducing a willingness to bargain politically. In fact, such a threat may instead provoke "preemptive" counter-violence.

The "rational" goal of the threat of violence is an accomodation of interests, not the provocation of actual violence. Similarly, the "rational" goal of actual violence is demonstration of the will and capability of action, establishing a measure of the credibility of future threats, not the exhaustion of that capability in unlimited conflict.[3] An investigation of the function of violence begins with an outline of concepts.

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[1] "Violence" is defined as direct or indirect action applied to restrain, injure, or destroy persons or property.

[2] The role of violence in political organizations is vividly demonstrated by a recent event among a group of elks at the Bronx Zoo. A 4-year old bull elk, Teddy, had his magnificent antlers sawed off to one-inch stumps. He had reigned as undisputed boss of a herd of six cow elks and one younger bull. But the breeding season was on, and he was becoming "a bit of a martinet." With his antlers off, he gets a new perspective on his authority and becomes a tolerable leader. A younger bull may try to take over as paramount leader of the herd, but if he does, the veterinarian will saw off his antlers, too. *New York Times*, September 26, 1962, p. 35.

I. POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND CONSENSUS

We assume that all human relationships, both individual and institutional, are involved in a dynamic process of consensus and competition. These are opposites only as conceptual poles of a continuum. In real relationships, it is often difficult to distinguish objectively between the two. The distinction is sharp only subjectively, for the participant, and his perception of consensus or competition may change from moment to moment, depending on his political role and the objective circumstances.[4] A political role is defined in terms of the many political systems in which the individual objectively or subjectively (by identification of interests) plays a part. A political system contains a hierarchy of authority and values. Each system has a complex structure of leadership and influence but, because of the nature of its task (maximizing and allocating certain values), policy and decision-making power is usually vested in one or a few roles at the top of the pyramid of authority (the elite). Formal and informal political systems exist at all levels of group life (children's play groups, families, lodges, gangs, work groups, nation-states, international alignments, etc.), interpenetrating each other among and between levels. Each isolated system has an interdependent structure of roles, involving loyalty to certain values, symbols, leaders, and patterns of behavior according to system norms. The discrete individual, part of many different systems, must structure his own hierarchy of commitment to meet the simultaneous demands made upon him by many different roles.

Within the individual, the conflicting demands of these roles create tension. Similarly, within each system conflicting values between members are constantly adjusted as roles change, maintaining a state of tension. And political systems as wholes have an objective, dynamic interrelationship, structured into the hierarchy of macro-systems. Within the latter, each sub-system has a role much like that of the individual in smaller constellations. Each sub-system may be part of several macro-systems, imposing conflicting demands upon it. Consequently, within macro-systems there is maintained a state of constant tension between sub-systems.

This objective tension, existing on all levels, is perceived subjectively in terms both of competition and consensus, depending on the comparative degrees of collaboration and conflict which exist in the situation at any given moment.

So any two or more systems may appear as hostile at any given time. From the viewpoint of the participants, the conceptual framework of competition overrides underlying consensus. Decisions and policies of the rival elites then are rationalized in terms of hostility to the values and leaders of the other system. However, if events transpire to place a higher value on a hostile tactical situation involving the macro-system of which both smaller systems are a part, their relationship will be transformed quickly to a conceptual framework of consensus which will override and mute the unresolved competitive elements. Such an event may also bring about internal leadership changes in both sub-systems, if their elites were too firmly wedded to the requirements of the now-irrelevant competitive situation.

Objectively, tension is always present among all roles and systems; that is, elements of both competition and consensus go together. The subjective emphasis which each pole of the continuum receives depends on the value which the tactical situation places on acts and attitudes of hostility or collaboration among the various systems at various times. Degrees of hostility and collaboration are structured by a hierarchy of values within and among all roles and systems all the time. All are involved in a dynamic process.

Conflict, in functional terms, is the means of discovering or reaching consensus, of creating agreed terms of collaboration. Because of our personal roles in the macro-system of nation-states, we tend to view the Cold War in terms of competition. Similarly, because of our roles in the sub-system of the family group, we tend to view family problems in terms of consensus (until the system breaks down completely).

One can reverse these conceptual fields. The Cold War can be viewed in terms of the large areas of consensus that exist between the two power-blocs. For example, the wish to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to each other's allies; the wish to avoid giving each other's allies the power of precipitating general war between the main antagonists; the common interest in reducing accidental provocations; the common interest in establishing some norms of predictability in each other's behavior; etc. Conflict can therefore be considered merely as the means of perfecting these areas of consensus. In the same way, one can view the family situation negatively in terms of competition and hostility. As in an O'Neill drama, one would dwell on all the things that divide the family members and interpret all actions in terms of maneuvers to subdue each other's will. Consensus then becomes a residual category *hors de combat,* and therefore of no importance. One might dwell upon the collaborative aspects of international affairs or the disruptive aspects of family affairs. A policy-maker should do both in the former area, just as a psychiatrist does both in the latter. The collaborative view of the Cold War should not, however, induce euphoria about the nature of the relationship (as it unfortunately does for some), since so many crimes of violence occur in families, and so many murders involve lovers or ex-lovers.[5]

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[3] By "rational" here is meant: having a conceptual link to a given end, a logical or symbolic means-ends relationship which can be demonstrated to others or, if not demonstrable, is accepted by others (but not necessarily all) as proven.

[4] Essentially, the perception by an individual of his relationship to others within a framework of hostility or cooperation is the subjective basis of "ideology," using the term as Karl Mannheim does in "Sociology of Knowledge," *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1957), pp. 265–66.

In performing this exercise, the relativistic nature of the concepts of consensus and competition becomes evident. It is impossible to reach any consensus without competition and every consensus, no matter how stable, is still only provisional, since it represents for all its members a submerging of other values. All collaborating individuals, groups, or nations constantly try to exploit favorable opportunities to improve their roles or to impose a larger part of their own value structures upon a larger political system. In an important sense, all individuals, groups, or nations desire to "rule the world," but are constrained to collaborate with others on less desirable terms because of the objective limits of their own power or the cost of the exertion required.

The commitment required to produce a credible threat of violence, sufficient to induce peaceable accommodation, is one of a very high order. Not all individuals nor all political systems are capable of credibly using the threat of violence in order to induce greater deference by others to their values. People generally recognise the kinds of values which can and cannot elicit the high degree of commitment required to make the threat credible.

By and large, all violence has a rational aspect, for somebody, if not for the perpetrator. Acts of violence can consequently be rationalized (*i.e.,* put to rational use), whether they are directed against others or against oneself. This is true because people who may be anxious to apply the threat of violence to achieve a social or political bargaining position are nevertheless usually reluctant also to pay the costs or take the risks of an actual demonstration of that threat. Incoherent acts of violence can be exploited by elites as a means of improving their roles or imposing a larger part of their values upon a greater political system. The more obvious the logical connection between such an act and the ends sought by the elite, the easier it is to assimilate the act and claim it as a demonstration of the potential violence available to the elite if its demands are ignored. The rapidity with which insurgent movements create martyrs from the demise of hapless bystanders, and the reluctance of governments to give martyrs to the opposition, are evidence of this.

II. NATIONS, LAWS, AND BALLOTS

The nation is a highly organized, formal political system, whose structure is well defined by law and custom, reinforced by sanctions legally imposed by the near-monopoly violence (police power) of the state. The central problem of lawful societies is to develop principles, procedures, institutions and expectations that create conditions of continuity and predictability in the lives of its members. The legal system is an abstract model of the society, designed to crystallize relationships of the *status quo,* maintain their continuity in the midst of political and social change, and provide lawful methods of resisting or accommodating change. Law itself tends to maintain the *status quo* and, with the instruments of state power, to resist change. But relationships in organized societies change anyway. The process for codifying changed conditions and relationships is called "politics." Political systems legitimize certain kinds of potential violence within controlled limits; it then becomes force.[6] However, law almost never serves the interests of all equally. Rather, it protects some against others or gives advantages to some over others. By placing the force of the state behind the interests of some, law serves to neutralize the potential violence behind the demands of others. In a sense, it thus raises the threshold of violence required to make social protests against the law efficacious. This guarantees that the law cannot be changed easily or quickly by any group, thus giving it greater permanence and stability.

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[5] See E. Frankel, "One Thousand Murderers," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* Vol. 29 (1938–39), pp. 687–88, cited in Marshall B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior* (New York, 1957), p. 216.

[6] The distinction between "violence" and "force" (one uncontrolled, the other controlled), was common in pre-Lasswellian literature. They are often difficult to distinguish objectively. Assessments of controllability may be almost entirely ideological. I prefer to use "force" to designate the objective capabilities, *i.e.,* the concrete means or instruments for violence.

Pressures for political and social change must therefore be substantial before the threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order rise above the threshold set by the force held by the state. While the threat and fear remain below the threshold, the *status quo* often responds to challenges against the law by more severe enforcement, augmented police and enlarged prisons. But when the threat and fear come near or cross the threshold, a general tendency toward non-enforcement of the law sets in. The *status quo* interests begin to share with the disaffected groups a desire to evade and to change the law.

Private demonstrations of force are illegal in all domestic societies. Toleration is accorded to threats of potential violence, however, to the extent that the laws and institutions are democratic. In all systems, the state, to deserve its name, must apply adequate force to control outbreaks of actual violence by private sources—or tolerate some more or less recognised "off-limits" areas for outlawry.[7] If the instrumentalities of state power are not equal to broad private threats, indeed, the government in power ceases to rule. Vigilantism or the private threat of violence has then in fact become the last resort of authority in the system. Why do governments sometimes fall when there is a general strike, or a street demonstration? Why don't they ignore outbreaks with which they cannot cope? And say: "All right, go ahead and strike, fight each other for control of the streets, snake-dance down the avenue. We will sit here in our offices anyway making decisions!" Governments fall when their capabilities for dealing with threatened violence fail. The emerging political system which proves itself capable of raising a higher threshold of violence (than the established government can or will surmount with its force) becomes *de facto* the highest authority, and *de jure* the new government.

Laws are not merely the rules of a game of economic and political competition. They are also a means of winning the game, if some of the players can, as in fact they do, write the laws. The ideal system may be one in which the rules are written with perfect dispassion, so that they accord no special advantages to anyone. This ideal is never realized. The process of politics which underlies the making and unmaking of laws is not dispassionate. Indeed, it is one of the most passionate of human affairs. No matter how scrupulously fair may be the original constitution and the representation of governing institutions, the tensions of political systems soon intrude historical hierarchies of advantage. Whoever enjoys early advantages in the game soon enjoys that and more by law, with the heightened threshold of the force available at the beckoning of the state to vouchsafe them. In this manner the law tends always to become to some extent the instrument of the *status quo*, resisting change.

In democratic societies, however, the law also guarantees the right of voluntary association, among other political liberties, and restrains (by a constitutional distribution of authority) arbitrary use of the police power. These permit opponents of the *status quo* to establish and maintain a base of political action that may become formidable. It may then be difficult for the regime to find legal pretexts for controlling this base while its potential for anti-state violence is still within the state's control capability. Once its potential equals or grows greater than that of the state, repression is no longer a realistic policy. Changing the law, or treating it as a dead letter, gains precedence over enforcing it, even for *status quo* leaders who wish to preserve what control remains over informal political systems in which they are the elite. Once this process of peaceful political change has been successfully set in motion, both the emerging and the declining political elites have a high interest in maintaining a general freedom to threaten violence without initiating or provoking it, either on the part of the state or by other groups. For the *status quo* elites, there is more to be gained in preserving the continuity of the laws than in initiating and provoking the demonstration of violence at an unpredictable level. For the insurgent elites, there is usually more to be gained in preserving the continuity of the laws than in appealing to the uncertain results of violence.

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[7] There are many areas outside the effective—if not the nominal—jurisdiction of formal governmental authority, as, for example, "off-limit" slum areas where police seldom penetrate, or the Mafia areas of Sicily. Such areas represent political sub-systems which possess a high degree of sovereignty, tolerated, for one reason or another, by the general government. Within such areas, the *de facto* authority is often the elite able to maintain the highest threshold of potential violence, not the formal government. In such areas, an unwritten law usually makes it a severely punished offense to call upon the authority of the general government.

In democratic systems, the ballot becomes the non-provocative symbol by which the elites may measure their capabilities for threatening direct action. In a real sense, voting is an approximation of picking sides before a street fight. Once the sides are picked, the leaders are able to gauge their bargaining strengths and make the best possible deal for themselves and their cohorts. The appeal to actual battle not only is unnecessary, but also, for the weaker side (the only side with an interest in challenging the results of the count), it does not promise to change the results, and may in fact undermine the authority of the polls as a method for reversing one's future position.

The threat of violence implicit in counting heads is an ambiguous measure of the power available to the political systems into which people group themselves at election time. The extent of voter commitment in these systems is uncertain and probably, in most cases, unequal to demands for supporting action. There are very few national elections in the United States —although many elsewhere—in which the results prefigure a plausible threat of civil war as the means by which the defeated candidates can gain concessions and appointments from the winning side. In general, democratic political leaders share a common interest in resolving disputes without invoking real violence. Neither side can be confident that the loyalty of its voters will stand the test of a demonstration of strength. Voting is a very imperfect register of loyalty, but rather conveys a miscellany of emotions, difficult to penetrate or to order rationally. Strenuous efforts are made by defeated candidates to restrain a show of violence by their own followers. Public concessions of defeat, homiletic congratulations, and avowals of support for the winner, are designed to communicate to their backers the finality of the verdict at the polls, which is subject to revision, not by a demonstration of violence, but by renewed peaceful efforts in the next election.

In 1960, after the close result of the Kennedy-Nixon election, what dangers could have been unleashed if Nixon had publicly repudiated the poll and openly supported minority efforts to hold recounts in California and Illinois? In a situation of this kind, it is clear how close to the surface lies the threat of violence implicit in the voting process.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS

Many people blithely argue for law as a substitute for violence, as though there was a choice between the two. They call for international law and world government to eliminate war. This point of view reveals a blissful ignorance of the functions of violence in domestic legal systems. A viable system based on law protects the conditions of group action which make threats of violence tolerable. Law always rests on force, a legitimate monopoly in the hands of the state, and it can be changed by the threat of private violence. The threat of violence and the fear of the breakdown of law and order cast their shadows ahead; they operate to moderate demands and positions, thereby setting into peaceful motion the informal political processes of negotiation, concession, compromise, and agreement. Although there is no centralized monopoly of force in the international forum, the processes of mediation and negotiation function in much the same way. The credible threat of violence in the hands of nations has a similarly stabilizing effect, providing statesmen are attentive to the maintenance of their national capability for demonstrating violence, and providing their ambitions are commensurate to the bargaining position which their armaments achieve. More comprehensive legal codes and a world government may not improve the stability of the world community in any case, since the possibility of civil conflict exists in all political systems. Civil wars are frequently bloodier and more unforgiving than wars between sovereign nations.

In international politics also, the threat of violence tends to create stability and maintain peace. Here the threat is more directly responsive to policy controls. The nation-state has greater continuity than the informal political systems that coalesce and dissolve in the course of domestic social change. The threat of force can be asserted much more deliberately and can be demonstrated under full control, as in "good will" Navy visits, army maneuvers near a sensitive border, partial mobilization, etc. Because of the greater continuity of these macro-systems, the national leaders must strive to maintain the prestige of a nation's might and will. If the reputation of a nation's military power is allowed to tarnish, future bargaining power will be weakened. The country may feel obliged to re-establish that prestige by invoking a test of arms, as a means of inducing greater respect for its position from other nations. Strong nations prefer to demonstrate their military power peaceably in order that their prestige will afford them the bargaining power they deserve without a test of arms.

Because the threat of international violence is a conscious instrument of national policy, it generally lacks the random character of domestic violence. This means that if the armaments of nations fall out of balance, if the prestige of nations is no longer commensurate with their ambitions, if the will to take the risks of limited military conflicts is lacking, if domestic political considerations distort the national response to external threat, then the time becomes ripe for the outbreak of violence that may escalate out of control.

In general, the dangers of escalating international conflict induce greater, not lesser, restraint on the part of national leaders in their relations with each other. Attempts to achieve infinite security—and consequent irresponsibility—for the nation are as self-defeating as similar attempts for a domestic regime.

The functioning of consensus and competition between nations is not fundamentally different from that of domestic politics. The most striking difference is that in domestic politics the level of centralized force available to the state creates a high threshold of stability against the threats brought to bear within the system by private groups. In the international forum, the closest approximation to such a threshold is the array of decentralized forces available to the great powers. An aggressive power interested in modifying the *status quo* must cross the threshold of its own threat of force in order to induce other powers to choose between concessions to its demands or the costs and risks of an arms race. To the extent that the *status quo* powers are able and willing to pay the costs and take the risks, their own threshold can be raised, depriving the challenger of any political advantages from his investment. When all of the great powers are attentive to the equations of potential violence, no nation can hope to gain conclusive political advantages from an arms race. This situation makes possible international agreements or a tacit consensus for stabilizing arms and bringing about political settlements. Diplomatic ceremonials, like the ceremonials of personal relations which we call "manners," serve to minimize the dangers of provocation and threat in the day-to-day relations between nations.

IV. THE DOMESTIC PROCESS

Underneath the norms of legal and institutional behavior in national societies lies the great beast, the people's capability for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence. This is common to totalitarian as well as democratic societies, and is a major restraint against completely arbitrary government. Even totalitarian regimes can hope for stability only if they reflect in some degree the changing currents of political interest of the people and if they are willing to recruit members of their elites from the potentially disaffected groups which they rule. Even a totalitarian state must purvey some concept of fairness and flexibility, an ability to change in response to the changing internal and external demands put upon it. Indeed, to the extent that a totalitarian regime permits the threat of violence to be raised against it in the form of political pressure, it loses some of its totalitarian quality. The dynamics of totalitarianism, however, generally make this kind of evolution difficult, if not impossible. Dictatorships of one or a few raise the level of official terror to offset or deter the threat of violence from below. Terror and counter-terror may escalate until the whole system collapses in an orgy of violence. The prospects for raising anything but another such dictatorship out of such wreckage would seem remote, except that people tire of violence and presently respond to it with passivity. Dictators are sometimes suspected of seeking an escape from this iron logic by provoking international wars which unite the country behind the leader, postponing issues of internal dissension.

The threat to carry political dissent outside peaceable channels can distract the government from the pursuit of other values, can impose upon it as its first and major responsibility the re-establishment of domestic peace and order, and can lure it into shortsighted measures to suppress violence, measures that may instead widen the base of opposition and increase the occasions for anti-government protests.

The mere threat of private violence directed against the government has a very great influence upon government actions. By causing reallocations of the resources of the society into the essentially negative goals of internal security, the opposition may succeed in defeating or crippling the positive goals whose accomplishment might legitimize and strengthen government authority. To avoid this predicament, even totalitarian governments occasionally go out of their way to appease their critics. The alternative to reform is ruthless suppression not only of the sources of the threat, but also of every symptom of united social action. Bowling clubs, assemblies of three or more people on street corners—there is no rational way to identify the first links of the chain which leads to social action. All must be broken up. The hopeless search for infinite security begins in this way; its logical end is the downfall of the regime. With this choice before it, it is easy to see why even a dictatorial regime may prefer social and political reform to the threat of violence. This is why so many kings and tsars, rather than destroying their rivals and opponents, often sent them instead on enforced vacations and educational tours abroad.

In democratic societies this sharp dilemma is avoided far short of infinite deterrence. The institutional distribution of authority—constitutionalism—precludes unilateral attempts to centralize all the police powers in the hands of one agent. Also the law proscribes the overt threat of private violence and the existence of para-military forces, although it tolerates and protects the implied threat of violent outbreaks if political accomodation fails. Violence is demonstrated, not in organized forms, but rather in sporadic outbursts. Disgruntled elites who possess a clear capability for causing a planned demonstration—who have, that is, organized groups with a deep sense of moral outrage and injustice—avoid incriminating themselves and provoking counter-action against themselves. Instead they carry out "peaceable demonstrations" designed to reveal their numbers and the intensity of their commitment. These may have the bonus effects of provoking violent action against them, causing government intervention, or causing their more inflammable followers to ignite into unplanned outbursts of violence. Such potentials are implicit in the situation.

The leaders of the agitators then are placed in a position of minimum risk and maximum effectiveness, that of playing the role of "responsible leader." They can bargain with formal authorities and with all the other members of the society in this way: "You must accept our just complaints and you must deal with us; otherwise, we will not be able to control our people. Unspeakable things may happen. We do not desire this to happen, but it is up to you to help us prevent it." While playing this role, the reformist leaders may not be unhappy to have their prophesies partially fulfilled by sporadic outbreaks. Events which demonstrate violence (and thus induce other elites to make concessions) do not have to be planned. Once the emotions of a real social movement are churned up, the problem is to keep the events from happening.

The irresponsible elements may be disowned, but the bargaining power of the responsible leaders is enhanced. In the bargaining process, the moderate leaders often accept concessions which fall short of those demanded by some of their more extremist followers. Opportunists or "realists" often inherit the benefits wrought by the blood of martyrs. This is a healthy mode of exploiting the demonstration of violence without condoning it, enabling compromises to be reached which isolate the extremists and render them less dangerous to the body politic. Most followers in social movements will follow responsible leadership through the gives-and-takes of compromise, because they share the general fear of unlimited violence and counter-violence, with its unpredictable results and the defeat of all rational goals. Accomodations can be reached, even if only provisionally, which preserve the general consensus in maintaining the form and continuity of society and law.

V. SOME CONCRETE EXAMPLES

Let us turn to some concrete examples of how violence works its effects in practice.

A classical case of its actual demonstration against the legality of existing authority is the founding of the state of Israel in 1949. The Irgun, an underground terror organization, created conditions in Palestine which made further British occupation impractical. There is some doubt whether the British government would have honored their commitment to the Jewish Agency or honored it when they did, had it not been for the Irgun's role. Yet the Jewish Agency, the responsible and moderate leadership, negotiated the partition of Palestine and played the major role in the founding of the new state, all the while disavowing the terrorist acts and methods of the Irgun. Before the launching of Irgunist terror, the British government stalled the Jewish Agency and accorded it little respect.

More instructive are cases of domestic violence where the actual demonstration is minimal and where the implicit threat is all, as in the current compaign for Negro rights. Until the last decade, little sustained pressure was exerted to improve the Southern Negro's position by governmental action. Even with the growth of Negro voting power in the big cities of the North, Washington authorities have generally shown great respect for the implicit capabilities of violence of well-organized white supremacists. Partly because of the power of the White South in the Congress, in Democratic National Conventions, and in the Electoral College, presidents have acted with restraint in protecting the rights of Southern Negroes. So long as the possibility of violence was asymmetrical, the Whites well-organized and armed, the Negroes apathetic, intimidated, and disorganized, Negro attempts to register to vote, to protest lynchings and other injustices, could easily be tranquillized by the County Sheriffs, the local police, and the KKK. In the last decade, Negroes have been in the throes of a new self-consciousness, confidence, organization, and leadership. The Black Muslims, the Committee on Racial Equality, the NAACP, etc. have now demonstrated that the Southern Negro is capable of social action and of organized demonstrations of strength. As the capability grows for effective counter-violence against White Citizen Council activities—or, what is more significant, non-violent demonstrations which invoke violence by the extremist Whites—the Negro will gain increasing consideration for his demands, increasing support from "moderate" white leaders, and increasing attention and support from the federal authorities. Just as the existence of the White Citizens Councils strengthened the hand of southern moderates in trying to restrain civil rights action from Washington, so the existence of the Black Muslims and CORE now strengthens the position of the NAACP in seeking concessions from Southern Whites and action by the Justice Department. The threat of uncontrolled violent outbursts, hovering just beneath the surface, acts as a moderating influence, maintaining the institutions of peaceful process, inducing *status quo* groups to a greater readiness to yield some privileges, and restraining the responsible leaders of the insurgent Negroes from extremist demands.[8]

The strategy of non-violent social action (passive resistance or pacifism) does not abandon the threat of force as an instrument of social change. Rather, the threat operates within a civilized society by its provocative effects. By provoking the use of force by others, it forces the government to intervene on the behalf of the non-violent demonstrators, while evoking the sympathies of those less intensely involved. But as an international ideology, pacifism or unilateral non-violence may fail to achieve its objectives. Unless those who pursue it succeed in invoking some force in their behalf, they will be destroyed with impunity by their enemies.

The Dukhobor Sons of Freedom (of Vancouver, British Columbia) have adopted a novel tactic of demonstrating violence as they conduct their immemorial campaign against compulsory public education. They set fire to their own homes and barns, standing by and watching the blaze. They also parade naked down the center of city streets. The significance of these demonstrations is plain. Their religion forbids them to threaten or use violence against others. Instead, they symbolically demonstrate their discipline and passionate commitment to their own way of life by inflicting violence upon their own property. The naked marches provoke arrests and imprisonment and the house-burnings force the welfare agencies to provide temporary shelter. Both actions impose on the government responsibilities it is ill disposed to carry out, especially if such demonstrations are to continue indefinitely and involve the entire Dukhobor settlement. In addition, the demonstrations invoke public attention and sympathy for the believers. All of this may well give the local authorities an incentive to ignore Dukhobor defiance of school attendence laws. In fact, this is what has happened during the last 50 years. Efforts to enforce the law have been spasmodic and half-hearted, while the law has been generally evaded.

The relations of suicide and crime to social change form too large a topic for treatment here.[9] Durkheim studied these phenomena as an indicator or measure of social disorganization. They might also be studied in terms of demonstrating violence as an instrument of political and social change. When teenagers commit crimes, their legitimate grievances get more attention. When someone commits suicide, those who sense the circumstances that drove him to it are led to re-examine their own lives, and may be strengthened in convictions concerning the society in which they live. A suicide by an over-extended installment buyer in Chicago led to efforts to reform state and national laws governing loan-shark interest rates and collection of unpaid installment debts. A suicide, apart from its real motives, may be quickly exploited by those with a social cause. In effect, a suicide resembles a resignation from a government: it challenges values and institutions, evoking from all survivers a sense of the unresolved tensions which surround them, threatening the prospects for their own survival.[10] Suicides and crimes, however obscure and ambiguous, threaten the world and thus change it.

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[8] The recent violence at Oxford, Mississippi, involving the registration of Negro James Meredith at the State University, is likely to expedite Negro integration throughout the South. By precipitating violence (which resulted in two deaths), the White Extremists may have strengthened the ranks of the Moderates. Fearing a recurrence, white leadership in future situations may be more concerned with controlling the firebrands than in using them to force concessions from the Justice Department. Gunnar Myrdal put his finger on this when he referred to the "positive" aspect of the riots. "The riots make people think," he declared. *New York Times,* October 4, 1962, p. 10.

[9] See summary of some pertinent research: Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, Jr., *Suicide and Homicide* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), pp. 69–81.

[10] According to numerous press reports, the suicide of Marilyn Monroe led within a few days to a flurry of suicides by women. In the same manner, it may also have led to many decisions to live, which were not recorded.

VI. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several points may be made in conclusion. Demonstrations of domestic violence serve to establish the intensity of commitment of members of the political system. The more intense the commitment, the greater the risks the system will take in challenging the *status quo*. Accordingly, the greater will be the bargaining efficacy of future threats. Social change often occurs legalistically. Rationalization in terms of the continuity of abstract legal models is a useful means of stressing consensus over competition, adding to the stability of the whole society. However, it is obvious that a legal or ideological syllogism is meaningless except in terms of the emotional force which members of the society attach to the first principle. The infinite regress of syllogistic reasoning ends somewhere with a commitment of self. Such commitments cannot be explained or understood by reasoning alone. Efforts to adduce rational principles for explaining social and political change are futile unless one grapples with the often irrational and illogical intensity of self-commitment which marks social movements.

No system can hope to survive unless it can live with and adjust itself to the multitudinous threats of violence which are the basis of social change. Democracies have shown a greater ability to do this. Yet democratic forms can be subverted to become totalitarian in substance, if the search for infinite security in the international forum is reflected internally in a search for infinite deterrence of threats against the social and political *status quo*. Major social changes have major social causes; they are not the result of isolated conspiracies and plots. They cannot be arrested by an effort to stamp out all conspiracies and plots. In healthy democracies, all political leaders and would-be leaders are, in effect, conspirators and plotters. They must be. This kind of activity is the heart of political democracy.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NEW ORTHODOXY FOR OLD LIBERALISM

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Reinhold Niebuhr has profoundly affected American thought in theology, on society, and about politics.[1] He has puzzled more than one of his many critics and commentators, especially by the veritable panorama of doctrines which, at one time or another, he has appeared to advocate: several varieties of socialism, liberalism, and what seems to be a sort of mellow conservatism. The confusion engendered by this ideological medley has not been alleviated either by the voluminous extent of his writings, or by his teutonic, yet highly personal style.[2] But Niebuhr's policy suggestions have been shaped in response to changing conditions in the political world. Deeper analysis reveals a remarkably consistent teaching, present in all essential respects at least as early as his *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, which if not a philosophy, is at least a theology of politics. The scope of this paper prevents any examination of the entire intellectual pilgrimage of Reinhold Niebuhr; I shall confine my attention to the main lines of his political teaching.[3]

Most critics and analysts would agree that whatever else he may have been, Niebuhr has been a critic of liberalism, modernity, and of American culture. Yet, as so often is the case with Niebuhr, appearances can be misleading. It is true that his characteristic *bêtes noires* have been such comparatively modern thinkers as John Dewey. But this paper will endeavor to demonstrate that Niebuhr's basic political ideas are essentially the same as those of the liberals he seeks to criticize. His criticism is often devastating; but beginning as a critic, he ends with concepts and convictions drawn from the core of the liberal tradition. In this, he is not unique. Niebuhr shares the intellectual tendencies of the generation of which he is a part, which, both attracted and disillusioned by the rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson and the crusade of 1917–1918, was and remains affected by anti-rationalism, doubtful of human nature, and suspicious of enthusiams in politics. Yet Louis Hartz has indicated that the most scathing critics of post-Wilson America were unable to escape the "irrational Lockeanism" of the American liberal tradition, and came to terms with it after a period of voluntary expatriation. At the approach of World War II the critics of

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[1] In referring to Niebuhr's major works, I have adopted a system of abbreviations, as listed below. Unless otherwise noted, the publisher is Scribner's, New York.

BT	*Beyond Tragedy*, 1938
CPP	*Christianity and Power Politics*, 1940
CRPP	*Christian Realism and Political Problems*, 1953
DCR	*Does Civilization Need Religion?* (Macmillan, 1944; orig. 1927)
SOT	*Discerning the Signs of the Times*, 1946
FH	*Faith and History*, 1949
ICE	*An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (Harper, 1935)
MMIS	*Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 1932
REE	*Reflections on the End of an Era*, 1934
CLCD	*The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, 1944
IAH	*The Irony of American History*, 1954
HN	*The Nature and Destiny of Man* (vol. I), 1951
HD	*The Nature and Destiny of Man* (vol. II), 1951
SDH	*The Self and the Dramas of History*, 1955
SNE	*The Structure of Nations and Empires*, 1959
WCAR	*The World Crisis and American Responsibility*, E. Lefever, ed., (Associated Press, New York, 1958)

[2] Paul Tillich has suggested that Niebuhr's major stylistic fault is an "overpredilection for paradox"; "Niebuhr's Theory of Knowledge" in C. Kegley and R. Bretall, eds., *Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought* (New York, 1956).

[3] Critical writings about Niebuhr are almost as numerous as his own writings. Among the most useful are: Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.;* Kenneth W. Thompson, "Beyond the National Interest," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 17 (April 1955), pp. 167–188 and "Toward a Theory of International Relations," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (September 1955), pp. 733–746; Levi Olan, "Reinhold Niebuhr and the Hebraic Spirit," *Judaism*, Vol. 5 (Spring 1956), pp. 1–15; N. P. Jacobson, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy of History," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 37 (October 1944), pp. 237–268; also the sections on Niebuhr in Morton White, *Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism* (Boston, 1956) and Charles Frankel, *The Case for Modern Man* (New York, 1956).

the 1920s became horrified at the destructive effects of their criticism on the national myth and advocated "responsibility."[4] This pattern is quite descriptive of Reinhold Niebuhr's intellectual history.

But Niebuhr is far too subtle and profound a thinker to be disposed of within the confines of a "generation." Any such effort would do violence to the real character of his contribution to that generation which has so frequently, and frantically, urged America to "come of age." The refurbishing of the liberal creed has not been an easy task. The "truths" which had been so daringly held self-evident in the 18th century had come to be the "inarticulate major premise," in Holmes' phrase, of American civilization by the early 19th century. It is difficult to tell whether the inarticulateness was due to the universal acceptance of these "truths" or to the development of doubts about their self-evident qualities.[5] The original theorists credited the discovery of the "self-evident truths" to reason. Yet they also believed in another, instrumental, reason which was the "servant of the passions," so in some ways they were progenitors of the anti-rationalism of our times.[6] The discoveries of that instrumental, scientific, and empirical reason have dealt rather roughly with the premises of the old liberal creed. The panoply of beliefs of liberal utopianism, of men "born free and equal," of men forever devoted to increasing individual liberty, and of progress and perfectibility in history, has been radically undermined on a rational level.[7] Niebuhr has often noted that liberalism has become a "holding action."[8] Indeed, his own criticism of reason has not been notably different from that of a number of critics, whether earlier, such as Hume, or more contemporary. In part, it is a criticism of the "pretension" of instrumental rationalism that Niebuhr finds in such theorists as John Dewey. But revealingly, it is not a criticism of instrumental rationalism as such; when reason is reduced to the proportions of a technique, Niebuhr favors employing it instrumentally. His criticism is an effort to reduce it to those proportions, to prevent instrumental reason from "absolutizing" its "finite" perspectives. Niebuhr's quest is for a safer basis than reason on which to rest the great liberal premises. His criticism presents the arguments of a long line of critics to establish the failure of reason to uphold the old creed. But this denial constitutes, in Niebuhr's eyes, a "negative validation" of a faith which comes to embody the articles of the liberal system, especially its central conception of freedom. His argument retains the characteristic argumentative style of early liberalism, what Max Weber called *Wertrationalismus:* the willingness to use means given by reason for ends discerned by "inspiration." But where the early liberals called the inspiration rational, Niebuhr calls it religious or theological. This goes a long way toward explaining the curious fact, which has baffled many critics, that Niebuhr makes a "virtue of incomprehensibility."[9] In fact, the title of Niebuhr's early work *Does Civilization Need Religion?* is incomplete. It is not "civilization" but that civilization of which Niebuhr is a part that is involved; not civilization, but liberalism, "needs religion."

In the analysis which follows I shall attempt to demonstrate that Niebuhr adheres, at least in "this-worldly" and political terms, to four central liberal doctrines: (1) the perfectibility of man, (2) the identification of freedom with the social good, (3) the contractarian conception of the state, and (4) the idea of progress in history. Since he has devoted much of his attention to international affairs, the argument will conclude with the contention that Niebuhr's view of international politics reflects these four doctrines, as well as the equally vital liberal concept of the "brotherhood of man."

I

Niebuhr has been cited as a "realist" as often as he has been called a critic of liberalism. Of course, "realist" is an appealing term to apply to oneself; every theorist likes to believe himself to be truly "realistic." Yet curiously, "realism" represents only a part of Niebuhr's reality. "Realism" is identified with the comprehension of physical nature, a world governed by an often grim necessity, if unified by an equally deterministic set of "pre-ordained harmonies." But man is more than physical, and more than "realism" is able to realize. Niebuhr's "prophetic" insight reveals to him a radical human freedom, which is "transcendent" and which seeks the absolute and the infinite, beyond any of the limitations imposed by time or nature.[10] But though these elements may be separated analytically they are never separated in Niebuhrean man. Man forever combines the two and can never escape the resultant tension and ambiguity, an ambiguity productive of anxiety which leads him to the futile effort to escape the demands of nature on one hand, or of the spirit on the other. Nature imposes self-seeking passion and egoism on the spirit, and roots the spirit in the finite; the sin of the spirit is to seek to deny that finite or temporal element in man, and hence to be guilty of pretension and pride. Moreover, the spirit breaks the "pre-ordained" harmonies of nature and makes the prudent and limited attributes of "natural man" become infinite and insatiable, leading to conflict, competition, and disorder.[11]

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[4] Louis Hartz, "The Coming of Age of America," this Review, Vol. 51 (June 1957), pp. 474–483.

[5] Russel B. Nye, "The Search for the Individual, 1750–1850," *Centennial Review*, Vol. V (Winter 1961), pp. 1–20.

[6] Geoffrey Clive, *The Romantic Enlightenment; Ambiguity and Paradox in the Western Mind, 1750–1920* (Meridian Books, New York, 1960), pp. 19–38.

[7] John H. Schaar, *Loyalty in America* (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957), pp. 116–119.

[8] SDH 36, 222; WCAR 11; IAH, ch. vi.

[9] Olan, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 7.

Intermediate between spirit and nature is the area of "human contrivance" or "rational freedom." Though reason is always an instrument of the natural self-seeking of man, it qualifies and restrains it by a kind of prudence and calculation. The purely harmonic world of nature is forever destroyed, yet man, a "creator" as well as a "creature" of history, is able by techniques, institutions, and science to harness nature to his purposes and increasingly to master it.[12] But, of course, the more that man masters nature, the more his own natural passions are freed from restraint; the more that men can obtain, the more they will want. Conflict remains eternal, contradictions perpetual.

But this world of conflict and struggle is not the world of nature; it is the product of the spirit and of reason in nature. Consequently, a purely secular "realism" which is typified for Niebuhr by Hobbes and Machiavelli understands neither the true nature of man nor of conflict in the world. "Realism," it will be seen, represents a doctrine about the world which is developed by empirical and unaided reason; it becomes identified with a curiously old-style brand of naturalism, of the conflict of passions, and of man the acquisitive animal.[13] Nor need "realism" necessarily be secular. St. Augustine represents the "theological realist." Aided by theology and faith, Augustine perceived the radical freedom of the human spirit but he made too sharp a separation between the spirit and nature. While it is by no means true (as Niebuhr seems to imply) that Augustine was prepared to let the world run without ethical restraints, he provided far too small a role for the idealistic element of human nature in this world to satisfy Niebuhr, who regards Augustine as "excessively realistic."[14] Theological realism makes too many concessions to the natural world, and regards Christianity as an essentially other-worldly ethic. Niebuhr, despite his long distrust of the "utopian" effort to apply Christian or other perfectionist teachings directly to the world, will not allow such teachings to be separated from it. He has always contended that the "impossible ethical ideal" remains "relevant."[15] He is not a realist on his own terms; he is better regarded as a "realistic" or moderate utopian. Niebuhr has laid stress on the limits which restrict the degree to which any utopia may be attained. But within the ultimate limits, his awareness of the problem of "less and more" has been quite intense, the intensity being especially marked in the years just preceding the outbreak of World War II.[16] In fact, all realists, contemporary or historical, have conceded that given the limits which attach to human endeavor man should always strive to approach the limits: to become as perfect as his imperfections allow.[17]

Two factors determine the content of such a teaching. The first, and perhaps crucial, question is the nature of the Good toward which human striving should aim. The second question, of importance in "realistic" or pragmatic terms, is the character and scope of the limits that are thought to restrict the attainment of the ultimate and yet impossible standard.

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[10] SNE 287–290, 298–299, 7; MMIS 25; HN 4, 11, 26–27, 48, 68, 125; HD 95–96, 155, 240, 284, 308; SDH 13–15, 23, 128; CLCD 6, 49, 53–55, 187.

[11] *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 9 (Spring 1945), pp. 7–8; IAH 156–158; NH 178–190, 249–250; BT ch. vi; SOT 68; SNE 107, 287–288.

[12] SNE 40–41, 105–107, 289; thus man is said to be able to "deflect" history without changing its direction. The Baconian roots of the doctrine are evident: FH 71–94; SOT 65; CLCD 154; MMIS 29; IAH 4–7, 71–77.

[13] SNE 133; CPP 215; SDH 109–111, 119.

[14] SNE 105–107, 291; CRPP 127; REE 205–231.

[15] Even so friendly a critic as K. W. Thompson has found the relevance "not clear": "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 169 and "Beyond the National Interest," *op. cit.*

[16] CPP, passim; IAH 157; HD 191–195, 233–234; FH 27–28; SNE 28–31, 298–299; "Peace and the Liberal Illusion," *The Nation*, Vol. 149 (28 January 1939), pp. 117–119.

[17] Norman Jacobson, "Political Realism in the Age of Reason: The Anti-Rationalist Heritage in America," *Review of Politics*, Vol. 15 (October 1953), pp. 446–469.

It is quite revealing that, in answer to this second question, Niebuhr is content with the assertion that limits exist; he is adamant in his refusal to specify them more precisely. For to claim to know the limits of human perfection is to claim Divine knowledge. If it is prideful to seek to establish goodness in the world, to escape limits altogether, then to seek to define the limits is, in his eyes, no less so. And while the first has at least the merit of overestimating man, the second runs the risk of limiting man to a level of baseness lower than necessary.[18] Niebuhr frequently denounces all theories of "natural law" because they compromise too readily with that nature which man may increasingly "master."[19] His denunciations of these, and other theories, from Catholic Rationalism to Marxist-Leninist, center on their supposed identification of a particular political order with the ultimately perfect. It is to be hoped that Niebuhr knows better than that. Almost all the "pretensions" he indicates did not constitute claims that a given state was perfect but that it represented the best attainable state in the conditions and limitations under which men operated.

Niebuhr's attack on the "absolutizing" of such "finite" perspectives has a dual nature. His attack on some theorists is actually a criticism of the good which they defined, *different* from that which Niebuhr holds as a standard. Others perceived the nature of the good, but set the standard at too low a level of attainment, or identified it too much with the preconceptions of an age. Thus democracy, a "perennial necessity," had to be extricated from the "bourgeois" associations of its origin.[20]

Niebuhr's language is apt to delude the reader. Despite his denials, his theory contains an implicit "natural law" or "natural right," that is, a conception of the best state in this world. Despite his "historical relativism" his teaching contains a number of such "perennial necessities" and "constant factors" in politics. To assert that progress is always possible leads to an emphasis on a society which is open to change, as Niebuhr's theory does. But such a state becomes a this-worldly "best state." In fact, such a state is necessary if the "fanatical" effort to establish the ultimately perfect state is to be avoided. For immediate purposes, the significance is that, although Niebuhr denies that man can ever be perfect or that progress is limitless, his theory strives to, and to a large degree does make the limitations meaningless in political terms; that is, his effort is to salvage as much of the liberal creed as is possible in an age that doubts it.

II

The content of Niebuhr's "best state" in the world is determined by the nature of the other-worldly best which it strives to imitate, just as his pragmatic opponents, in order to discern policies or states which are "better" must have a standard of the "best" by which to judge them so. Niebuhr's distinctive stance—which often obscures his meaning—is that in a period accustomed to pragmatic evasions, he begins with an ultimate and reasons down to the world. The ultimate standard gives the character to Niebuhr's political teaching as a whole.

There is little doubt as to the "human good" in Niebuhr's teaching: it is contained in the spiritual, in the element of man's nature characterized by "transcendent freedom" and the quest for the ultimate. In fact, this element constitutes the "true" nature of man; without such a teleological conception much of Niebuhr's rhetoric of pathos concerning the human condition would be pointless.[21]

Yet such a good is quite different from classical definitions of virtue, in that it is without content. It is an ability or a way of doing things which does not describe what is done. Niebuhr's terms, used in describing this virtue, are suggestive: man the "creator" as opposed to "creature," "transcending" his nation, class or place in history. All suggest an almost romantic individuality, or those conceptions of "creativity" or "autonomy" which have been so fashionable in recent years.[22] One may summarize Niebuhr's idea of the ethical rather simply. It is freedom. The more things of which man becomes free—time, space, passion, class, or nation—the better he becomes. Now it is true that Niebuhr attacks modern theorists for "exaggerating" the degree to which freedom and virtue can be identified.[23] But to suggest an "exaggeration" is to suggest that they can be identified to some degree. And, moreover, the reason modern theorists are said to be in error is that they fail to discern the "natural" element in man. Thus, freedom and virtue cannot be identified completely in this world, not because they are not ultimately identifiable but because *total* freedom is impossible and impracticable. But it remains the standard toward which man ought to strive. Love, of course, is the ultimate value beyond freedom. But love demands freedom because it cannot be commanded or coerced. And, moreover, love itself is defined in terms of "self-sacrifice" and of over-coming "egoism." Not only is it true that from another point of view this is surely "self-realization" or "fulfillment," but the very existence of "egoism" in Niebuhr's teaching is bound up with the fact that man is in nature.[24]

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[18] FH 34, 54, 71–83, 91, 123, 174, 180, 238–239; IAH 130, 158; HD 47, 85, 95–96, 155, 232; HN 197, 281; SOT 65; CRPP 133; SNE 291, 298–299; Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

[19] FH 77, 174; HD 48, 55, 281; CRPP 3, 200–201; DCR 26, 170–175, 218–219; SDH 109, 229; ICE 41–46, 114, 188; HN 178, 281.

[20] SNE 59–61; HD 249; SOT 100; CLCD 48–49, 118; IAH 96–100.

[21] Frankel, *op. cit.*, describes Niebuhr's ethics as "masochism, not wisdom" for much this reason, p. 115; MMIS 257; CRPP 159; CPP 215; FH 174–185; HN 16, 48, 249.

[22] Kenneth Keniston, "Alienation and the Decline of Utopia," *American Scholar*, Vol. 29 (Spring 1960), pp. 161–200.

Much of Niebuhr's discussion and concept of freedom has obvious roots in Kantian idealism; so does his corollary concern that individuals be used as "ends and not means" and with the ethic of "good will."[25] Ultimately, Niebuhr agrees with the idealists as to the nature of virtue. Given his great stress on the inevitable corruption of freedom by egoism in the world, it follows that not only can freedom and virtue not be *simply* identified but that greater freedom runs the peril of greater evil as well as greater good. Niebuhr has, in fact, made a point of this. While such a fact demands a certain prudence, Niebuhr's refusal to set limits to perfectibility places him in the idealist camp. Prudential ethics concede too much to "nature." Moreover, they cannot guide men in the extreme case where "heroism" is demanded for the choice between opposite goals: freedom or slavery, tyranny or anarchy.[26] Prudential ethics are valid only if they assume the ultimate importance of freedom. Man's involvement in nature demands that a certain amount of self-interest be "legitimated," as must concern for self-preservation. But, not surprisingly, this merely emphasizes that the pursuit of self-interest and freedom should be "enlightened."[27] This enlightenment has two characteristics, a realization of the perils of "natural self-interest" in one's own freedom, and a readiness to pursue self-interest in ways compatible with the freedom of others.

Indeed, Niebuhr's "realism," said to reside in his "recognition of the effects of power," is itself part of that idealistic element of his thought we have discussed. Freedom demands power, the power to free the spirit from nature by "conquering" the natural, a belief which unites Niebuhr with modern theorists from Bacon forward. While the quest will ultimately fail, increasing increments of power will make man freer of the natural. It is for this reason in fact—that power is never sufficient to free man from nature—that for practical purposes freedom is defined as power.[28] Thus the quest for power (which produces conflict) and historical "progress" (which is ambiguous precisely because power may be used for good or evil) must both be judged good in a relative, "this-worldly," sense. This decisively sets Niebuhr apart from a theorist like Hobbes, who regarded conflict and the quest for power as among the chief evils of man and set his goal instead at the attainment of social peace. It puts Niebuhr in the camp of the liberals, beginning with John Locke, who regarded the state of war as merely an annoyance compared with the loss of "freedom" that would be entailed by accepting the iron peace of Hobbes' *Leviathan*.[29] As Niebuhr has put it,

> Self-interest may be a source of discord ultimately but it is tentatively necessary to prevent the harmony of the whole from destroying the vitality of the parts.[30]

Niebuhr's concept of the state follows this liberal Lockean model, and although he criticizes the "social contract" theory, his criticism suggests that he accepts that theory in all essential respects. Like Locke, he posits a state of "pre-ordained" harmonies as the "natural" state of man before he "fell." The condition of man after the fall was, as in liberal theory, a "state of war" which led to the establishment of the state.[31] By placing the "state of nature" in Eden—and outside history—Niebuhr avoids the great dilemma of liberal contractarian theory: the question of how conflict arose among pacific "natural men." Indeed, for practical purposes, Locke and his successors equated the natural state of man with the state of war and may have regarded the idea of a period of harmony as a somewhat deceptive myth.[32] But to both the liberals and to Niebuhr what follows is that the state is produced only to avoid the state of war; and yet, given the "natural" condition of fallen man, conflict is inevitable. Hence the state, a "human contrivance" exists to channel the conflict into relatively bloodless and law-abiding ways. Niebuhr's attack on the contract theory denies that the contract took place at any definite time; rather, it developed through "organic" and historical processes.[33] (Burke, of course, made the same argument, yet Burke, as we too often forget nowadays, called himself a Whig and not a Tory.[34]) In any case, most contractarian theorists treated the historicity of the social contract as unimportant. It represented a necessary postulate to account for man's escape from the state of war; how long such a development took—or even whether it had taken place—was of little concern.[35] Liberal theorists, who often sought to show that the "original" contract, even granting its existence, had been corrupted and was not yet embodied in government, were even less concerned with the event. Niebuhr's unwillingness to credit the state to an act of speculative or scientific reason is important but it does not change the concept of the state as such.

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[23] SDH 38–53; HD 69, 144.

[24] HN 14, 178–190, 249–250, 260, 288–289; HD 78, 149–151; IAH 57, 84; SOT 17, 21; CLCD 79; SDH 30–32, 169.

[25] SOT 101–103, 176, 181, 195–201; FH 77; DCR 19, 22, 126; MMIS 170–175; HN 22, 30–33, 77; SDH 61; CPP 139; ICE 41, 52, 112, 194.

[26] CRPP 110, 132–135; CLCD 19–21, 61; FH 119, 134, 174; SDH 31, 139; ICE 21, 39, 41, 111, 206, 65; WCAR 42; DCR 152–153, 76; HN 178, 214, 281; BT 146, 292, 306.

[27] SDH 30–35, 139; SOT 39; WCAR 41–42; or "pragmatic" in IAH, *passim.*

[28] HN 141; FH 94, 219; IAH 30; SOT 48, 65; MMIS 2; CLCD 154; Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 432, even to the shocking and Machiavellian statement "powerless goodness ends on the cross" which is clearly indicated as a stricture, SOT 143; ICE 237. For a discussion of the concept of liberty as power, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sovereignty* (University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 248–275.

[29] John Locke, *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, ch. vii, 93; HN 101; SOT 101–105; CPP 15, 42–43, 93; SDH 14–15, 229.

[30] "The Moral Issue in International Relations," cited in Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 742.

For Niebuhr, as for early liberals, the political order is not among the higher ethical achievements of man. Man is not a political animal but an animal "born free." Community is based on "animal gregariousness," and not on human freedom; the goal of harmony within the civil order is "uncivilized" or tribal.[36] The state, since it employs coercion to attain its ends, is perhaps even less desirable than purely natural community. The state is never more than a product of necessity, to which men "give up" freedoms in the effort to escape the state of war. Hence political society is always "ambiguous" and forever "frustrates" the higher impulses of man.[37]

Since the state of war is apparently produced by the action of the spirit in "transmuting" natural harmonies, it might be suggested that the spirit be directed toward the purely spiritual, toward the contemplative life. But here Niebuhr's "idealism" asserts itself strongly; he is unwilling to allow such a separation even at the cost of conflict. St. Augustine and the Medieval theorists committed this fault: that they set the standard of human attainment too low. They paid too high a "price in order" and denied sufficient scope for freedom. "Freedom" in this case is notably a freedom to act in and to change the political order, a liberal and not a notably Christian definition of liberty. Medievalism restricted "cultural vitalities" in a quest for unity. The synthesis of Medievalism was broken up, he asserts, by "creative chaos."[38] Though medievalism may be extreme in this quest for unity, it represents only part of a general rule: that all political orders are morally mediocre because they "exalt peace over freedom."[39] Given the fact that political orders are, however, necessary due to the presence of evil and the propensity to war, justice consists in that harmony which provides maximum scope for the "unique vitality and freedom of the parts."[40]

One of Niebuhr's "perennial necessities" is the existence of a social balance of power.[41] This "necessity" is "perennial" in precisely the way that the "Rights of Man" were conceived to be inalienable: it is necessary to a just order. The balance prevents just that concentration of power in the hands of a few which limits the freedom of the many precisely because it concentrates the stuff of freedom, power. Hence a state should "institutionalize" conflict to keep power divided. And since "love" is the regulative principle of justice in absolute ethics, and freedom is the condition of love, the balance should be weighted in the direction of more, rather than less, freedom for the parts.[42] Niebuhr is not unaware that a justice whose principal virtue consists in preventing tyranny is "negative." But, he asserts, in "advanced" societies only a "rough justice" or "minimum harmony" is possible.[43] One might ask why such societies are considered "advanced." The answer can only be, because they make "freedom" possible. Justice, although a moral norm within the limits of human life, is less desirable than freedom. A "negative" justice which permits freedom, then, is better than a "positive" justice which does not.

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[31] SNE 50-51, 40-41.

[32] Richard Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960).

[33] SNE 50-51.

[34] I am indebted for the reminder to Harvey Mansfield, Jr., Harvard University; for further evidence see Ralph Barton Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944), p. 14, in which Perry identifies Burke with the "fundamental philosophy of the Declaration of Independence."

[35] Thus Hobbes: "It may, peradventure be thought that there never was such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so. . . . But though there had never been any time. . . . " (*Leviathan*, Bk. I, ch. 13).

[36] CRPP 91; SOT 21, 25, 180; SDH 17, 222; CPP 63, 119; HN 270; HD 79, 310; CLCD 53.

[37] SDH 10–11, 137, 235; SNE 33, 50, Introduction, 291; MMIS, *passim;* FH 77, 96–97, 196, 219; HD 79, 267–268, 310; SOT 168.

[38] SNE 135–139, 108–112, 4, 146–163, 44–48, 51–59, 105.

[39] SOT 175–181; FH 129, 219; SDH 229; CPP 104; CRPP 155–158; HD 310; HN 270.

[40] "The Moral Issue in International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 742.

Like all his sometime antagonists, whether Marxist or Liberal, Niebuhr sees "chaos" as oftentimes creative, conflict a good, and not merely a mournful necessity. If conflict is the price of freedom, then Niebuhr will accept conflict; and not only accept it, but sanctify it in the name of a higher morality. If Niebuhr chastizes "rationalists" for the belief that freedom is always compatible with order, it is not because, as a conservative might, he means that freedom must sometimes be restrained, but rather that one must be prepared to sacrifice order to maintain freedom.[44]

Despite his frequent criticism of that idealism which denies the limits imposed on man by nature, Niebuhr argues for the utility of even these trans-historical perspectives in the attack on political orders from a more perfectionistic stance.[45] Niebuhr's analysis of the limitations of medievalism on "cultural vitalities" suggests Marx's notion of "fetters on the modes of production." But Niebuhr goes beyond this to suggest not only that the "synthesis" became outdated but that it had paid too high a "price in order" from the outset. Both the idea of a trans-historical standard of criticism and the belief in the desirability of historical change suggest a theory of progress. And while Niebuhr regards history as "inconclusive" and progress as a mixture of good and evil, he nonetheless regards the movement of history as a forward one. His emphasis on the mixture of good and evil merely makes progress dialectic, rather than linear.[46] "Like Hegel's new logic," he once conceded, without its "premature finality."[47] Hegel's standard was also set too low. Niebuhr's theory resembles Kant's claim of a "cunning" in war and conflict in history, and progress as virtually limitless.[48] Although they differ in that Niebuhr puts the heavenly city outside of history while Kant put it inside, the concept of historical progress through conflict is the same for both. And the standard by which progress is measured, the goal of perfect peace in total freedom, is the same whichever side of the history/post-history dividing line it is placed on. Niebuhr strives valiantly to relate this idea of progress to Christian ideas of Providence. Yet orthodox Christianity saw divine providence as essentially eschatological. God's judgment at the end of history did not guarantee that events in historical time would "lead" to that judgment by a humanly discernible progression.[49]

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[41] WCAR 26; HD 253–266; SDH 198; CRPP 134–135.

[42] FH 34, 128–129, 133, 227; CLCD 118, 173–174; SDH 38, 51, 71, 168, 196–198; ICE 61, 88; 103–106, 117, 155–159, 189–191; REE 246–247, CRPP 31, 148–150; CPP 19, 27, 29; SOT 46, 68, 81, 134–135; IAH 2, 84–85; HD 277; MMIS 29, 257.

[43] BT 140; HD 252–258, 266; CPP 104, 107; ICE 60; MMIS 22; IAH 96–108; SDH 38, 178, 198, 229.

[44] "The Unity and Depth of Our Culture," *Sewanee Review*, Vol. 53 (1944), p. 193; CLCD 66; SOT 177; SDH 1; ICE 122, 171.

[45] SNE 11–13, 105, 59–61, 291.

[46] FH 20–35, 54, 66, 69, 227; SNE 297–298; HD 47, 186, 287–292, 315, 320; SDH 52; MMIS 60–62; SOT 48, 65; thus, Niebuhr retains the conviction that "time is on our side"—or at least he did in 1956: "A Qualified Faith," *New Republic*, Vol. 134 (13 Feb. 1956), pp. 14–15. Equally illustrative is Niebuhr's conviction that historical "meaning" is a "necessary affirmation": HN 4, 10, 240; FH 114; BT 5, 18.

[47] CRPP 177; *cf.* FH 214–232.

[48] Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism and War," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (June, 1962), pp. 331–340. Niebuhr's continuing belief in the virtue of "rising social forces" is connected to his earlier belief in the utility of catastrophe in advancing progress, and his continuing belief in the role of conflict. REE, passim; FH 227; SDH 151, 196; BT, ch. ii; CPP 198; MMIS 222; CLCD 118.

[49] N. P. Jacobson, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–266, 275. See also J. D. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (Dover, New York, 1955), p. 21 and the brilliant analyses

Yet despite these basically liberal perspectives, Niebuhr has continually asserted a difference between his position and that of liberalism. That he believes this difference to be one of practicability is indicated by his use of the term "realism." Liberals and social scientists, Niebuhr declares, have a "fundamental goal" of anarchy.[50] Yet although anarchy is presumably impractical, Niebuhr is not prone to deny the virtue of freedom or the evil of coercion.[51] His claim to a distinct position rests on the dubious proposition that the presumed anarchist aims of liberals ever constituted the actual goals of their policy, or that they believed that social harmony could be obtained "easily." But of far more significance is the fact that Niebuhr accepts the liberal goal as the valid goal of social policy. Religion, in a rather unusual role, has very little to say about ends of life and policy which liberalism does not say. It teaches prudence in attempting to achieve them and a safe basis on which to rest them. But the Heavenly City of Reinhold Niebuhr retains a distinctly modern form in which to cast its eternal perfections.

In fact, the best state in this world—as opposed to the heavenly ultimate—seems strikingly to resemble the United States. Niebuhr's best state must be an "open" and a "pluralist" society which, at the same time, must have an "organ of dominion and authority." Democracy, a perennial necessity, is also desirable in that it "obscures" the element of domination in the central organ by making it public, rather than the preserve of a ruling class.[52] Despite the ambiguities of technology, the state should also be technological, so as to maximize freedom over nature.[53] We may pass over the question of how far this picture actually represents the reality of American politics today; it is apparent that the image suggests the ideal of the most traditional American theorists and present day social scientists.

Niebuhr has less faith in institutional change than many liberals, and is unwilling to credit the "best state" to rational contrivance. We have "stumbled on" the "constant factors" in the human situation. Democracy is not possible for all states at all times.[54] Hamilton and Madison would have disagreed with little of that analysis. They certainly did believe that they had discovered a "science of politics." They were equally aware, however, that what had been "stumbled on" was the opportunity to put this science into practice, and that America represented a unique historical situation in which experiment was possible.[55] Niebuhr's ideal remains, in any case, the same. If his hopes for the realization of that ideal have come to rest more on historical development than on institutional change, he reflects a general tendency among 19th century liberals, once the hopes of the Enlightenment for despots who would establish their program were dissipated. Perhaps even more, he reflects the alienation from a seemingly hostile world and the sudden desperate clinging to institutions which once seemed secure that has characterized "the responsible" liberalism of his generation.

III

Niebuhr's view of man, the social good and the best state are directly connected to his conceptions of international politics. Like Kant and the liberals, Niebuhr believes, as we have noted, not only that conflict and the quest for power are inevitable, but that they are beneficial in tendency. Nations are aggregations of individuals (but without the restraints of the individual moral conscience) and must minimally leave men no less free than they were on entering the state. But since a policy based on the goal of stability is impracticable and undesirable, the state must seek to add power, to make its citizens "freer than they were before." Thus Jefferson, whose policy of "protective imperialism" sought only the power needed to preserve his country, is classified as only partially "realistic."[56] A genuine realist, then, must add power in order to increase national

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of Karl Löwith in Kegley and Bretall, *op. cit.*, pp. 282–290, and *Meaning and History* (Phoenix Books, Chicago, 1950), pp. 160–173.

[50] CLCD 66, SDH 1; MMIS xvii; ICE 61, 122, 171; SOT 177; "The Unity and Depth of Our Culture," *op. cit.*

[51] CRPP 148–150; FH 219; SOT 81, 145; ICE 147, 164, 171, 191, 209.

[52] SNE 34–35, 28, 59–65, 234–238, 291–294; CRPP 91, 96, 148–150; CLCD 1, 47–49, 118–120; HD 194–195, 249, 254–258, 266–268; SDH 38, 51, 178, 196, 198, 229; SOT 100; IAH 96–100, 108; ICE 77–78.

[53] FH 71–94; CLCD 154; IAH 71; MMIS 9; IAH 18, 30, 95, 54–58; HN 22, 57, 68.

[54] "A Qualified Faith," *op. cit.;* SNE 61–65, 34–35, 294; IAH *passim.*

[55] For example, *The Federalist*, No. 1; see also Martin Diamond, "Democracy and the *Federalist:* A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March 1959), pp. 52–68.

[56] Thus, to Niebuhr all communities are "imperialist" and oriented toward expansion. SDH 137; SNE 190–191; FH 97; CPP 18, 108; HD 89, 284–285; REE 18, 26, 36, 53, 68, 157–158.

freedom. Niebuhr's criticism of the "pretension" of empires does not imply that all imperial aims are equally bad. He regards some empires, such as the British, as clearly preferable to others. The "pretension" of empires consists in the effort to deny that all efforts to add power are equally justifiable and equally good. Differences between empires arise from the effects of their rule on others. As an act of state, however, the addition of power is always morally the same and, in adding freedom to the state concerned, morally defensible. "Universal pretensions," whether religious or ideological, are undesirable because they deny the legitimacy of the freedom of others; the "nationalistic imperialisms" of the 17th–19th centuries, Niebuhr argues, avoided this fault.[57] Yet imperial ideologies of that period reveal a number of pretensions, not the least of these being the doctrine of Social Darwinism, the claim that imperial states obeyed a "law of nature" and of progress in subjecting the weak. Presumably, Niebuhr does not regard this as a "universalist pretension" because it allows each state an equal opportunity to subject others, although it is possible that he deems the doctrine unpretentious because he believes it to be true.

But one need not go so far. Niebuhr's picture of international politics regards nations as fundamentally analogous to groups or individuals in the domestic political system, except that nations are somewhat less ethical. Hence, he advocates pluralism among power centers, change and openness, conflict and balance in the international, as well as the domestic, political world. He has always been aware that the balance of power alone could not prevent war.[58] But if the alternative to war is the empire of a single state, or even of a world state based around a single center of power, Niebuhr is quite as hostile as he would be to the rule of an elite in domestic politics. The "current" approval Niebuhr gives the balance of power arises not only from its "necessity" but from the fact that it is inherently more just, morally preferable to either of the alternatives described above.[59] For peace itself is not desirable unless it is compatible with the quest for freedom.[60] Of course, peace is a good and especially so in our day. States should therefore conduct themselves according to the dictates of "enlightened self-interest," seeking to add only so much power as is compatible with the maintenance of international order. To be exact, the policy of states should be a certain moderate variety of imperialism.[61]

This view of international politics is quite characteristic of "realist" theorists; fundamentally it is a kind of nostalgic appeal to the image of nineteenth-century European diplomacy.[62] Such diplomacy not only was permitted the luxury of a large number of centers of power, it was able to look with comparative equanimity on those conflicts which developed into open warfare, and to see such conflict as contributing to historical "progress." That Niebuhr's entire view would be shaken by the development of weapons capable of almost universal destruction is evident. Indeed, he admits that the development of these weapons has upset the traditional balance between "potential good" and "potential evil" in the increase of human power over nature; that balance, of course, is at the core of his concept of historical progress. Men, he concedes, no longer have control of the technology they have created. The power available to man has passed the point where "human contrivance" could harness it to the effort to conquer nature.[63] And Niebuhr is not without a Hobbesian aside to the effect that the peril of universal destruction may cause both the great empires of our time to prefer life to death.[64]

Yet, despite these new perceptions, Niebuhr's theory remains unchanged in its identity with older liberalism. While it is presumably desirable that both empires should prefer life, capitulation is undesirable, because it entails the loss of freedom.[65] And—one must presume—it is undesirable whether the United States or the U.S.S.R. were to be the state capitulating. And, he adds, by far the greater number of states, when confronted with a choice between survival and liberty, have chosen the latter. This is more than an empirical observation. It merely repeats his old argument that to make any other choice would be "morally perverse."[66] As so frequently in his thought, his argument that a given event must take place, given "human nature" or "history," conceals the optimistic assumption that it ought to take place, a point to which we shall return.

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[57] SNE 22–27, 146–149, 201–216.

[58] CLCD 173; HD 258, 266, 285.

[59] *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 18 (4 May 1958); SDH 202–205, 208; IAH 2, 18, 40, 77, 91, 97, 129, 133, 140–142; CLCD 161, 172, 187; CPP 125, 42, 15; CRPP 31; WCAR 85–104, 126; FH 121, 129.

[60] *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 10 (20 Feb. 1950); CPP, *passim;* SOT 194; SDH 213; CRPP 136.

[61] SNE 36, 239, 259, 193, 105–107.

[62] Michael Oakeshott, "Scientific Politics," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 1 (March 1948), pp. 347–358; Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *World Politics*, Vol. 4 (October 1951), pp. 39–65.

[63] SNE ch. xvi, 190–191, 282–290; MMIS 2, 142, 176; REE 91, 99; IAH 10; SDH 36, 222.

[64] SNE 31–32.

[65] SNE 278–279, 25–27.

Niebuhr's criticism of liberal attitudes toward foreign affairs is that liberals have seen nothing between the nation-state and the "vague universalism" represented by the idea of a world community. But he is not himself without commitments to just such a "vague universalism." Classical political philosophy and much of modern utopian theory took the small state as ideal. Niebuhr rejects the small state not only because of its lack of power but because it cannot satisfy the "limitless demand" of humanity for brotherhood, a demand to the realization of which he also refuses to assign limits.[67] In other words, the demand for "brotherhood" is treated in precisely the same terms as is the demand for freedom. But, though the terms are fundamentally the same, he offers even less discussion of this presumed human goal. This is not at all unique. Liberal and modern discussions of "fraternity" have been few, especially in comparison to the extensive theoretical discussions of the relationship of liberty and equality.[68] This may not have resulted from any sense that the Brotherhood of Man was an unimportant or secondary goal, to be realized on the attainment of liberty and equality, but rather from the belief that human fraternity was the primary goal which could only be achieved when men were free and equal. It is likely that just such a concept unites the two schools of liberalism, the older school which demanded "unfraternal" conduct and competitive ethics in the interest of a "long-run" human unity, and the more sentimental and short-term ethics of modern welfare liberalism.[69] Nor is it accidental that Niebuhr, like most of the early liberals, sees an "irresolvable" tension between "planned justice" and "laissez-faire," yet regards both as legitimate values.[70]

The universalism of traditional liberalism sought an expression in which peace and freedom would be compatible through the medium of a world federation, as opposed to a world state or empire. Niebuhr has persistently attacked this as an "illusion."[71] Government, he notes, is founded on community, and men will not be frightened into forming a world regime without a sense of community throughout the world. This seeming despair would appear to make his universalism even vaguer than that of the liberals he attacks. But he does not completely give up the goal. The mistake of his opponents is to believe world government possible immediately, without waiting for "history."[72] Man was terrorized out of the state of war and into society and thence to larger political units only by slow historical growth and "accretions" of loyalty and community. Niebuhr is again in agreement with Kant's pre-Darwinian ethic of natural selection, "historical cunning." Implicit in Niebuhr's argument is the conviction that time will bring a world regime into being. Hence his concern with political units between the "parliament of man" and the nation state: with regionalism and with empires. These, presumably, men are sufficiently terrorized to form, given the present stage of the growth of loyalty and community.

Yet by his own showing, the forces and balances which he has relied on to control nature have broken down; his, and the traditional liberal view of history are no longer adequate. One cannot be sure that man and civilization will survive long enough for history. Niebuhr is not without hopes that a disaster can be avoided, presumably long enough for history to do its work. We may, he counsels us, hope for more democracy in the government of the U.S.S.R. This is assumed to be an "improvement" either because of a belief that democracies are peaceful or because a more democratic regime in the U.S.S.R. might be more willing to form a world regime. Yet there is little reason to believe either to be the case, within Niebuhr's theory. For the "freer" a government is, the more it will feel obliged to pursue the aim of adding power; and so the more it will come into conflict with others. Niebuhr apparently connects the hope for increased democracy in the Soviet Union with his belief that war will be best avoided if states are "less rigid and righteous" and if they "realize their involvement in a common fate."[73] That is, if they gave up "universalist claims" (but not universalist *beliefs*, such as the belief in the "freedom of all nations") states would be more inclined to accomodate the claims of others, which would be recognized as quite as legitimate as their own. Moreover, it is presumably true that if states did not make universal claims, they would be less inclined to come into conflict with others in the first place. But even if "democratic" states are more likely to lack righteous and rigid attitudes the belief that the absence of such attitudes conduces to peace, however, true, is itself a suggestive one. The absence of rigidity, the willingness to compromise, to accept the interests of others as legitimate, comprise once again the traditional liberal belief in "enlightened self-interest" and in the "natural harmony" of the interests of nations. To be sure, Niebuhr stresses the necessity of the sense of a "common fate." But that sense too was part of the liberal creed in the "vague universalism" to which we have had reference, the belief that free, equal and democratic nations would sense the "brotherhood of nations" just as individuals were to sense human fraternity, and by the same process. That Niebuhr's theory relies a good deal on this sense of community being produced by terror is no new addition. For terror and the fear of violence have long been involved in the modern hope to realize in practice the vision of human brotherhood, from the Machiavellian belief that necessity and the fear of death make men virtuous, through Rousseau's willingness to force men to be free, to Wilson's use of war in the service of universal democracy.[74] Reformation through violence has always been close to the center of the liberal-modernist creed, a creed which, in its Jacobin form, was described so brilliantly by Chamfort, "*Sois mon frère, ou je te tue.*"

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[66] CPP, ch. 1, SNE ch. xvi.

[67] HD 245–246, 85, 95–96; CLCD 48–49, 154, 187; SOT 48, 84; WCAR 47; CRPP 16, 155–158.

[68] Kenneth Benne, "The Uses of Fraternity," *Daedalus*, Vol. 90 (Spring 1961), pp. 233–246.

[69] Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Princeton, 1949).

[70] IAH 108; BT ch. iii; SDH 195–200; DCR 85, 175; "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities," *New Republic*, Vol. 133 (4 July 1955), pp. 11–13; "Liberals and the Marxist Heresy," *id.*, Vol. 129 (12 October 1953), pp. 13–15. For the same problem in early liberalism, see E. Halevy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism* (Boston, 1955).

[71] SNE 28, 66–88, 256, 266, 289; CRPP ch. 2.

[72] SNE 279.

IV

Niebuhr's dilemma is not his alone. It is the dilemma of modern liberalism, and of those radical ideas based on liberal premises such as orthodox Marxism. For contemporary events have made the faith in historical progress through struggle, the belief that the vital human goal is the conquest of Nature, and even that man is born with a desire to be free, seem more and more doubtful, dangerous, or irrelevant. In this light the widespread appeal of Niebuhr's work, even to those Morton White calls the "atheists for Niebuhr," can be understood.[75] For as a theologian Niebuhr can do what the secular liberal cannot: he can elevate the doubtful basis of liberalism to an area of "prophetic" and revealed insight where it may be safe from disconfirming experience in the world and criticism at the hands of reason. If there is a cost for the liberal, that his utopia is placed beyond the possibility of complete attainment, then that cost is small considering the added security of his cherished beliefs. For liberals have come to doubt the possibility of that utopia themselves, and Niebuhr's teaching leaves them the chance to approach ever more closely that undefined set of "limits" which he postulates. To the "vague universalism" of liberalism he has added a "vague utopianism" which is both more vague and more secure by being beyond argument in the sphere of faith. His "realism," his repeated attacks on "utopians," and his rhetoric of "metaphysical pathos" merely enable him to avoid a discussion or clarification of the goals which he believes a man or a state should pursue. Niebuhr notes that the moral issue is persistently raised because men "cannot follow their interest without claiming to do so in obedience to some general scheme of values."[76] But what such a comment overlooks is that men cannot know what their "interest" *is* without reference to some scheme of values. "Interest" is, after all, a term without intrinsic meaning. That Niebuhr, like so many American writers, can use it as though it had such a meaning merely reflects the American "liberal tradition," a connected set of beliefs regarding human nature and moral values which are not discussed at all. He approaches the issues from a curious stance because "realism" is not only a statement of what is practical; when supplemented by a knowledge of man's "free spirit" it is also a statement of what is desirable. The social good is one which "works" for him as for the liberals, because that good is power over nature, the power to "predict and control" the world. The problem of the ends toward which control should strive may be ignored: control is itself the end. For Niebuhr the free man is in essence the good man; virtue follows automatically from freedom. Man's imperfections arise from his involvement in nature—an inevitable involvement, to be sure, but one rooted in lack of power and not of virtue in the classical sense.

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[73] SNE 280–283, 236–238, 276–277, 246–255.

[74] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Machiavellian Utopia," *Ethics*, Vol. 55 (January 1945) pp. 145–148; Allan Bloom, "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: An Interpretation of Othello," this REVIEW, Vol. 54 (March 1960), pp. 130–157, or Michael Polanyi's recently published pamphlet, "Beyond Nihilism." A brilliant and closely related discussion is John F. R. Taylor's "Politics and the Human Covenant," *Centennial Review*, Vol. 6 (Winter 1962), pp. 1–18.

[75] "Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning," *Confluence*, Vol. 3 (1954), pp. 402–412.

[76] "The Moral Issue in International Relations," *op. cit.*, p. 740.

Plato and Aristotle, Niebuhr argues, believed the *polis* to be the "final form" of the state. They believed that the small state was the best for man because they distrusted the expansionist urge and its consequent imperialism. They did not claim, as Niebuhr seems to believe, that the *polis* would always endure. His contention that the empires which succeeded the city state sacrificed order and community for domination would seem to support their view.[77] But the classic theorists were less concerned than Niebuhr with predicting history or with what form of state "works best," preferring to defer such questions until it became clear what form of state *is* best and forms the standard of human aspiration.

Niebuhr, the liberals, and many social scientists have excoriated "utopians." But they did not thereby avoid having a utopia. They simply avoided discussing it. And that lack of discussion conceals the fact that they identify ideality with practicality, and virtue with necessity, what works with what is right. If man in our times feels a "prisoner of forces" outside himself, it is often because he has abdicated to those forces the eternal responsibility to articulate a vision of what is best. The very bankruptcy of Niebuhr's ideas, his inability to offer a new vision even at a time when by his showing the old ideas have proved themselves false, may have a function. That bankruptcy may provide us with the courage, as we already have the opportunity, to resume from history and necessity the old quest to discover by reason the nature of the good life, of virtue, and of Utopia.

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[77] SNE 42–43, 288.

COMMUNISM, NATIONALISM AND THE GROWTH OF THE COMMUNIST COMMUNITY OF NATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II

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In the apocalyptic visions of Marx, the world revolution which was to destroy capitalist society was also to sweep away the entire system of nation-states, and in its place to substitute a world proletarian society, a new supra-national community ruled over by the victorious working class.

Of all the prophecies of early Marxism, none proved more ill-founded than this belief in an international socialist order. The revolution, when it came, was confined to Russia. Only after the victories of the Soviet armies in World War II did it become possible to extend Communist rule beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. After less than two decades, this new international Communist community of nations has become divided into blocs of quarrelling states, and the goal of international Communism seems still distant. The Communists, like other universalistic movements of the past, have apparently proved incapable of surmounting the limits of the nation-state system they set out to destroy. Why?

It seems immediately obvious that the Communists were themselves divided by the forces of nationalism. But this observation, while not necessarily incorrect, needs more precise formulation and further analysis. In the pages to follow, the formation and the growth of the Communist community of nations after World War II will be re-examined, to reveal more clearly the dynamics of the process. The central point, which will emerge as the discussion proceeds, is that nationalism did not lie at the root of the centrifugal pressures which appeared within the Communist bloc. Nationalism came later, and when it did, developed a variety of forms which reflected the unique conditions under which each Communist state evolved. Before we get into the details of this process, however, it will be necessary to comment briefly on two points: the meaning of nationalism, and Communist views prior to World War II on the subject of supra-national integration.

I. THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM

Definitions pose one of the most exasperating problems in all the literature dealing with nationalism. Those who have wrestled with them seem to agree on one point only: nationalism is an elusive phenomenon that defies exact description.[1] Nevertheless, definitions cannot be avoided. This is especially true when dealing with the emergence of nationalism in Communist nations. The confusion which this problem has engendered can often be traced to the lack of common agreement on the meaning of the terms employed. Rather than formulate one comprehensive definition of nationalism, we shall attempt to deal with the difficulty by suggesting several complementary situations, each of which can be said to reflect the presence of nationalism. These distinctions will be useful in analyzing the character which nationalism has assumed in Communist states.

National Pride. Many writers have suggested that nationalism is a state of mind in which the individual ascribes special virtues to the national way of life (language, culture, or national history), and so demands that the supreme loyalty of each citizen be given to the individual nation-state.[2] This approach is legitimate if not construed too narrowly. The idea of nationalism may develop in a revolutionary context, in which it can be inspired by ideals which transcend the framework of the nation-state. "Supreme" loyalty to the state is never unconditional: it rests on underlying assumptions of what the desirable state is. For our purposes it is sufficient to allow that *nationalism, is, in one sense, the product of a fundamental attachment to the values embodied in the national culture and history of a people.*

National Independence. Nationalism may also refer to the process, so often noted in discussions of international politics, by which states, unsure of each other's motives and seeking the fullest possible security, attempt to maximize their power and maintain their independence of action. Here again, there is no absolute standard for determining what is and what is not a "national" position. Cooperation between nations may be in the national interest, even to the point of giving up considerable freedom of action. On the other hand, nations which are linked through mutual understanding and compatibility of interests may still deem it wise to pursue independent paths which lead to clashes of national interest. Taking these factors into consideration, we suggest that *a second form of nationalism manifests itself in the belief that there exists a fundamental need—arising from fear, lack of understanding, or the unpredictable nature of international politics—for the maintenance of a considerable degree of national independence and for giving priority, in most cases, to one's own immediate national interests.*

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[1] For a useful summary see Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), ch. 1.

[2] Hans Kohn defines nationalism as "A state of mind permeating the large majority of the people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the source of all creative cultural energy and well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore rooted in and made possible by its welfare." *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1944), p. 16.

The Nation-State as a Vehicle of Progress. In the course of the vast social and economic revolutions of the past several centuries, the nation-state has emerged as the most effective socio-political mechanism by which change can be stimulated or channelled by a ruling elite or dominant class. There is no need to interpret this process—as the Marxists have done—in terms of narrow class interest. On the contrary, the mechanisms of the state, acting through a national culture or economy, may be used for an infinite variety of purposes, and today these channels of action are more and more becoming associated with the pursuit of economic progress through industrialization.

We therefore suggest that in this day and age *nationalism also reveals itself in the belief that progress toward whatever new goals men aspire to comes about through the creation of the nation-state and the stimulation of its growth, strength and effectiveness, regardless of whether the final end may be narrower than the state (a class or group interest) or universal in scope.*

National communism may be interpreted in a number of ways. It may mean the adoption, by a national party, of certain ideas or methods not generally approved by the rest of the Communist bloc. A recent work on the Communist bloc follows this approach in defining national communism as "the explicit assignment of priority to internal considerations even if openly challenged by those who consider themselves to be the central spokesmen of international communism."[3] Such a situation could of course arise even if nationalism never entered into the picture. Our own interpretation of national communism, to be given later, will suggest that the term is most appropriately used in association with the third type of nationalism just described.

II. VIEWS ON SUPRA-NATIONAL INTEGRATION PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II

Before the Second World War the Communists gave surprisingly little attention to the subject of the integration of states into a supra-national community. Early Marxist writings seldom bothered with the issue, for it was assumed that the victory of the proletariat would bring the final destruction of the nation-state system.[4] After the victory of communism in the Soviet Union, reference was made to a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics, but discussion even of this goal vanished in the 1930s.[5]

At the same time, the Soviet party prior to World War II developed positions on the question of nationalism and relations among Communist parties that were of central importance for any future Communist community of nations. Although these developments were complex, we can only deal briefly with them here.

First, communism came to be identified with suppressed national aspirations, a position we shall refer to as "revolutionary nationalism." Revolutionary nationalism differed from the original Marxist views insofar as it recognized the importance of national feelings and encouraged the notion that every nationality exhibits its own particular virtues (language, culture, history) and therefore enjoys the right to its own existence. The practice of appealing to revolutionary nationalism first arose during the Russian revolution and was later extended to the colonial countries. The doctrine was fully articulated in the theory of Soviet federalism, according to which each Soviet Republic was "sovereign" and free to develop national cultural forms with a socialist content.

Second, the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia established the doctrine as well as the fact that the world Communist movement would operate on the basis of monolithic unity under the control of the Soviet party. The dogmatic insistence on the need for monolithic unity, and the ruthless fashion in which the Soviet party applied this Leninist precept, are too well known to require further elucidation.

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[3] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, 1960), p. 62.

[4] Marx and Engels wrote little on the national problem. For their views, see E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. I (New York, 1951), pp. 410–28 and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, 1957), ch. 1.

[5] For Communist views on the world state, see Elliot Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York, 1960), ch. 2.

Third, the consolidation of Stalin's power in the Soviet Union was paralleled by the growth of Soviet nationalism. The necessity of building socialism in one country encouraged a fusion of Russian nationalism and Soviet patriotism; Soviet totalitarianism, when it matured in the 1930s, proved to be a blend of both revolutionary and traditional Russian elements.[6] The international Communist movement, under Soviet leadership, was forced to subordinate the aim of world revolution to the national interests of the Soviet Union—often to the discomfiture of communist parties in other countries.

At first glance it might seem difficult to reconcile the doctrines of revolutionary nationalism, monolithic unity and the supremacy of Soviet national interests. For some, of course, it was more than difficult; it became impossible. But for the hard-core Communists who were later to come to power in Eastern Europe, the Communist interpretation of these problems was consistent and beyond criticism. Revolutionary nationalism, although it tolerated a certain degree of national feeling, made a sharp distinction between "Socialist patriotism" (which was acceptable) and "nationalism" (always a pejorative term). Nationalism was associated with attachment to a pre-revolutionary way of life and a refusal to give supreme loyalty to the goal of world communism. Ultimately, the toleration of national cultures would lead to their fusion in a world socialist culture; when this point was reached, concessions to revolutionary nationalism would no longer be necessary.[7] Dedicated Communists saw no contradiction in subordinating themselves to an international movement whose primary aim was to advance the interests of the Soviet Union; after all, the Soviet Union stood alone, encircled by capitalist foes, and the first duty of Communists everywhere was to come to her defense. Revolutionary unity, under the leadership of the Soviet party, was accepted as an absolutely necessary pre-condition for the success of the revolution in other parts of the world.

In general, the Communist approach to the problem of establishing an international socialist system was conditioned by the importance of the current struggle to defend the Soviet Union and strengthen the revolutionary movement in capitalist countries. No concrete plans seem to have been made to meet the problems which would arise if Communist states were formed outside the Soviet Union, in particular in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless there were some hints, long prior to the war, of the eventual Soviet view on the form of a Communist community of nations. There is evidence that Stalin himself did not fully accept the position that Soviet federalism could be applied at the international level.[8] Another fact of importance was the introduction in the mid-1930s of the idea of "Proletarian United Front Governments."[9] These were to be transitional, between bourgeois democracy and socialism, Communist-dominated, and apparently free from any machinery of supra-national control or coordination. In fact, they were the original concept from which the "Peoples' Democracies" of Eastern Europe developed after the war.

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[6] These developments are analyzed in detail in Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York, 1956).

[7] For a discussion of the future world culture as interpreted by the Communists, see Goodman, ch. 7.

[8] At the 2d Congress of the Comintern in 1920 Stalin suggested that the future international Communist community be designated a confederation ("an alliance of independent states") out of consideration for national differences, rather than a federation, which was the appropriate form within the framework of the old Russian Empire. Lenin rejected the proposal, and the future world state was referred to as a federation. See Goodman, pp. 232–33. Earlier, in his work *Marxism and the National Question*, Stalin had shown a rather conservative view toward socialist internationalism by incorporating elements into his description of the nation which magnified the importance of the nation and were therefore unacceptable to Lenin at the time. See Pipes, p. 39. Stalin also made a connection between national conditions and forms of Communist rule when, in 1928, he suggested that nations in which capitalism had only begun to develop (Poland and Rumania were used as examples) could not adopt Soviet institutions immediately; rather, these were areas where "the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and will certainly require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" *Works*, Vol. XI (Moscow, 1954), p. 162. The rationale for a transitional period is here based on socio-economic conditions, and should be distinguished from the reasons behind the proposals for "proletarian united front governments" in the 1930s (*infra*).

[9] "If . . . it will prove possible, and necessary, in the interests of the proletariat, to create *a proletarian united front government*, which is not yet a government of the proletarian dictatorship, but one which undertakes to put into effect decisive measures against fascism and reaction, the Communist Party must see to it that such a government is formed . . . " (italics in the original). *Resolutions, Seventh Congress of the Communist International* (New York, Workers Library), pp. 30–31.

III. THE METHOD OF CONSOLIDATING COMMUNIST POWER IN EASTERN EUROPE

On the basis of this ill-digested body of doctrines concerning the world Communist state, the construction of a new Communist community of nations began after World War II. The power of the Soviet Union was such that she might conceivably have absorbed these nations directly into the Soviet federation. But a host of practical considerations weighed against this course of action. It would have needlessly antagonized the West, weakened the international Communist movement, and, at the very least, complicated enormously the tasks of occupation, if it did not, indeed, provoke the peoples of Eastern Europe to revolt against the newly established Communist regimes. National differences in Eastern Europe were simply too great to be ignored. On similar grounds Hitler in 1940 had chosen to establish the Vichy regime rather than occupy all France; and a century earlier, *mutatis mutandis*, the British had preferred a system of indirect rule in India and elsewhere. Purely tactical considerations were therefore sufficient to dictate a policy of Soviet caution in integrating the new states within some supra-national framework.

These differences among the peoples of Eastern Europe did not, however, exist within the national Communist parties. The party leaders in Eastern Europe were a group apart, trained and selected by Moscow in the years prior to the war. They came to power convinced of the need for monolithic unity, contemptuous of the bourgeois nationalism of the people, and eager to begin the process which would eventually lead to a new supranational Communist order. The strong national feelings of the people were not, therefore, automatically transferred to the Communists who assumed power in Eastern Europe. Nor did the obvious obstacles to immediate integration of the newly formed Communist nations imposed by the attitude of their masses rule out the formulation of a policy by which this goal might sooner or later be achieved.

A different sort of difficulty arose from the fact that Moscow now had to deal with established parties and official governments rather than with the revolutionary movements which had struggled so desperately to survive between the two world wars. Indeed, it was unwise in the altered circumstances to formalize the power of the Soviet party over the new officials in Eastern Europe in a set of rules analogous to those which existed within each party. And it would seem only natural that the national party leaders, under the influence of their lately acquired power and prestige, might interpret a too direct Soviet supervision of their actions as unwarranted control over the "domestic" affairs of the nation.

It would be wrong, however, to consider this new-found legality a decisive factor for the development of the Communist system in Eastern Europe after the war. In all likelihood the majority of national party leaders did feel that their new formal authority should be acknowledged by the Soviet Union. But the proper limits of interference by Moscow were never clearly defined, and practical necessities kept reminding them of their dependence on the Russians. More important, the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe continued to acknowledge the primacy of Moscow in all matters touching on the monolithic unity of the bloc, a position which, in the last analysis, recognized the right of the Soviet party to play a decisive role in the concerns of the national parties.

Finally, it could be argued that the Communist parties of Eastern Europe had, in coming to power, assumed the burden of protecting the national interests of their peoples, and that this was bound to create special problems which did not exist before the war by revealing the contradictions involved in equating the interests of each Communist party with the national interests of the Soviet Union.

While there is much to be said for this interpretation of the situation created by the formation of Communist governments outside the Soviet Union, it leaves too much unexplained. Although not couched exactly in these terms, the discussion in the pages to follow will be aimed at analyzing more closely just what "national interest" meant in the context of the Communists' views on the method to be pursued in constructing a totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. For the postwar developments in Eastern Europe cannot be fully understood without reference to a broader issue closely connected with the ultimate aim of supra-national integration: the method by which Communist power was to be consolidated throughout the bloc as a whole. Although means, not ultimate ends, may originally have been at stake, this was not the first occasion in the Communist experience when means became ends in themselves and profoundly influenced the course of Communist evolution.

Theoretical analyses of totalitarianism agree on its built-in bias toward unlimited expansion.[10] But there is also agreement that a totalitarian system may, through its own methods of operation, put obstacles in its path to world domination. The Nazi method of empire building was an obvious case in point. The Stalinist type of totalitarianism, we think, must also be analyzed from this point of view.

To understand how Soviet totalitarianism developed in ways detrimental to its own universalistic aspirations, we must re-examine the concept of building socialism in one country alone. The idea was a natural one, since world revolution did not seem imminent. But the decision to pursue such a policy was arbitrary in so far as it implied that circumstances unfavorable to the creation of a Communist utopia (the existing obstacles to the creation of an advanced economy or socialist society, such as lack of a working class) could be overcome by sheer determination and will on the part of the revolutionary party and its leadership. This underlying assumption became a mystique in the Soviet Union with the emergence of Stalinist totalitarianism in the 1930s. To its disciples, Soviet development seemed to prove that by mobilizing political power through a disciplined party one might destroy the existing society, build up an industrial base, and attain socialism through one's own efforts. The size of the country, and other material factors relevant to its potential industrial capacity, were largely overlooked.

We think these assumptions, so different from the original precepts of world revolution, were in fact a decisive influence on the development of the international Communist community. After World War II a strong bias arose toward transforming the principle of building totalitarianism ("socialism") in one country alone into a more general principle which, for want of a more appropriate term, we may call the building of Communist totalitarianism in each country separately.

Did the Soviet Union actively inculcate this notion among national party leaders in Eastern Europe after World War II? The answer to this question is by no means clear-cut, for the Soviet position was shifting and ambiguous. First let us deal with its ideological aspects, and then turn to the practical policies guiding Soviet actions in the satellite nations.

In Soviet writings after the war the Communist states of Eastern Europe were referred to as "Peoples' Democracies," a transitional form of Communist rule less advanced than the Soviet Union's. The significance of the Peoples' Democracies was first said to lie in the fact that they were pioneers in the development of a new path to socialism.[11] After 1948 (the year of the Soviet-Yugoslav break) the line changed, and Soviet writers insisted that Peoples' Democracies were following the laws of development first applied in the Soviet Union. "National" roads to communism—such as Tito's—were made the object of a vicious, uncompromising attack.

The earlier interpretation of the meaning of People's Democracy seemed a linear descendent of the pre-war notion of the "Proletarian United Front Government."[12] This view suggested that conditions in Eastern Europe precluded simple imitation of Soviet development. For this reason, it might be expected to find favor among those satellite leaders who wished to build socialism in one country by adapting Soviet practices to local conditions. By comparison, the post-1948, "narrow" interpretation of People's Democracy left the satellites with little room for independent development. But it is important to note—and this is often overlooked—that after 1948 it was clearly spelled out for the first time that each Eastern European nation, since it must follow the Soviet path, *could* do so. Soviet socialism could be duplicated in each Communist state. Communist totalitarianism could be built in each country separately.

In one sense, at least, this suggested more, not less power for the new Communist states: if the East European nations could duplicate the Soviet performance, they might one day become her equals. Imitation of the Soviet Union, after all, did not necessarily imply subordination and dependence. It could also mean power and independence for each Communist nation separately. But the Soviets were at pains to deny just this set of conclusions after 1948. It was claimed instead that the formation and development of the Peoples' Democracies rested on the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War II. Indeed, the aim of Soviet policy after 1948 was to bind the satellites even more tightly to the Soviet Union, and the new version of Peoples' Democracy was rightly interpreted as one means to this end.

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[10] See Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, 1956), ch. 6, and Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), p. 391.

[11] See the remarks of E. Varga that "the social structure of these states is distinguished from all known to us up to now; it appears as something completely new in the history of humanity." "Demokratiia novago tipa," *Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 3, 1947, p. 3. For an exhaustive analysis of the term see H. Gordon Skilling, "People's Democracy in Soviet Theory," *Soviet Studies*, III, pp. 16–33 and 131–49.

[12] The origins of the theory of People's Democracy have been the source of some disagreement. For other views, *cf.* Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, ch. 2, and G. Ginsburgs, *Soviet Studies*, XIII, p. 451.

The ideological issue was even more complex than this brief summary suggests. But enough has been said to indicate that national party leaders, especially those *most* imbued with Stalinist concepts of building totalitarianism in each country separately, might accept the premise of Soviet theory—the necessity of following Soviet laws of development—and reject the important *caveat* that the process would result in greater, not less, dependence on the Soviet Union.

The policy of the Soviet Union in regard to economic and political matters also suggested that the methods of building totalitarianism in each country separately were being applied, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, to build communism and to favor the narrow interests of the Soviet Union.

As noted earlier, Stalin had on occasion made a distinction between the federal form of government, suitable for the Soviet Union, and a looser confederation, suitable for a number of Communist states. In the years 1945–1948, Soviet policy went to considerable lengths to adjust to the special problems facing the formation of an integrated Communist community among formerly independent nation-states. During this time satellite leaders were permitted a degree of flexibility which allowed them to consolidate their power in accordance with local conditions.[13] In 1948 a reversal of policy took place. The national parties were then forced to apply Soviet cultural standards as well as Soviet political methods without regard for local conditions or the national feelings of the population.

Even after 1948, however, there was ample evidence that the Soviets continued to develop their policies within the framework of the existing pattern of nation-states in Eastern Europe. One striking example of this was the manner in which treaties between the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe adhered to traditional concepts of territorial integrity and diplomatic rights.[14] More important was the increasing emphasis on autarchic economic development[15] within each Eastern European state after 1948. The exact reasons for the adoption of such a policy have remained a source of debate. Both the Soviets and the satellites seem to have had complete faith in the methods of economic development which had worked so well in the Soviet Union, even when the arguments for economic autarchy would seem difficult to justify under East European conditions.[16] On the other hand, Stalin's support for this policy can be interpreted as consistent with his desire to isolate the satellite nations from one another in order to assure their control by the Soviet Union. Stalin may also have calculated that self-contained autarchic development would permit the maximum exploitation of the East European economies.[17]

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[13] See Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc*, pp. 32–36, for a description of how the Eastern European parties and the Soviet Union adjusted their policies in the light of the strong nationalism of the Eastern European peoples immediately after the war. Brzezinski emphasizes how, in this period, the national parties masked their designs under appeals to national interests. Thus (p. 36), "the founding declaration of the Polish Workers (Communist) Party reads almost like a national harangue."

[14] See John N. Hazard, "Soviet Socialism as a Public Order System," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1959, pp. 36–37. Border treaties carefully dealt with questions of land mass, waterways and airspace in a manner designed to protect the sovereign rights of each partner. Consular conventions between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies carefully defined diplomatic privileges and immunities —including the right to the use of cipher in communicating with the home country!

[15] Although the term "economic autarchy" is normally used to describe the economic development of Eastern Europe in this period, the situation was complicated by the fact that each of the Eastern European nations depended heavily on trade, especially with the Soviet Union, to supply it with basic raw materials, and further by the tendency of the major partner to set the terms of this trade to its own advantage. Still, autarchy—in the sense of constructing all the components of heavy industry—was the goal of these countries.

[16] The economic benefits of such a policy for Eastern Europe were argued by David Granick, "The Pattern of Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe and Its Relations to Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 68, pp. 366–400. Granick suggested that the satellites were following a policy of "balanced national economy," meaning that "each country should produce sufficient agricultural and industrial products to meet its own consumption needs, that it should provide the means of production necessary to make this possible, and that the remainder of its production should be geared to heavy industry and the construction of machinery with which to further industrialize its economy." Dealing with this problem at a later date, Granick suggested that the forced pace of economic development led

In our opinion, Stalin accepted the principle of building totalitarianism in each country separately as the basic method of consolidating Communist rule. Within, and sometimes contrary to this principle, he attempted to exploit and control the satellite nations. Certainly the frame of reference for the international Communist community as a whole, even before 1948, was the duplication, through a series of stages, of Soviet development within the existing nation-state system, rather than political and economic integration throughout the bloc as a whole. The pattern of development which was to lead to a world Communist state was therefore unique. It was not integrative so much as it was reproductive. One could say that each nation was going along parallel tracks, guided by Moscow. More concretely, each was engaged in an effort to duplicate, *in toto,* the structure of Soviet totalitarianism.

IV. STRAINS IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC AFTER WORLD WAR II

As a result of the Communist approach to the problem of consolidating power, the historical nation-state came to have a central importance for those Communists faced with the postwar task of constructing a totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. The ultimate goal was still to create a uniform pattern of totalitarian rule that would destroy all differences among nations. But it is clear from the discussion of People's Democracy above that considerable confusion prevailed concerning the immediate consequences of the development of totalitarianism in each country separately.

Broadly speaking, three possible alternatives were envisaged: (i) the nation in question might develop a form of Communist rule somewhat different from that in the Soviet Union but adapted to her own conditions (a pattern hereinafter referred to as "domesticism"[18]); (ii) the nation might adopt Soviet institutions and practices in their entirety but remain so dependent on the Soviet Union that any form of integration would only make permanent the inferior status of the satellite nation and its party; (iii) the nation might pattern herself after the Soviet Union in the belief that the successful construction of a totalitarian state required (and would lead to) the duplication not only of Soviet institutions, but also of Soviet power. In this case integration, if and when it took place, would have to be among equals.

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to repeated bottle-necks and uncertainty of supply, compensated by efforts to be self-sufficient. This general pressure toward autarchy can be observed in the Soviet enterprise and can be extended, in principle, to the nations of the Communist bloc. See Norman J. G. Pounds and Nicolar Spulber (eds.), *Resources and Planning in Eastern Europe,* p. 140. The small size of the Eastern European states may not have been as great a barrier to the policy of economic autarchy as was once thought; a recent discussion of the economic problems posed by the limited size of nations suggests that it is easy to over-estimate the role of economies of scale achieved by large states. See Austin Robinson (ed.), *The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations* (New York, 1960), p. xvii. Only in "small" countries of under 10 to 15 million do economies of scale make it unwise to engage in the construction of certain key industries such as large machine tools or heavy electrical equipment (without access to an adequate foreign market). This very rough criterion suggests that in Eastern Europe, Albania and Bulgaria were too small to engage in an all-out program of heavy industry construction, while Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia were borderline cases.

On the other hand, the policy of economic autarchy produced obvious distortions in the Eastern European economies, and was subject to bitter attack after 1955 by the more liberal Communist elements as economically indefensible. See Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York, 1957), ch. 20, and Oscar Lange, *The Political Economy of Socialism* (The Hague, 1958).

[17] Granick, in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* rejected the thesis that the pattern of economic development in Eastern Europe was governed by Soviet interests in exploiting the area, suggesting that if this were the case, the Soviet Union would not have encouraged heavy industry, but a type of economy more complementary to her own (consumers goods, for example). For a contrary view—that the Soviets were primarily interested in exploiting the East European economies in the Stalinist period—see Alfred Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism,* VIII, No. 4, pp. 23–29.

[18] A term coined by Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* p. 52, to refer to the adaptation to local circumstances by a national party within the general pattern.

The kinds of problems that arose in relations between members of the Communist bloc after World War II can be associated, for the most part, with attempts to pursue one or another of these courses of development. It might be supposed that the choice among these alternatives, since it revolved around means rather than ultimate ends, would not necessarily have been of importance for the new Communist nations. Yet the dynamics of the process did indeed create strains between the national parties and Moscow, and ultimately prejudiced the end of supranational integration itself.

The manner in which Eastern Europe developed these distinctive patterns is well known. In the countries where the national parties were weak (such as Poland), there was a tendency to accept the first alternative suggested above—domesticism. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the third alternative—the duplication of Soviet institutions *and* Soviet power—came to be accepted as the only proper method of building communism in each country separately. After 1948, the nations within the Soviet orbit were forced to accept the second course—duplication of Soviet institutions artificially and with extreme reliance on Soviet power.

The trend toward domesticism has sometimes seemed to be potentially the most divisive force. It is closely associated with nationalism and the desire to question the infallibility of Soviet methods. But such an interpretation makes too mechanical a connection between the lingering effects of nationalism and the dynamics of Communist development—at least in the years immediately after the war. If our analysis is correct, the trend toward domesticism in the immediate postwar period was not a preferred choice but essentially a sign of weakness among parties that were not yet *able* to duplicate the Soviet pattern of development. Poland is a case in point. Here, opposition to the Soviet demands for conformity from the satellites in 1948 was inspired not by a wish to pioneer in the development of new institutions, but by a desire to move slowly in the introduction of Soviet methods, especially in the field of agriculture.[19]

It was the Yugoslav path to Communism which, as events proved, posed the greatest threat to the unity of the Communist bloc. The Yugoslav case is extremely instructive, for the party leaders, working in a multi-national state to begin with, had no strong national loyalties and were the most eager, among the Communists of Eastern Europe, to follow the Soviet path of development. On the other hand the Yugoslav Communists had, since the time of the Partisan campaigns in World War II, developed the habit of independent thinking and an overbearing confidence in their own abilities. This arrogance has been well described as "Partisan chauvinism." It led the Yugoslav Communist Party to believe that it was the dominant party in the Balkans and not unnaturally produced friction with the Soviet leadership. Many of the difficulties that then arose, far from being peculiarly national in origin, can be traced back to differences over the tactics to be pursued in the world revolutionary struggle for the consolidation and spread of Communist power.[20]

The dispute between the Yugoslav and Soviet parties might be described in this context alone. But to do so would overlook another essential element in the struggle. The Yugoslav Communists had been led, by their very success in building communism, to believe that they had become indispensable for the task of socialist construction in Yugoslavia. Within the broad and ambiguous bounds of the prevailing mystique of building totalitarianism in each country separately, this position of duplicating Soviet institutions *and* power seemed absolutely orthodox to the Yugoslav Communists, although it immediately precipitated them into conflict with the Soviet party. Matters were only made worse when the Soviets accused the Yugoslavs of moving *too fast* down the road to socialism.[21] Correctly or not, their own Stalinist outlook led Tito and his associates to the conclusion that Moscow, by questioning the means pursued by the Yugoslav Communist party, had renounced the end of socialism itself—at least as far as Yugoslavia was concerned. Thus fortified by the belief that the very fate of the revolution was at stake in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Communists were able to take the momentous step of openly defying the military, political and ideological pressures brought to bear by the Soviet Union.

The Chinese party also adhered to the method of building communism followed by the Yugoslavs. Stalin learned from his experience in 1948 that strong-arm tactics could not reverse this trend, while the Chinese, for their part, were careful not to provoke a split with the Soviet Union.[22] The outward unity between these two great Communist powers could nevertheless not disguise the fact that the Chinese party had decided upon an autarchic path of economic development resting on an independent power base. Thus it came to pass that historical national boundaries, which should only have been incidental factors in Communist plans for the future world society, came instead to represent crucial dividing lines between separate, and often clashing, concentrations of power.

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[19] See Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 174–78.

[20] There is evidence that the Yugoslavs associated themselves with the Zhdanov faction within the Soviet leadership, and that the discrediting of this group in the spring of 1948 helped touch off the attack on Yugoslavia. See R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (New York, 1961), pp. 101–02.

[21] See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (London, 1948).

V. THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM

We can now return to the problem of nationalism and inquire more closely into its role in the development of the Communist bloc after World War II. Nationalism, as already noted, should be considered in its several meanings: first, as a positive commitment to the values embodied in the national culture and history; second, as a belief in the fundamental need to maintain independence in the international sphere; and third, as a belief that progress comes about through the vehicle of the nation-state. "National communism" was tentatively associated with this third type of nationalism.

Following one line of argument, the failure of the Communists to establish a supra-national state after World War II could be interpreted as the last of a series of concessions on the part of communism to one or another of these forms of nationalism. In support of this theory one could point to the acceptance of the idea of revolutionary nationalism; the rise of aggressive Soviet chauvinism; and, finally, the application of the concept of building totalitarianism in each country separately. The logical conclusion, after such an enumeration, might be that nationalism had swallowed communism.

Yet this view oversimplifies the situation. Our analysis has not indicated that the first type of nationalism listed above was of crucial importance after the war: *i.e.*, that the Communist leaders of Eastern Europe were infected with the nationalistic prejudices of the former ruling groups in their countries, or that Soviet chauvinism came into immediate conflict with the principles associated with revolutionary nationalism. Nor would it be correct to say that Tito's national communism, although it gave priority to the interests of the Yugoslav state, was originally motivated by a belief in the desirability of establishing independence for Yugoslavia in the international sphere (the second type above).

Might we say that the pattern of development in the Communist bloc after World War II reflected the acceptance of nationalism in the third sense—the belief that progress is accomplished through development of the nation-state? Here we meet a curious paradox. As we have described it, the process of building Stalinist totalitarianism took place within the boundaries of existing historical states for precisely the opposite reason, not out of a desire to strengthen the nation-state, but in order to carry out more swiftly the "de-nationalization" of the states concerned and the "atomization" of their populations.

On the other hand, those who most faithfully followed the Soviet method of building totalitarianism—the Yugoslavs and the Chinese—came almost immediately to champion the need and desirability of an independent power base, built within the existing pattern of nation-states, in order to carry out the construction of a Communist totalitarian state in the most ruthless and effective manner. The result was, at least in the short run, to reinforce rather than to destroy the role of the nation-state as a vehicle of change.

Some of the reasons why this was so have already been suggested: the difficulty of insisting on uniform practices throughout the Communist bloc at an early stage of its development before national differences had been levelled; the feelings of the Yugoslavs and Chinese that the rapid progress of communism in their states was the result of their own efforts; and, finally, the suspicion that Moscow did not actually wish communism to develop as rapidly in these countries as the national leaders felt was possible.

The most important point remains, however, the context in which these problems arose: the doctrine of building totalitarianism in each country separately. This perspective, by assuming that industrialism and socialism were the product of political factors, completely divorced the concept of progress through economic betterment from its original class determinants (the international proletariat) or environmental factors (resources, population, the location of markets) and gave the concept of the nation-state a new significance which, although the product of the totalitarian mentality, was akin to the third type of nationalism we have distinguished.

As long as this mystique held sway it would seem impossible to envisage any real integration of the Communist bloc under the conditions prevailing after World War II. Upon reflection it seems clear that none of the three alternative modes of building communism in each country separately (domesticism; the duplication of Soviet institutions on a weak power base; the duplication of Soviet institutions and Soviet power) could really create the pre-conditions for integration. The most likely path in the short run, the duplication of Soviet institutions on a weak power base, was thoroughly compromised by the Stalinist excesses between 1948 and 1953. Domesticism was either the result of weakness (the situation in most European nations between 1945 and 1948) or was transformed into a reaction against Stalinist exploitation. In the former case it was largely a temporary phenomenon; in the latter, an explosive force that stimulated a national reaction against the whole idea of duplicating Soviet institutions—of which more presently.

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[22] *Cf.* Brzezinski, "Deviation Control," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (March 1962), pp. 5–22.

Building Soviet institutions and power might seem the most realistic path to eventual integration if all the parties in question were willing to accept each other as equals. Militating against this solution, however, was a dogma equally as strong as that of building totalitarianism in each country separately—that of monolithic solidarity based on the dominance of one party. This latter principle, usually considered a cohesive force in the Communist bloc, was ultimately responsible for the collapse of the Communist international order, for it made integration between equals an impossibility and forced the more radical and powerful parties of Yugoslavia and China to abandon the goal of integration entirely.

In general, the articulation of nationalism in its more concrete forms begins in each Communist country *after* these alternative paths to integration have been foreclosed, and the doctrine of building socialism in each country separately is no longer viewed as a means to an end but as an end in itself. In its least complicated aspect, such nationalism should most closely resemble the third type of nationalism we have mentioned (the belief that progress is made possible through developing the nation-state). And its identification would be most sure when a Communist country has incorporated this idea into its ideological view of the national question.

Yugoslavia has, indeed, made such an ideological re-evaluation, criticizing the canons of Marxism-Leninism in this field—in particular, Stalin's *Marxism and the National Question*. The present Yugoslav view is strongly internationalistic. But it departs significantly from earlier Marxist-Leninist views by stressing the essential role of the nation-state in the building of socialism, even after the revolution.[23]

Whether articulated in the ideology or not, the primary role of this third type of nationalism has been to facilitate a re-interpretation of the *goals* of communism in the light of national capabilities. The process should be distinguished from the domesticism of the period immediately following World War II and in our view is the only case where the term national communism is correctly applicable. The development of Titoism in Yugoslavia illustrates this type of change. The introduction of the communes in China is a similar, although less clear-cut, example.

The Soviet Union, after several years of hesitation in the mid 1950s, has now launched a counter-attack within her own orbit against this form of nationalism. Khrushchev, while avoiding the excesses of the Stalinist period, has pressed the nations of Eastern Europe to adopt Soviet practices, especially the collectivization of agriculture. These nations are now to work for the elimination of differences in levels of economic development within their own ranks. Eventually, they are to reach the same stage of development as the Soviet Union, and all will enter the stage of "communism" more or less simultaneously.[24] The emphasis on eliminating differences within the bloc has been paralleled by a cautious modification of the principle of economic autarchy, and forms of economic cooperation unknown in the Stalinist era have now developed within the Soviet sphere.[25]

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[23] See, in particular, Sperans [Edvard Kardelj], *Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja* (2d ed; Belgrade, 1958). Kardelj defined the nation as "a specific community of peoples arising on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism in a compact territory and within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural similarity in general" (p. 104). The insertion of the phrase, "on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism," differentiates this from Stalin's classic definition of a nation given in *Marxism and the National Question*. For Kardelj, this addition was meant to signify that nations are a progressive factor in developing socio-economic relations, and will not disappear until they have exhausted their functions in this regard, the victory of a Communist revolution notwithstanding.

[24] A statement of these plans for Eastern Europe can be found in the *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Part Two, Section VI, "Communist Construction in the USSR and Cooperation of the Socialist Countries."

By re-examining the practice of economic autarchy, the nations of the Soviet bloc have initiated a trend away from the dogma of building totalitarianism in each country separately. Conceivably, this could lead to new forms of integration impossible in the Stalinist period. In practice, however, each satellite state has resisted proposals which would work to its own economic disadvantage.[26] These disagreements have operated to strengthen the feeling that each country must protect its own interests in building socialism, thus encouraging the type of nationalism about which we are speaking. Poland has even refused to collectivize agriculture, and sustains a form of national communism in which the goals of socialism are re-interpreted in accordance with local Polish conditions. The Communist world as a whole seems to have reached a stage where competing modes of socialism encourage, to an ever greater degree, the identification of national institutions with universally desired ends.

It would still be premature, however, to predict the ultimate victory of nationalism over communism in this way. No fixed pattern has yet emerged. Much will depend on the future commitment of each nation to autarchic economic development. It would also be misleading, in our opinion, to identify centrifugal forces within the Communist bloc solely, or even primarily, with this form of nationalism. In Yugoslavia, for example, the trend toward nationalism must also be measured by the degree to which the regime has stressed non-alignment in foreign affairs and the protection of immediate national interests (the second type of nationalism described earlier). Yugoslavia interprets many of her most vital interests from the perspective of a neutral power in the East-West struggle, and this stand, far more than her domestic innovations, has led to Yugoslavia's isolation from the rest of the Communist world.

The crystallization of the second type of nationalism takes place, we would suggest, *after* a Communist nation is isolated from the bloc by a concerted attack against its leadership.[27] Such a country is then obliged to consider its former partners as enemies and potential aggressors. This situation—and therefore the nationalism it breeds—seems most likely to arise in the case of small Communist states whose powers of resistance to attack by the rest of the bloc have been underestimated by Moscow (Yugoslavia, and now, perhaps, Albania). Unfortunately for the West, this second form of nationalism, while it is of decisive importance for the balance of power in the cold war, is therefore apt to develop in the least important of the Communist states.

The failure of post-war plans to consolidate the Communist bloc have also created conditions for the appearance of the first type of nationalism (a positive commitment to the values embodied in the national culture and history). Here again the pattern is a complex one, and generalizations are dangerous. Some brief comments may nevertheless serve to clarify the problem. First, if nationalism was to appear in this form a necessary preliminary was to re-interpret the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism in such a way that it could provide a link with the bourgeois nationalism of the masses and the pre-revolutionary ruling elites. In Yugoslavia and China, the ground was laid for such a step by the attempt to build socialism on an independent power base. Under such conditions, a gradual infusion of nationalistic values into the system would enable the leadership to strengthen its power and thus actually facilitate a rapid transformation of the society and the economy.[28] In this case, a parallel can be drawn with the growth of Soviet nationalism in the 1930s. In the East European satellites of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, revolutionary nationalism came to be associated with bourgeois national values as a result of the reaction against Soviet cultural chauvinism in the period 1948–1953. The situation at that time encouraged the Communists of these nations to identify their plight with that of the oppressed peoples of the non-Communist world for whom the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism had originally been formulated. In its origins, therefore, this reaction did not imply a re-interpretation of the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism, but only a demand that the doctrine be faithfully observed. When the satellite leaders realized the necessity of re-establishing links with the masses after the campaign to duplicate Soviet institutions on a weak power base was abandoned in the post-Stalin period, the doctrine of revolutionary nationalism became infused with nationalistic elements, above all in Poland and Hungary.

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[25] For the development of economic integration generally, see Zauberman, pp. 23–29. Information on the coordination of heavy industry under the Council for Mutual Economic Aid can be found in Nikolai Kent, "Soviet Plans for Developing Heavy Industry in the Satellite Countries," *Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR*, VIII, No. 2, pp. 3–9. *Eastern Europe*, XI, No. 7, p. 30, contains an account of recent developments, including the publication of the "Basic Principles of the International Division of Labor," approved at the June, 1962, meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. For the principles governing economic integration see the reference in note 24, above.

[26] The differences among the Eastern European states over economic interests are well described by Michael Gamarnikow, "The Future of COMECON," *East Europe*, XI, No. 6, pp. 3–10.

[27] The origins of such a dispute are, of course, quite another matter. In the Yugoslav case, as we have seen, nationalism of the second type was a result, not a cause, of the break with the Soviet Union.

[28] Thus, in 1958 in China the Great Leap Forward, by departing from accepted methods of industrialization and putting great strains on the Chinese social and economic structure, gave rise to nationalistic appeals to discard Western methods in favor of traditional Chinese practices in the sciences, medicine, and other fields. See Geoffrey Hudson, *et al.*, *The Chinese Communes* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1960), p. 35. Conditions in

Local conditions must be taken into account from this point on. The decisive stage in the development of this type of nationalism comes when the nation in question admits to an historical continuity between past and present, between the pre- and post-revolutionary systems. If the nation has an imperial tradition, such an identification will be easier, as in the case of China. The existence of large national minorities in neighboring states may also encourage appeals to this type of national feeling, as in the case of Albania's quarrel with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, nationalism of this sort may be curbed in a multi-national state. Thus ethnocentrism has never developed in Yugoslavia because of the delicate nationalities question within that country.

The growth of this sentimental form of nationalism, and its association with the national forms of communism discussed earlier, would indeed mean the triumph of nationalism over communism. But here again a word of caution is in order. No Communist nation, not even the Soviet Union, has gone so far as to claim that its own form of communism is the product of the unique genius of its people, thus transforming communism from a universalistic to a particularistic philosophy. To do so would be to undercut the revolutionary appeal of the doctrine, and this no Communist nation is at present prepared to do. Nor should the divisive effects of this form of nationalism be overestimated. Relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in recent years have demonstrated how mutual interest and sheer necessity can overcome national antipathies. The postwar history of the Communist bloc suggests that disputes over minorities or boundaries have become acute only when the countries in question were already at odds for other reasons.

These observations all must be viewed in the light of current transitions within the Communist bloc; predictions concerning its future evolution are hazardous. Nationalism, in its various forms, seems on the increase. This should not, however, lead us to forget that some of the strongest centrifugal forces within the bloc originated in the "pre-national" period after World War II, and that the conditions of that time were in many ways unique. Communist dictrine was committed to the construction of a supra-national community on the basis of a universalistic model of socialism—the Soviet Union—and the monolithic solidarity of national parties under Soviet leadership. However sound a basis this might at first glance seem to provide for beginning the construction of a supra-national community, the facts were otherwise. Soviet totalitarianism, by its fascination with what could be achieved through political power and organizational skills—to the almost total disregard of other factors—encouraged the consolidation of power separately within existing nation-states. This delayed the obvious first step to integration, the development of a supra-national economic bloc, and meant that integration could only be achieved through sharing power at the top—something the Soviet Union would not agree to and something which, even if it had been achieved, would probably have destroyed the monolithic unity on which the whole structure of the supra-national community supposedly rested.

National boundaries thus became crucial dividing lines between separate and often clashing centers of power. But could not a new start now be made toward integrating the Communist nations, when the shortcomings of economic autarchy are slowly becoming appreciated, and when the Soviet leadership is increasingly willing to tolerate diversity within the Communist bloc? The possibility should be considered, even in the face of the current drift toward nationalism and the importance of Sino-Soviet tensions. For paradoxical as it may appear, only through the consolidation of nationalism may the conditions ultimately be created for the integration of the Communist nations. First, the principle of monolithic unity under the direction of one party must give way to a flexible form of cooperation which will

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Yugoslavia dictated the more theoretical approach of Kardelj, *supra*.

permit the internationalization of the leadership of the world Communist movement. Only then can the national parties be assured of equal treatment in a supra-national union. Second, the drive for world domination must spend its force. As long as this dynamic goal is urging on the nations of the Communist bloc, quarrels such as that presently going on between China and the Soviet Union over the proper tactics of the revolutionary struggle seem inevitable. Third, the powerful nations of the Communist bloc must exhaust the possibilities inherent in development within national boundaries in order to re-focus their energies on the construction of supra-national institutions. National consolidation would favor such a process; the growth of virulent nationalism would, of course, have an opposite effect, destroying any hope of integration. Situations conducive to the second type of nationalism would have to be avoided.[29]

We believe, on reflection, that the West may take comfort at what lies ahead. It seems difficult to imagine that the Communist states will be able to meet the conditions just laid down for effective integration across national boundaries. But this is not all; for while the powerful supra-national community of Communist dreams may not be entirely a chimera, its realization may well entail a prior national development which would emasculate those elements of the Communist system most dangerous to our survival. The nation-state system will then have performed its function of stemming the Communist drive for world conquest. While the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917 was indeed a setback for those who believe in national self-determination and democracy, we may also be thankful that Communism appeared when it did, before integration of the nations of the world had progressed to the point—as it someday may—when the groundwork for an international totalitarian state would already have been laid.

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[29] For a discussion of the concept of the "Socialist Commonwealth," which the Communists have developed recently in response to changing conditions within and outside the bloc, see Kurt L. London, "The 'Socialist Commonwealth of Nations': Pattern for Communist World Organization," *Orbis*, III, pp. 424–42. London speaks of the problem of "establishing a conceptual framework vast and flexible enough to contain the organizational structure within which world communism could be achieved," and sees this in the concept of the Socialist Commonwealth. The term still lacks clarity, however, and is used by the Communists almost interchangeably with the phrases "socialist camp" and "world socialist system" (*ibid.*, p. 430).

THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM AND THE 1961 FEDERAL ELECTION[1]

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Each German federal election since 1949 has resulted in a reduction in the number of parties securing representation in the Bundestag. While this trend continued in 1961, there is evidence that the party system is becoming stabilized, making it unlikely that any of the present parties will disappear in the near future. This article examines the 1961 election and its significance for the German party system.

I

The major outlines of the present German party system became apparent as early as 1946, when party activities were resumed on a zonal basis. The principal parties then in the field were the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union, and the Free Democratic Party.[2] The last two of these were known differently in different sections of West Germany, but today, with very few exceptions, the designation for each group is the same throughout the Federal Republic.

In the first election held in the Federal Republic, the Bundestag election of 1949, no less than ten parties won seats.[3] The CDU/CSU emerged as the strongest, and its chief opposition, then as now, was the SPD. The third major party, winning more seats than the total of the next three (DP, BP, and KPD), was the FDP.[4] Inasmuch as no party had received a majority it became necessary for Adenauer, elected chancellor by a one-vote majority of the Bundestag, to form a coalition cabinet. Of its thirteen ministries, eight went to the CDU/CSU, three to the FDP, and two to the DP. The parties of the center and the right thus formed the first government, leaving the SPD in the opposition role and excluding completely from any role of significance the extreme left (KPD), the radical right (DRP) and the special interest, strictly regional and particularist groups (ZP, BP, WAV and SSW).[5]

In the second Bundestag election in 1953 "a radical simplification of the political spectrum" had already become quite pronounced: only six parties were successful in winning seats. The CDU/CSU was able to increase its share to 243 (49.9 per cent) of the total of 487; and the SPD, although taking a small loss in terms of its percentage of seats (from 32.7 to 31.2), was nevertheless able to increase its bloc of seats from 131 to 151. The FDP, the DP, and the ZP suffered losses both absolutely and in percentage terms. None of the other parties which had won seats in 1949 was successful, but in 1953 the new "Refugee Party" (BHE), had appeared and was able in its first election to surpass all but the three leading parties (the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the FDP) and win 27 (5.1 per cent) of the 487 seats.[6]

The two major parties together accounted for

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[1] The authors wish to express their gratitude to the Whiting Foundation for enabling them to observe the German election during August and September of 1961.

[2] The abbreviated designations contained in the following glossary will be used through the rest of the paper:

CDU/CSU: Christian Democratic Union (Christian Social Union in Bavaria).
SPD: Social Democratic Party.
FDP (DVP) (BDV): Free Democratic Party (Democratic People's Party in Wuerttemberg, Bremen Democratic People's Party in Bremen).
KPD: Communist Party of Germany.
BP: Bavarian Party.
DP: German Party.
DKP/DRP: German Conservative Party, German Rightist Party.
EVD: European People's Movement of Germany.
RSF: Radical Social Freedom Party.
RWVP: Rhenish-Westphalian People's Party.
SSW: South-Schleswig Voters' Association.
WAV: Economic Reconstruction Association.
ZP: Center Party.
BHE: Refugee Party.
DFU: German Peace Union.
GDB: All-German Bloc.
DRP: German Reich Party.
DG: German Community.

[3] Three seats were won by independent candidates.

[4] See Table XII, *infra*, for the distribution.

[5] The six minor opposition parties held a total of only sixty (14.8%) of the Bundestag seats.

[6] See Table XII, *infra*.

394 (81.1 per cent) of the Bundestag seats, and an impartial observer viewing this election might have concluded that a two party system was emerging in West Germany. The radical groups, both left and right, had, for all practical purposes, suffered a total defeat; and the CDU/CSU was able to draw the FDP, the DP, and the BHE into its coalition, leaving only the SPD in opposition.[7]

The further weakening or elimination of the minor parties continued apace. By 1957 only four parties retained representation in the Bundestag. In that year the CDU/CSU was able to win an absolute majority of the seats (270 or 54.3 per cent of the 497), and for the first time in the history of democratic Germany it became possible for a single party to organize a government without a coalition. The SPD was able to increase its strength to 169 seats, 34.1 per cent of the total. The FDP lost seven seats; and the DP, although regaining two it had lost in 1953, nevertheless lost in proportion of total seats as compared with 1949.[8] After the 1957 election, all evidence pointed toward Germany's arrival at a stage at which the doctrinaire, programmatic party is discouraged and in which the spirit of compromise so necessary and conducive to a two-party system appears.

II

A number of changes within the parties took place between 1957 and 1961 and affected their fortunes in the fourth Bundestag election. The condition of the parties on the eve of the campaign therefore deserves mention.

The CDU/CSU continued the policies of pragmatism and compromise that had brought it increasing majorities in previous elections. It is Christian but not in any narrowly confessional sense. It has asserted the inviolability of the rights of persons and property and in consequence has opposed such concentrations of power as constitute a threat to these rights. It has stood for both economic and political decentralization and the separation of Church and state. And perhaps none of its tenets is adhered to more fervently than the alliance with the democracies of the West.

The CDU/CSU unites Catholics and Protestants, businessmen and trade unionists, Bavarian particularists and refugee nationalists within its ranks; it is an amalgam of virtually every element in the body politic, and considerable skill is necessary to maintain this precarious balance of interests. In fact, the CDU/CSU is two parties, and the composition of the Government has always reflected this. The CSU has always considered itself a separate party working in alliance with the CDU for reasons of mutual advantage, but in no sense subservient to it. It is pertinent to note that although the CDU/CSU lost strength nationally in 1961, the CSU losses in Bayern were less than in any other state except Niedersachsen (a special case), a fact tending to indicate that its strength is not entirely dependent on that of its ally.

To date Chancellor Adenauer, by his great political skill and his successes, has managed to hold the party together. Paradoxically, this strength is also a potential party weakness: we do not know the extent to which he personally is responsible for its unity, nor whether its unity can be preserved when the problem of Adenauer's succession presents itself.

Unquestionably, Adenauer has lost prestige since the zenith of 1957. His actions in the recent campaign in the face of the Berlin crisis, to be described later, no doubt account for much of the loss. Perhaps he suffered even more from his maneuvers in connection with the election of a successor to President Heuss in 1959. In this year, fearing that Carlo Schmid, the popular and respected SPD leader, might be elected to the presidency, Adenauer urged the election of Dr. Ludwig Erhard, the even more popular architect of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. Dr. Erhard, however, suspected that Adenauer's support was inspired principally by a desire to elevate him upstairs to a position of much less influence than the one he held. When the ensuing disagreement threatened the unity of the party, Adenauer announced that he himself would seek the presidency and that if he attained it he would make it into an office of real power and influence. Soon, however, he came to realize that his choice for chancellor, the minister of finance, Franz Etzel, was not nearly so popular with the party as Erhard, and that there was a real possibility of his losing on both the presidential and chancellor fronts. Whereupon he reversed himself and announced that he would remain chancellor. This quite high-handed and arbitrary behavior, together with his age and a resentment in some quarters of the alleged growing influence of the German Catholic hierarchy, portended no little disaffection and loss of confidence as he prepared to lead his party into the campaign of 1961. The only question was the degree of his loss.

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[7] The Center Party, in its last effort in a federal election, won three seats. One of these can be attributed to the planned absence of CDU opposition, while a second was won by a CDU member running on the ZP list.

[8] Of the six direct seats the DP won, five were unopposed by CDU candidates. The BHE was completely unsuccessful, but it is reasonable to assume that a part of its 1953 following had shifted allegiance to the CDU/CSU. It is equally reasonable, however, to assume that it had lost its *raison d'etre*, that the refugees of 1953 had by 1957 for the most part become integrated into West German society, and, as a consequence, identified themselves with one or another of the older and less particularistic political groupings.

After the election of 1957 the Social Democrats, soundly defeated in three consecutive elections, began what must have been a painful process of self-criticism. The economic system which had produced the *Wirtschaftswunder* was highly popular, and an overwhelming majority of West Germans also approved maintaining strong ties with the West and sharing in the responsibility of keeping Western defenses at a level sufficient to discourage Russian aggression. A new program was adopted at Bad Godesberg in 1959 which, although perhaps repugnant to many of the older and more doctrinaire elements within the party, represented a triumph for the realists. With the promulgation of this program, the SPD abandoned its Marxist trappings, and accepted both the free market and the necessity of participating in NATO. In terms of its declared objectives, the SPD after Bad Godesberg became a middle-of-the-road party with a program designed to appeal to almost all segments of the populace.

This new posture was also reflected in the new leadership to which the SPD turned. By accepting Willy Brandt as its standard bearer in August, 1960 the party added a new dimension to the qualities it sought in its leaders. A new emphasis had been placed upon popular image and appeal, and a consequent de-emphasis of such traditional qualifications as length of service to the party and orthodoxy of view. As the 1961 election approached, the SPD was prepared as never before to compete with the CDU/CSU in the middle ground of democratic politics where majorities are obtained. Although it had little hope of obtaining a majority in 1961, it had come to realize the direction in which future success must be sought.

The importance of the third major force in the 1961 election, the FDP, could not have been foreseen in 1957. In that year it lost both absolutely and relatively for the second time. Its own history and that of other minority parties in the Federal Republic warranted an anticipation of a still further decline in support—even to the point of being denied any seats in the Bundestag through the operation of the 5 per cent-3 direct seats clause. The FDP had suffered severely from internal strife, from the absence of effective leadership, and from the fact that its economic program had been taken over by the CDU/CSU and implemented in an amazingly successful way by Dr. Erhard. Its loss of positive appeal was also compounded by a certain loss of negative appeal after the SPD issued its Bad Godesberg program.

The fortunes of the FDP, however, took a turn for the better when in 1960 Dr. Erich Mende succeeded to its chairmanship. With a strong, forceful personality, a fine appearance and a distinguished World War II record, Dr. Mende was able to bring to the FDP a unity long lacking, and to infuse it with a wholly new vitality. By the summer of 1961 it had succeeded in putting together an effective and well financed organization which could exploit all available opportunities. Among these was a considerable dissatisfaction with the cultural policies of the CDU/CSU, and particularly with its reputedly close alliance with the Catholic Church, already noted. A vague unhappiness with Adenauer was unsettling in some quarters, and the FDP emphasized "Adenauer's policies without Adenauer."

Another unknown factor in the 1961 election was a new political party, the All German Party (GDP), composed of the surviving elements of the BHE and the DP. In 1957 the BHE secured only 4.5 per cent of the vote and accordingly failed to win any seats in the Bundestag; and its leadership had been disintegrating since 1955. The DP, although enjoying a slight gain in 1957 (up from 15 to 17 Bundestag seats), had a future hardly more promising than that of the BHE. Prior to 1961 many of its leaders and members had moved into the CDU. The marriage of these two disparate groups was evidently one of convenience and had been formalized primarily for the purpose of avoiding the consequences of the "five-three" clause.

The other two parties entering the campaign in every state, and discussed in some detail below, were the DRP and the DFU, the former an extremist splinter of the right, and the latter a splinter of the extreme left. From the outset of the campaign they were not regarded seriously and need not be considered here. The SSW and DG also entered the campaign, but not on a national basis. We now turn to the electoral campaign itself.

III

The parties sought to profit in the 1961 campaign from the strengths and weaknesses they revealed in 1957. The great success of the chancellor in securing an absolute majority of the seats left the CDU/CSU feeling confident, and it adopted the general theme of "more of the same." The SPD, on the other hand, spent the intervening years attempting to reshape its public image; by 1961 its principal task was convincing the electorate that its new face was real, and not just assumed for the elections. The FDP sought to rebuild its organization and internal unity, and to project an image different from the other two major parties.

The campaign opened with little drama; few people expected much excitement or doubted that the final results would be similar to those of 1957. But intensive campaigning had barely begun when the Berlin crisis quickly came to dominate political discussion. Consequently, the following analysis will note first the original campaign strategy of the parties and then will examine the impact of that crisis.

The CDU/CSU campaign, repeating the 1957 pattern, emphasized prosperity and a continuation of present foreign and domestic policies. The slogans "No experiments" and "Let's keep our freedom" accurately expressed the mood it sought to convey. That new departures in policy would be necessary, was not even anticipated. As before, the party sought to be everything to everybody. If any particular effort was made to court new sources of support, it was the special attention devoted to regions of former DP and BHE strength. The importance of these areas was clearly recognized, and the CDU took special care in the selection of its candidates and in the scheduling of the speeches of the party notables in these districts.

A second CDU tactic of particular interest was its handling of the question of Adenauer's age and the succession in the party—it ignored the subject. Adenauer's age seemed not to be nearly the issue it had been in 1957, nor did his vigor seem to have weakened appreciably during the interval. The chancellor pointedly avoided the question of his successor numerous times during the campaign despite invitations to comment on it. He replied merely that the CDU/CSU government was a "team" affair, and that there were several capable men to succeed him. Erhard was one of these, said the chancellor, but he refused to single him out as being superior to the others. Different party notables shared posters with Adenauer in different parts of the country, depending upon their popularity in the locality, but none was built up as the heir apparent. Adenauer was criticized both inside and outside the party for this, and late in the campaign the portrait of Erhard looking hopefully over the shoulder of Adenauer was increasingly in evidence. But the chancellor never wavered in his domination of the party.

Another interesting aspect of the CDU/CSU campaign was its treatment of the socialists. In general, the opposition was shrugged off with contempt or ignored; but occasionally CDU/CSU speakers were asked about the recent changes in the SPD party program and leadership. They questioned the sincerity of the changes; they called Herbert Wehner, a former communist and presently a member of the SPD executive, the real power within the party, which was merely using Brandt and a platform of moderation to get into power. Alternatively, they accused the SPD of "me too-ism," of repudiating its past in an opportunistic attempt to win votes: "How bankrupt a party must be when it no longer believes in its title."[9]

The 1961 campaign began for the SPD with its determination to seek to secure the votes of the growing middle class in Germany. The Bad Godesberg program of 1959 removed the formal ideological barriers to the attempt; and its selection of Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, as its candidate for chancellor gave it an attractive and skillful leader. The party's strategy in 1961 was based on his personality to an extraordinary extent. His youth, dynamism, moderation, and responsibility were emphasized as symbolic of a new SPD. The party accepted the economic miracle and the system which had achieved it, demanding only that the fruits be more equitably shared. The SPD accepted the principal elements of the Adenauer foreign policy, including European integration and NATO, but wished greater flexibility and increased efforts to overcome the division of Germany. It hammered away at these points, and when the Berlin crisis interrupted the campaign, the SPD was able to incorporate it into its preconceived line of attack, while the CDU/CSU was momentarily thrown off stride.

The FDP entered the campaign with more optimism than in many previous years. It had an attractive leader in Erich Mende, it was relatively united internally, and it hoped to benefit from the recent internal difficulties of the CDU/CSU. The FDP advocated fewer welfare measures and a strict *laissez-faire* in economic policy, along with greater independence for Germany and less emphasis on European unity. It differed with the CDU/CSU also in the sensitive cultural realm; the FDP acted subtly to gain from Protestant unrest within the CDU/CSU.

As the FDP could not hope to govern alone, it had to face the issue of what it would do following the elections. This was a sensitive question, as the FDP conceivably would hold the balance of power and so might determine the composition of the government. A statement of intent to support one party or the other could have damaged its electoral chances, as potential supporters might prefer to vote for the major party rather than a minority ally. Furthermore, the FDP had suffered greatly from its last experience in a coalition under Adenauer. Mende announced that it would not be possible to work with the socialists, but that the FDP might support Erhard, Gerstenmaier or Krone; more definite statements would have to wait, he said, until after the election.[10] The FDP generally took the "plague-on-both-your-houses" approach, although it obviously viewed the SPD as the more undesirable.

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[9] Erhard, in a press conference reported in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 8, 1961.

The minor parties entered the electoral contest with little to hope for, and their campaigns never got off the ground. Only the GDP, the DRP, and the DFU made any pretense at national coverage, and their campaigns seemed to be limited largely to their ubiquitous posters. The DFU was a new party which entered the campaign seemingly well financed—so it was hinted—by the East Zone. It capitalized also on the prestige of Albert Schweitzer, whose portrait appeared on its posters, and the pacifism of some Protestant ministers in southwest Germany. It appealed to the desire for peace and the fear of atomic warfare; after an initial publicity splash, it faded rapidly following the erection of the Berlin Wall. Most of its respectable followers abandoned it at that time, or even before; and it probably ended with only the support of the hard-core communists remaining in West Germany.

The DRP made an even smaller impact during the campaign. Featuring the looming shadow of Bismarck on its posters, it hinted that he would have responded differently to the Berlin Wall. The party did not run a very active campaign. Radicalism was of no significance in the election.

The GDP, formed of the union of the DP and the BHE, also failed to get its campaign off the ground. The merged parties were combining weaknesses, not strengths, and the absence of well known leaders and money was a severe handicap. Even the weather improved by mid-September so that agrarian discontent, traditionally a source of DP strength, was reduced; and the party did badly in the competition.

The erection of the wall separating East and West Berlin, on August 13, enlivened what had begun as a rather dull campaign. The Berlin crisis gave Brandt an unexpected amount of publicity, and this advantage was compounded by Adenauer's reaction to it. The crisis focused not only German but world attention on the youthful mayor of the city, and he used the opportunity to stress the vitality, moderation, dynamism, and patriotism of the SPD. Brandt called for all-party unity on this issue; while Adenauer called the crisis a Khrushchev trick to help the SPD. In reply, Brandt said that "*Der alte Herr*" had lost contact with reality by his "politics as usual" attitude when the German people were threatened.[11] Brandt addressed a personal letter to Kennedy requesting that something be done for the morale of Berlin. This letter was followed by—although it was not necessarily the cause of—Vice President Johnson's trip to Berlin.[12] Adenauer did not go there immediately, ostensibly because of the press of business in Bonn, but he did find time to attend a CDU rally in Regensburg, almost as far from Bonn as Berlin. And at the Regensburg rally, Adenauer raised the issue of Brandt's illegitimate birth by referring to him as "Brandt alias Frahm." When Adenauer finally went to Berlin on August 22, he was greeted coldly by Brandt and subjected to unpleasant remarks from the crowd. The chancellor explained that Vice President Johnson had asked him not to come with him.

It seems likely that Adenauer badly gauged the political significance of the Berlin crisis and refused for over a week to heed his advisors. He has no strong attachment to Berlin, which is not only strongly SPD but was also the headquarters of Jacob Kaiser, long his chief competitor for the CDU leadership.[13] For Adenauer, Berlin is a "heathen city," and he sometimes lets a year pass without visiting it. Consequently, he refused at first to believe that the event could force him to alter his original campaign plans and fight on issues and terrain favorable to, if not chosen by, his opponent. His response contrasted unfavorably with Brandt's actions and call for an all-party government of national unity; and this seems to have cost Adenauer greatly in prestige in August.

In evaluating the campaign, August 13 is a significant date. Before then, the campaign was largely devoid of excitement. The CDU/CSU was concentrating on repeating the success of

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[10] *Ibid.*, August 25, 1961; September 4, 1961.

[11] *Ibid.*, August 30, 1961.

[12] We heard criticism of Johnson's trip from CDU sources in Germany who felt that his visit was a campaign aid to Brandt.

[13] On this latter point see Arnold J. Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), *passim*.

1957; with no prospects of a majority, the SPD sought to improve its national image by its moderation. While the FDP was hopeful of improving its position, the other minor parties never seemed of great importance. After August 13, the campaign took on a new vitality. The SPD took the initiative, aided by the events and Adenauer's reaction to them, and handled the opportunity presented them very skillfully. Brandt benefitted greatly from the limelight in which he stood as mayor of Berlin, as well as from his underdog role.

While the initial impact of the crisis favored the SPD greatly, it is not so easy to evaluate the importance of the incident in the campaign as a whole. Its capacity to dominate headlines had all but evaporated by election day. Adenauer's view that there was nothing pressing to be done made more sense a month later, too. It is doubtful that many votes were altered by the crisis, despite criticism of Adenauer's reaction to it; there are other acceptable explanations for the changes in voting between 1957 and 1961. And except for the Berlin crisis, the campaign was devoid of the unexpected.

IV

The law under which the election was held is unchanged in its essential features from that adopted for the 1953 elections.[14] The 494 regular seats in the *Bundestag* are distributed among the states on the basis of population. Half the seats are filled from single-member districts and half from state lists. Originally, each state filled half its seats each way; however, the districts have remained unaltered, so population shifts are reflected by altering the number of list candidates assigned.[15] Parties run candidates in the districts and also prepare a state list. Voters indicate their choices twice: once for the individual party candidate in the district and once for the list. The party which wins a plurality in the district takes that seat. On the state list, seats are distributed by proportional representation, with the seats won in the districts being subtracted from those elected from the state list. The net results are similar to those obtained by straight PR, while the presumed benefits of close contact between the delegate and his constituents are achieved by electing half of the members in single-member districts. The system has in each election resulted in additional seats being assigned, as a party retains the extra seats it wins by taking more direct seats than its proportion of the state vote would give it (*Ueberhangsmandate*).[16]

The combination list-district system has several advantages not immediately apparent. Important candidates who risk being defeated in their districts can also be placed high on the list in order to insure their election, and the party can bring needed specialists into parliament in a similar fashion. Finally, in practice each district has a member of each of the two major parties to represent it, for the minority party in the district is still informally represented in parliament by someone elected from the state list, often the defeated constituency candidate himself.

An important element of the electoral law which cuts down on the number of parties in parliament is the "five-three" clause, under which a party may send representatives to parliament only if it gets 5 per cent of the popular vote in the entire Federal Republic or wins three direct seats. These provisions apply to all except parties of national minorities, of which only the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein are presently organized, and they have elected no one since their single success in 1949.

The only significant change between the 1957 and 1961 election laws was the provision for absentee balloting. In 1953, a citizen could use an election certificate (*Wahlschein*) to vote anywhere in the Federal Republic. In 1957, this certificate could be used to vote in person in any precinct of one's election district, or it could be used as a postal ballot: this change was to prevent communists from concentrating their votes in one district. In 1961, one could vote only in one's own precinct or by postal ballot, which was tabulated separately on election night.

A final provision of the electoral law which deserves special mention is the method of distributing seats following the election. Individual parties may, and the major ones do, combine their votes in all the states in determining the distribution of seats (*Listenverbindung*). Seats are distributed nationally to the *parties so combined*, not the states, on the basis of the parties' proportion of the votes for parties which surmounted the "five-three" clause. The seats are then assigned to individual states on the basis of the proportion the state's vote for the party bears to the party's total national vote. Hence the exact number of representatives from a state is not determined until after the election; and states with low participation and many invalid votes, as well as states with a high proportion of votes for parties which do not secure representation in the Bundestag, are penalized. This system of tabulating the results, of course, favors the larger parties. We turn now to the results of the 1961 election.

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[14] See James K. Pollock, "The West German Electoral Law of 1953," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (March, 1955), pp. 107–130.

[15] See Table XI for the division of district-state seats in each state. This slightly aids the CDU/CSU because it encourages *Ueberhangsmandate*, explained below.

[16] As can be seen from Table XI below, the representation of Schleswig-Holstein, for instance, would have been 20 in 1961, due to the loss of population relative to the rest of the country, with 14 of these elected directly and 6 from the list. But the CDU took 13 direct seats by plurality although it had but 41.8 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* votes. The SPD with 36.4 per cent and the FDP with 13.8 per cent received 7 and 3 list seats, bringing the SPD total to 8. The CDU under proportional representation would have gotten 9, but it kept the additional four it had won directly.

V

The election was held on Sunday, September 17, 1961. Polls were open from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, and the day passed with no unusual incidents. Participation was high even by European standards. Whatever the optimum participation in democratic elections may be, the advocates of high turnout will be pleased to see that 87.7 per cent of the eligible electorate of the Federal Republic went to the polls.

Table I shows that a high turnout level was also the rule for the several states. From the lowest participation percentage, in Baden-Wuertemberg (84.8), to the highest, in Hessen (89.2), there was only a 4.4 per cent spread. Looking at the turnout trend over the years, however, we can also observe a very interesting leveling off in popular participation: 1949: 78.5%; 1953: 86.0%; 1957: 87.8%; and 1961: 87.7%. With certain variations, this leveling off can also be found for each of the states in Table II. Apparently a plateau has been reached which constitutes the "appropriate" voting turnout for current West German politics. Apparently, only a major crisis could increase participation further. Without question, the 1961 election was more interesting and conducted with greater vigor and enthusiasm than the rather cut-and-dried affair of 1957, yet participation remained essentially the same.

TABLE II. PERCENT PARTICIPATION, BY STATES, 1949–1961*

States	1949	1953	1957	1961
Schleswig-Holstein	82.7	88.5	88.3	88.0
Hamburg	81.2	87.4	89.2	88.6
Niedersachsen	77.7	88.7	89.0	88.5
Bremen	81.9	87.4	88.7	88.2
Nordrhein-Westfalen	79.6	86.0	88.0	88.4
Hessen	77.3	86.7	89.1	89.2
Rheinland-Pfalz	79.6	86.0	88.3	88.2
Baden-Wuerttemberg	70.6	81.8	84.4	84.8
Bayern	81.1	85.8	87.7	87.2
Saarland	—	—	89.3	87.7
Federal Republic	78.5	86.0	87.8	87.7

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

The ratio of invalid ballots cast in 1961 does not appear to be excessively high, considering the relative complexity of voting in Germany (two votes per voter): 2.6 per cent of the *Erststimmen* and 4.0 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* were invalid. The higher figure for the *Zweit-*

TABLE I. PARTICIPATION AND VALIDITY OF VOTES CAST, BY STATES, 1961 (*Zweitstimmen*)*

States	Eligible voters	Particip. voters	% Part.	Valid votes	Invalid votes	% Inv.
Schleswig-Holstein	1,626,141	1,431,704	88.0	1,363,366	68,338	4.8
Hamburg	1,386,411	1,227,787	88.6	1,193,737	34,050	2.8
Niedersachsen	4,613,112	4,083,490	88.5	3,942,955	140,535	3.4
Bremen	507,760	447,936	88.2	428,241	19,695	4.4
Nordrhein-Westfalen	11,085,775	9,799,429	88.4	9,518,246	281,183	2.9
Hessen	3,395,285	3,028,241	89.2	2,878,689	149,552	4.9
Rheinland-Pfalz	2,348,108	2,069,927	88.2	1,969,933	99,994	4.8
Baden-Wuerttemberg	5,211,883	4,419,748	84.8	4,189,163	230,585	5.2
Bayern	6,551,728	5,714,545	87.2	5,486,962	227,583	4.0
Saarland	714,512	626,817	87.7	579,609	47,208	7.5
Federal Republic	37,440,715	32,849,624	87.7	31,550,901	1,298,723	4.0

* Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden (hereafter referred to as "Bundesamt"): VIII/5/18. (Roman VIII refers to the electoral series of the Bundesamt; the other numbers refer to the particular document.)

stimmen appears to result from the failure of some to have understood the need for *two* checkmarks on their ballots.

The highest percentage of invalid votes, not surprisingly, was cast in the Saarland, 5.6 per cent of the *Erststimmen* and 7.5 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen*. This state has been part of the Federal Republic only since January 1, 1957, so voters there have had less experience than others with the German electoral system. The other states (with two exceptions) had less than 3 per cent of the *Erststimmen* invalid, and (with one exception) less than 5 per cent of the *Zweitstimmen* invalid. (See Table I.)

The trend figures exhibit an interesting counter-movement:

Erststimme: 1949: 3.1%; 1953: 3.4%; 1957: 3.0%; 1961: 2.6%
Zweitstimme: 1949: none; 1953: 3.3%; 1957: 3.8%; 1961: 4.0%

Since the two trends do not go in the same direction, the "natural" theory that the increase in participation over the years has brought to the polls less interested and less discerning people cannot readily be accepted. Indeed even for the *Zweitstimmen*, the correlation coefficient (Pearsonian r) for invalid votes and participation shows no relationship between the two factors. It amounts to minus 0.0001 when computed on a state basis (N = 10). A better explanation is that there are now more voters without a sufficient understanding of the function of the *Zweitstimme* vote. Here the (largest) increase of 0.5 per cent following the admission of the Saarland is significant. In any case, the low magnitude of invalid votes is as favorable a sign of the success of political education in postwar Germany as the high level of popular participation.

We turn now to the party vote in the election of 1961. For the first time the nationwide electoral trends favorable to the CDU/CSU met a reverse. The CDU/CSU again emerged from the election as the strongest party, as can be seen from Table III. However, the slim popular majority of 1957 was lost; and furthermore, the margin by which it was lost—the difference between what the party received and 50% of the popular vote—was large enough also to result in a loss of the parliamentary majority. In both these respects, then, the CDU/CSU must be appraised as one of the losers of the election. This, however, need not at all mean a troubled future for the party. The CDU/CSU, as already noted, had to fight the campaign under far less than ideal conditions. Furthermore, the actual loss is not so very large; its significance lies in the margin involved.

For the SPD the election brought an important gain, even if it was not as large as the party had hoped. But for the first time the party did attract substantially more than its usual 30 per cent, more or less, of the popular vote in federal elections. This may well indicate an important "breakthrough" for the SPD,

TABLE III. VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTIES (*Erststimmen* AND *Zweitstimmen*), IN PER CENT, 1949–1961*

Party	Erststimmen				Zweitstimmen			
	1949	1953	1957	1961	1949	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	—	43.7	50.3	46.0	31.0	45.2	49.8	45.4
SPD	—	29.5	32.0	36.5	29.2	28.8	31.8	36.2
FDP	—	10.8	7.5	12.1	11.9	9.5	7.7	12.8
DP	—	3.9	3.5	2.7[a]	4.0	3.3	3.4	2.8[a]
BHE	—	5.9	4.4		—	5.9	4.6	
ZP	—	0.2	1.0[b]	—	3.1	0.8	0.9[b]	—
BP	—	1.5			4.2	1.7		
DRP	—	0.7	1.0	0.8	1.8	1.1	1.0	0.8
KPD	—	2.2	—	—	5.7	2.2	—	—
DFU	—	—	—	1.8	—	—	—	1.9
Other	—	1.6	0.3	0.1	9.1	1.5	0.8	0.1

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18; VIII/100/1; VIII/200/1.
[a] GDP.
[b] FU.

indeed one for which the party has been working quite hard: it may have made the transition from a class-based organization to a *Volkspartei* (a party based on, and integrating, a variety of social groups).

However, a certain *guarded* optimism is called for on the part of the SPD. Only the future can tell whether the 4.4 percentage-point increase was produced by factors particular to the 1961 campaign or by long-range voter realignments. The first state election following the federal election of 1961 was held in Hamburg on November 12, 1961. In it, the SPD expanded its already impressive majority. Yet it must be kept in mind that over the years the results of federal and state elections have been highly independent of one another.

The great winner in the federal election was the FDP. While its actual gain of about 5 percentage points was not much greater than that of the SPD, it had started out with a far smaller base. Its success, therefore, was quite spectacular. Three factors seem to have been primarily responsible for this gain: a modern and ably conducted campaign; the events of August in Berlin; and a favorable popular response to the party's main theme: Adenauer's politics without Adenauer.

Now the party's problem is whether it will be able to hold the new voters to its colors. The probability of doing so will depend essentially on whether most of the new FDP voters were traditional CDU/CSU voters now dissatisfied with the person of Dr. Adenauer, but not necessarily also with his party or his politics; or whether these new voters were the old followers of the constituent organizations (DP and BHE) of the collapsing GDP? Most election commentators ascribed the greater part of the increase to former CDU/CSU voters. If this should be the case, the future does not look quite as bright for the FDP as it seemed immediately after the election.[17]

Indeed, the 1961 state election in Hamburg (Table IV) shows that the FDP could not hold on to most of its new voters there. However, several reasons warn that this should not be regarded as an important indication of things to come. First of all, participation was lower in the state election. Secondly, the combined DP and BHE vote of the federal election of 1957 constituted a smaller percentage in Hamburg than in the Federal Republic as a whole. This means that the FDP could draw on a proportionately larger non-CDU/CSU reservoir in other states. And finally, as noted above, state elections and federal elections move more or less independently of each other.

TABLE IV. FEDERAL AND STATE ELECTIONS IN HAMBURG, IN PER CENT*

	SPD	CDU	FDP
1957 State election	53.9	32.2	8.6
1961 Federal election	46.9	31.9	15.7
1961 State election	57.4	29.1	9.6

* Adapted from *Newsletter*. Hamburg: Atlantik-Bruecke, November 17, 1961.

The case of the GDP is also interesting. It has been noted that this merger was a desperate attempt of two rather incompatible groups to escape the 5 per cent-3 direct seats clause by joining forces. It turned out that the dynamics of politics do not conform to mathematical conventions: 4.6 plus 3.4 summed to 2.8 per cent.[18] Table III shows that the fate of the GDP is not without precedent in German politics. In the election of 1957 the BP and the ZP merged to form the FU since neither alone could hope to hurdle the "five-three" clause. But in spite of help from a rather strange corner (the SPD did not run candidates for the direct seat in a number of districts, to increase the chances of the FU), the alliance did not succeed in its purpose. By 1961 the FU had disappeared from the scene. A similar fate can be predicted for the GDP.

As for the other small parties, the continuing decline of the DRP, which received a total of only 0.8 per cent of the popular vote, suggests the unpopularity of right wing extremism in today's Germany; and the 1.9 per cent of the DFU indicates a similar lack of support for left wing extremism. If the events in Berlin—bringing home with great force to the Germans the divided condition of their country—could not revive German nationalism, one might doubt that anything short of catastrophe could do it. For the DFU, of course, the effect of the Berlin wall was entirely negative. Yet, even without it, this party was never a serious contender in the election.

The Danish minority party (SSW) of Schleswig-Holstein—exempted from the "five-three" clause—failed again to gain a seat in parliament. Its share of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein fell to 1.9 per cent (1949: 5.4; 1953: 3.3; 1957: 2.5). The SSW's share of the federal

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[17] A statistical analysis of voter re-alignments is under way currently which is expected to throw considerable light on this and related questions.

[18] Unless indicated otherwise, all percentages and figures given in the text refer to *Zweitstimmen*.

TABLE V. *Erststimmen* BY STATES AND PARTIES, IN PER CENT, 1961*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad-W.	Bay-ern	Saar-land	Party Total[a]
CDU/CSU	43.5	32.4	40.1	27.6	48.1	35.8	49.4	45.8	55.7	49.3	46.0
SPD	36.5	47.2	38.9	50.1	37.6	43.2	33.8	32.4	30.3	33.6	36.5
FDP	12.5	15.1	11.9	14.6	11.1	14.4	12.8	16.3	8.1	12.7	12.1
GDP	3.6	0.9	6.3	3.9	0.8	3.9	0.4	2.6	3.8	0.3	2.7
DFU	1.2	3.5	1.2	2.8	1.9	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.5	3.1	1.8
DRP	0.8	0.8	1.5	1.1	0.4	0.5	2.1	0.6	0.4	0.9	0.8
DG	0.1	—	0.1	—	#	#	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
SSW	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
Other	—	—	#	—	#	#	—	—	#	—	#
State Total[b]	4.4	3.8	12.5	1.4	29.9	9.2	6.2	13.4	17.4	1.8	100.0

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

[a] Total *Erststimmen* of the parties in the Federal Republic.

[b] Total *Erststimmen* of the states in the Federal Republic. Except for rounding errors, the sums of the columns add up to 100.0%.

# Less than 0.1%.

vote was 0.1 per cent. The DG also received 0.1 per cent of the federal vote. Primarily a South German party, it did not run candidates in all the states. (See Tables V and VI.) The DG is essentially a nationalist-conservative group, and its failure to attract support underlines our observations on the weakness of the DRP.

In four states—Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, and Bayern—splinter group and non-party nominations were made for altogether six direct seats. None of them was successful. (See Table V.)

We shall now briefly examine the party vote in each of the states. In six of them—given in order of CDU/CSU strength: Bayern, Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz, Nordrhein-Westfalen,

TABLE VI. *Zweitstimmen* BY STATES AND PARTIES, IN PER CENT, 1961*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad.-W.	Bay-ern	Saar-land	Party Total[a]
CDU/CSU	41.8	31.9	39.0	27.0	47.6	34.9	48.9	45.3	54.9	49.0	45.4
SPD	36.4	46.9	38.7	49.7	37.3	42.8	33.5	32.1	30.1	33.5	36.2
FDP	13.8	15.7	13.2	15.2	11.8	15.2	13.2	16.6	8.7	12.9	12.8
GDP	3.9	1.0	6.1	4.1	0.9	4.1	0.5	2.8	3.9	0.3	2.8
DFU	1.3	3.6	1.3	3.0	2.0	2.3	1.5	2.3	1.6	3.2	1.9
DRP	0.9	0.9	1.6	1.1	0.5	0.6	2.3	0.7	0.5	0.9	0.8
DG	0.1	—	0.1	—	#	—	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
SSW	1.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
State Total[b]	4.3	3.8	12.5	1.4	30.2	9.1	6.2	13.3	17.4	1.8	100.0

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

[a] Total *Zweitstimmen* of the parties in the Federal Republic.

[b] Total *Zweitstimmen* of the states in the Federal Republic. Except for rounding errors, the sums of the columns add up to 100.0%.

# Less than 0.1%.

TABLE VII. VARIABILITY OF PARTY STRENGTH IN THE STATES, GIVEN AS PERCENTAGE DEVIATION FROM THE TOTAL PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTES (*Zweitstimmen*) RECEIVED BY THE PARTIES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, 1961*

Party	Fed. Rep.	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad.-W.	Bayern	Saar-land
CDU/CSU[a]	45.4	−3.6	−13.5	−6.4	−18.4	+2.2	−10.5	+3.5	−0.1	+9.5	+3.6
SPD	35.8	+0.6	+11.1	+2.9	+13.9	+1.5	+ 7.0	−2.3	−3.7	−5.7	−2.3
FDP	12.8	+1.0	+ 2.9	+0.4	+ 2.4	−1.0	+ 2.4	+0.4	+3.8	−4.1	+0.1
GDP	2.8	+1.1	− 1.8	+3.3	+ 1.3	−1.9	+ 1.3	−2.3	0.0	+1.1	−2.5
DFU	1.9	−0.6	+ 1.7	−0.6	+ 1.1	+0.1	+ 0.4	−0.4	+0.4	−0.3	+1.3
DRP	0.8	+0.1	+ 0.1	+0.8	+ 0.3	−0.3	− 0.2	+1.5	−0.1	−0.3	+0.1

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

[a] The +'s and −'s are unweighted (not adjusted for state size) and therefore do not average out across the states.

Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Schleswig-Holstein—the chancellor's party (or parties) placed first. Correspondingly, the greatest margin over the second-running SPD was gained in Bayern, the smallest in Schleswig-Holstein. See Tables V and VI.

In three of the states—in order of SPD strength: Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen—the SPD was the strongest party. By the same token, its largest margin over the CDU/CSU was received in Bremen, its smallest in Hessen.

Only Niedersachsen failed to give one of the two leading parties a commanding advantage over the other. The CDU received only 1.2 per cent more *Erststimmen* and 0.3 per cent more *Zweitstimmen* than the SPD. This state was formerly more strongly CDU than SPD. In the 1961 election, however, the SPD increased its popular vote by about 6 percentage points, while the CDU barely managed to hold its own. In 1957, it is pertinent to note, Niedersachsen had the highest (19 per cent) combined DP and BHE vote of any state.

Table VII gives an idea of the variability of party strength. Each entry represents the difference between a party's federal and state percentage of the popular vote. In absolute terms we find greater variability in the larger parties, as might be expected. But when we examine the variations in *relative* terms (as per cent of the federal average), the greater variability is found in the smaller parties. In only two of the ten states did the three major parties deviate more than 25 percentage points from the federal average. Nine deviations of such magnitude were found for the GDP, six each for the DFU and DRP.

Some attention may be given to the difference in the voting for district candidates (*Erststimme*) and list candidates (*Zweitstimme*). Table VIII shows that in 1961, in all the states, the two large parties received fewer, and the smaller parties received more, *Zweitstimmen* than *Erststimmen*. In general, this has also been true in previous federal elections. The reason seems to be that at least some supporters of smaller parties view their direct candidates' chances of election as negligible. (As will be seen below, at least in 1961, this appraisal was entirely correct: all direct seats were won by the CDU/CSU and the SPD.) To choose a small-party candidate, then, is to throw away one's vote; however, to vote for the list of a small party is an entirely different matter, for

TABLE VIII. LOSS OR GAIN IN *Zweitstimmen* AS COMPARED TO *Erststimmen*, IN PER CENT, 1961*

Party	Schl-Holst.	Hamb.	Nied-Sachs.	Brem.	Nordr-Westf.	Hess.	Rhein-Pfalz	Bad.-W.	Bayern	Saar-land	Fed. Rep.
CDU/CSU	−1.7	−0.5	−1.1	−0.6	−0.5	−0.9	−0.5	−0.5	−0.8	−0.3	−0.6
SPD	−0.1	−0.3	−0.2	−0.4	−0.3	−0.4	−0.3	−0.3	−0.2	−0.1	−0.3
FDP	+1.3	+0.6	+1.3	+0.6	+0.7	+0.8	+0.4	+0.3	+0.6	+0.2	+0.7
GDP	+0.3	+0.1	−0.2	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+#	+0.1
DFU	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.2	+#	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1
DRP	+0.1	+0.1	+0.1	+#	+0.1	+0.1	+0.2	+0.1	+0.1	+#	+#
DG	+#	—	+#	—	+#	—	+#	+0.1	+#	+#	+#
SSW	+0.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+#

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

Less than 0.1%.

all the votes in the state (or under *Listenverbindung,* in several, or all, states) are combined. Thus, *every Zweitstimme* counts.

One could argue, of course, that from the standpoint of strengthening the party of one's choice, even a wasted vote would be better than an effective vote for another party. Yet, since one's own party is deserted on the *Erststimme,* this is not quite true. For, as was seen above, with the exception of possible *Ueberhangsmandate,* it is the *Zweitstimme* that determines how many seats a party will receive in parliament. All this seems to indicate a rather sophisticated understanding of the electoral law on the part of some of the small-party followers. The habitual large-party voters, of course, are never bothered by this matter.

The phenomenon just noted might be attributed simply to the attractiveness of some candidate who by his personal appeal is able to win support among the followers of other parties, but for the great regularity of large-party *Zweitstimmen* loss, and small-party *Zweitstimmen* gain. It is hardly plausible that only the two larger parties ever have attractive candidates.

One more point may be observed on Table VIII: the SPD vote is more stable than that for other parties. This, of course, is to be expected, since all the smaller parties, with the exception of the DFU, are essentially bourgeois in their orientation. Thus, their voters are much more likely to desert them on the *Erststimme* for the CDU/CSU, than for the SPD.

We consider next the distribution of seats in the Bundestag. Only three parties (four, if we count the CSU separately) were able to surmount the 5 per cent-3 direct seats hurdle and thus receive seats: CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. Table IX lists the number and percentages of seats won by the various parties since 1949. The 1961 distribution follows the division of the popular vote quite closely, except, of course, for the dropping out of the smaller parties. The CDU/CSU received 2.7 per cent, the SPD 2.3 per cent, and the FDP 0.6 per cent more seats than votes. Another indication of the relative equity of the seat distribution among the successful parties is the votes-per-seat index. (See Table X.) The slight advantage of the CDU/CSU results from its winning five *Ueberhangsmandate.*

From Table IX we can also observe a constant reduction in the number of parties seated in the Bundestag. In 1949, ten parties plus three independents were represented; in 1953, six parties; in 1957, four parties. Now only three survive. A parallel reduction can be observed in the total number of parties in the Federal Republic. We shall return to this mat-

TABLE IX. NUMBER AND PER CENT OF BUNDESTAG SEATS WON BY PARTIES, 1949–1961*

Party	Number				Per Cent			
	1949	1953	1957	1961	1949	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	139	243	270	242	34.7	49.9	54.3	48.5
SPD	131	151	169	190	32.7	31.2	34.1	38.1
FDP	52	48	41	67	12.9	9.9	8.2	13.4
DP	17	15	17	0[a]	4.2	3.2	3.4	0.0[a]
BHE	—	27	0		—	5.1	0.0	
ZP	10	3	0[b]	—	2.5	0.7	0.0[b]	—
BP	17	0			4.2	0.0		
DRP	5	0	0	0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
SSW	1	0	0	0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
KPD	15	0	—	—	3.7	0.0	—	—
WAV	12	—	—	—	3.0	—	—	—
Other	3	0	0	0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total[c]	402	487	497	499	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

[a] GDP.

[b] FU.

[c] Does not include the members from Berlin.

TABLE X. AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES (*Zweitstimmen*) PER SEAT IN BUNDESTAG, BY PARTIES, 1949–1961

Party[a]	1949*	1953	1957	1961
CDU/CSU	52,932	51,210	53,759	59,084
SPD	52,918	52,616	52,462	60,144
FDP	54,382	54,774	53,654	60,131
DP	55,299	59,742	59,252	
BHE[b]	318,418	59,887		
ZP	54,382	72,359		
BP	58,036			
DRP	85,790			
SSW	75,387			
KPD	90,667			
WAV	56,832			
Other	422,315			

* James K. Pollock, "The Electoral System of the Federal Republic of Germany—A Study in Representative Government," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (December 1952), pp. 1056–1068. Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18 for 1953–1961.

[a] Does not include the members from Berlin.

[b] Various refugee groups in 1949.

ter presently, in discussing the nature of the emerging party system.

An examination of the types of seats won by the parties in each of the states provides a further indication of their strengths. In particular, it should be noted that the FDP was not able to win a single direct seat in 1961.

Table XII provides information about the types of seats won by the parties in all four federal elections. It shows that in previous elections smaller parties were quite able to win direct seats. This, however, should not necessarily be taken to mean that certain parties were previously much stronger in certain districts. Rather, most of the previous successes were due to *Wahlabkommen*, usually among the bourgeois parties, whereby one party would refrain from nominating a direct candidate in the district and ask its supporters to give their *Erststimmen* to the candidate of the other party.

The German party system, it has been seen, has undergone considerable change since 1949. But if there are only three parties represented in the Bundestag today, it has certainly not been because of any *scarcity* of political groups in the Federal Republic since 1949. About 80 parties and splinter groups have at some time or other, at some place or other, run candidates for the Bundestag or for a state legislature. On the supply side, then, the situation is certainly similar to that of the Weimar Republic. That the demand side shows such a retrenchment seems attributable to at least these three factors: the electoral law, West Germany's economic stability, and the greater political maturity of the citizenry.

TABLE XI. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SEATS WON, BY STATES AND PARTIES, 1961*

States	Direct Seats			List Seats			All Seats			Total
	CDU[a]	SPD	FDP	CDU[a]	SPD	FDP	CDU[a]	SPD	FDP	
Schleswig-Holstein	13	1	0	0	7	3	13	8	3	24
Hamburg	0	8	0	6	1	3	6	9	3	18
Niedersachsen	15	19	0	11	6	9	26	25	9	60
Bremen	0	3	0	1	0	1	1	3	1	5
Nordrhein-Westfalen	41	25	0	35	35	19	76	60	19	155
Hessen	3	19	0	14	2	7	17	21	7	45
Rheinland-Pfalz	10	5	0	6	6	4	16	11	4	31
Baden-Wuerttemberg	27	6	0	5	16	12	32	22	12	66
Bayern	42	5	0	8	23	8	50	28	8	86
Saarland	5	0	0	0	3	1	5	3	1	9
Federal Republic	156	91	0	86	99	67	242	190	67	499[b]

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/18.

[a] In Bayern: CSU.

[b] In principle, one-half of the seats should be Direct, and one-half List. It will be seen, however, that the total of 499 seats actually is comprised of 247 Direct seats and 252 List seats. The 5 additional List seats are the so-called *Ueberhangsmandate*, all of which were won by the CDU/CSU: 4 in Schleswig-Holstein and 1 in the Saarland.

TABLE XII. NUMBER AND TYPE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES, 1949–1961*

Party	1949			1953			1957			1961		
	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total	Direct	List	Total
CDU/CSU	115	24	139	172	71	243	194	76	270	156	86	242
SPD	96	35	131	45	106	151	46	123	169	91	99	190
FDP	12	40	52	14	34	48	1	40	41	0	67	67
DP	5	12	17	10	5	15	6	11	17	0	0	0[a]
BHE	—	—	—	0	27	27	0	0	0			
ZP	0	10	10	1	2	3	0	0	0[b]	—	—	—
BP	11	6	17	0	0	0						
DRP	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SSW	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KPD	0	15	15	0	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
WAV	0	12	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total[c,d]	242	160	402	242	245	487	247	250	497	247	252	499

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

[a] GDP.

[b] FU.

[c] Does not include the members from Berlin.

[d] The intended divisions between Direct Seats and List Seats for the Federal Republic were 60/40 per cent in 1949 and 50/50 per cent in the other elections. List Seats beyond 40 per cent or 50 per cent constitute *Ueberhangsmandate.*

The great reduction in running and seated parties between 1949 and 1961 has already been noted. A multi-party system, similar to that of Weimar, or another one-party system, definitely do not appear as real possibilities at this point. The question is essentially whether a two- or a three-party system, will emerge; and the party in doubt is the FDP.

To test this question, Table XIII gives the percentage of popular votes and seats alternatively for the CDU/CSU plus SPD and the CDU/CSU plus SPD plus FDP. We can see immediately that the percentages have increased steadily both in the two- and in the three-party category. On the federal level the two-party combination now holds 81.6 per cent of the popular vote and 86.6 per cent of the seats. The three-party combination, by contrast, now holds 94.4 per cent of the popular vote and, of course, all the seats. This leads us to classify the current situation as a three-party system. It seems unwarranted to call it a two-party system when the two parties receive only 81.6 per cent of the vote, for the possibility of a clear majority *and* alternation in office seems remote with such a division of the vote.

TABLE XIII. PERCENTAGES OF POPULAR VOTES (*Zweitstimmen*) AND SEATS IN THE BUNDESTAG, 1949–1961,* COMBINED FOR TWO MAJOR PARTIES AND FOR THREE MAJOR PARTIES

Year	CDU/CSU+SPD		CDU/CSU+ SPD+FDP	
	Popular Vote %	Seats in Bundestag %	Popular Vote %	Seats in Bundestag %
1949	60.2	67.2	72.1	80.1
1953	74.0	80.9	83.5	90.7
1957	81.6	88.3	89.3	96.5
1961	81.6	86.6	94.4	100.0

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18. Computations do not include the members from Berlin.

Very similar conditions prevail in each of the states. (See Table XIV.) Selecting 90 per cent of the popular vote as an arbitrary dividing line between sufficient and insufficient ground for ascribing the whole domain to a certain number of parties, we find that *three* parties are required in each of them. We also find a reduction in the number of parties parallel to that at the federal level.

Whether the current three-party system has reached stability or instead will give way to a two-party system depends largely on the future of the FDP. And the future of the FDP would

TABLE XIV. THE PARTY SYSTEMS OF THE STATES: NUMBER OF PARTIES NECESSARY TO ACCUMULATE 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE (*Zweitstimme*) IN BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS, 1949–1961*

State	Number of parties necessary to accumulate 90% or more			
	1949	1953	1957	1961
Schleswig-Holstein	7	5	4	3
Hamburg	5	4	3	3
Niedersachsen	7	5	4	3
Bremen	6	5	3	3
Nordrhein-Westfalen	5	4	3	3
Hessen	5	4	4	3
Rheinland-Pfalz	3	3	3	3
Baden-Wuerttemberg	7	4	3	3
Bayern	5	5	3	3
Saarland	—	—	3	3

* Bundesamt: VIII/5/14; VIII/5/18.

seem to depend on at least two things: the source of its 1961 increment and the reaction of the electorate to the FDP's post-election behavior. On this second score, to date, the most important and consequential political act of the FDP has been its entrance into a coalition with the CDU/CSU *under Adenauer*, discussed below. The source of the FDP's gains will be dealt with elsewhere.

The most significant phenomena of the German party system appear to be the de-emphasizing of ideology, noted above, and the widening of the support bases of the three major parties. The CDU/CSU, while by no means a complete cross-section of the German people, has nevertheless become a genuine *Volkspartei* drawing support from a great variety of social groups. The SPD, by contrast, has a long history as a class-party; yet in recent years it seems to have succeeded in widening its base. The party most narrowly based still is the FDP. While its support is not monolithic—it rather varies with region—it is predominantly middle class. Nevertheless, there is no evidence at present that the FDP will inevitably suffer the fate of the other small parties.[19] The German party system seems to have stabilized at its present equilibrium. Assertions concerning the emergence of a two-party system are at this time unwarranted.

POSTSCRIPT: AFTER THE ELECTION

It became readily apparent when the votes were counted that the election had really decided nothing except that the CDU/CSU had lost its absolute majority in the Bundestag. If the election meant the end of the Adenauer era, the chancellor himself refused to depart: two days after the election he announced that he wished to remain as chancellor. Later, he agreed not to stay the entire four years. The next seven weeks were spent determining the terms under which the FDP would enter a coalition with the CDU/CSU, and once again the chancellor exhibited his political skill in a game of nerves which deserves brief attention.[20]

Prior to the vote, Mende had expressed his opposition to serving under Adenauer, and some of his statements were interpreted as indicating an unwillingness on the part of the FDP as a whole to serve under the old CDU/CSU leader. Mende had listed several CDU/CSU leaders who were acceptable, of whom Erhard was the favorite. The FDP faced difficult decisions. There was widespread feeling that to serve under Adenauer would be a betrayal of many of the party's supporters; yet, the alternatives of either joining with the SPD or seeing the CDU/CSU and SPD come to terms were equally repugnant. The FDP also risked destroying its newly found internal unity should an open struggle take place; on the other hand, it feared the results of a coalition with the CDU, which had swallowed up several previous coalition partners. Finally, a remaining solution, a minority CDU government existing by the sufferance of the FDP, was ruled out by Federal President Luebke, who announced that Germany must have a strong government during the crisis over Berlin.

The SPD continued with its pre-election plea for an all-party government during the emergency period. Talks were held between Brandt and Mende, but given the difference in clientele and outlook between the two parties, an SPD-FDP coalition would have been an unholy alliance. However, a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, though unlikely, was not completely unthinkable; and when a CDU/CSU spokesman reminded the FDP that the CDU/CSU could sit down with the SPD and work out a satisfactory arrangement "in three hours," he was only saying publicly what the FDP already knew and feared. And the SPD did not allay this fear when its spokesmen stated that while an all-party coalition was preferable, an SPD-CDU/CSU government, even under Adenauer, was not beyond contemplation.

Attempts to alter Adenauer's decision to remain in office were unrewarding. Several CDU/CSU backbenchers spoke out politely against his continuance. Party leaders such as Strauss, Erhard, and Gerstenmaier said nothing in public, although they were known to oppose his candidacy. An unconvincing plan, which appeared in an FDP journal, to elevate Adenauer to a new governing council separate from the present institutional structure was stillborn. In the face of Adenauer's determination and the absence of effective opposition from within the CDU/CSU, the FDP found itself without acceptable alternatives to serving in a coalition under Adenauer. This they accepted, but only after the impasse caused by their demand that Von Brentano be replaced as foreign minister had been broken by his supposedly self-willed resignation, for the chancellor had remained firm; indeed, the FDP charge against Von Brentano was that he was a yes-man, but his replacement, Gerhardt Schroeder, was even closer to Adenauer.

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[19] For a contrary view see Peter Merkl, "Equilibrium, Structure of Interests, and Leadership: Adenauer's Survival as Chancellor," this REVIEW, Vol. 56 (September 1962), pp. 634–650.

[20] For a more extensive analysis of the process of forming the coalition see *ibid.*

The FDP insisted upon a formal coalition agreement which stated the terms upon which the cooperation of the two parties would be based.[21] It provided for a coalition committee, composed of the two top parliamentary leaders of the partners plus the whips, to meet weekly to work out common parliamentary programs and so avoid conflict on the floor of the Bundestag. The agreement also stated that Adenauer would not remain chancellor for the full four years.

Thus on November 7, 1961, after seven weeks during which Adenauer exhibited his manipulative skill, the Bundestag elected him chancellor on the first ballot, giving him 258 of 499 Bundestag votes. There were 206 votes against him, 26 abstentions, and 9 members absent. Hence, Adenauer failed to receive 51 of the 309 votes of the coalition.

In the distribution of cabinet positions, the FDP received five of twenty—those of justice, finance, expellees and refugees, federal property, and economic cooperation. Mende did not take a position in the cabinet, nor did he receive the chairmanship of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee which he had desired. Moreover, the FDP plan for the appointment of a state-secretary in each ministry, from a party different from that of the minister, was rejected by the CDU/CSU.

The chief difference between the pre-election and post-election cabinets is that the FDP secured five ministries. Another significant change was the shift in the foreign ministry. In addition, a woman was brought into the cabinet for the first time, as minister of public health, a new cabinet post. The major issue of the campaign—the nature of the post-Adenauer era in German politics—remained unsettled by the election and its aftermath.

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[21] Reprinted in *Die Welt*, October 21, 1961.

PRESIDENT SUKARNO AND THE COMMUNISTS: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICATION

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The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is today the largest communist party outside the Sino-Soviet bloc. In a country with a population of some 96 million, it claims today a membership of two million, and the communist mass organizations claim more than 11 million members. At the same time PKI is well represented in parliament and the several high-level councils appointed by Sukarno to render advice to the government. The deputy governors of three of the four provinces in Java are communists, and as of March 9, 1962 the two main Party leaders acquired quasi-cabinet status. Yet the possibility is remote that PKI may achieve power in Indonesia in the foreseeable future. My purpose here is an analysis of the Party's place in Indonesian politics that results in this forecast.

On March 14, 1957 Sukarno declared the whole of Indonesia to be under a state of war and siege. The army commanders in their capacity as war administrators thereby received wide powers over political activities and the administration, powers they have not relinquished. Three weeks later, on April 4, Sukarno appointed himself, "citizen Sukarno," as *formateur* of an "extra-parliamentary business cabinet," an action declared illegal by many Indonesian politicians but one which pointedly demonstrated the increasingly important political role the president had taken. His nomination of the Djuanda cabinet on April 9 marked the end of a line of cabinets chosen as the result of bargaining between the political parties in parliament. From about the middle of 1958 Sukarno and the central army leadership have clearly dominated the government, a domination formalized by the decreed restoration of the 1945 constitution on July 5, 1959. Sukarno took over the post of prime minister, and officers of the armed forces were brought into his cabinet. [Army officers had urged him to assume greater power—and thereby responsibility—in 1956–1957, and it was also a major proponent of the return to the 1945 constitution, erecting a system that ensured him a considerably enhanced share in the conduct of affairs.]

The government coalition between Sukarno and the army has been marked by both cooperation and conflict. Cooperation, because each needs the other in order to rule: Sukarno has legitimate authority as the leader of the revolution, and the army has the naked power with which to maintain order. But because Sukarno lacks his own organized basis of support or power, he has sought allies to bolster his position in the governing coalition. His main ally is PKI.

I. THE ALLIANCE IS ESTABLISHED

Sukarno first sought the friendship of PKI at the end of 1955, and his alliance with the communists was firmly cemented by early 1957. Two basic factors explain why Sukarno sought this alliance: his struggle to achieve and maintain a dominant political position, and his wish "to complete the revolution".

In 1956, after more than ten years of parliamentary democracy in Indonesia, the parliamentary regime was crumbling. Parliament and the political parties had notably failed to create political stability or an expanding economy. Dutch capital still controlled much of the economic activity, and the Dutch still occupied West New Guinea. Among the politically conscious Indonesians a widespread belief developed that the parliamentary system—or "free-fight liberalism" as Sukarno was to call it—had failed and must be replaced. Sukarno sought to become the dominant political force in the country, and needed allies to help counterbalance the other emerging power, the army. He viewed the army with suspicion because many of its officers would have been glad to establish either an army-led government or an army-backed government in which his political opponents, Dr. Hatta and the Masjumi party, would probably have played a major role. The nationalist party, PNI, despite rare floutings of his wishes, was so dependent upon Sukarno for its mass support and for his backing in political maneuvers that he could count on it. But his own popularity and political skill combined with PNI support were still not enough to counter the army, Masjumi, and other opponents. Therefore Sukarno sought the alliance of PKI, not only the largest but also the best organized party (at that time, in mid-1957, PKI claimed over one million members, and more than seven million members in a network of mass organizations). PKI organization could be used to demonstrate to the army Sukarno's apparent great popularity, his legitimate position as father and leader of the revolution, by mobilizing enormous crowds for his speeches, by plastering the country with his slogans. Communist support would be of importance in parliament and the constituent assembly. And with PKI on his side, Sukarno could feel fairly certain that the army dare not attempt to oust him for fear of civil war.

Apart from seeking PKI's alliance for purely power reasons, Sukarno probably viewed PKI as the only party able and willing to assist him toward his major policy goal, "the completion of the revolution." What he means by this is somewhat nebulous, but it includes maintaining the people in a state of nationalist fervor through mass actions toward the elimination of all imperialist (that is, Western) political, economic and cultural power in Indonesia. PKI, combining a vociferous anti-colonialism with size and efficient organization, is the only Indonesian party that can be of much assistance in Sukarno's revolutionary task.

From PKI's viewpoint, it was preferable that parliamentary democracy continue and the extra-parliamentary forces remain relatively insignificant. For a time, during the second Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet of March 1956 to April 1957, the PKI leaders attempted to bolster the crumbling parliamentary system, but once it was obvious that the regime would be drastically overhauled anyway, they accepted Sukarno's proffered hand. Within the army, voices advocated the abolition of all parties, and prominent officers, both in the central command and in the regions, were outspokenly anti-communist. PKI was not yet strong enough to make its own bid for power, and the only person or political force capable of preventing an army-led or army-backed anti-communist government was Sukarno. Consequently the Sukarno-PKI alliance was established.

II. COMMUNIST EXPECTATIONS AND GAINS

The main purpose of the alliance, for PKI, was the maintenance of Sukarno as the dominant force in or behind the government. In that position he was seen as likely to have protective and positive results of benefit to the Party. Dependent upon PKI, he could protect the Party from repression by the army—both the central army command and the regional commanders—and he could exert his influence to prevent PNI and the orthodox Moslem party (NU) from attacking the Party.

PKI probably hoped for four main positive results from the alliance. First, it expected to be able to exploit Sukarno's popularity, especially in Java, by closely identifying itself with him. Dangers of course attended such a use of his popularity. If the identification became rooted, and he were then to become unpopular the Party would suffer likewise (and it is to be noted that, anyway, Sukarno is not so popular in several regions, especially outside Java). Another danger in the identification, if Sukarno was built up or maintained in the eyes of many Party members as the great leader and father of the revolution, lay in the corresponding degree of control he might gain over the Party members. Identification with and praise of Sukarno might increase PKI's mass support, but it might also reduce the PKI leaders' control over their supporters.

The second positive result PKI hoped for was leverage to exert pressure upon the president to preserve the widest democratic freedoms—that is, to permit PKI and its mass organizations to continue to expand, to maintain a degree of parliamentary democracy in which political parties would still have a considerable role, and to permit PKI to train its members to an increasing "class consciousness" or militancy in preparation for a forceful communist take-over. A third possible benefit of the alliance might arise if Sukarno, in a dominant position in the government, should emphasize fervent nationalism to the neglect and detriment of economic stability or development. If this happened, then, with the retention of democratic freedoms, PKI would be able to exploit simultaneously the anti-colonial agitation and the inevitable dissatisfaction with the economic situation. In preparation for this eventuality, PKI announced in April 1957, when the Sukarno-appointed Djuanda government took office, and again in July 1959, when Sukarno himself became prime minister, that it would continue its policy of support for the government's popular measures, and criticism of its unpopular acts. Finally, PKI leaders alternately hoped and feared that the alliance would bring communist participation in the cabinet—which had been Sukarno's declared goal since the end of 1955. Through the control of ministries, PKI might gain significant control of the administrative apparatus and so make electoral victory or revolution unnecessary.

In the event, under the alliance with Sukarno, PKI has gained much. It is impossible to measure how far PKI's support has enabled Sukarno to maintain his position as the leading power in Indonesia and to push through his ideas and aims against those of his partners in the government, but communist support has certainly been a considerable factor. Partly by reason of unwavering communist support, Sukarno has been able to thwart efforts in 1957 to form a government led by Hatta; he has been able to prevent the formation of an army-led government (if that is what a majority of officers have wanted, which is doubtful) or an army-dominated government; he has been able to ban the two parties most opposed to himself and PKI and most oriented to efficient administration and economic development (Masjumi and PSI); and he has ensured the military defeat of the anti-Sukarno and anti-communist PRRI-Permesta rebellion that broke out in February 1958.

As to the protective expectations from the alliance, Sukarno has prevented the army from banning or severely repressing PKI and its mass organizations. Among his more public interventions on their behalf, he insisted against army opposition that the PKI sixth national congress of September 1959 be held (and he himself delivered a friendly speech to the congress); he frustrated army-inspired attempts in 1960 and 1961 to obtain the fusion of the communist trade union federation and youth association into tame, all-embracing organizations; and he insisted on the lifting of bans on PKI and its mass organizations imposed in August 1960 by army commanders in South Sumatra/Djambi, South Borneo, and South Celebes.

Sukarno, as expected, has ensured that PNI and NU pay at least lip service to the need for Nasakom (Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis, nationalist-religious-communist) unity in solving the nation's problems. During the second half of 1957, after local elections in Java had shown a rapid communist advance, particularly at the expense of PNI, several national and regional leaders of PNI and NU demanded an end to the alliance with PKI and proposed a new period of cooperation with Masjumi. Sukarno is reported to have exerted pressure on the national leaders of PNI and NU to stop such a move—which they did.[1]

PKI has been less successful in securing from the alliance what I have termed positive results. Certainly its close identification with Sukarno was a contributory factor in the increase in PKI's vote in Java from 5,477,707 to 7,514,197 between the parliamentary elections of September 1955 and the local and regional elections held from June to November 1957. PKI thus emerged as the largest Indonesian party in terms of a direct electoral following as well as in membership and control of mass organizations. Under Sukarno's protection, PKI and its mass organizations have been permitted to hold regular conferences and congresses, and they claim a considerable increase in their organizational network and in membership. For example, between July 1959 and October 1962 PKI claims to have increased its membership from $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions to 2 millions, while the four major communist mass organizations claim an increase from 7.8 to over 11.0 millions.

As expected, Sukarno has emphasized fervent nationalism, especially the campaign to liberate West Irian, to the detriment of the domestic economy.[2] But, as will be seen below, the nationalist agitation and economic decline have not brought PKI the great benefits that were hoped for because Sukarno, in conjunction with the army, has removed most of the opportunities for PKI to exploit either. And if, on March 9, 1962, Sukarno gave the two PKI leaders Aidit and Lukman quasi-cabinet status, this may have proved an unwanted embarrassment for the Party, not the political lever that had been expected.

III. OBSTACLES TO COMMUNIST VICTORY

Today, after five years of the close alliance, PKI seems as far as, or further than, ever from winning power. Two basic and related reasons account for this: the strengthening and entrenchment of the army, and what I term the domestication of PKI.

The strengthening and entrenchment of the army has been a process that Sukarno has been unable to prevent, and one which his policies have indirectly encouraged. His insistence on the military defeat of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion improved the fighting ability of the army and strengthened the control of General Nasution, then army chief of staff, over what had been a loosely integrated national army. The West Irian campaign necessitated the enlargement and modernization of the armed forces; large purchases of modern equipment have been made, especially from the USSR, and the army now contains over 300,000 troops. Sukarno's declaration of a state of war and siege in March 1957, at the time when he was preparing to instal the Djuanda cabinet, conferred wide powers on the army over administration and political life—powers which the army has not relinquished. The Sukarno-inspired workers' seizure of all Dutch enterprises in December 1957 enabled the army to take over the administration of those enterprises in the name of order and production.[3] And Sukarno's restoration of the 1945 constitution in July 1959 and his implementation of "guided democracy" gave the army a legitimate and formal part in the government, whereas previously it had exerted influence from behind the scenes. Seven army officers received posts in the presidential cabinet appointed in July 1959, army officers received seats in the appointed parliament announced in June 1960 and in the local and regional councils appointed at the end of that year, and army officers have been appointed as governors of several provinces.

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[1] Some leaders of PNI and NU, however, especially at the center, were and are ready to cooperate with PKI, and to keep criticism of PKI in check. This is because they see PKI as an ally in their struggle against Masjumi and PSI (until those parties were banned in August 1960), and also as an ally against the encroachments by both Sukarno and the army against the role and freedom of the parties and parliament.

[2] To give but two illustrations: in December 1957 all Dutch enterprises were seized, resulting in a drastic decline in production and efficiency so that they are now a financial liability; and since 1960 huge sums have been spent on modernizing and enlarging the armed forces in order to force the Dutch from West Irian. Inflation has accelerated, and severe shortages have occurred of basic commodities.

Time has been another factor in the strengthening of the army. General Nasution, though he has lately given up the post of army chief of staff, has retained the Ministry of Defense, with a protegé as chief of staff. Counting both posts, he has been in command of the army continuously since October 1955. He has had the interval since then to weed out from important positions the officers he considers less than trustworthy.

As for the domestication of PKI, Sukarno has eradicated Masjumi and PSI, the only two parties that dared to oppose him openly and consistently, and he has successfully tamed the remaining political parties, including PKI. Within the other major partner in the government, the army, many officers apparently would like to be rid of all political parties, and especially PKI. In this, they have been thwarted by Sukarno, who needs the parties in his power struggle with the army. But the army has been Sukarno's eager partner in the policy of domesticating the parties, especially PKI, the greatest potential threat to the present ruling groups.

IV. DOMESTICATION

Domestication in the context of Sukarno's policy towards PKI contains two main elements. One is the protection of PKI and its mass organizations from above-ground extinction; that is, the preservation of their legality and of at least a limited freedom of overt activities. The other is the creation of effective blocks to PKI's possible assumption of power, so that the Party provides Sukarno with support but cannot exploit the alliance towards its own major goal, which is governmental power. Such a policy is only possible if one of the two allies wields greater power or is considerably shrewder than the other. On the record so far, Sukarno is both; he is not only an extremely able politician, but as the leading force in a governmental coalition he can use the government's coercive powers to compel PKI to either accept the situation or break the alliance. It is not his interest to coerce PKI too far, for if the alliance were broken his own position *vis-à-vis* the army would be greatly weakened; therefore the process of domestication has been gradual, and PKI and its mass organizations have been allowed to expand. On the other hand, PKI has felt obliged to accept the risks of domestication because a break with Sukarno would bring down severe governmental repression, which PKI could hardly survive.

At the beginning of the alliance, there were broadly four ways by which PKI might conceivably have been able to achieve power. The first was infiltration of the armed forces and the bureaucracy. The second was by parliamentary means, by skilful use of the then existing parliamentary system in which the cabinet was responsible to parliament. Through electoral and therefore parliamentary strength, PKI might have aspired to form its own government, or might have secured communist inclusion in a coalition government as the first step towards the seizure of power. The third was the development of existing cadres and members into a force capable of seizing power. And the fourth was by acclamation; that is, the politically conscious Indonesians might have turned to PKI as the only group capable and worthy of ruling, after all other groups had demonstrated their inability to solve the major problems facing Indonesia. These alternative possibilities are worth examining in turn.

Infiltration. As a means of achieving power, infiltration could be ruled out as a practical possibility in 1957, and the same applies today. PKI has gained very little support among the officers of the armed forces, and it appears that since 1956 General Nasution has gradually removed the few pro-communist army officers from positions of influence. It also appears that the officers retain the respect and obedience of the lower ranks. The Indonesian bureaucracy, too, like white-collar groups in general, has proved surprisingly resistant to PKI so that the Party commands little support among public servants in strategic positions. Since January 1948 no communist has had control of a ministry. The two PKI members of the cabinet, appointed on March 9, 1962, have been given positions without portfolio; they do not sit in the regular meetings of cabinet; and their status is that of advisers on economic matters and on measures for the liberation of West Irian.

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[3] The army officers placed in charge of the former Dutch enterprises were later required to relinquish formally their positions in the army. However they still retain their army titles and maintain close contact with the army.

Parliamentary success. In the September 1955 elections for parliament, PKI emerged as the fourth party, with 6.2 million votes or 16.4 per cent of the total. In the local and regional elections held in Java in the second half of 1957, PKI received 27.4 per cent of the votes. Communist leaders, perhaps purposely understating their strength lest alarm provoke counter-measures, estimated they would receive about 25 per cent of the votes in the second national parliamentary elections scheduled for September 1959. On such a showing, if these elections had been held and if the parliamentary system had been maintained, PKI would have emerged as the largest or second largest party in parliament and so would have been in a strong bargaining position in the formation of a cabinet, if it were settled by the usual processes of inter-party bargaining. However, this prospect has been completely removed. In September 1958 the government announced that the 1959 elections would be postponed for one year, and when that time was up they were postponed again. They were put off once more in 1962. Meanwhile, parliament is now appointed and its power destroyed.

On July 5, 1959, President Sukarno decreed the restoration of the 1945 constitution—an action that PKI very reluctantly accepted after the elected constituent assembly had failed to reach an agreement on a new constitution.[4] Under the 1945 constitution the cabinet is chosen by the president and is not responsible to parliament. Furthermore, Sukarno has taken advantage of the loose wording of that constitution to rule largely by decree, and so bypass parliament. When parliament from December 1959 to March 1960 demanded at least control of the budget, Sukarno decreed its dissolution and in June 1960 appointed a new one. He has made quite clear that he will tolerate neither opposition nor major criticism from parliament, nor from the several advisory councils that he has appointed since July 1959. At the end of 1960, Sukarno also "re-tooled" the local and regional councils, and replaced them by appointed bodies. Their executive committees, too, are now nominated by the government, as are the regional and local district heads.

In short, it must have been fairly clear to the PKI leaders by 1955 at the latest that they had little hope of winning power through the infiltration of the army and the bureaucracy. The army's direct involvement in government from late 1956 onwards, followed by the re-enactment of the 1945 constitution, Sukarno's rapid removal of parliament's limited powers under that constitution and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime, all showed that the parliamentary road to power was also closed. Hence, shortly after Sukarno's assumption of the office of prime minister in July 1959, only two ways were left by which PKI might aspire to power: the development of the existing or enlarged support into a force capable of seizing power (by the use or threat of force), and the elevation of the Party by acclamation.

Developing the cadres. By the middle of 1957, as already noted, PKI claimed a membership of over 1 million, while the communist mass organizations claimed about 7½ millions.[5] If these members or even a small proportion of them could have been trained to a higher level of revolutionary discipline and class consciousness, then the PKI leaders might have had at their disposal a force capable of capturing power even against the forceful opposition of the non-communists. But the PKI leaders have been unable to develop such a force from their mass support for two basic reasons: one that may be called built-in obstacles, and the other, preventive government action.

Built-in obstacles. Few members of the Indonesian political elite, armed forces or bureauc-

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[4] For PKI's public explanation of how it was forced by political circumstances to agree to the restoration of the 1945 constitution, see Sakirman, "Apa arti sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi terpimpin," Part II, *Bintang Merah*, July–August 1960, pp. 320–28.

[5] The membership claims of the main communist mass organizations in the latter half of 1957 were: Sobsi (trade union federation), 2.7 millions; BTI (peasants' association), 3.0 millions; Pemuda Rakjat (youth), 800,000; Gerwani (women), 671,000; and PPDI (village officials), 350,000.

racy, have been attracted to communism.[6] The PKI leaders have therefore been forced to seek and build support among the poorer segments of society: the peasants, the workers and the "petty bourgeoisie." In Indonesia, however, and especially in Java where for a complex of reasons PKI found the readiest support, the poorer people are essentially passive in face of the wealthier and ruling groups, and even in face of the problems which press most directly upon them. Partly as a result of this passive nature, and of the overwhelming superiority in power (that is, ability to coerce and repress) of the non-communist ruling groups, the Aidit leadership of PKI in late 1951 and early 1952 decided that large numerical support was essential if PKI was to win power from the incumbent ruling groups.[7] Consequently the leadership formulated a broad national united-front strategy capable of amassing the necessary support.[8] The two essential elements of this strategy were painstaking but "limit-conscious" work among the poorer social groups, and friendship toward the internal non-communist political groups. These two elements were mutually dependent. Without the image of PKI as patriotic, sympathetic to religion, opposed to the use of force in the achievement of its goals, attached to democracy, moderate in demands, friendly toward the non-communist political forces, and generally responsible in the exercise of the role of non-governing party, the Party could have won neither the sympathy of the broad masses of poorer people, nor the toleration of ruling groups toward PKI's organizational activities.

Thus, since early in 1952 PKI has increased its membership from under 8,000 to about 2 millions, and has educated its new and old members in the strategy of the broad national united front. Typical slogans devised by the Aidit leadership for Party members have been "national interest above class and Party interests," "national unity above all else," and "the basic contradiction is between the people and imperialism." Alliance has been sought with the non-communist political groups, from Sukarno through PNI to the conservative Moslem NU, and with social groups ranging from the "national bourgeoisie" through the devout Moslems, even to the "patriotic landlords." That is, under the Aidit strategy, Party members and cadres have not been educated to militant action against internal enemies, with some exceptions such as the regionalist councils established in 1956 and 1957.

Despite the great change in the Indonesian political situation during and since 1956 and 1957, PKI has not altered its basic strategy; it has adapted the strategy to the new situation. To alter the strategy would have been very difficult. First, a switch to a policy of hostility to "class enemies" would have alienated a large part of the mass support which is unprepared for such hostility. Second, a radical switch would probably have caused a major division among Party *cadres* and members, where since 1951 there had been a unity unequalled in any other major communist party. And third, a switch could have brought down severe government repression, as it had in September 1948, repression for which the Party was unprepared after many years of the Aidit strategy. In other words, the PKI leaders were and are faced with a dilemma: their strategy has certainly achieved mass support, but at the same time it has created a party incapable of seizing power, apart from winning it by the parliamentary road, a road no other fraternal party has yet traversed successfully.

Preventive measures. The government has been careful to restrict the opportunity for PKI and its mass organizations to develop militancy among their members. Two broad categories of restrictions have been applied: general threats, and specific controls.

Two government laws enacted in 1960 posed a legal threat to PKI's above-ground existence. The first, adopted on January 12, 1960, is called "Conditions and Simplification of the Party System." Under this law political parties must accept and defend the 1945 constitution and Pantjasila,[9] and must use peaceful and democratic methods to achieve their political goals; political parties may receive assistance from abroad only with the consent of the government; the president may order an investigation into the administration, finances and wealth of any party; and the president may dissolve any party if its program is aimed at undermining the principles and objectives of state policy, or if it has not officially condemned party members who have acted in support of a rebellion. By this law PKI could be banned at any time the government so decided, and a precedent for dissolution was set with the banning of Masjumi and PSI in August 1960. In order to stay within the law, PKI has altered its constitution to include adherence to Pantjasila and a *gotong-rojong* (mutual help) democracy; but a party could still be banned which aims at communism, instead of socialism-on-the-Indonesian-plan, and which contends that the communist Madiun rebellion of 1948 was a patriotic act of self-defence.

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[6] PKI, founded on May 23, 1920, is the oldest communist party in Asia. Dutch repression, which became severe after the communist rebellion of 1926–1927, prevented it from gaining wide support among the increasing group of politically conscious Indonesians. From 1927 to the end of World War II, PKI virtually ceased to exist. During the Indonesian revolution, which broke out in August 1945, PKI did succeed in attracting the support of a small section of the political elite and the revolutionary armed forces. But due to the mis-timed communist rebellion at Madiun in September 1948, many of the more prominent communists were shot, most of the pro-communist elements in the armed forces were weeded out, and PKI for several years suffered from an anti-patriotic stigma.

[7] Only through mass support could PKI build a large body of competent cadres, win a significant position in parliament (with the possibilities for political maneuver that this would bring), or develop a power basis capable of ousting the ruling groups if they opposed PKI by force.

[8] For a study of the formulation and implementation of this strategy see Donald Hindley, "The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1961: a decade of the Aidit leadership," Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1961.

Later in 1960, all parties were required by law to present the government with a list of their branches and of all members. The address, date of entry to the party, and position in the party were required for every member. PKI handed in its list on February 4, 1961.

By these two laws, the government holds the threat of banning over PKI's head, while the government's possession of details of every Party member must discourage members from action in defiance of the authorities.

As has been seen, Sukarno has protected the legal existence of PKI, and has thwarted army-inspired efforts to obtain the merger of the communist-led trade union federation and youth organization into national, all-embracing, government-controlled organizations. PKI has lost, however, one very important constituent unit, Perbepsi, the para-military veterans' association which by December 1957 was claiming 300,000 members. Because Perbepsi had the makings of a formidable force at PKI's command, it is possible that Sukarno acquiesced in—and there is no evidence that he opposed—the army's efforts to fuse all veterans' organizations into an army-led veterans' legion. This process of fusion was begun in December 1956 and completed by August 1959, to PKI's considerable chagrin. But with this exception, PKI and its main mass organizations have been protected by Sukarno.[10] On the other hand, with the ready assistance of the army, he has sought to prevent the development of the communist mass support into a militant force capable of disputing for power. The two ways by which the PKI leaders might heighten the revolutionary discipline and militancy of their followers are by the dissemination of news and ideas, and by practical training of *cadres* and members in militant actions. The government has fairly effectively blocked both these ways.

The main channels open to PKI for the dissemination of news and ideas are the schools and courses of the Party and its mass organizations, and publications. The schools and courses appear to have been developed since 1957, and now form a nation-wide network. They have suffered little interference from the government, except, of course, during the few months when all party activities have been banned and in the regions where local army commanders have placed temporary bans on all activities of PKI and its mass organizations.[11] However, the political content of the education given is set by the central Party leadership, and it consists of an enunciation and justification of the broad national united front. This means that it emphasizes the imperialist rather than the internal enemies, alliance with and moderation toward the "national bourgeoisie" (that is, ruling groups) and religion and rich peasants and "patriotic landlords," rather than hostility and militancy in face of them. Undoubtedly the authorities would take severe measures if the schools and courses were to teach class antagonisms.

In the realm of publication, PKI and its mass organizations have been dealt with severely. In October 1960, the central war administration, of which Sukarno is supreme administrator, refused permits to all seven periodicals published under the auspices of the PKI central committee.[12] At the same time, the permit of the thrice-monthly periodical of Sobsi, the communist trade union federation, was indefinitely suspended. The only regular publication left to the central committee is the daily newspaper "Harian Rakjat," whose circulation was cut arbitrarily from 60,000 to 44,000 in June 1960 at a time when the government reduced newsprint to all newspapers. The only periodicals apparently left to the mass organizations are BTI's "Suara Tani" (circulation 5,000), BTI's "Pembangunan Desa" (5,000) Gerwani's "Api Kartini" (2,500), and the fortnightly "Zaman Baru" (5,000) of the communist cultural association Lekra. A few regional publications are permitted, but their circulation is very restricted.

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[9] Pantjasila, or the five principles, are the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945. They are humanism, nationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God the Almighty.

[10] In 1961, Sukarno also forced the merger of all scout and pioneer associations, including PKI's, into a national association with himself as chief scout.

[11] All political activity was banned from June 4 to August 1, 1959, and from September 13 to December 1, 1960. In the last ten days of August 1960, temporary bans on all activities of PKI and its mass organizations were imposed by the regional army commanders in South Borneo, South Sumatra/Djambi, and South Celebes. Due to direct intervention by Sukarno the bans in the last two regions were lifted on December 1, 1960, but that in South Borneo was lifted only on August 28, 1961.

Control of the contents of publications is, of course, far more important than the control of numbers. The decree of March 14, 1957, placing Indonesia under a state of war and siege, and making the army commanders war administrators, has since been modified, but in effect the army commanders retain wide powers of control and supervision over political activities. One power widely used is that of censorship. News and opinions disliked by the army and other sections of the government have been suppressed, and newspapers have suffered frequent suspension for arousing the displeasure of the ruling groups. For example, "Harian Rakjat" was suspended for a total of 65 days in the period from January to September 1960 inclusive. In the same year, the communist news agency, INPS, was suspended for several months. Also, temporary but lengthy bans on the circulation of "Harian Rakjat" have been imposed by some regional commanders, notably in South Sumatra and Nusatenggara.

Sukarno intervened to protect "Harian Rakjat" from complete closure, but as part of his policy of taming the parties he has brought all newspapers under tight government control. On February 15, 1960 a decree stated that newsprint would be witheld from any newspaper or periodical which failed to develop public opinion or national culture along lines he laid down. On October 12 of that year, publishers were told that their newspapers and periodicals must support and defend the principles of state he enunciated, assist in the abolition of liberalism, imperialism and separatism, promote a free and independent foreign policy, remain aloof from the Cold War, and promote the Indonesian personality. Several non-communist newspapers have been closed. During 1961 all private printing shops were brought under direct government supervision, as were all duplicating machines, to prevent their clandestine political use.

In short, Sukarno and the army have successfully controlled the press in Indonesia, including the communist press, so that it supports the government on all major issues, and dares utter no more than the most minor criticisms. The communists have been even more cautious in their publications than some non-communists because they know that the army is ready to suspend their now limited publications on the slightest excuse.

Practical training. As we have noted, the Aidit leadership of PKI has been restrained in the encouragement and promotion of militant action by its mass support in part because the Indonesian poorer classes are unprepared for such action, and in part because the communists require the government's toleration of their organizational activities. However, PKI and its mass organizations attempt to increase the political consciousness and militancy of their supporters by stepping gradually from "small but successful" actions (such as a demand for the distribution of work clothes in a factory, or for payment for peasant sharecroppers who carry the landlords' share from the fields) to the point where workers dare openly oppose employers, peasants oppose landlords, and both oppose the authorities. This practical training in actions of increasing scope is of supreme importance in Indonesia, and especially in Java where most PKI support lies, because the lower social strata have no tradition of nor experience in such actions. The lower social strata are, in general, devoid of any belief in the short- or long-term efficacy of their own action in removing social and economic inequalities. It is even true that, in general, the Indonesian poor still need much convincing that inequalities are unjust and removable, and not predestined and unchangeable by man. The Indonesian ruling groups, including Sukarno, the army, and the civil service, have been prompt to prevent their poorer compatriots from acquiring practical experience in the efficacy of united action in the general political, the labor and the peasant fields.

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[12] These seven were: *Bintang Merah* (the monthly ideological journal), *Kehidupan Partai* (a monthly with practical information for cadres), *Ilmu Marxis* (containing news of scientific and cultural developments in the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc), *Mimbar Komunis* (an Indonesian version of *World Marxist Review*), *PKI dan Perwakilan* (a quarterly containing news of PKI activities in parliament and the local and regional councils), *Ekonomi dan Masjarakat* (a quarterly with articles on economic and financial matters), and *Review of Indonesia* (an English-language monthly of news on the whole "progressive" movement in Indonesia).

PKI had also hoped, as earlier noted, that the maintenance of Sukarno as the leading force in the government would lead to a government emphasis on anti-colonial agitation and to the neglect of the economy. This has happened, but PKI has been prevented from unduly exploiting either nationalist feeling or popular dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation. Whatever the legal powers held by the central war administration and the regional war administrators over the activities of the political parties, the mass organizations, and the populace in general, in practice the administrators take the power to deal more or less severely with activities deemed detrimental to the government as a whole, or to its various main components.

At the end of 1959 and in January 1960, the communists had a ready popular grievance to exploit in the economic situation. Inflation was intense and wages lagged far behind. Consequently demonstrations were held throughout Indonesia, and the government was inundated with delegations, petitions, letters and telegrams demanding (not requesting) price cuts and wage increases—until General Nasution ordered strict measures against them. Since then the communists have not used the public as a means of pressing the government, complaints being confined to requests by usually muted statements, telegrams and deputations.

Even on anti-colonial matters the government has exercised strict control over communist activities. On February 10, 1958 the army established the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian, to channel and control all activities in this campaign, and so prevent PKI from gaining advantage from it. At present the recently formed National Front seems to be playing this role. And where the communists in a frenzy of anti-colonial zeal have acted independently, the authorities have not hesitated to react severely.[13]

Labor agitation has been peremptorily eradicated. In August 1957 strikes were banned in all "vital" enterprises, the definition of "vital" being gradually widened to cover virtually all industries. Strikes have ceased, and many communist trade union *cadres* have been imprisoned for long terms for merely discussing with workers the possibility of strikes. Even May Day ceremonies have been controlled. As of May Day 1958, the authorities have organized joint rallies at which speeches are given by representatives of the army, the Department of Labor, and the various trade union federations. The speeches of the trade union representatives must be presented to the authorities for prior clearance.

In the rural areas, the only significant group of peasants still willing to take militant action in defense of their interests are the squatters who occupied estate and forestry lands during the Japanese occupation and the revolution. Since the demise of parliamentary democracy, the authorities have taken firm and often forceful action against squatters protesting eviction. The latest example occurred in Kediri, East Java, in November 1961 when several of them were shot down.[14] Official reprisals have greatly reduced the incidence of militant squatter actions which were, anyway, rare events in the broad sea of peasant passivity.

Embourgeoisement. Thus it appears that PKI is effectively obstructed in its efforts to create a militant force from its mass support. Firm action by the authorities to prevent the first steps in militant experience seem to have successfully prevented the step by step acquisition of experience hoped for by the Aidit leadership. Worse still for PKI, a decline in the revolutionary morale of some of the important *cadres* seems to have set in simultaneously. In fact, government policy, with Sukarno as its chief proponent, is aimed deliberately to reduce or remove it. There are two facets to this process, the one more obvious, the other more complex.

The more obvious aspect is the inevitable general discouragement among *cadres* because of the overall situation in which PKI finds itself. Despite its continued legal existence, there are severe restrictions on the activities of the Party and its mass organizations; there is enforced servile praise of Sukarno—who in private is heartily disliked by the *cadres;* the non-communist forces appear to be consolidating their hold on power and to be creating a "semi-fascist" regime; and the Party is at best marking time in its own march to power.

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[13] A typical incident occurred in Malang on July 4, 1961, when communist-led workers seized control of the Belgian Faroka cigarette factory in protest against alleged Belgian intervention in the Congo. The army immediately arrested the ring-leaders, and put them on trial. In North Sumatra the army commander threatened severe action against anyone attempting to disrupt production on the Belgian-owned estates.

[14] Typically, as a result of the incident in Kediri, the government suspended the activities of all major Communist mass organizations throughout the entire Residency of Kediri from November 21, 1961 to September 11, 1962. Prominent *cadres* were arrested and placed on trial, including the BTI secretary for East Java.

The other facet of the decline in revolutionary morale is the *embourgeoisement* of the *cadres.* A number of communist *cadres* apparently are finding sufficient satisfaction of their material and status ambitions so that they have lost or are losing the will to overthrow the existing socio-political order—and under present and foreseeable circumstances that order will have to be forcibly destroyed if PKI is to win power.

In the September 1955 general elections, PKI won 16.4 per cent of the total votes, as noted above, and 39 seats in the parliament that met for the first time in March 1956. Local and regional councils were established in 1956 on the basis of these election results.[15] Between June and November 1957, local elections were held throughout Java, PKI increasing its vote compared with September 1955 by 37.2 per cent and the number of communist councillors to almost 1,000. At lower levels, PKI has succeeded in placing its members and sympathizers into such positions as village head. Javanese society, particularly, is extremely status-conscious; the status (and income) deriving from membership in parliament, councils and the body of village officials may be for many a fully acceptable substitute for power.[16] Thus for many *cadres,* coming from the poorer segments of society, PKI and the mass organizations have provided them directly (through positions in the extensive communist organizational network) or indirectly with prestigeful and materially secure positions—but within the framework of the existing order.

In March 1960, Sukarno dissolved the elected parliament and appointed a new one. Toward the end of the year, the local and regional councils were also "re-tooled." The heads of the various levels of "autonomous districts" became the appointees of the government. Communists were given about 65 seats in the new parliament, and PKI and its mass organizations have been well represented in the appointed local and regional councils. Communist-supported—though independent-minded—appointees now fill the positions of deputy-governor in Djakarta Raja, West Java and Central Java, and communist members have been appointed mayors in Semarang, Surakarta, Tjirebon, and Surabaja. In the new, appointed high councils to advise the government, such as the National Advisory Council, the National Planning Council and the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, communists have received many positions.[17]

Some Western observers have been horrified by these appointments, and view them as evidence that Sukarno is either pro-Communist or blind to the danger of communism. In fact, they are further evidence that Sukarno is a shrewd political manipulator determined to maintain the present non-communist regime. The appointments help him in three ways. First, parliament, the Consultative Assembly, and the various councils, though shorn of any power, are still necessary for the president to legitimize his rule and to give an appearance that there is a democratic aspect of guided democracy. Second, by bringing PKI and other political parties into the various appointed bodies, but at the same time preventing those bodies from voicing criticism, he is forcing the parties to identify themselves with the government. This in turn makes it difficult for them to exploit popular discontent at the government's inadequacies and failures, particularly in the economic field.[18] And third, he is giving communist *cadres* a vested interest in the regime. To have excluded communists from the appointed positions would have made many of them bitterly resentful of the loss of dignifying and materially rewarding positions; to include them, at the same time making the positions virtually powerless, may well reduce or remove their ardor as communists for the overthrow of the regime. If their personal situation is quite good, it is doubtful that they will risk the gamble of revolutionary action.

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[15] In Java alone there are 4 province-level councils, and 99 city and *kabupaten* councils. There are usually about 75 members in the provincial councils, and 35 in the lower councils.

[16] PKI requires that any member who receives a remunerated position because of his membership in the Party must give the Party his wages and in return receive an honorarium. But, in general, communist members of parliament and councils, as well as *cadres* holding important positions in the Party and the mass organizations, are readily distinguishable from their colleagues by the better quality of their clothes and the expensive brands of their cigarettes.

[17] On March 9, 1962, Sukarno even appointed the top two PKI leaders, Aidit and Lukman as cabinet ministers. However, they have been given positions not only without power, but ones which identify them with the government in the field of activity in which the government is least successful and least popular, namely, economic affairs.

[18] So long as the West Irian liberation campaign was the center of government and national attention, the government found a ready "cause" for economic disorganization, and criticism of the economic situation necessarily smacked of anti-patriotism.

. In short, Sukarno and the other groups in the government have prevented the communist leaders from educating and training their mass following in militant and successful actions, and, worse still, the revolutionary spearhead of *cadres* appears to have been somewhat blunted.

Power by acclamation. The possibility that PKI might achieve power "by acclamation" has never loomed large in Indonesia, and has grown no larger during the period of the alliance with Sukarno.[19] Certainly inflation continues at a rapid pace, and there are often grave shortages of basic consumer commodities. But the situation is very different from that in Weimar Germany or the last years of Kuomintang China. In the economic field, the Indonesian government manages to ensure a minimum of basic goods and occasional luxuries to the politically important sections—the armed forces, the public servants, the leading politicians, and the white-collar groups in general—while in the villages the tendency to share available wealth not too unequally among all villagers prevents the appearance of a truly impoverished rural proletariat. The administrative apparatus in the towns and countryside is unimpaired and, with the final collapse of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in 1961 and of the Darul Islam in 1962, government control now reaches to all parts of Indonesia for the first time since independence. Of greatest importance, the non-communist ruling groups, and especially the army, are now more firmly entrenched in power, and more cohesive, than they were in 1956 or 1957. And the ruling groups are as sure of their ability to govern as they have ever been.

At the same time, PKI, unlike the Chinese Communist Party in the years before 1949, does not appear to be a strong alternative ruling group with a distinctive program. At present PKI submits to government control, and the obstacles to its victory (for example, the army, Islam, and the outer islands) are so great as to suggest that even if victory could be achieved it would be at the expense of a protracted civil war. Furthermore, the close identification of PKI with Sukarno and the government, with at the most minor proposals for improvements in the implementation of the government's program, does not suggest that the Party has a clearly distinctive program capable of solving the country's main problems.

In other words, the present ruling groups, who have a considerable edge on PKI in terms of power, have given no indication of turning to PKI as the only group able to govern well, especially as their hold on power is being strengthened.

V. CONCLUSION

When the Aidit leadership won control of PKI in January 1951, it took over a small, poorly organized party still licking its wounds after the failure of the Madiun rebellion. The more politically conscious and politically influential sections of Indonesian society had proved and continued to prove resistant to the Party's search for support. Consequently the Aidit leadership was forced to seek support among the masses, the workers, peasants and poorer sections of the "petty bourgeoisie," who were still by and large outside the political process. In order to win mass support it was necessary to present an image of PKI that would be both attractive to the poorer, generally passive, sections of society, and acceptable to significant sections of the non-communist ruling groups who controlled the means of repression and who could have made communist organizational work extremely difficult if not impossible. This image was one of PKI as fervently patriotic, sympathetic to religion, peaceful in pursuit of its goals, painstakingly solicitous of the small problems consciously felt by its potential supporters, moderate in demands, and self-effacing in the friendliness shown towards most other Indonesian political forces. With this image plus organizational skill and tenacity, PKI has become the largest non-governing communist party in the world, and important non-communist political forces have worked in alliance with PKI.

When the possibility of a parliamentary road to power was firmly blocked after 1955, PKI was forced to seek the alliance of one of the two emerging dominant powers in the country. PKI had mass support, but after many years of the broad national united-front policy, and in face of the overwhelming power superiority of the extra-parliamentary political forces, the Party was in no position to challenge the new ruling groups. Certainly the Party could have survived severe government repression, but it would have survived as a mere underground shadow of its former self. In these circumstances the Aidit leadership preferred to seek alliance with Sukarno, who was primarily concerned with his power struggle with the army. Undoubtedly the communist leaders hoped that the alliance would provide at least the protection of legality and the opporutnity to continue the necessarily slow process of developing their mass support into a force capable of acting in a disciplined and revolutionary manner.

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[19] The proposition that PKI might come to power peacefully, "called to power, as it were, by acclamation," is argued in Guy J. Pauker, "Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 1 (May 1961), pp. 26–35.

Sukarno has understood and exploited the major dilemma faced by the PKI leaders. He knows that they can either earn his protection by rendering him support in his struggle with the army, but at the same time accept the risk of domestication; or they can break the alliance, which would very probably alienate much of the existing support, divide the *cadres*, and bring about a strongly anti-communist government. In the knowledge of this dilemma, Sukarno, with the willing assistance of the army, has implemented a policy of domestication. PKI and its mass organizations have been protected, but the forseeable roads to power have been effectively blocked. Communists have been given no control of ministries or positions in the bureaucracy from which they could pad the administration with their own supporters; and the central army command has had a free hand to remove to powerless positions officers suspected of communist sympathies. Parliament and elections have been rendered ineffective as a means to power. At the same time the government has gradually applied restrictions, controls and supervision over communist activities with a view to preventing the PKI leaders from creating a disciplined, militant force capable of winning power against the opposition of the ruling groups. And the very process of domestication removes the possibility that PKI may be called to power by acclamation.

Because Sukarno would lose from a break in the alliance, government action at no time has been sufficient to force PKI to the point of making a break. The restrictions, controls and supervision have been applied piecemeal, the communist organizations have been permitted to expand, and communist *cadres* have been given prestigeful and remunerative honors, so that the Aidit leadership and the majority of *cadres* can justify to themselves and their followers the continuation of the alliance. But nevertheless domestication has taken place.

Since 1951 PKI has been notably free of "heretics" largely because the broad national united-front strategy of the Aidit leadership appeared to be bringing the Party ever closer to power, Now, however, the alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" may be viewed as strengthening the ruling groups at the same time as blocking all possible roads to PKI's assumption of power. Unrest among the *cadres* over the continuation of the alliance is to be expected, and has been admitted by the Party leadership.[20] Now that the Chinese Communist Party, as one of the two competitors for leadership of the communist world, is also questioning the general usefulness of such an alliance, the dissenters within PKI can claim international authority in support of their dissent. In short, unless the internal and international situation alters radically to the advantage of PKI, the unity of the world's largest nongoverning communist party may soon be broken.

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[20] See, for example, Sakirman, *op. cit.*, pp. 328–40, 348; for indication of unrest, see D. N. Aidit, political report to the third PKI central committee plenum, *Harian Rakjat*, January 2, 1962; and Muhammad Samikidin, "Diatas segala-galanja: Persatuan!", *Madjalah PKI Surabaja*, February 1962, p. 12.

THE DIALECTICS OF SUPRANATIONAL UNIFICATION*

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The application of several European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries for membership in the Common Market (EEC) is viewed in Washington with great pleasure: the development of a United States of Europe is widely anticipated. Many observers have already calculated the combined manpower, economic resources, military power, etc. of the new union, and have pointed to the decisive advantage the United States, in coalition with this "third power," will have over the Soviet Union. Even the fact that the EEC and EFTA, if completely merged, would have 13 members is not considered unlucky: after all, the United States itself evolved out of a union of 13. It may however, be premature to prepare a celebration for the birthday of the United States of Europe. The following theoretical excursion suggests that loading the EEC with new members may well reduce it to the level of a glorified customs union rather than forward it to a political federation. Moreover, I shall argue, political communities often unify not by increasing their membership, but in a dialectic fashion: two or more groups form; they appear to be moving in opposite directions until each is well integrated, then they are "synthesized" (not merged) in a superior union. That is, they form one encompassing union without dissolving the bonds that held together the units that composed a group before the larger unification. The earlier autonomous groups become sub-groups in one union, adjusting to the new over-riding bond without being fused into one group that knows no internal divisions.

I. CONSENSUS FORMATION IN HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES

The political process is one in which groups of citizens who differ in belief and interest work out a shared policy. The larger the number of participants in a unit, the greater the differences of belief and interest among them, the more difficult such a consensus becomes, to form or keep.[1] This holds for students in social relations laboratories, for executives in industrial conferences, and for politicians in national government. Increasing the number of participants in a group may cause it to become so heterogeneous that one of two things will happen: either the ability of the group to form consensus breaks down or a new structure for the formation of consensus is built. In this structure consensus is formed on two (or more) levels. On the first, participants are separated into sub-groups according to the relative affinity of their beliefs and interests. Each of these sub-groups forms consensus among its members, and sends a representative to the second level. The second level, composed of representatives only, establishes consensus for the whole unit. This differentiation can be extended to more than two levels.

Political systems differ in the way consensus formation is institutionalized. In some, the lower level is strictly informal, having no legal or organizational status, like the blocs in the United Nations. The recent Russian proposals, commonly referred to as the "troika" system, can be viewed as a suggestion to institutionalize a two-level structure in the UN. Three blocs would be recognized—a Communist, a Western, and a Neutral one. This would require each of the blocs to form consensus internally first, on a "lower" level.[2] In other systems, two or more levels are formally recognized. In the United States, for example, the state primaries serve as one level, national party conventions as another, and interaction between the parties and between the President and Congress (see below) as still another level.

In some systems, policies formulated on the top level, the most encompassing level, are brought before all the participants for final approval (*e.g.*, the recent nomination of Burma's U Thant to be acting Secretary General of the UN was approved, but hardly worked out, by the plenum of the General Assembly). In other systems, approval by the representatives of the sub-groups is deemed satisfactory, as is the case in practically all bureaucratic structures.

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[1] Theoretically one can increase the number of participants without increasing heterogeneity by adding new participants who are just like the old ones; this is the common justification for immigration policies, *e.g.*, that discriminate in favor of readily assimilable applicants for entry. In practice, I assume for the purpose of this discussion that heterogeneity increases with size. Note, though, that no one-to-one relationship is assumed. Actually, the marginal heterogeneity produced by increases in size probably declines.

[2] The obvious disadvantages of this system for the UN are irrelevant to the present analysis.

II. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL

All heterogeneous polities that effectively attain consensus have a multi-level consensus formation structure. The major national political systems differ greatly, however, in their specific structures. In multi-party systems, as long as they work—a problem to which we will return—consensus is first formed in each faction; then the factions contained by each party reach a compromise (which all consensus formation involves). Inter-party consensus is then worked out among representatives of the parties, *not* the factions. The general outline of the consensus is worked out during the negotiations over the formation of a coalition, which follows the elections; more specific consensus is worked out daily in the parliament, expressed in legislation and motions supported by votes of confidence.

In some instances, the minority party or parties (the opposition) may be left out of the process; quite often, though, they affect the policies formed, by reason of the fact that the coalition parties take their positions into account, in bi-partisan policy (especially foreign policy), as well as through participation in other "governments." Often parties that are in opposition in the national government nevertheless participate in the national consensus formation process by joining a coalition with government-parties on the city or municipal level.[3] The effective operation of the multi-party system of consensus formation requires that the number of parties be limited, otherwise communication difficulties arise and the top level may become too heterogeneous for effective negotiations; it also requires that the parties be stable, at least to the degree that a consensus reached on the lower level will be maintained on higher levels. If members of parliament maintain only a limited loyalty to their party once the parliament is elected, party representatives cannot negotiate in the name of its factions, and we are back to the state of many participants on one level. The French parliaments of the Third and Fourth Republics were at various times confronted with this type of stalemate.[4]

In two-party countries, more consensus formation takes place on the lower levels than in multi-party countries, because only two positions can compete on the top level. So, for instance, there are only two presidential candidates for national elections, but often more than two for one party's nomination. The British system differs from the American in that the minority party tends to be excluded from the top consensus formation level, except in periods of national crises and infrequent instances of bi-partisan foreign policy. In the United States, such exclusion is rare because the Congress and the Presidency are frequently not held by the same party, and because party ties sit more lightly than in England: witness the conservative Republican southern Democratic coalition. Moreover, in the United States, instances of a bi-partisan foreign policy —*e.g.*, on Castro's Cuba—are common.

Totalitarian societies are not exempted from the need to form consensus, though they can rely to a greater degree on coercion and downward-produced consensus through the manipulation of the mass media, rituals, etc. The major upward consensus formation takes place within extra-political structures; first, in each major bureaucracy (*e.g.*, the military, the economic planning agency, the party); then, among the bureaucracies. One might even speak, with caution, about coalitions of some bureaucracies against others (*e.g.*, Army and Party against the NKVD). In sum, while political systems differ in their consensus-formation structure, it is multi-level wherever it is effective.

III. IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

An examination of the international scene from this viewpoint shows first, that the hypothesis that the formation of consensus within and among heterogeneous units requires differentiation, holds here too, though several additional variables have to be taken into account.

The United Nations is probably best characterized by lack of consensus because of the deep cleavages in interests and beliefs among many of its members. But when we review those infrequent decisions—limited in importance, to be sure—where an overall consensus was reached we see the same multi-level structure in operation. Representatives of various groups of nations "caucus" to work out their shared position; then, their unofficial spokesmen negotiate with those of the other caucuses or blocs, to work out a general compromise which in turn is brought, for discussion or approval by acclamation, to the UN floor.[5] Bloc decisions themselves are frequently reached in a two-level process of a similar sort. In this light one may wonder whether we do not exaggerate the monolithic nature of the Communist bloc. China seems to have "caucused" with Albanian, and evidently North Vietnamese and North Korean representatives also, before the Congress of Communist countries in Moscow, in October, 1961.[6] Khrushchev is reported to have conferred with East European Communist countries during his boat trip to New York in 1959. The 1961 conference of twenty-five unaligned nations in Belgrade is reported to have comprised three factions: neutral-neutrals, pro-Western neutrals, and pro-Communist neutrals. The African "bloc" seems to have at least two groupings—though their degree of cohesion is as yet hard to assess—that of the Casablanca group and that of the Brazzaville group.[7] Although the latter is reported to have taken a more moderate, pro-Western line on the Congo issue, the two groups frequently vote *en bloc* in the UN.[8]

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[3] In Israel, many opposition parties share the leadership with the government leader, *Mapai* (Labor party), by joining the executive board of the Jewish Agency and the *Histadrut*, often referred to as the two other governments of Israel. On their functions and their effect on Israeli politics see my "Kulturkampf or Coalition: The Case of Israel" *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 8 (June, 1958), pp. 311–331.

[4] See Constantin Melnik and Nathan Leites, *The House Without Windows* (Evanston: Rowe Peterson, 1958).

While blocs in international organizations such as the UN, and in particular conferences such as the Belgrade Conference, are highly fluid, sub-groupings of potential supranational communities seem to have a somewhat higher degree of permanency. Thus, the Benelux countries constitute such a sub-grouping in the EEC, though by no means with regard to all or even most issues. Australia and New Zealand seem to constitute such a sub-group in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The EEC and the EFTA play such a part in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).[9]

So far, the process of forming consensus in international systems seems to be quite similar to the national one. Moreover, further examination of international consensus formation suggests that, there too, a multi-level structure is more effective than direct representation of all participants on the same level, and points to the process by which such a multi-level structure tends to emerge. First, the lower level of consensus is attained by grouping a few states at a time; once the union of such groups solidifies, a more encompassing union—and a higher level of consensus—is produced. In the initial stage of the formation of this multi-level structure, there are seldom harmonious relations between two groups of nations (or unions). In fact, intense rivalry among them is more frequent. Such rivalry seems to help the integration of each group, preparing it for the next step, *i.e.*, the formation of higher level, more encompassing unions. Finally, to push an analogy further, if one group is seen as the thesis, the other as the anti-thesis, the emerging synthesis tends to include both unions. The original units are now *permanent* elements (though changed in character) of the union, acting as lower-level consensus formation units; the new union is not built on the atomization of the groups, but on their inclusion as "individual" members. The development of several unions will illustrate this hypothesis about the dialectics of unification.

The history of Benelux is enlightening from this viewpoint. Any historical development is affected by many factors; the degree to which a multi-level consensus-formation structure is erected is, of course, just one of them. Still, it is noteworthy that after centuries of shared rule under dukes of Burgundy and kings of Spain, the Low Countries—integrated into two groups, the northern and the southern provinces—were not ready when they tried to form one republic (1795–1814), or a *United* Kingdom (1814–1830). The effort failed, among other reasons, because all provinces were thrown together. The two unions of provinces were not recognized in the new structure; efforts were made to form all consensus on one level. In 1830, the southern provinces rebelled, and formed Belgium. The ensuing war between the north (the Netherlands) and the south (Belgium) helped the integration of each, but did *not* hinder the eventual union of the two, in a structure that does recognize the distinctiveness of the two regions, *i.e.*, in Benelux. This analysis suggests that if Benelux should ever attain complete supranational integration, it would be functional to maintain some degree of local governmental structure in units that are the present Belgium and the Netherlands. The inclusion of small Luxemburg was also not simply a matter of adding a nation to an existing union; the way was prepared, as far back as 1921, by a customs union (BELU) with Belgium, which is maintained as a sub-union of the present, larger union, just as Benelux itself is a viable part of the EEC.[10]

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[5] Private communication with UN officials, and participant-observation in a UNESCO Conference in Montreal, in 1959.

[6] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York, 1962), pp. 150 ff.

[7] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Background to Paga-I," *West Africa*, July 29, 1961, p. 819.

[8] See Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1958).

[9] The EEC is represented in certain GATT negotiations by the Economic Commission as one polity rather than six national polities. See W. W. Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 3d ed., p. 27.

The 13 colonies that formed the United States were more or less autonomous societal units, with internal consensus-formation mechanisms. These societal units were not abolished with the federation, but found expression in the states' governments. They still have an important influence on the Federal government, both by carrying out some functions on the state level and through representation in the Senate. Moreover, groups of states—the South, East, Midwest, and West (sometimes smaller groupings, *e.g.*, the New England States or the Southwest) are still an important middle level of consensus formation informally recognized in Congress and in party conventions. The union here, as in Benelux, was completed only after a war between the South and the North, which did *not* eliminate either the South or the North or the states, as meaningful intermediary units in American politics. A similar analysis could be applied to the various Swiss cantons, and possibly even to their German and French-Italian groupings. Here too, civil wars, one as late as the suppression of a rebellion of a Roman Catholic canton in 1847, preceded but did not prevent federation in 1848.[11] To return to the contemporary scene, the Organization of American States, which has 21 members, may well be too large for effective, one-level unification; recent efforts to form common markets have been made between five Central American countries and seven South American ones. The possibility of forming a more encompassing union later is explicitly recognized.[12] The strains that have re-asserted themselves in the last two years in the relations between the United States and western European powers, especially over the question of national nuclear deterrents, advance rather than retard the political unification of France and West Germany, and will not necessarily as often claimed, undermine the proposed Atlantic Union.[13]

It would be hasty, however, to conclude from the preceding discussion that the only or the best way to form a European Community is to integrate the EEC and the EFTA—as they are—in some super-system. Before the validity of other approaches can be assessed, some additional factors that affect supranational unification need to be examined. First, there is the question of the degree of integration a union aims at and the scope desired.

IV. DEGREE OF INTEGRATION, AND SCOPE

Political communities of nations differ from other international systems—such as alliances, blocs, international organizations—in having a "supranational" structure and not just an inter-governmental one. By definition they have one center of government that legitimately decrees and enforces decisions within its jurisdiction on matters that affect the member nations and their citizens; this requires a higher degree of consensus than the inter-governmental structure of other international systems. Since the decisions of inter-governmental bodies are not binding and collective international actions are under national control, consensus can often be worked out in an *ad hoc* manner, and on specific issues, even when general consensus is lacking. In short, supranationalism is a politically more integrated structure which requires correspondingly more consensus formation than typical inter-governmental organizations.[14] This is, though, a question of degree, not a "yes" or "no" proposition. NATO, for instance, has a supranational SHAPE, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) its High Authority, and the European Economic Community, the Economic Commission; but all have also superior inter-governmental bodies, the various Councils of Ministers. They are, thus, part supranational, part inter-governmental.[15] Since the Council of Ministers has both formal and realistic superiority, these European bodies should be regarded as predominantly intergovernmental.

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[10] See F. Gunther Eyck, *The Benelux Countries* (New York, 1959), Pt. I.

[11] Charlotte Muret, "The Swiss Pattern for a Federal Europe," in E. M. Earle, ed., *Nationalism and Internationalism* (New York, 1950), pp. 261 ff.

[12] Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "The Emerging Common Markets in Latin America," *Monthly Review*, September, 1960.

[13] *Cf.* Walter Lippmann, *Western Unity and the Common Market* (Boston, 1962), ch. 3.

[14] For a keen analysis of the difference between inter-governmental and supranational structures, see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 520 ff.

[15] This point is elaborated in my "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," *World Politics*, Vol. XV (October 1962), pp. 44.

We would expect that the smaller a union is, all other things equal, the more homogeneous it could be, and the more integrated and "supranational."[16] This is in fact the case since, while many international organizations include almost all the states there are, from five continents and from all blocs (*e.g.*, 109 members of the UN), most supranational communities have less than ten members and are, comparatively homogeneous in their cultural, educational, economic, and political backgrounds. Hence, the question, whether the EEC and the EFTA should be merged and if merged should be preserved as sub-units, is in part dependent upon the degree of integration sought. A highly integrated union—a United States of Europe—is least likely to be formed by a large expansion of the membership of the EEC,[17] while a customs union—directed by an inter-governmental body—can readily accommodate a membership larger than that of the EEC and the EFTA combined. This conclusion, reached on the basis of studying the relationship between integration, heterogeneity and size, is reinforced by an examination of the relationship between integration and scope.

International systems differ in the number of societal sectors they pervade. Some, especially international organizations, are strictly mono-sectorial; they deal only with labor issues, or health issues, or postal services, or aviation; and as a rule only with some activities in these sectors, and not necessarily the most central ones. Other international organizations penetrate into two or more sectors (as, for instance, the Nordic Council which serves political, economic, educational, and cultural needs of the member-nations). The larger the sectorial scope of a union, the more consensus is required; and hence the fewer the number of nations (or more precisely, the degree of heterogeneity) it can tolerate, and the more it will need two (or more) structural levels of consensus formation. Thus, it is not surprising that the typical mono-sectorial unions have many members, while typical multi-sectorial unions have only from 3 to 8 members: for instance, the Nordic Council has 5 members; the Eastern European Community (with two major organizations as tools, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) has 8 members; the *Conseil de l'Entente* has 4, and Benelux has 3.

Even more important than the number of sectors encompassed is the nature of any particular sector to be integrated, in terms of its articulation with other sectors of the same society. Several authorities in the study of supranationalism have pointed out that integration in one sector tends to spill over into other sectors, *i.e.*, tends to trigger integration in them as well. Haas' study of the ECSC, for instance, shows how it spilled over into Euratom and the EEC.[18] He has also suggested that various societal sectors differ in their spill-over function.[19] On the basis of various sociological considerations that cannot be elaborated here,[20] I would order international organizations in various sectors with respect to their spill-over tendencies—from low to high—as follows: (a) organizations that deal with services, such as postal services, allocation of radio frequencies, police cooperation, etc.; (b) organizations dealing with labor, health, and cultural exchange, *i.e.*, services to which "human values" are attached; (c) tariff agreements and military organizations; (d) economic unions or common markets.

The spill-over phenomenon points to the fact that societal sectors differ in the degree to which they are inter-related. Integrating some of them triggers unification tendencies in many other sectors; while integrating some other sectors has comparatively small repercussions. The military sector, for instance, is highly segregated and autonomous, unless industrial mobilization is involved. Military units of two nations can be integrated, their war plans coordinated, their navies participate in combined maneuvers, military information extensively exchanged, etc., without this having much effect on other societal sectors. Only when integration reaches the higher level of policy making is there a considerable spill-over into the political sector, and this because integration here requires some governmental integration, *e.g.*, of Defense Departments. Similarly, standardization of weapons and other equipment often has some repercussion on the economic sector. Economic integration, on the other hand, affects all societal groups—consumers, producers, management, labor, farmers, small business—and therefore tends to have extensive political repercussions. In contrast, tariff agreements, especially to the degree that they cover only some goods and concern only reduction but not abolition of tariffs, affect only some exporters and importers and a limited number of related industries. It is only as such unions become so broadly encompassing as to tend to affect the flow of capital, monetary policy, levels of employment, etc., in the countries involved, that they spill over into economic unions, *i.e.*, that they trigger integration of many other spheres.

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[16] See note 1, above, on the relationship between size and heterogeneity.

[17] The union of the United States, well "prepared" by 1789, took a hundred years and a civil war before it solidified, and yet was one of a highly homogeneous group: " . . . Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs." John Jay, *The Federalist*, No. 2, cited by Gerard J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 26, fn. 10.

[18] *Uniting of Europe, op. cit.*

[19] Ernest B. Haas, "International Integration," *International Organization*, Vol. 15 (1961), pp. 366–392.

[20] See my "The Epigenesis of Political Community at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 68 (Jan. 1963).

In cases where the unification of a high spill-over sector has occurred and unification of other related sectors is blocked, an unbalanced state is created which generates pressures to "solve" the imbalance, either by removing the blocks or by reducing the degree of unification in the sector in which it was initiated. For instance, if furnishing nuclear weapons to NATO would require NATO to create a joint political authority to command their use (there would hardly be time to consult 15 governments if NATO is attacked nuclearly, and contingent decisions are unsatisfactory), and if for some reason the 15 nations are not "ready" for the required political integration, these would be two factors working against the acceptance of such weapons by NATO. The prospect that spill-over from the military into the political sector is blocked would work against military integration. [Integration, so to speak, proceeds in steps. There are several plateaus on which one can rest, but one cannot stand on two steps simultaneously; one has either to progress to more encompassing unification or retreat to a narrower one.]

What does the study of the scope of integration and spill-over add to our understanding of EFTA-EEC relations? The EEC is continuously growing closer to an economic union, above and beyond a mere tariff agreement. Such unions have high spill-over effects, as is evident in the EEC talks about federation and in the increased public and private support for a strong, political EEC.

In short, by 1962, the Europe of the Six was on the verge of an increasing spill-over into the political sector. Britain, on the other hand, though consistently interested in a European tariff agreement, or even in an economic one, was ambivalent if not negatively disposed toward a political union. This was one of the major reasons why England did not join the EEC in the first place and instead joined the EFTA, a free trade association with limited spill-over potentialities. By 1961 Britain had changed its position. EFTA clearly failed. Some of its members traded more across the tariff wall with EEC countries than with each other. While customs reductions within the EEC seemed to trigger a rapid rate of economic growth—better than six per cent a year—economic stagnation in Britain continued. The prospect of a fully integrated Western Europe became more and more real. Hence Britain's resolution, in the middle of 1961, to abandon EFTA, to weaken its ties to the Commonwealth if necessary, and to join the EEC on any reasonable conditions. Britain's interest in the EEC is, though, almost completely economic. British feelings against political unification with the continent have deep roots which include a long history of hegemony; a self-image of a big power, or even more painful, of an ex-big power, jealous of its remaining privileges, sensitive about its status, anxious to preserve its strong ties to the Commonwealth and to the United States. Many of these roots will have to be considerably weakened before the United Kingdom can genuinely participate in a political integration of Western Europe.

Last but not least, is the question of hegemony in the EEC. International communities seem to function best when one nation has clear hegemony;[21] sometimes, two countries can share the leadership, especially when there is a third outside force against which they unite. This is the present situation in the EEC, where

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[21] *Cf.*, for instance, the period of hegemony in the British, Hapsburg, and German empires to the periods of dual or multi-leadership. See also Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). And compare the Communist bloc in the days when the Soviet Union had a clear hegemony to the later period of the Soviet-Chinese rift. See T. M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 351–7; Georg Simmel, "The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8 (1902), pp. 45–6.

France and West Germany share the leadership. Systems with three leaders hardly ever stabilize.[22] There are too many latent and tempting benefits to be derived from the collusion or coalition of two against the third partner. On all these counts, Britain's entry into the EEC makes the completion of the spill-over from the economic to the political area quite unlikely. And this may mean that the EEC will not even remain an economic union, but instead will more likely regress to the level of a tariff agreement. This point requires some elaboration.

International unions of this type seem to have two stable stages: *low* integration with little or no spill-over, and *high* integration, where unification initiated in one sector spills over to many others, especially the political. Unions that try to maintain a medium-level integration, *e.g.*, economic only, or economic with a minimum of political integration, are unstable, not because they are likely to disintegrate but because their capacity to form consensus is out of balance with the need for it: they are likely to become more integrated or regress to a lower level of integration. The chances, in case England joins the EEC, favor regression rather than progression.

The fact that England and other EFTA members apply for membership in the EEC as individual countries, not *en bloc,* makes high integration of the EEC less, not more, likely, for it produces a merger rather than a synthesis on a higher level. One might therefore be inclined to favor the formation of a super-system, to include both the EFTA and the EEC as subunits. But this will not do because the units of an effective union, one that can maintain an adequate level of consensus, have to be fairly cohesive, stable units. One cannot build a second floor structure of consensus formation unless the first one has a firm foundation. While the EEC is already quite cohesive, and becoming more so, the EFTA is not. EFTA was formed, not out of any genuine commitment to a union, but to countervail the EEC; it was viewed as a temporary union, to be used to bargain with the EEC, hardly a morale-building feature. Austria and Switzerland, *e.g.*, trade more with EEC countries than with EFTA countries. In addition, the EFTA membership is highly heterogeneous: it includes NATO and non-NATO members; democracies and Portugal; Protestant countries and Austria.

The preceding discussion suggests that western Europe includes too many countries, is too heterogeneous, to form one union. It follows that two or more unions are needed, to form the units of a larger system. But it does not follow that the unification of any specific group of countries would be more conducive to European integration than any other, as long as cohesive unions serve as building blocs. One course toward unification is the expansion of the EEC to include a few more countries (though not all the members of the EFTA), such as some that are contiguous to the EEC and less competitive for its leadership than Britain. Austria and Switzerland are natural candidates. The fact that they are not NATO countries, and in the past have taken a neutral position in the inter-bloc strife, is not necessarily a barrier to their inclusion, probably first as associate members; and later as full members, to be included also in the political union. The neutrality of these nations is quite pro-Western and both France (since De Gaulle) and West Germany (since the inclusion of the Free Democrats in the government) move in the direction of a somewhat more "independent" foreign policy. [It is hard to see how the USSR could stop a gradual integration of Austria into the EEC.]

Another European union, the Scandinavian community, forms a core for a larger union. It has already grown from three to five members, adding Iceland and Finland to Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Once European trade problems are solved in a large framework, as discussed below, Britain might find this union—which is democratic, Protestant and welfare-oriented—more appealing for political unification than the continental one. Portugal and Spain have been reported to have considered an Iberian union of their own.[23] Once the major requirements of small size and cohesion are satisfied, other possible combinations might emerge; the major question that remains is the type of super-system to which these unions can belong.

V. KINDS OF SUPER-SYSTEMS

How encompassing could such a super-system be, in terms of the number of unions to be included? What could be the functions of the super-system, above and beyond those of the member unions? The major alternatives discussed seem to be a European super-system or an Atlantic one, the latter to include the United

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[22] See Miriam Camps, *Division in Europe,* Policy Memorandum No. 21, Center of International Studies (Princeton University, 1960).

[23] *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 1957, p. 6.

States and Canada in addition to the European countries (including either all western Europe or only NATO members).[24]

The following analysis suggests that a European super-system[25] will be more integrated and stable than an Atlantic one, as long as it will itself be a part of a third-level organization. The main reason for this is that the United States, as the leading Western power, has many commitments and functions in other international communities than the European ones, especially in Latin America, but also in the Far East, South East Asia, the Middle East, and to an increasing degree in Africa. Strong integration of the United States in a European union would impose sharp strains on these other American ties.

The optimal participation for the United States is on the third level of consensus formation, a structural level where super-systems—of several European unions, of several African ones, and of several Latin American ones, etc.—are integrated in a single super-super-system, already vaguely recognized as the "Free World." A three-level structure may perhaps seem too complicated to be attained; or if attained, to function effectively. It should therefore be pointed out that three-level structures are quite common. Most national governments and practically all large corporate enterprises have at least a three-level structure, and many of them are quite effective. Actually, the evolution of a third-level structure would not preclude active participation in the development of a fourth level, that of the United Nations.

The main problem is not the number of levels but the distribution of functions, powers and political loyalties among the various levels. The formal, legal and institutional differences between unions whose members are nations, and super-systems whose members are unions, is that representation in super-systems is in the hands of those who speak in the name of the unions (*e.g.*, the EEC), either in addition to or instead of national representatives. For the division of functions, we can consider two major possibilities: one is that the super-systems will be a replica of member-unions on a more encompassing level. Such a super-system is approximated (in limited spheres to be sure) in the relations between the EEC and the EFTA in the OEEC and in GATT. Each group, for instance, introduced some internal reductions of tariffs, then met in the wider arena of GATT to consider mutual tariff cuts—as well as small cuts for "third" countries, not members of either union. According to this plan the control of one specific function, in this case setting tariff rates, is divided between two levels beyond the national one: that of the unions and that of the super-system.

The second way to integrate unions into super-systems is to introduce a functional division of labor among the levels instead of a differentiation of authority. One such arrangement might take the form of leaving to the small, cohesive unions the economic and political functions; to the super-systems, the role of military integration; and to the third-level system (or bloc), the coordination of foreign policy, monetary policy (*e.g.*, through a revised International Monetary Fund), and tariff agreements.[26] This might also be the best level on which to coordinate aid to underdeveloped countries.

This specific division only illustrates the nature of inter-level division of functions; of course other arrangements can be worked out. It should, though, be emphasized that the division outlined above takes into account the need to reserve to smaller, lower-level units those functions that require a high degree of consensus formation and hence of relatively strong supranationalism. The actual structure of the West approaches such a division with the smaller economic-political EEC and Nordic Council, the larger NATO, and the still more encompassing GATT, IMF, and OECD. The third-level system is still highly informal, and centered around trips of premiers to Washington, foreign tours of American representatives, and regional meetings—but no Free World ministerial conferences.

Which of the two types of inter-level division is optimal has yet to be determined. It seems that they differ in effectiveness with regard to different goals: functional division of labor seems better for short-run stability, and an inter-level division of control over each function the better for long-run integration of second- and third-level super-systems. This latter seems to be the case because here high spill-over functions are in part carried out by super-systems, and because the units which carry out high spill-over functions command more political loyalty than those which do not.

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[24] Such a union has been advocated by Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York, 1960), pp. 165–8. See also Joseph Kraft, *The Grand Design* (New York, 1962). Some of the problems involved in its formation have been pointed out by Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957).

[25] Not to be confused with a merger of nations as "individuals" in a European union, such as "revised" OEEC.

[26] See Robert Trillon, *Gold and the Dollar Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), ch. 4, and Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* (London, Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1959), ch. 4.

The long-run trend toward integration seems to be for functions, authority and loyalties to be transferred from smaller units to larger ones; from states to federations; from federations to supranational unions; and from these to super-systems. This transfer may progress without major upsets because a variety of processes tend to reduce the heterogeneity of the member-units—through industrialization, the spread of education, democratization, and the unification process—to lower-level units.[27] Hence the transfer of additional powers of decision to higher levels—those encompassing more members—need not undermine stabilization as long as the pace of upgrading function or authority does not overtake that of decreasing heterogeneity. We close with the speculative, though not unimaginable possibility that eventually, in this way, the highest super-system, that of a global society, might develop.

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[27] This point is elaborated in my *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), ch. 8.

GAME THEORY AND CUMULATIVE VOTING IN ILLINOIS: 1902–1954*

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Since the theory of games was first made widely available, with application to economic behavior,[1] its use has been suggested in many other areas, from the global[2] to the individual.[3] Several correspondences between game theory and certain aspects of political process have been noted.[4]

The contribution of game theory to substantive knowledge in the empirical sciences, however, has been modest; Luce and Raiffa[5] judge that its impact has been greater in applied mathematics. The area of political behavior—despite the apparent applicability of the notion of conflict of interest—is similarly lacking in studies, although a few notable exceptions exist.[6]

Many of the previous studies have taken the form of defining a situation in terms of game theory and prescribing the proper behavior for a given set of conditions. In the present study, however, it was possible not only to specify a simple game theory model, but to try it out in a large number of actual cases. The following sections describe a voting behavior being modeled, the game theory model employed, an empirical test of the model, and implications of the results.

I. THE VOTING SITUATION

Voting for representatives for the Illinois General Assembly proceeds in a manner unique among state legislatures.[7] The system used, cumulative voting, is intended to secure minority representation and does so by providing multiple member constituencies and allowing individuals to "cumulate" their votes on fewer than the total number of candidates to be elected.[8]

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[1] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton University Press, 1944).

[2] M. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (Wiley, 1957).

[3] H. A. Simon, "A Comparison of Game and Learning Theory," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 267–72.

[4] Richard C. Snyder outlines conceptual parallels and several potentially fruitful areas of application in "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," in Stephen K. Bailey, *et al.*, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1955). See also the broad collection edited by Martin Shubik, *Readings in Game Theory and Political Behavior* (Doubleday, 1954).

[5] R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (Wiley, 1957).

[6] L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787–792; R. D. Luce and A. A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-Party System," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 1 (1956), pp. 83–95; and William H. Riker, "A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 120–131.

[7] Cumulative voting is, however, common in voting for corporate boards of directors; for an application of the theory of games in this area, see G. J. Glasser, "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," *Management Science*, Vol. 5 (1959), pp. 151–156. In England, cumulative voting for school boards of from five to fifteen members was instituted through the Education Act of 1870, and continued until school boards were abolished in 1902; see J. F. S. Ross, *Elections and Electors: Studies in Democratic Representation* (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), pp. 62–63.

[8] In 1870, when cumulative voting was adopted in Illinois by referendum as part of a new constitution, the General Assembly was sharply divided by region. In the Assembly of 1867, one could draw a line across the state about the latitude of Springfield such that districts north of the line returned 52 Republicans and no Democrats and those south of the line returned 8 Republicans and 24 Democrats. In the first election after the change to cumulative voting, however, all but one of the 51 newly created three-member districts returned members of both parties. North of the same line referred to above, the Democrats had increased their representation from zero to

As it is applied in Illinois, three representatives are elected from each district, and each voter has three votes, which he may distribute 3–0, 2–1, 1½–1½, or 1–1–1, among the candidates. Each party may nominate for the general election one, two, or three candidates, and the *number* to be nominated is decided upon and announced prior to the primary. This decision is made more or less independently by separate three-man committees elected by members of each party, with the voters in the primary election then determining *who* the candidates shall be.

The committee's decision is made under uncertainty as to the percentage of the vote that the party will receive, and often, though not always, the number of candidates that the other party will nominate. The behavior of this committee in arriving at a decision in the face of uncertainty is the object of the present study. In particular, the "rationality" of this decision in terms of its success in maximizing the number of the party elected is investigated by reference to the theory of games.

Previous studies of cumulative voting,[9] while giving major attention to other aspects, have noted that occasionally the majority party fails to nominate two candidates and thereby loses the second seat it could otherwise fill. (As it turns out, however, by far the most frequent occasion of loss comes when a party with a 75 per cent majority nominates only two rather than three candidates.) Hence, in order to examine systematically the behavior of the nominating committee, the present study postulates a model based upon the theory of games, for the process of deciding upon the number of candidates.

II. THE GAME THEORY MODEL

The behavior of the two nominating committees—one for each party—may be viewed as a two-person game in which the payoff is the number of candidates elected. The game is essentially zero-sum, in that positions not filled by one party are filled by the other. Each party has three strategies, namely to nominate one, two, or three candidates.[10]

Applicability of the Model. The theory of games assumes that each player (1) knows all the rules of the game, *i.e.*, the payoff matrix; (2) has a preference ordering of the payoffs, and also knows that of his opponents; and (3) expresses his preference ordering in selecting strategies, *i.e.*, he acts to maximize expected utility. As Luce and Raiffa[11] point out, the third condition may perhaps best be taken as tautological, being simply a description of "preference ordering." The alternative is to determine preference orderings independently and use these to test the postulate.

In this application—unlike many experimental trials of the theory of games—the stakes are so considerable that there is good reason to assume a preference ordering. At the least, electing one candidate is not preferred to electing two candidates, and neither is preferred to electing three candidates. The assumption of a known payoff matrix is also met unusually well in this case, for both the available strategies and the outcomes for different combinations of strategies are completely prescribed and known to both parties. Hence, among situations involving actual political behavior, the case of cumulative voting appears particularly appropriate and specifically overcomes many of the problems raised by Deutsch[12] in the application of game theory to politics.

Factors in the Committee's Decision. In determining the number of candidates to nominate, the committee acts under uncertainty as to (1) the percentage of the vote its party will receive, (2) how the vote will be divided among its candidates, and (3) how many candidates the other party will nominate. The division of the vote among the various candidates of the same party, however, is in practice usually very even, reflecting perhaps a combination of voter indifference, party discipline, and the effect (in machine voting) of the party lever, which makes it relatively easier to divide one's votes equally among the party's candidates. In any event, given a rational opponent, an equal division of the votes among the candidates is

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34%, and south of the line, the Republicans had increased their representation from 25% to 38%. For an account of the operation of cumulative voting in Illinois over the period 1872–1954, see George S. Blair, *Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics* (University of Illinois Press, 1960).

[9] B. F. Moore, "The history of cumulative voting and minority representation in Illinois, 1870–1919," *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1919); C. S. Hyneman and J. D. Morgan, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois," *Illinois Law Review*, Vol. 32 (1937), pp. 12–31; and George S. Blair, *op. cit.*

[10] The theoretical alternative of nominating none may be eliminated from consideration since it is never optimal and never employed.

[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[12] K. W. Deutsch, "Game Theory and Politics: Some Problems of Application," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 20 (1954), pp. 76–83.

TABLE I. NUMBER ELECTED BY PARTY A, BY PERCENTAGE OF VOTE

0–25% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	0
2	2	1	0
3	2	1	0

25–40% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	1
2	2	1	0
3	2	1	0

40–50% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	1
2	2	1	2
3	2	1	0

50–60% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	2	1	3

60–75% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	2	3	3

75–100% A

A Nominates \ B Nominates	1	2	3
1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3

always reasonable for a given party. Otherwise, as has happened in a small percentage of elections, a party barely in the majority may find its less preferred candidate running behind both the equally preferred minority party candidates. Consequently, the formulations which follow assume that each party's vote is divided equally among all candidates of that party.[13]

The Payoff Matrices. The two remaining uncertainties may be dealt with by considering, for any given distribution of the vote, what the payoffs are in terms of number of candidates elected for any particular combination of strategies. It turns out that, given a two-party situation, there are only six different payoff matrices, one for each of the following ranges of the vote for the first party: 0–25%; 25–40%; 40–50%; 50–60%; 60–75%; 75–100%. These six matrices are given in Table I, with the payoff the number of candidates elected by party A.

Take, for example, the matrix for the case in which A has 50–60 per cent of the vote. If each party nominates only one candidate, both are elected, and the payoff to A is one.[14] If A nominates one while B nominates two or three, A being in the majority, will elect that one, while B will elect the other two. If A nominates two, he will elect both, regardless of how many B nominates. The third strategy of A presents an interesting inversion in outcomes: if B nominates one, he will elect that one and A will elect two; if B nominates two, he will elect both (despite his overall minority, each of his *two* will have *more* than 20 per cent of the vote, while each of A's *three* candidates will have *less* than 20 per cent); but if B nominates three, he will elect none and A will elect all three. This latter case illustrates particularly how it is possible to nominate either too many *or* too few candidates.

Solution of the Game. In the same payoff matrix (50–60%) considered before, what is the optimal strategy for each party? Among A's strategies, it is apparent that by nominating two, he can guarantee electing that many, which is more than can be guaranteed by any other choice of strategy. B, on the other hand, by choosing to nominate two, can assure that A will elect at most two. The same assurance is given B if he chooses to nominate only one, but this strategy is dominated, since the outcome resulting from its selection is in no case better, and sometimes worse than that from nominating two. Thus the minimax loss solution for this game matrix calls for each party to nominate two, in which case the outcome is that A elects two.[15]

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[13] Actually, as will be made apparent later, the most desirable situation—although difficult to attain—would be the ability to maintain a very small, but highly reliable, difference among the candidates.

[14] This is an extremely rare event, occurring only when there is a strong third party—a case not covered by the present exposition. Technically, this feature makes the game non-zero-sum, in that the gains of A plus the gains of B do not sum to the constant three for this case. In a two-party situation, however, this combination of strategies is never optimal, and, in practice, never occurs.

In the 60–75% matrix, B can, by nominating only one, guarantee himself electing that one, while for A, nominating either two or three guarantees his electing two. Nominating two, however, is consistent with A's minimax strategy in the 50–60% case, and provides for the event that the vote should actually fall below 60 per cent (which is much more likely, on the basis of past experience, than that it will exceed 75 per cent).

In the 75–100% matrix, A's best strategy clearly is to nominate three, which guarantees his electing all of them, while B can by no choice guarantee himself even one. It might seem that B's best choice is to nominate two or three, in the hope that A might grossly err by nominating only one. It seems more reasonable, to assume, however, that B in this case acts as if he knew the *a priori* distribution of A's choices to have zero probability for the strategy of nominating one.[16] With this assumption, B's three strategies give identical outcomes and leave no choice. However, given even the slightest positive probability (which always exists in practice) of the percentage of the vote to party A being not 75–100 but instead between 60 and 75, then B should nominate only one, as a hedge against this possibility. In addition, other considerations enter, such as the cost of candidacy, the discouraging effects of running redundant candidates in the face of certain defeat, etc., which might suggest that B should realistically choose to run no candidates. But the chance of A's vote falling below 75 per cent will practically always be large enough to justify the costs of a single candidacy; moreover, there may be a positive benefit to party morale from running one candidate rather than none.[17]

Solutions for the three remaining matrices are symmetrical to the ones already obtained, and, in summary, the hypothesized behavior, based upon a combination of probability and game theory principles, is that the number of nominations by each party will conform to the table below:

Per Cent of the Vote to Party A	*Expected Number Nominated*	
	A	*B*
0– 25	1	3
25– 40	1	2
40– 50	2	2
50– 60	2	2
60– 75	2	1
75–100	3	1

Rationale for a minimax solution. The conservative minimax loss criterion—providing a sure minimum rather than a chance of greater gain or loss—appears particularly compatible with a stable political system. Using the minimax loss solution excludes the possibility that parties try to demolish the opposition completely, even at considerable risk to themselves. One would not expect, on the other hand, such a consensus-promoting model to apply to revolutionary parties, which might be more likely to risk all for total victory.

Alternative Solutions. One might consider the minimax regret criterion,[18] and ask, *given a particular choice of strategy by the opponent*, what the regret (in terms of a smaller number elected) would be at one's actual choice of strategy compared with one's best choice in the light of that particular strategy of the opponent. While much *post mortem* speculation is carried on over election results, it is not clear that this retrospective criterion is invoked before the choice is made. One can, however, compare the solutions obtained by minimaxing loss with those obtained by minimaxing regret. In the latter case, of course, a non-zero-sum game results, since A's regret for a particular outcome depends upon the other entries in that row of the matrix. In the case of these small matrices and limited range of payoffs, however, it happens that precisely the same solutions result from minimaxing either regret or loss.

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[15] In general, the minimax loss criterion calls for an individual to determine, for each of his possible strategies, the maximum loss which he could suffer (depending upon the choice made by the other party); he then chooses that strategy which minimizes his maximum loss. Equivalently, this may be considered as maximizing one's minimum gain, referred to by Luce and Raiffa, *op. cit.*, pp. 218–219, as maximin.

[16] In the more than 1500 district elections since 1902, this has indeed been the case: with 75% of the vote, the majority party has never nominated less than two.

[17] The detrimental consequences of local atrophy of party organization are suggested in V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics* (Knopf, 1956), ch. 6.

[18] L. J. Savage, *The Foundations of Statistics* (Wiley, 1954), pp. 163–164.

In general, solution of a game by the minimax principle assumes a rational opponent who will behave in the same conservative fashion, *i.e.*, to assure himself a guaranteed minimum. Such behavior may not be optimal against an opponent who behaves in some other fashion, although it will still guarantee one the stated minimum. It may be more profitable yet, though, to utilize some more risky strategy. In particular, if some *a priori* preference distribution can be ascribed to the strategies of the opponent (as was done in a limited sense in the 0–25% matrix), then a solution, given this particular distribution, can be found which maximizes the expected number elected. A party nominating committee could act on such a basis, of course; the problem is to specify the *a priori* distribution. The number of previous elections upon which to base experience is small, and in most districts the distribution of the vote has varied considerably, affecting the choice of strategy. It seems unreasonable, therefore, to assume constant probabilities, unchanging over time. Yet if separate distributions among strategies are posited for different distributions of the vote, the number of previous elections upon which to base any such distribution becomes very small. In addition, committee membership, and perhaps party philosophy, is continually changing. Considering all these contingencies, minimax loss seems the most appropriate model for this situation.

Since the proportion of the vote received by party A is a variable, imperfectly estimated, it is not entirely certain, of course, that the vote will be within the range applicable to a particular matrix. Hence, as a first approximation to a stochastic model, the solutions just described incorporate the following feature: in the case of a matrix for which a party has two possible minimax strategies, that strategy is preferred which is consistent with the minimax strategy of one of the adjacent matrices (the one closer to the middle of the distribution). A further step might involve specifying a probability that the vote is in each of the six ranges, and solving the composite game, based upon the relations among the six probabilities. However, the present examination of empirical data, described in the next section, is based upon the simpler model.

III. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION DATA

To examine the fit of the model, data were obtained from official records[19] for the 1377 biennial elections (27 in each of Illinois' 51 districts) for the years 1902–1954.[20] Of these 1377 elections, 187 resulted in one party receiving fewer seats than following a minimax strategy would have guaranteed it. (Of the non-minimax outcomes 29 were, however, the result of an uneven distribution of the party's vote among its candidates.) In 86 of the non-minimax outcome elections, the Democrats won fewer seats than guaranteed by minimax strategy; in 101 elections, the Republicans were the losers. The following sections examine further the factors involved in rationality of the choice of the number nominated.

Number Nominated and Per Cent Democratic. Table II displays, for each of the six ranges of the per cent of the vote which is Democratic (the same as for the six payoff matrices in Table I), the distribution of the number nominated: 1–3 (one Democrat; three Republicans), 1–2, 2–2, 2–1, 3–1. Columns add to one hundred per cent. The 24 elections (many of them involving strong third parties) which display a nomination pattern other than one of these five are omitted from the table.

From both sets of marginals, it is evident that Illinois General Assembly districts were more Republican than Democratic over this period. The table entries themselves, however, show, for the more than ninety per cent of the elections in which the Democratic vote fell between 25% and 75%, a remarkable symmetry between the two parties. The second (25–40% Dem) column (5, 81, 13, 1, 0) corresponds closely to the reverse of the fifth (25–40% Rep) column (1, 87, 10, 2, 0); likewise the third column (1, 26, 68, 5, 0) to the reverse of the fourth (0, 27, 67, 6, 0). Given a vote between 25% and 75%, the parties behave with remarkable similarity in respect to the number nominated.

As a test of the appropriateness of the particular game theory model in this situation, one may examine the distribution of the number nominated for each of the six ranges of the vote. The predicted cells (as specified in the preceding section entitled "Solution of the Game") contain 27%, 81%, 68%, 67%, 87%, and 9% of the elections in their range of the vote, the overall proportion in those cells being 69 per cent.

In over half of all elections, the vote was between 40% and 60% Democratic. In about two-thirds of these elections both parties employed the minimax strategy of nominating two

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[19] Illinois Secretary of State, *Blue Book of the State of Illinois* (State of Illinois, 1902–1954).

[20] Fortunately for research purposes—although in disregard of the constitution—the Illinois Assembly had failed to redistrict during this entire period.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 1902–1954, BY NUMBER NOMINATED AND PER CENT DEMOCRATIC

Number Nominated		Per Cent Democratic for the Same Election						
Dem	Rep	0–25	25–40	40–50	50–60	60–75	75–100	Total
		(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
1	3	27	5	1				3
1	2	69	81	26	6	2		36
2	2	4	13	68	67	10		40½
2	1		1	5	27	87	91	20
3	1					1	9	½
Total no. of elections		77	371	419	295	145	45	1353

candidates. In another quarter of these elections, only the majority party nominated two candidates, with the result that the election was uncontested, but its outcome was the same as that obtained by use of minimax strategy. For about five per cent of the elections, however, the majority party nominated only one candidate, thereby losing a seat it could have obtained.

The case in which one party had between 60 and 75 per cent of the vote resulted in an uncontested election about five-sixths of the time. Only rarely (2 per cent for Democrats; 1 per cent for Republicans) did the party with this distinct majority fail to nominate the two candidates which it could surely have elected.

With more than 75 per cent of the vote, however, both parties were considerably reluctant to nominate the three which that proportion enabled them to elect, although the Democrats were much less likely to nominate three than the Republicans (9 per cent compared with 27 per cent).

The foregoing results convey a strong implication of non-linear utility: parties *never* fail to run at least one candidate; 5 per cent of the time when they could elect two, they fail to run the second candidate; but 80 per cent of the time when they could elect three, they fail to nominate a third candidate. The third seat seems less valuable to the nominating committee than the first or the second, especially for the Democrats.[21]

Insensitivity to Change. In examining various aspects of the sensitivity of the behavior of the nominating committee to change, the most striking result is the basic conservatism of both parties. No matter what political changes occur from one election to the next, by far the most likely number of nominations for any given year is the same as that for the previous election. Changes in number nominated often represent changes in the vote that occurred several years before.

Multiple Regression to Predict the Number Nominated. To investigate the association of variables with the choice of the number of candidates, multiple regressions were performed separately for Democrats and Republicans, using as dependent variables the numbers of candidates chosen at the 1275 elections of 1906–1954. Independent variables were the number nominated at the previous election; the percentage of the vote at the present election, the previous election, and the next previous election; and the occurrence of a minimax (rather than a non-minimax) outcome at the previous election.

The same general pattern of partial regression coefficients was obtained for both parties (Table III); nearly all the weight is placed on the first two variables, the number nominated at the previous election and the percentage of the vote at the present election.[22] Note, though,

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[21] Such non-linear utility, of course, implies a non-zero-sum game, although the more complex model resulting would necessarily describe the data somewhat better. Another possible extension of the present model would formally incorporate stochastic properties; there could be determined an expected distribution of the variable, per cent Democratic, based upon past experience, and from this could be stated the probability of any given one of the six matrices obtaining in the next election. Choice of strategy would then be based upon a composite super-game, amalgating the six matrices and their respective probabilities.

[22] The relevance of the latter variable may be taken as reflecting on the committee's use of estimates of the forthcoming vote—which correlates, however, .82 with the vote of the previous election.

TABLE III. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR NUMBER NOMINATED AT TIME *t*

Variable	Democrats	Republicans
Number nominated at time $t-1$	.462	.519
Per Cent Democratic* at time t	.470	.301
Per Cent Democratic* at time $t-1$	.012	.044
Per Cent Democratic* at time $t-2$	−.085	.027
Minimax outcome at time $t-1$	.041	−.022
Multiple Correlation	.767	.800

* For the Republicans, the second, third, and fourth partial regression coefficients are for per cent *Republican*, at times t, $t-1$, and $t-2$.

that while for Democrats, the two variables are weighted about equally, for the Republicans, the number nominated in the previous year has significantly ($p<.01$) more weight, showing them to behave more conservatively. The correlations of the number nominated at the present election with the number nominated at the previous election, the percentage Democratic at the present election, the previous election, and the next previous election, are all between .60 and .75, and in decreasing order as named, for both Republicans and Democrats.

Number Nominated vs. Change in Per Cent Democratic. Examination of the behavior of each party in the face of a changing vote gives additional insight into the differential role of conservatism as a correlate of choice. The following implications are drawn from Table IV: (1) change (in the number of nominations from that of the previous election)—for all values of change in the vote—comes slowly for both parties, but more so for the Republicans; (2) between the small and large vote change situations, Democrats show a larger reduction in the proportion of elections showing no change in number nominated, than do Republicans; (3) when the vote changed over 10 per cent, and a party did change its number of nominations, the Democrats were more likely to change in the proper direction; (4) for the Democrats, the change in the number nominated is much more likely to be in the appropriate direction if the change in the vote is large; (5) for the Republicans, however, the change in the number nominated is no more likely to be in the appropriate direction for a large change of the vote than for a small change. (The differences of statements (1) to (4) above are all significant at $p<.01$.)

TABLE IV. CHANGE IN NUMBER NOMINATED VS. CHANGE IN PER CENT DEMOCRATIC

Change in Number Nominated	Change (±) in Per Cent Democratic	
	0–10	10–50
	(%)	(%)
Democrats		
Same direction as (Dem) vote	9	26
No change in number nominated	87	72
Opposite direction from vote	4	2
Republicans		
Same direction as (Rep) vote	7	12
No change in number nominated	91	84
Opposite direction from vote	2	4
Number of elections	1080	246

Examination of particular years of great change in the vote further documents the conservatism. Given below are the total number of changes in number nominated, over all 51 districts for the years 1920 (when the Republicans should have been increasing their number nominated) and 1932 (when the Democrats should have been doing the same):

	Democrats			*Republicans*		
	Up	*Down*	*Same*	*Up*	*Down*	*Same*
1920	1	8	42	5	1	45
1932	8	1	42	0	7	44

Some anticipation is shown, but far from adequate: in 1920, the Republicans failed to win 21 seats they could have gained by running more candidates; four years later they lost 14 seats in a similar fashion; in 1932, the Democrats lost 8 seats by failing to run enough candidates.

Number Nominated vs. Non-minimax Outcome. A similar reluctance to change the number nominated can be observed even in the case in which the previous election resulted in a lesser number of seats for a given party than the minimax strategy would have guaranteed. For the Democrats, loss of a seat by occurrence of a non-minimax outcome at the previous election increases the probability of change in the number nominated from .15 to .26; while for the Republicans, the corresponding probabilities are .10 and .20. Following a non-minimax outcome, the Democrats and Republicans each have a probability of changing the number of nominations which is only about ten per cent greater than that obtaining if the number elected were at least equal to the number guaranteed by following minimax strategy. Of the changes in the latter situation, two-thirds are in the direction of nominating more candidates; this is appropriate, since practically all of the non-minimax losses result from nominating too few, rather than too many candidates.

Correlations Over Districts. Table V presents correlations among 12 variables for the 51 districts. The variables represent the experi-

TABLE V. CORRELATIONS OVER 51 DISTRICTS

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Number of contested elections	—										
2. Number of non-minimax losses: Dem	−.43	—									
3. Number of non-minimax losses: Rep	−.40	−.17	—								
4. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Dem	.14	−.08	−.12	—							
5. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Rep	.01	.21	.05	−.03	—						
6. Mean % Democratic	−.04	.67	−.41	−.23	.19	—					
7. Absolute value of (mean % Dem-50%)	−.57	.24	.44	.11	−.07	−.28	—				
8. Variance (over years) in % Dem	−.27	.43	.15	.04	.23	.10	.11	—			
9. Change in % Democratic, 1902–1954	−.20	.62	−.06	−.11	.05	.42	.06	.70	—		
10. Var. of 2 yr change in % Democratic	−.42	.58	.20	.00	.19	.29	.17	.64	.59	—	
11. Var. of presidential yr change in % Dem	−.33	.41	−.02	.01	.17	.20	.03	.37	.34	.72	—
12. Var. of off-year change in % Dem	−.21	.31	.25	.18	.09	.09	.25	.59	.28	.54	.14

ence of each district over the period 1902–1954, and are as follows:

1. Number of elections in which there were a total of more than three candidates for the three seats.

2. Number of elections in which the Democrats elected fewer than guaranteed them by following the minimax strategy.

3. Number of elections in which the Republicans elected fewer than guaranteed them by following the minimax strategy.

4. Number of elections for which the number nominated by the Democrats represents a change from the previous election.

5. Number of elections for which the number nominated by the Republicans represents a change from the previous election.

6. Mean, over all years, of the variable, per cent Democratic.

7. Absolute value of the difference between 50% and variable (6) above.

8. Variance, over all years, of the variable, per cent Democratic.

9. Change in per cent Democratic from 1902 to 1954.

10. Variance of the change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

11. Variance of the change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election, for the 12 presidential election years, 1908–1952.

12. Variance of the change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election, for the 13 non-presidential election years, 1906–1954.

The relation of non-minimax losses (variables 2 and 3) to the other variables is of particular interest. Districts having more contested elections had fewer non-minimax outcomes, although even in these districts, far from all of the elections are contested. Perhaps the *willingness* to contest is the critical element. Each party has the most non-minimax losses in those districts in which its mean proportion of the vote is highest. This may again reflect the decreasing utility of the third seat. For the Democrats, non-minimax losses are also greater in those districts where the mean vote has been increasing over time. The number of contested elections is much greater in those districts where the mean vote is close to 50 per cent.

Correlation Over Years. Correlations were also computed (Table VI) among 12 variables for the 25 election years, 1906–1954 (1902 and 1904 could not be used, since some of the variables involved changes from two or four years earlier). For each year, the variables in Table VI represent all 51 districts. Variables 2–7, and 10,

TABLE VI. CORRELATIONS OVER 25 BIENNIAL ELECTION YEARS, 1906–1954

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Year	—										
2. Number of contested elections	.42	—									
3. Number of non-minimax losses: Dem	.14	.38	—								
4. Number of non-minimax losses: Rep	−.25	−.07	−.26	—							
5. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Dem	−.36	−.58	−.36	.32	—						
6. Number of changes in no. nom'd: Rep	−.43	.24	.31	−.07	−.42	—					
7. Mean % Democratic	.45	.44	.71	−.69	−.54	.19	—				
8. Mean of 2 yr change in % Democratic	−.06	−.10	.27	−.67	−.34	.37	.44	—			
9. Mean of 4 yr change in % Democratic	−.06	.15	.35	−.40	−.44	.64	.44	.46	—		
10. Variance in % Democratic	.39	.20	−.03	.01	.10	−.17	−.08	.02	−.13	—	
11. Variance of 2 yr change in % Dem	−.74	−.05	−.12	.52	.38	.37	−.53	−.09	−.07	−.02	—
12. Variance of 4 yr change in % Dem	−.70	−.37	−.18	.04	.20	.30	−.31	.38	.00	−.18	.59

correspond to variables 1–6, and 8, respectively in the correlations over districts. The other variables are:

1. Year of the election: 1906, 1908, . . . , 1954.

8. Mean, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

9. Mean, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election.

11. Variance, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the previous election.

12. Variance, over all districts, of the variable, change in per cent Democratic from the second previous election.

The changes associated with time have been considerable in Illinois, and many significant relations emerge. Paralleling the previous finding concerning districts, non-minimax losses are highly related to the party strength that year, as well as to the increase in the party's vote from two and four years previous. This is true for both parties. Both parties are also more likely to change the number of nominations from the previous year when their vote is dropping than when it is rising.

A number of variables change with time itself: an increase in the number of contested elections; decreases in the number of changes in the number nominated from the previous election (for both parties); an increase in the Democratic vote; an increase in the variance among districts; and sharp decreases in the variance of the change from the previous election or the second previous election. Changes over time are further examined in the next section.

Changes in the Vote, 1902–1954. Figure 1 gives the mean Democratic vote of the 51 counties for each of the 27 biennial elections, 1902–1954.

It can be seen that the variance among the means of the districts for presidential years is much greater than that among off-years—in fact, more than twice as great. However, the variance *among districts within years* is much *less* for presidential years than for off-years. Associated with presidential voting, then, is a



Fig. 1. Mean per cent Democratic of all 51 districts, 1902–1954.

unifying effect among districts. However, the unity among districts of the presidential years is less stable than the relative diversity among districts of the off-years. If the presidential election could be said to bring the districts together, then it tends to unite them at a *different* level from election to election, following which the districts return in the off-years to a more stable diversity.[23]

In general, the variance among districts is greater than the variance among years, and the greater variance among districts is associated particularly with the division between Cook county (Chicago and suburbs) and the rest of the state. Moreover, this division has been increasing over time. In 1960, the average Democratic vote in the Cook county districts was 57 per cent, compared to 46 per cent for the remaining districts.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

It is apparent from the preceding sections that the particular game theory model employed here provides a partial, though not a complete description of the behavior of the nominating committee in determining the number of candidates to run. This section examines some factors relevant to the agreement and disagreement of data and model.

Rationality. Game theory may be employed as a model of rational behavior, defined in terms of minimaxing a certain quantity. In this sense, a considerable amount of rationality was demonstrated by the nominating committees in their determination of the number of candidates: in 69 per cent of all elections, both parties employed the predicted strategy.

It is, however, for both parties, a rationality associated with a basic conservatism. A number of years often elapse between a change in the vote and the corresponding adjustment in the number nominated. There is some question whether the effective behavior which is shown results from a considered rationality, or simply from the conservatism of not changing the number nominated, which usually turns out to be the best thing to do. Or perhaps, more significantly, the general decision for conservatism has been made on a rational basis, since this is generally effective.

Utility and Job Security. The principal departures from the model occur in the relatively rare cases in which one party has more than seventy-five per cent of the vote. In these cases, however, the departure is very considerable, with parties nominating three candidates only about 20 per cent of the time. As has been previously suggested, there is a strong implication of non-linear utility particularly with respect to the election of third candidates. Further investigation has revealed some possible bases for this non-linearity.

A relevant consideration seems to be the individual job security of incumbents (or less often of other candidates). Nominating committees may know that they can elect three candidates with 75 per cent of the vote, and that even if the vote falls somewhat below that, they will surely elect two. But the critical question to them is "Which two?" The nominating committee naturally seeks to control who is nominated, as well as the number nominated. Hence, coalitions may form between the two stronger forces within the party and militate against adding a third nomination which would reduce the certainty of the incumbents' reelection.[24]

In addition, there is evidence that in certain cases, again most likely to occur when one party has 75 per cent of the vote, bi-partisan agreements are reached to allow the minority a seat, in exchange for what in game theory would be termed an appropriate "side payment." The bi-partisan agreement is also seen to alleviate the job-security problem, and perhaps to satisfy both parties, inasmuch as, if the utilities are non-linear, the side payment can be larger than the utility of the majority's third member and less than the utility of the minority's first member.

Minority Representation. In terms of the intent of the law—to provide minority representation—the game theory solution is optimal. If both parties follow a minimax strategy, and divide their votes equally among all their candidates, the result will be to give the minority one seat whenever it has as much as 25 per cent of the vote. This end has been generally achieved, as Blair has noted.[25] Indeed, as we have seen, nearly all of the mal-representation that has occurred has been in the direction of giving the minority *over*-representation.

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[23] A related theory, taking into account the differential composition of the electorate in Presidential and off-years, has been proposed in A. Campbell's "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1960), pp. 397–418. See also V. O. Key, Jr., "Partisanship and County Office: The Case of Ohio," this REVIEW, Vol. 47 (1953), p. 526; and Malcolm Moos, *Presidents, Politics, and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952), pp. 13n, 110.

[24] The possibility of coalitions of two against one would seem to make job-security-initiated pressure against an additional nomination more likely against a third candidate when the vote is 75%, than against a second candidate when the vote is 50%.

[25] *Op. cit.*

In the earlier days of cumulative voting in Illinois, some "good government" groups protested the lack of choice available to the voter in the general election—with many elections having only three candidates, no more than the number of seats—and hence proposed that parties be required to run full slates. This would, of course, negate the basic purpose of this scheme of minority representation. In addition, several writers have implied that a non-contested election represented collusion, but this is not necessarily so. Such a case may indeed be the best strategy for each party, and may also represent the *only* way in which nearly proportional representation can be assured.

A modification might be proposed, however, to guarantee more proportional representation by removing the uncertainty which influences committees to limit the number of candidates unnecessarily (and unprofitably). Allow the primary elections to specify the *order* of election of candidates, and the number of votes for the party (without regard to candidates) in the general election to determine the *number* elected from each party, in the already-specified order. Better yet, let one election suffice for both functions, by allowing the votes within a party to determine the ordering of candidates within that party, and the total number of votes cast for each party to determine the number of candidates it elects.[26] Each voter would, as before, have a number of votes equal to the number of candidates to be elected, and would still be able to cross party lines if he desired. Thus proportional representation could be achieved to a much greater extent, unhampered by possibly non-optimal committee decisions.

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[26] This system has some similarity to the French provision for *apparentements* in their legislative elections of 1951 and 1956. But in France it was only the order of candidates *among* parties in an alliance, and not (for practical purposes) within parties, that was determined by the votes. American party organizations, like the French, would undoubtedly prefer to retain control of the intraparty ordering; insofar as their assent is necessary to electoral reform, some compromise in the direction of a list system might be required, although this would, however, run contrary to the presumed intention of the present direct primary law.

TWO FACES OF POWER[1]

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The concept of power remains elusive despite the recent and prolific outpourings of case studies on community power. Its elusiveness is dramatically demonstrated by the regularity of disagreement as to the locus of community power between the sociologists and the political scientists. Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" communities power is widely diffused.[2] Presumably, this explains why the latter group styles itself "pluralist," its counterpart "elitist."

There seems no room for doubt that the sharply divergent findings of the two groups are the product, not of sheer coincidence, but of fundamental differences in both their underlying assumptions and research methodology. The political scientists have contended that these differences in findings can be explained by the faulty approach and presuppositions of the sociologists. We contend in this paper that the pluralists themselves have not grasped the whole truth of the matter; that while their criticisms of the elitists are sound, they, like the elitists, utilize an approach and assumptions which predetermine their conclusions. Our argument is cast within the frame of our central thesis: that there are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see.

I

Against the elitist approach to power several criticisms may be, and have been levelled.[3] One has to do with its basic premise that in every human institution there is an ordered system of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and the mirror image of the organization's stratification. This postulate the pluralists emphatically—and, to our mind, correctly—reject, on the ground that

> nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community. . . . If anything, there seems to be an unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at bottom *nobody* dominates in a town, so that their first question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?," but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?" The first query is somewhat like, "Have you stopped beating your wife?," in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the stratification theory.[4]

Equally objectionable to the pluralists—and to us—is the sociologists' hypothesis that the power structure tends to be stable over time.

> Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. . . . To presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure is to introduce systematic inaccuracies into one's description of social reality.[5]

A third criticism of the elitist model is that it wrongly equates reputed with actual power:

> If a man's major life work is banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption holds until the banker's activities and participations indicate otherwise. . . . If we

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[1] This paper is an outgrowth of a seminar in Problems of Power in Contemporary Society, conducted jointly by the authors for graduate students and undergraduate majors in political science and economics.

[2] Compare, for example, the sociological studies of Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); Roland Pellegrini and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61 (March 1956), pp. 413–19; and Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants and Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (February 1958), pp. 3–9; with political science studies of Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961); and Norton E. Long and George Belknap, "A Research Program on Leadership and Decision-Making in Metropolitan Areas" (New York, Governmental Affairs Institute, 1956). See also Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (August, 1960), pp. 474–84.

[3] See especially N. W. Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 475f.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 476.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 478–79.

presume that the banker is "really" engaged in running the community, there is practically no way of disconfirming this notion, even if it is totally erroneous. On the other hand, it is easy to spot the banker who really *does* run community affairs when we presume he does not, because his activities will make this fact apparent.[6]

This is not an exhaustive bill of particulars; there are flaws other than these in the sociological model and methodology[7]—including some which the pluralists themselves have not noticed. But to go into this would not materially serve our current purposes. Suffice it simply to observe that whatever the merits of their own approach to power, the pluralists have effectively exposed the main weaknesses of the elitist model.

As the foregoing quotations make clear, the pluralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise. Power to them means "participation in decision-making"[8] and can be analyzed only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions."[9] As a result, the pluralist researcher is uninterested in the reputedly powerful. His concerns instead are to (a) select for study a number of "key" as opposed to "routine" political decisions, (b) identify the people who took an active part in the decision-making process, (c) obtain a full account of their actual behavior while the policy conflict was being resolved, and (d) determine and analyze the specific outcome of the conflict.

The advantages of this approach, relative to the elitist alternative, need no further exposition. The same may not be said, however, about its defects—two of which seem to us to be of fundamental importance. One is that the model takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. The other is that the model provides no *objective* criteria for distinguishing between "important" and "unimportant" issues arising in the political arena.

II

There is no gainsaying that an analysis grounded entirely upon what is specific and visible to the outside observer is more "scientific" than one based upon pure speculation. To put it another way,

> If we can get our social life stated in terms of activity, and of nothing else, we have not indeed succeeded in measuring it, but we have at least reached a foundation upon which a coherent system of measurements can be built up. . . . We shall cease to be blocked by the intervention of unmeasurable elements, which claim to be themselves the real causes of all that is happening, and which by their spook-like arbitrariness make impossible any progress toward dependable knowledge.[10]

The question is, however, how can one be certain in any given situation that the "unmeasurable elements" are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making?

We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.[11]

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[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 480–81.

[7] See especially Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," this Review, Vol. 52 (June 1958), pp. 463–69; and Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," this Review, Vol. 55 (December 1961), pp. 817–31.

[8] This definition originated with Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.

[9] Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *loc. cit.*, p. 466.

[10] Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 202, quoted in Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 481n.

[11] As is perhaps self-evident, there are similarities in both faces of power. In each, A participates in decisions and thereby adversely affects B. But there is an important difference between the two: in the one case, A openly participates; in the other, he participates only in the sense that he works to sustain those values and rules of procedure that help him keep certain issues out of the public domain. True enough, participation of the second kind may at times be overt; that is the case, for instance, in cloture fights in the Congress. But the point is that it need not be. In fact, when the maneuver is most successfully executed, it neither involves nor can be identified with decisions arrived at on specific issues.

Situations of this kind are common. Consider, for example, the case—surely not unfamiliar to this audience—of the discontented faculty member in an academic institution headed by a tradition-bound executive. Aggrieved about a long-standing policy around which a strong vested interest has developed, the professor resolves in the privacy of his office to launch an attack upon the policy at the next faculty meeting. But, when the moment of truth is at hand, he sits frozen in silence. Why? Among the many possible reasons, one or more of these could have been of crucial importance: (a) the professor was fearful that his intended action would be interpreted as an expression of his disloyalty to the institution; or (b) he decided that, given the beliefs and attitudes of his colleagues on the faculty, he would almost certainly constitute on this issue a minority of one; or (c) he concluded that, given the nature of the law-making process in the institution, his proposed remedies would be pigeonholed permanently. But whatever the case, the central point to be made is the same: to the extent that a person or group—consciously or unconsciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power. Or, as Professor Schattschneider has so admirably put it:

> All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.[12]

Is such bias not relevant to the study of power? Should not the student be continuously alert to its possible existence in the human institution that he studies, and be ever prepared to examine the forces which brought it into being and sustain it? Can he safely ignore the possibility, for instance, that an individual or group in a community participates more vigorously in supporting the *nondecision-making* process than in participating in actual decisions within the process? Stated differently, can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts?[13] To do so is, in our judgment, to overlook the less apparent, but nonetheless extremely important, face of power.

III

In his critique of the "ruling-elite model," Professor Dahl argues that "the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if . . . [t] here is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested."[14] With this assertion we have two complaints. One we have already discussed, viz., in erroneously assuming that power is solely reflected in concrete decisions, Dahl thereby excludes the possibility that in the community in question there is a group capable of preventing contests from arising on issues of importance to it. Beyond that, however, by ignoring the less apparent face of power Dahl and those who accept his pluralist approach are unable adequately to differentiate between a "key" and a "routine" political decision.

Nelson Polsby, for example, proposes that "by pre-selecting as issues for study those which are generally agreed to be significant, pluralist researchers can test stratification theory."[15] He is silent, however, on how the researcher is to determine *what* issues are "generally agreed to be significant," and on how the researcher is to appraise the reliability of the agreement. In fact, Polsby is guilty here of the same fault he himself has found with elitist methodology: by presupposing that in any community there are significant issues in the political arena, he takes for granted the very question which is in doubt. He accepts as issues what are reputed to be issues. As a result, his findings are fore-ordained. For even if there is no "truly" significant issue in the community under study, there is every likelihood that Polsby (or any like-minded researcher) will find one or some and, after careful study, reach the appropriate pluralistic conclusions.[16]

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[12] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), p. 71.

[13] Dahl *partially* concedes this point when he observes ("A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," pp. 468–69) that "one could argue that even in a society like ours a ruling elite might be so influential over ideas, attitudes, and opinions that a kind of false consensus will exist—not the phony consensus of a terroristic totalitarian dictatorship but the manipulated and superficially self-imposed adherence to the norms and goals of the elite by broad sections of a community. . . . This objection points to the need to be circumspect in interpreting the evidence." But that he largely misses our point is clear from the succeeding sentence: "Yet here, too, it seems to me that the hypothesis cannot be satisfactorily confirmed without something equivalent to the test I have proposed," and that is "by an examination of a series of concrete cases where key decisons are made. . . . "

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

Dahl's definition of "key political issues" in his essay on the ruling-elite model is open to the same criticism. He states that it is "a necessary although possibly not a sufficient condition that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups."[17] In our view, this is an inadequate characterization of a "key political issue," simply because groups can have disagreements in preferences on unimportant as well as on important issues. Elite preferences which border on the indifferent are certainly not significant in determining whether a monolithic or polylithic distribution of power prevails in a given community. Using Dahl's definition of "key political issues," the researcher would have little difficulty in finding such in practically any community; and it would not be surprising then if he ultimately concluded that power in the community was widely diffused.

The distinction between important and unimportant issues, we believe, cannot be made intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the "mobilization of bias" in the community; of the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others. Armed with this knowledge, one could conclude that any challenge to the predominant values or to the established "rules of the game" would constitute an "important" issue; all else, unimportant. To be sure, judgments of this kind cannot be entirely objective. But to avoid making them in a study of power is both to neglect a highly significant aspect of power and thereby to undermine the only sound basis for discriminating between "key" and "routine" decisions. In effect, we contend, the pluralists have made each of these mistakes; that is to say, they have done just that for which Kaufman and Jones so severely taxed Floyd Hunter: they have begun "their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a lobby or foundation,"[18] *i.e.*, they have begun by studying the issues rather than the values and biases that are built into the political system and that, for the student of power, give real meaning to those issues which do enter the political arena.

IV

There is no better fulcrum for our critique of the pluralist model than Dahl's recent study of power in New Haven.[19]

At the outset it may be observed that Dahl does not attempt in this work to define his concept, "key political decision." In asking whether the "Notables" of New Haven are "influential overtly or covertly in the making of government decisions," he simply states that he will examine "three different 'issue-areas' in which important public decisions are made: nominations by the two political parties, urban redevelopment, and public education." These choices are justified on the grounds that "nominations determine which persons will hold public office. The New Haven redevelopment program measured by its cost—present and potential—is the largest in the country. Public education, aside from its intrinsic importance, is the costliest item in the city's budget." Therefore, Dahl concludes, "It is reasonable to expect . . . that the relative influence over public officials wielded by the . . . Notables would be revealed by an examination of their participation in these three areas of activity."[20]

The difficulty with this latter statement is that it is evident from Dahl's own account that the Notables are in fact uninterested in two of the three "key" decisions he has chosen. In regard to the public school issue, for example, Dahl points out that many of the Notables live in the suburbs and that those who do live in New Haven choose in the main to send their children to private schools. "As a consequence," he writes, "their interest in the public schools is ordinarily rather slight."[21] Nominations by the two political parties as an important "issue-area," is somewhat analogous to the public schools, in that the apparent lack of interest among the Notables in this issue is partially accounted for by their suburban residence—because of which they are disqualified from holding public office in New Haven. Indeed, Dahl himself concedes that with respect to both these issues the Notables are largely indifferent: "Business leaders might ignore the public schools or the political parties without any sharp awareness that their indifference would hurt their pocketbooks . . ." He goes on, however, to say that the prospect of profound changes [as a result of the urban-redevelopment program] in ownership, physical layout, and usage of property in the downtown area and the effects of these changes on the commercial and industrial prosperity of New Haven were all related in an obvious way to the daily concerns of businessmen.[22]

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[16] As he points out, the expectations of the pluralist researchers "have seldom been disappointed." (*Ibid.*, p. 477).

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

[18] Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 14 (Summer 1954), p. 207.

[19] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961).

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Thus, if one believes—as Professor Dahl did when he wrote his critique of the ruling-elite model—that an issue, to be considered as important, "should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups,"[23] then clearly he has now for all practical purposes written off public education and party nominations as key "issue-areas." But this point aside, it appears somewhat dubious at best that "the relative influence over public officials wielded by the Social Notables" can be revealed by an examination of their nonparticipation in areas in which they were not interested.

Furthermore, we would not rule out the possibility that even on those issues to which they appear indifferent, the Notables may have a significant degree of *indirect* influence. We would suggest, for example, that although they send their children to private schools, the Notables do recognize that public school expenditures have a direct bearing upon their own tax liabilities. This being so, and given their strong representation on the New Haven Board of Finance,[24] the expectation must be that it is in their direct interest to play an active role in fiscal policy-making, in the establishment of the educational budget in particular. But as to this, Dahl is silent: he inquires not at all into either the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor into their impact upon the public schools.[25] Let it be understood clearly that in making these points we are not attempting to refute Dahl's contention that the Notables lack power in New Haven. What we *are* saying, however, is that this conclusion is not adequately supported by his analysis of the "issue-areas" of public education and party nominations.

The same may not be said of redevelopment. This issue is by any reasonable standard important for purposes of determining whether New Haven is ruled by "the hidden hand of an economic elite."[26] For the Economic Notables have taken an active interest in the program and, beyond that, the socio-economic implications of it are not necessarily in harmony with the basic interests and values of businesses and businessmen.

In an effort to assure that the redevelopment program would be acceptable to what he dubbed "the biggest muscles" in New Haven, Mayor Lee created the Citizens Action Commission (CAC) and appointed to it primarily representatives of the economic elite. It was given the function of overseeing the work of the mayor and other officials involved in redevelopment, and, as well, the responsibility for organizing and encouraging citizens' participation in the program through an extensive committee system.

In order to weigh the relative influence of the mayor, other key officials, and the members of the CAC, Dahl reconstructs "all the *important* decisions on redevelopment and renewal between 1950–58 . . . [to] determine which individuals most often initiated the proposals that were finally adopted or most often successfully vetoed the proposals of the others."[27] The results of this test indicate that the mayor and his development administrator were by far the most influential, and that the "muscles" on the Commission, excepting in a few trivial instances, "never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought before them. . . ."[28]

This finding is, in our view, unreliable, not so much because Dahl was compelled to make a subjective selection of what constituted *important* decisions within what he felt to be an *important* "issue-area," as because the finding was based upon an excessively narrow test of influence. To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation. How, that is to say, can a judgment be made as to the relative influence of Mayor Lee and the CAC without knowing (through prior study of the political and social views of all concerned) the proposals that Lee did *not* make because he anticipated that they would provoke strenuous opposition and, perhaps, sanctions on the part of the CAC?[29]

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

[24] *Who Governs?*, p. 82. Dahl points out that "the main policy thrust of the Economic Notables is to oppose tax increases; this leads them to oppose expenditures for anything more than minimal traditional city services. In this effort their two most effective weapons ordinarily are the mayor and the Board of Finance. The policies of the Notables are most easily achieved under a strong mayor if his policies coincide with theirs or under a weak mayor if they have the support of the Board of Finance. . . . New Haven mayors have continued to find it expedient to create confidence in their financial policies among businessmen by appointing them to the Board." (pp. 81–2)

[25] Dahl does discuss in general terms (pp. 79–84) changes in the level of tax rates and assessments in past years, but not actual decisions of the Board of Finance or their effects on the public school system.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

[27] *Ibid.* "A rough test of a person's overt or covert influence," Dahl states in the first section of the book, "is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiates a policy where no opposition appears." (*Ibid.*, p. 66)

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

In sum, since he does not recognize *both* faces of power, Dahl is in no position to evaluate the relative influence or power of the initiator and decision-maker, on the one hand, and of those persons, on the other, who may have been indirectly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being raised.[30] As a result, he unduly emphasizes the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing, and in the process casts the pluralist conclusions of his study into serious doubt.

V

We have contended in this paper that a fresh approach to the study of power is called for, an approach based upon a recognition of the two faces of power. Under this approach the researcher would begin—not, as does the sociologist who asks, "Who rules?" nor as does the pluralist who asks, "Does anyone have power?"—but by investigating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant values, the myths and the established political procedures and rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of *nondecision-making;* that is, he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which the *status quo* oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions (as, *e.g.*, the unanimity "rule" of New York City's Board of Estimate[31]) which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues. Finally, using his knowledge of the restrictive face of power as a foundation for analysis and as a standard for distinguishing between "key" and "routine" political decisions, the researcher would, after the manner of the pluralists, analyze participation in decision-making of concrete issues.

We reject in advance as unimpressive the possible criticism that this approach to the study of power is likely to prove fruitless because it goes beyond an investigation of what is objectively measurable. In reacting against the subjective aspects of the sociological model of power, the pluralists have, we believe, made the mistake of discarding "unmeasurable elements" as unreal. It is ironical that, by so doing, they have exposed themselves to the same fundamental criticism they have so forcefully levelled against the elitists: their approach to and assumptions about power predetermine their findings and conclusions.

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[29] Dahl is, of course, aware of the "law of anticipated reactions." In the case of the mayor's relationship with the CAC, Dahl notes that Lee was "particularly skillful in estimating what the CAC could be expected to support or reject." (p. 137). However, Dahl was not interested in analyzing or appraising to what extent the CAC limited Lee's freedom of action. Because of his restricted concept of power, Dahl did not consider that the CAC might in this respect have exercised power. That the CAC did not initiate or veto actual proposals by the mayor was to Dahl evidence enough that the CAC was virtually powerless; it might as plausibly be evidence that the CAC was (in itself or in what it represented) so powerful that Lee ventured nothing it would find worth quarreling with.

[30] The fact that the initiator of decisions also refrains—because he anticipates adverse reactions—from initiating other proposals does not obviously lessen the power of the agent who limited his initiative powers. Dahl missed this point: "It is," he writes, "all the more improbable, then, that a secret cabal of Notables dominates the public life of New Haven through means so clandestine that not one of the fifty prominent citizens interviewed in the course of this study—citizens who had participated extensively in various decisions—hinted at the existence of such a cabal. . . " (p. 185).

In conceiving of elite domination exclusively in the form of a conscious cabal exercising the power of decision-making and vetoing, he overlooks a more subtle form of domination; one in which those who actually dominate are not conscious of it themselves, simply because their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged.

[31] Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 640. For perceptive study of the "mobilization of bias" in a rural American community, see Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, 1958).

INFLUENCE AND INTERACTION IN A STATE LEGISLATIVE BODY

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The purpose of this article is to investigate distributions of influence in a legislative body, to spell out the resulting hypotheses, to introduce a method for estimating the degree of interaction between legislators, and to demonstrate the relevance of specific indicators to the study of legislative behavior. The methodological task falls somewhere between the small group laboratory situation and the more complex arena of community decision-making. Intense observation, control, and precision are sacrificed in favor of a real and vital situation. The analysis of a relatively self-sufficient political entity is lost in favor of maintaining some of the advantages of laboratory research. The universe selected for this study consists of fifty people who must directly or indirectly, but not remotely, rely upon each other in order to satisfy their official purposes.

I. DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE

Data classified here under the term "influence" are accumulated from responses to nine items included in a structured interview form. The items were administered to 47 of 50 members of the 1961 Indiana Senate while the 1961 session was in progress. The responses represent "attributed" influence; that is, each response is treated as a reflection of the degree of influence one senator attributes to another.

Influence Data. The reliability of attribution data is a function of experimental conditions. The writer judged that the conditions of this experiment were favorable. The respondents were members of a face-to-face group where knowledge about other members is likely to be relatively great, especially in view of the fact that the continuity of membership from session to session has been high. The respondents were encouraged to make only those choices about which they had information. The sample approached the total universe about which conclusions are drawn. And finally, pre-session interviewing contacts and the usual assurance of anonymity aided in establishing the proper *rapport*. For reasons of convenience the term "attributed" will not be reiterated in the presentation of data. It should suffice to keep in mind that interview responses are classified under "influence" because the key word in the questions asked of legislators is the word "influential."

The first question asked was read as follows:

> Generally speaking and regardless of the legislator's formal position, who would you say are the most influential members of your chamber when it comes to determining policy?

The second question was stated in the following way:

> Regardless of the legislator's formal position, who would you say are the most influential members of your chamber in each of the following areas when it comes to determining policy?

Eight areas were then considered:

1. Local Government
2. Agriculture
3. Education
4. Appropriations
5. Labor
6. Business
7. Taxation
8. Benevolent Institutions

Legislators were invited to supply as many names as they wished for each item. Of the 25 Democrats and 22 Republicans interviewed for these items, no respondent named only his own party associates.[1] Approximately five names per respondent were obtained from the general influence question; the substantive area question elicited approximately two names per respondent for each item. Some respondents made no choice for certain items. Four of the substantive areas utilized reflect the names of Senate Committees (Agriculture, Education, Labor, Benevolent Institutions); the others do not. The distinction in design was made in order to avoid a group of responses that might adhere strictly to the formal structure of the legislature.

Senators were grouped and ranked according to the following distinctions:

1. *General Influence*—the number of times they

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[1] The Democrats held 26 seats and the Republicans 24. The Democratic majority was the first in the Indiana Senate since 1939.

were named in response to the question on general influence.

2. *Specific Area Influence*—the total number of times they were named in all substantive areas taken together.
3. The number of times they were named in each substantive area.
4. The number of substantive areas in which they were mentioned.

The distribution of responses for (1), (2) and (3) consistently characterizes a large majority of senators as having relatively little or no influence. The number of mentions tends to accelerate when moving from the least to the most frequently mentioned senator, in a graphic approximation of the "J" curve. In the substantive areas with designations that do not coincide with the names of Senate Committees, the responses tend to be spread among more members and are not so concentrated upon one or two members. The data reveal the same distributions for each political party, when political party is held constant.

General Influence and Specific Area Influence. The ten senators most frequently mentioned in the responses to the general influence question are named in a large number of substantive areas as well (Table I). Eight of the senators ranking highest in general influence make up eight of the top nine ranked by the number of areas in which senators were mentioned. Four of the top ten in general influence—numbers one, four, five, and ten—held Senate offices (excluding committee positions), and five of the ten were members of the minority party. Only two of the top ten general influencers were mentioned in relatively few substantive areas. Both exceptions held the office of Conference Chairman, but in opposite parties.

TABLE I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND THE NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE AREAS IN WHICH GENERAL INFLUENCERS ARE MENTIONED

(Question #1) Rank of Senators by General Influence	(Question #2, Items 1–8) Number of Areas Mentioned								
	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1	1								
2			1						
3		1							
4		1							
5						1			
6		1							
7		1							
8			1						
9			1						
10						1			
11–50			1	3	7	9	11	6	3
Totals	1	4	4	3	7	11	11	6	3

TABLE II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND SPECIFIC AREA INFLUENCE

	High Specific Area Influencers	Low Specific Area Influencers
High general influencers	21	4
Low general influencers	4	21

$\chi^2 = 23.12$, $p < .001$.

The number of substantive areas in which legislators were named as influential, however, does not reveal the degree of influence they had in each substantive area. A handy way to gauge roughly the amount and scope of a legislator's influence is to total the number of times he is named in a variety of policy-making areas. The resulting total is described as the legislator's *specific area* influence score. In the Indiana Senate, senators who scored high in specific area influence tended also to score high in general influence. To illustrate, in Table II the median serves to distinguish between high influencers and low influencers. High general influencers tend to be high specific area influencers, and low general influencers low specific area influencers. General influence appears to be related to several sub-structures of influence which are based upon policy determination within certain substantive areas.

II. EMERGENCE OF INFLUENCE

If influence or power relationships are vital to an understanding of political phenomena, then the emergence of influence or power is of special significance. Insight into the emergence of influence can be acquired by examining attribution data. While the data and categories are derived from responses to interview questions, the resulting generalizations need not be untenable if they are otherwise consistent with our present knowledge of human behavior.

Observers of legislative activity don't need to be told there is a direct relationship between length of service and degree of influence, *ceteris paribus*. The Indiana Senate conforms to that expectation. Both general influence and specific area influence are strongly associated with length of service. In the full spread of the data for general influence rankings, there is a clear break between senators serving in at least their fourth session and those still in their first, second or third session. The former tend to be high general influencers, and the latter low.[2]

Specific area influence and length of service present a slightly different relationship. Of the six senators in their third session of service five rank high and one low in specific area influence; yet only two of these senators rank high in general influence. Senators in their first or second session of service tend to be low specific area influencers.[3] Although the number of senators involved in these correlations is fairly small, the evidence does suggest that specific area influence tends to precede general influence.

One cannot simply assume, however, that legislators always will first become influential in rather specific substantive areas and then broaden their scope of influence with time. Recall that the Conference Chairmen were named a large number of times in response to the question on general influence; yet they were named relatively few times for the more specific influence items. It is possible that their policy specialties were not included among the influence items; however, it was the writer's observation that they seldom attempted to argue the specific content of important legislation. Their roles were more attuned to the maintenance of party organization and discipline. One would need to search their earlier records to see if they once possessed an influence now lost in specific areas.

The evidence also indicates that some legislators become highly specialized without the reward of becoming generally influential in the legislature. Of the top ten specific area influencers, four do not fall among the top ten general influencers. The four exceptions have a fairly similar influence description (Table III). Their recognized influence fell primarily into one substantive area. They received respectively 93, 92, 93, and 57 per cent of their mentions in that single area. Among the top ten general influencers, only the minority party Conference Chairman received more than 60 per cent of his mentions in one substantive area, and only one other received more than 50 per cent in one area. Furthermore, the substantive areas listed in Table III are highly significant areas from the legislators' standpoint. When senators were asked to rate their preferences among committee assignments, Education ranked first, Finance fourth, Labor fifth, and Benevolent and Penal Institutions tenth in a listing of 29 committees.

TABLE III. SENATORS IDENTIFIED WITH ONE SUBSTANTIVE AREA

	Total No. of Mentions	No. of Mentions in One Area	Name of Area	No. of Areas Mentioned	Specific Area Influence Ranking
1	44	41	Benevolent Institutions	3	5
2	39	36	Labor	3	6
3	30	28	Education	3	8
4	30	17	Appropriations	5	9

Tentative Hypotheses. The terms utilized to specify substantive areas of policy (taxation, labor, education, etc.) may perhaps more realistically be described as interviewing stimuli which represented different contexts of ideas; then legislators responded to these terms by naming those they regarded as influential within the context of ideas represented by each term. Alternatively, legislators responded by naming those they had heard of as influential within the same contexts.

The foregoing data then suggest that: (1) legislators generally become recognized as influential within certain policy-making areas before they achieve general influence; (2) organizational skills, falling outside the context of ideas relating to specific policy-making areas, give legislators recognition as having general influence; (3) in the terms utilized in the interviews, legislators become recognized as competent or influential in more than one context of ideas before becoming recognized as generally influential (*i.e.*, among the top ten general influencers).

Specialization in the Indiana Senate is not as complete as one might find in other legislative bodies, such as Congress. Members of the 1961 Indiana Senate served on a minimum of three and a maximum of eight committees. When the tasks are more complex, when the stakes are higher, and when the institutional arrangements enforce a greater division of work, the emergence of influence may change accordingly. A legislator may then find that the path of least resistance calls for a demonstration of competence in a single context of ideas relating to policy and a greater emphasis upon organizational skills.

III. EXERCISE OF INFLUENCE

Influence is exercised through interaction, along patterns related to the proximity of issues, ideas and people, and via certain styles. These facets of influence are the concern of this section. More specifically, I have devised and applied an interaction scale, an index to influence transferability, and indices to bill success and formal position success, to analyze them.

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[2] $\chi^2 = 15.7$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$.

[3] $\chi^2 = 16.34$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$.

Influence and Interaction. Influence is exercised through interaction in one form or another. Like "influence," "interaction" is an elusive concept. Ambiguity is reduced, it may be hoped, when such concepts are applied to specific sets of data. In this article "interaction" is described in a scale administered to 48 of 50 members of the Indiana Senate while the 1961 session was in progress. Every senator was asked to rate every other senator according to the following items and scale of weights:

0—Do not connect the name with the face
1—Recognize him, but have only a greeting acquaintance
2—Stop and talk with him regularly
3—Aid each other in common activities through actual personal contact
4—Visit or entertain in each other's house, apartment, or rooms, or eat meals together frequently, as well as aid each other in common activities

The total of scores that each senator received was calculated and utilized as a rough measure of his degree of interaction. For this immediate research senators were then grouped into quartiles by ranking their interaction scores.[4]

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL INFLUENCE AND LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION

	Interactors			
	Very High	High	Low	Very Low
High general influencers	11	10	3	1
Low general influencers	1	3	9	12

$\chi^2=23.12$, $p<.001$, when $df=1$.

Both influence and interaction scores are calculated from responses to interview items; however, the judgments necessitated by the two types of questions are quite different. The interaction scale called for a judgment applying only to the respondent when paired with each colleague in turn. The influence questions called for a judgment of each colleague's impact on the entire chamber. From these very different judgments comes the relationship between interaction scores and influence totals.

High legislative interactors (those falling above the median) tend to be high general influencers, and low legislative interactors tend to be low general influencers (Table IV). High legislative interactors also tend to be high specific area influencers and low legislative interactors tend to be low specific area influencers.[5] The distribution of Democrats and Republicans into high and low on these variables approximates the distribution in the chamber as a whole and can be ruled out as an explanatory factor.

In order to exert influence, senators must communicate either directly or indirectly with other senators. Those who are recognized as most influential interact at a higher rate than others; furthermore, the items of the scale indicate that the interaction is direct and face-to-face. Influence tends to be exerted or exercised through that type of interaction.

Index of Influence Transferability. The exercise of influence follows patterns partly determined by the nature of the tasks a group must perform. A task-diversified organization requires a number of skills, many of which the members of the organization can recognize. Over time skills build up priorities in relation to specific tasks. In a legislature the skills are not always easily identified, and their priorities in relation to policy-making follow no rigid standard. However, certain patterns are distinguishable through the use of attribution data. Sub-

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[4] The interaction scale is an adaptation from a scale presented by Theodore Caplow and Robert Forman, "Neighborhood Inter-action in a Homogeneous Community," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 40 (June, 1950), p. 358. An elaborate description of its reliability and usefulness can be found in a work by Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace, *The Urban Microcosm: Neighborhood Structure in a Changing Metropolis*, manuscript in preparation. Establishing the reliability of the neighborhood interaction scale, of course, only indirectly supports the use of a similar scale in a legislative situation. In the adaptation of the scale it was feared that the seasonal nature of legislative activity would raise the interaction ratings during the latter part of the interviewing period. Consequently, three weeks were allowed to elapse before beginning the interviews, in the hope that the social patterns would stabilize by that time. The evidence indicates that this was the case. The first ten interviews were compared with the last ten and no rise occurred in the average scale value for the ratings made by the latter ten. By necessity, no interviews were conducted during the last week of the session; however, for each group of ten interviews the party distribution and experienced-inexperienced distribution reasonably approximated the distributions in the entire Senate and for all those interviewed.

[5] $\chi^2=17.8$, $df=1$, $p<.001$.

TABLE V. MATRIX OF AN INDEX OF INFLUENCE TRANSFERABILITY

	Gen. Infl.	Tax.	Appr.	Bus.	Educ.	Agr.	Ben.	Lab.	Loc.	Area $\bar{x}$	Area Rank	Gen. Infl. Rank
Gen. Infl.	X	.7	.6	.7	.4	.3	.3	.3	.5			
Tax.	.7	X	.7	.6	.4	.4	.3	.2	.2	.40	1	1.5
Appr.	.6	.7	X	.4	.5	.4	.2	.3	.2	.39	2	3
Bus.	.7	.6	.4	X	.3	.2	.1	.4	.4	.34	3	1.5
Educ.	.4	.4	.5	.3	X	.2	.3	.2	.2	.30	4	5
Agr.	.3	.4	.4	.2	.2	X	.1	.2	.1	.23	7	7
Ben.	.3	.3	.2	.1	.3	.1	X	.1	.1	.19	8	7
Lab.	.3	.2	.3	.4	.2	.2	.1	X	.5	.27	5	7
Loc.	.5	.2	.2	.4	.2	.1	.1	.5	X	.26	6	4
											$r' = .84$*	

* Rank correlation coefficient computed from formula (10.19) appearing in Allen L. Edwards, *Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1960) p. 195.

stantive areas of policy can be identified. The top influencers in each area can be compared with the top influencers in every other area. Legislators with recognized skills in one area can influence other areas with varying degrees of difficulty. Certain types of influence, that is, are more transferable than others. For instance, influence in the area of taxation may be more transferable than influence in the area of agriculture.

The term "transferable" is employed in place of a lengthy explanation of assumptions concerning the reasons why legislators with influence in certain areas tend to have influence in certain other areas. The patterns along which influence is exercised are the major concern here. The immediate and central questions are: (1) from which substantive areas is a legislator most likely to transfer his influence to what other substantive areas; and (2) which areas appear to be characterized by high general influence? Rough answers to these questions can be calculated through a percentage matrix (Table V).

The top ten influencers from each influence category are compared with the top ten influencers of every other category.[6] In those substantive areas in which a greater percentage of top influencers overlap into other influence categories there is also a tendency to overlap more frequently into the general influence category. For example, of the ten members rated as having the highest influence in the area of taxation, seven fall into the top ten in the general influence category, an overlap which is as high as, or higher than, the overlap between general influence and any other substantive area. Correspondingly, members of the taxation influence area also fall more frequently into other substantive areas ($\bar{x} = .40$). The rank correlation coefficient of .84 demonstrates the more general nature of this tendency.

Several hypotheses can be drawn from the matrix analysis of the index of influence transferability, bearing in mind again that the matrix is composed from attribution data, while the discussion runs in terms of "influence." One underlying assumption concerning the matrix should be made clear. It is assumed that the substantive areas in the matrix do overlap, but that they nevertheless connote different meanings to respondents. No two substantive areas follow entirely consistent patterns when compared against other substantive areas and general influence, and no two substantive areas demonstrate a one-to-one correspondence when compared against each other. This assumption allows one to make tentative statements concerning the nature of influence transferability:

1. The higher the index of influence transferability between any two substantive areas, the easier it is for a legislator to transfer his influence from one area to the other area.
2. Conversely, the lower the index of influence transferability between any two substantive areas, the more difficult it is for a legislator to transfer his influence from one area to the other area.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of appropriations than to the area of labor.

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[6] Ties occurring at the lowest boundary of categories were broken randomly. For more precise purposes the index would not require equal groups of ten or any other number, but for the sake of clarity it is helpful to think of a .7 index value as an overlap of seven senators out of ten for two separate sets of data.

3. At any given level of influence transferability between two substantive areas, a legislator with high influence in the area more closely associated with general influence can more easily transfer his influence to the other area than a legislator with high influence in the area less closely associated with general influence.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of benevolent institutions than it is for a legislator with high influence in the area of benevolent institutions to transfer his influence to the area of taxation.

4. If two substantive areas A and B have the same index value in relation to area C, and if area A is more closely associated with general influence than area B, a legislator who is identified with area A will find it easier to transfer his influence to area C than will a legislator identified with area B.

Example: It is easier for a legislator with high influence in the area of taxation to transfer his influence to the area of labor than it is for a legislator with high influence in the area of agriculture, even though both taxation and agriculture demonstrate an index value of .2 in relation to the area of labor.

Certainly there are factors not fully taken into account when applying the index and stating the consequent hypotheses. For example, the index does not account for differences resulting from the influence rank of legislators within a given substantive area. Will a legislator with the highest rank in the area of taxation find it easier to transfer his influence to the area of education than the fifth ranking legislator in the area of taxation, assuming their ranks are equal in the area of education? Or if the answer is self-evident, then how much easier is it for him to transfer his influence to the area of education? The latter question opens up the old problem of how to measure the relative influence of individuals in a problem-solving situation, an answer for which this research will lay no claim to provide.

The index of influence transferability is further limited in the sense that it does not pinpoint the substantive and environmental complexities encountered in any specific piece of legislation, nor does it account for personality differences which might have an effect upon the influence structure.[7] Such limitations, however, do not prevent more general probability statements. Although the index may not apply to a specific legislator in regard to a specific piece of legislation, it is not so unreasonable to apply it to a group of legislators in regard to a large number of bills that fall more or less within a certain substantive area. Or it might be reasonable to advise a legislator to become recognized as competent in the areas of taxation and appropriations rather than in the areas of agriculture, benevolent institutions, or labor if he wishes to have the best chance of influencing all areas of legislation at some date in the future. Finally, the index lends itself to a more precise way of stating common sense judgments concerning the associations between substantive areas of legislative activity as they relate to the influence structure.

Styles of Influence. The previous analysis, as explained, rests upon attribution data acquired through interviews. The data so gathered can be supported and supplemented by specific legislative facts, and, in turn, the arrangement of specific legislative facts can be supported by the judgments of qualified interview respondents. In this section two sets of facts are analyzed, bill sponsorship and passage data, and formal or official position data. The data are arranged into two indices: (1) the index to bill success; and (2) the index to formal position success.

The index to bill success *for each legislator* is defined as:

$$\frac{(\text{Number of his sponsored bills passing chamber})^2}{\text{Number of bills he sponsored}}$$

The index is the ratio of bills passed to bills sponsored, the numerator squared because of a J-distribution of bill sponsorship among senators.

The index to formal position success for the *minority party* member is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{Committee assignment total}}{\text{Number of assigned committees}}$$

The committee assignment total is calculated by assigning group weights to a list of all committees ranked on the basis of the questionnaire previously mentioned, and then determining the committees to which each minority party member belongs. The same calculation is made for the majority party members, except that an allowance is made for those Senators with official chamber positions by totaling the *official position weight* of each (President Protem = 10; Conference Chairman = 5; Committee Chairman = 3; Ranking Majority Member = 1). Thus the index to formal position success for these *majority party* senators is defined as:

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[7] Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven, 1953). The authors emphasize the importance of personality in determining influence patterns.

$$\text{Official Position Weight} \times \frac{\text{Committee assignment total}}{\text{Number of assigned committees}}$$

Minority and majority party members are then ranked separately and distributed proportionally into four Senate quartiles.

Six classifications of legislators are relevant at this point. Legislators have been classified according to general influence, specific area influence, degree of interaction, the index to bill success, and the index to formal position success. The latter two are treated as indices to *styles* of influence. Some legislators exercise influence by actively and personally sponsoring legislation. Others seek and obtain strategic committee assignments and positions of authority, and exercise the sorts of influence that flow from these positions. Some legislators practice both styles effectively. To accommodate the third group, a sixth classification will be based upon a combination of the bill and formal position indices.[8]

Since the number of legislators involved in each classification is constant ($N = 50$), though small, it is practical to employ the phi coefficient ($r\phi$) to measure the observed degree of association between the various classifications.[9] Three relationships were considered earlier: (1) the significant relationship between general influence and specific area influence ($r\phi = .68$); (2) the significant relationship between general influence and degree of interaction ($r\phi = .68$); and (3) the significant relationship between specific area influence and degree of interaction ($r\phi = .60$). These strongly related variables can be given greater meaning when they are compared with the remaining classifications.

TABLE VI. DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN VARIABLES

	General Influence	Specific Area Influence	Interaction
Bill success	.20	.36	.44
Formal position success	.20	.44	.28
Bill and formal position success	.32	.64	.48

Phi Coefficients, $N = 50$

The index to bill success is significantly related to specific area influence and degree of interaction, but not significantly related to general influence (Table VI). Senators who sponsor a substantial number of bills which pass the chamber tend to be senators who are high interactors. In the Indiana Senate sponsors are generally responsible for their own bills.[10] That they should of necessity interact with other senators at a high rate in order to have high bill success seems quite reasonable; however, there are certainly off-setting factors such as the aid of lobbyists or the governor's support, either of which might diminish the need for interaction by the sponsor.

Senators who have high bill success also tend to have high specific area influence. Their influence is felt within vital substantive areas of legislation. However, they are not necessarily recognized as *generally* influential in the chamber. The bills they sponsor may be narrow in scope, falling predominantly into one area of legislation. To be recognized as generally influential may require activities in addition to those required by bill sponsorship.

The index to bill success does not relate significantly to the index to formal position success.[11] Senators who sponsor a relatively large number of bills which pass the chamber do not necessarily achieve formal positions of authority or serve on the most sought-after committees. One type of activity neither precludes nor necessitates the other; yet, like senators with high bill success, senators with high formal position success tend to be high specific area influencers, high interactors, but not necessarily recognized as high general influencers. High formal position success (as defined above) is not sufficient for high general influence.

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[8] This classification is based upon an accumulative quartile ranking. Let Q1 be the highest ranking and Q4 the lowest for both bill success and formal position success. A legislator's accumulative ranking can then range from the sum of 2 to the sum of 8. The line between high and low was drawn at that class boundary which most closely approaches the median (between the sums of 4 and 5).

[9] $r\phi = \sqrt{\chi^2/N}$ The phi coefficient has more meaning when it is considered in conjunction with chi-square (χ^2). When N is constant $r\phi$ varies directly with χ^2; therefore, certain values of $r\phi$ reflect significant values of χ^2. When $N = 50$, the probability of a distribution occurring by chance less than five times out of a hundred reflects a phi coefficient of at least .277. Thus when $p < .05$, $r\phi > .277$; when $p < .02$, $r\phi > .329$; when $p < .01$, $r\phi > .365$; when $p < .001$, $r\phi > .466$.

[10] In the Indiana Senate no bill may have more than two named sponsors. The sponsors generally explain their own bills on the floor and quite often in committee.

[11] $\chi^2 = 2.00$, $df = 1$, $p > .05$.

Senators who have high bill and formal position success tend to be high interactors, high specific area influencers, and high general influencers. When the bill and formal position indices are combined the phi values rise in each case (Table VI). Bill and formal position success is most closely related to specific area influence ($r\phi = .64$). Senators who serve on the most preferred committees, who hold such positions as committee chairman, and who sponsor a large number of bills which pass the chamber, are mentioned frequently as the most influential within substantive areas of legislation. Senators who practice both styles of influence effectively also tend to be recognized as generally influential ($r\phi = .32$).

IV. ANALYSIS OF EXCEPTIONS

The brief analysis below attempts to explain exceptions to observed relationships, through the use of variables and relationships already considered, and with a minimum of recourse to other related variables.

In Table IV eight legislators did not fit the predominant pattern. Four were high general influencers but low interactors, and four were low general influencers and high interactors. Of the former, three were serving in at least their seventh session of the legislature and were members of the middle age group (born between 1900 and 1919) for members serving in the 1961 Senate. Experienced senators tend to be high general influencers, as previously noted. Senators born between 1900 and 1919 also tend to be high general influencers (Table VII). But why do a few highly experienced senators approaching the age norm of the chamber have a tendency to interact at a low rate?

Perhaps they have learned to communicate efficiently in order to fulfill their policy desires, or possibly the mere fact that they do approach the age norm has an effect which reduces the need for high interaction. It should be stressed, however, that the interaction questionnaire was designed to test interaction for only the 1961 session. Past interaction in previous sessions may very well carry over into the influence structure of the session under study, yet this past interaction would not necessarily register for certain items on the questionnaire. Finally, there is the possibility that the senators had outside sources of influence which minimized the need for high interaction with other senators. All but the last of these suggestions prove too much: they are as applicable to the normal as to the deviant cases.

TABLE VII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND GENERAL INFLUENCE

Date of Birth	High General Influencers	Low General Influencers
1900–1919	17	9
Before 1900 or After 1919	8	16

$\chi^2 = 5.12$, $p < .05$.

The fourth senator who was characterized as having high general influence and low interaction was a freshman senator who interacted at a higher rate, at least, than any other freshman senator—a borderline case.

Of the four senators who were characterized as having low general influence but high interaction rates, one fell into the oldest age group and was serving in his sixth session, one was a female legislator, and the remaining two were in their second and third sessions of service. The latter two were rated high in specific area influence and would conform to the previous hypothesis on the emergence of influence if they should become recognized as general influencers in future sessions of the legislature. The other two evidently were content to talk without action.

The exceptions to the direct relationship between specific area influence and degree of interaction can to a large extent be accounted for by the same reasoning, partly because many of the same legislators are involved. Four of the ten exceptions to this second relationship appear to be of a different character; however, all four were in either their second or third session of service which appears to be a transitional phase of interaction and influence in the Indiana Senate.

There are eight exceptions to the direct relationship between general influence and specific area influence. All but one were in their first, second, or third session of service, and six of them were in their second or third session. These exceptions did not support the hypothesis that specific area influence precedes general influence, nor did they support the contrary. On the other hand, the evidence did suggest that those classified as high specific area influencers but low general influencers were named significantly more frequently in one single substantive area than were those classified as low specific area influencers but high general influencers.

CIVIL SERVICE AND MANAGING WORK: SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

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Nature seldom allows us to get what we wish without paying her price. This truism is commonly illustrated by the delicate balance in animal life which often cannot be disturbed to satisfy man's wants (*e.g.*, for fox hunting) without demanding of man in return (*e.g.*, by increases in the rabbit population and in crop damage).

The several civil service systems in this country also illustrate this bittersweet combination of intended and unintended consequences. The argument here will not go to the extreme of one observer, in whose judgment the United States Civil Service Commission was the single greatest obstacle to the successful waging of World War II.[1] Rather, the focus here will be upon several characteristics of our civil service systems that have as presumably unintended consequences an increase in the burdens of managing work. For the most part, the analysis of management problems will derive from the research literature dealing with behavior in organizations, a field of study presently seething with activity.

I. THE GOAL-MATRIX OF OUR CIVIL SERVICE MOVEMENT

The nature of these unintended consequences is suggested by the matrix of goals, or purposes, underlying our civil service movement. The primary goal, of course, was the separation of the management of public work from party patronage. Within this overriding goal, Sayre has noted three early subsidiary purposes of our public personnel systems:[2]

1. the guarantee of equal treatment of all employees and all applicants for employment;
2. the application of the logic (or theory) and methods of "scientific management"; and
3. the development of a public career service.

These goals define the field of my present effort. Detailed analysis later will demonstrate the significance for the management of work of the unintended consequences which derive from the ways adopted to achieve these purposes. I take this opportunity to suggest the general nature of these consequences.

Consider first the general tethers on the management of work implicit in the historical pursuit of the three purposes listed. The guarantee of equal treatment, to begin with, has never quite made peace with the managerially convenient notion that unequal contributions demand unequal reward. To take a recent and characteristic example, the teachers' union in Illinois has lately expressed violent opposition to a proposal for merit pay increases based upon performance. This opposition goes deeper than the convenience of seniority or of hours of graduate study as objective criteria for pay increases and far deeper than the blatant protectionism of hacks. However lofty the motives, their effect is clear. In practice, the struggle toward the "equal treatment" goal virtually forced public personnel systems into a monumental preoccupation with technique and mechanics. As Sayre concluded:[3]

> Its main effect has been to move personnel administration, in the words of Gordon Clapp, "into the cold objective atmosphere of tests, scores, weighted indices, and split-digit rankings" so completely that "these technical trappings have become symbols of the merit system."

The management of work pays a stiff price for such technical elegance. Work is notoriously insensitive to such easy capture, and the most subtly contrived managerial rewards and punishments might be frustrated by an awkward distribution of test scores. Moreover, these technical trappings put powerful weapons into the hands of "staff" people. That more than one "line" manager has been stymied by one of these "split-digit rankings" without accepting the results as divinely ordained, moreover, does nothing to lessen the often intense jurisdictional tugs-of-war encouraged by the traditional "line-staff" distinction. These tensions are apt to be increased by the time lag inherent in centralized administrative systems, and public personnel systems are usually operated centrally.

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[1] John Fisher, "Let's Go Back to the Spoils System," reproduced in part in Dwight Waldo, ed., *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration* (New York, 1953), pp. 200–1.

[2] Wallace Sayre, "The Triumph of Technique Over Purpose," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 8 (Spring, 1948), pp. 134–35.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

The logic and methods of "scientific management," second, tended to condemn managers to a treadmill even as it aided them. Scientific management was imported from the "practical" world of business where its impact was enormous.[4] But the impact was not one-way. Thus there is no denying the useful revolution in viewing work that the methods of scientific management sparked. However, as recent research particularly demonstrates,[5] the assumptions in the logic (or theory) of scientific management concerning man and his work were mechanistic caricatures. Consequently, the manager tended to be less effective in direct relation to the degree that he patterned his behavior on the logic of the approach. That is, the reasonable methods of scientific management often were guided by an inadequate theory. Consequently, the usefulness of engineering a task with the methods of scientific management must be differentiated sharply from the usefulness of organizing a task's component sequential steps in terms of the theory of scientific management.[6]

The establishment of a public career service, third, also tended to have unintended and unfavorable consequences which counterbalanced the favorable and intended consequences. As Sayre put it,[7]

> Stated in its most positive terms, this objective represents an effort to provide the conditions of work which will attract and hold a public service of optimum talents. In its negative aspects, the goal has been translated into an elaborate system of protectionism. In the area of methodology the negative connotations have slowly but surely won the dominant position. . . .

Such protectionism, of course, often would bind the manager severely even as it safeguarded him (and his subordinates) from arbitrary removal.

In sum, then, striving toward the purposes of the civil service movement had its general costs. Three more specific sets of restrictions that burden the management of work in our civil service systems will concern us presently.

These costs of our civil service systems, however, must be kept in perspective. Today we can profit from hindsight and a sophisticated research literature. The efforts to achieve the separation of the civil service from patronage, in contrast, came before enough was known about the conceptual and operational problems of the description of organization, personality, or "position" to preclude an uncomplicated Tinker Toy approach to all three of these elements of personnel administration. That is, simple assumptions took the place of an understanding of empirical phenomena which were at least more complex and often essentially different from the assumptions.

Consequently, the early approach to public personnel administration is understandable, if inadequate. The compulsions of life could not wait on the scientific explanation of the universe. However, necessity should not be suffered to be a virtue, lest the original simplistic assumptions become too deeply buried under a specialized literature. Students of public personnel administration, fortunately, have done considerable self-critical work of late. The determined, if preliminary, efforts since World War II to outgrow its early biases are a leading feature of the reorientation currently underway in public administration.[8]

II. SUPERVISORY POWER AND CIVIL SERVICE

Perhaps the most rewarding clue to supervisory effectiveness in recent research exploits the "power" concept. "Power" refers, in general, to the ability to control the job environment. Getting recommendations for promotion accepted, for example, indicates that a supervisor has relatively high power. "Power" thus conceptually complements "authority," which refers to the degree to which the formal organization legitimates a supervisor's control of the job environment. Typically, all supervisors at the same level monitoring similar operations have similar authority; and typically, these supervisors will differ in their power.

Power seems to be related to effective supervisory performance, whether it is exercised upwards, as influence with superiors, or downwards, as control of the specific job site. Pelz, for example, studied some fifty measures of supervisory practices and attitudes without finding any marked correlations with employee morale and attitudes. When the influence of a supervisor with his superior was specified, however, rather sharp differences were observed. High supervisory power was associated with effective performance.[9] Consequently, as Likert concluded, a supervisor must be an effective subordinate as well as an effective superior.[10] Otherwise, reasonably, a supervisor cannot be expected to influence his subordinates consistently.

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[4] Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York, 1948), pp. 47–64.

[5] See my *Behavior and Organization* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), esp. chs. 1–4.

[6] See my "Organizing Work: Techniques and Theories," *Advanced Management—Office Executive*, Vol. 1 (June, 1962), pp. 26–31.

[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 134–35.

[8] The outlines of this reorientation are drawn sharply in O. Glenn Stahl, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York, 1956), pp. 577–82.

Similarly, power expressed as control of the job site is associated with effective performance. Likert provides much supporting data. A comparison between the top third and the bottom third of departments (ranked in terms of productivity) is particularly relevant here Personnel in the "top" departments, in contrast with the "bottom" departments, uniformly attributed greater influence over "what goes on in your department" to these four sources: higher management; plant management; department manager; and the workers themselves. Moreover, the "top" departments also desired that greater influence be exercised by all four sources than did the "bottom" departments. Significantly, the greatest differences between the "top" and "bottom" departments are in the power attributed to department managers (their primary supervisors) and in the power the men desired that department managers exercise.[11] These are reasonable results. A low-power supervisor has little leverage for motivating his men *via* his control over the job site. That is, the men have little reason to take him seriously.

If the reasons for the importance of supervisory power to effective performance seem clear enough, our civil service systems do little to ease the burdens of managing work *via* increases in supervisory power. This is particularly lamentable because much evidence suggests that the "power" variable may be influenced substantially by the design of the job, by the organization structure (of which more later), and by training. The supervisor's personality, in short, does not appear to be the crucial (or major) factor in determining power.

Although only empirical research can establish the point definitely, there seems ample evidence of this failure of civil service systems to respond to the need to facilitate the management of work by increasing supervisory power. On the broadest level, the first and third primary goals of the civil service movement certainly do not encourage supervisory power; and (as will be demonstrated) the application of the logic and methods of scientific management has the same effect.

To become more specific, these limitations on supervisory power have many practical impacts. For example, first-line supervisors seem to have less control over hiring and firing than their counterparts in business. The difficulty in business organizations of firing or reductions-in-force need not be underplayed, but the elaborate review procedures and the novel "bumping" arrangements[12] often found in our civil service systems probably admit of less flexibility in public agencies even on the part of officials at relatively high organizational levels. Raw turnover ratios seem to support this position.[13] Similarly, the emphasis upon seniority in promotions and pay increases in the public service plus the failures of supervisory rating of employee performance[14]—both common in our civil service systems—suggest that the environment in public agencies has not been conducive to the general heightening of supervisory power.

Some counterforces are at work, although they do not promise imminent change in the present condition of limited encouragement of supervisory power. Thus the federal program for rewarding superior performance permits a modest increase in supervisory power. Even in this case, however, apparently many agencies have preferred to ride very close herd over the recommendations of lower-level supervisors or (in at least one case of which I have personal knowledge) to neglect the immediate supervisor altogether. Thus this program not only died aborning as an opportunity to increase supervisory power, but its administration may even further reduce that power.

All this, be it noted, is not by way of an argument for arbitrary managerial or supervisory action. Just such abuses, of course, supplied motivation for the restraints emphasized above. The stress here, rather, is upon ways of reinforcing formal authority so as to permit greater effectiveness consistent with the policies of an agency. Just as in the case of any delegation, that is, attempts to increase supervisory power imply training and the development of suitable overhead controls. Moreover, "power" in the relevant research does not imply heavy-handed coercive techniques, which most subjects interpret as lack of control of the environment. Evidence such as that reviewed below in the context surrounding footnotes 48–51 supports this point.

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[9] Donald C. Pelz, "Interaction and Attitudes Between Scientists and Auxiliary Staff," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 4 (December, 1959), pp. 321–36, and Vol. 4 (March, 1960), pp. 410–25.

[10] Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York, 1961), p. 114.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–57.

[12] James E. Drury, *The Displaced Career Executive Program* (Inter-University Case Program, University of Alabama Press, 1952).

[13] Stahl, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

[14] Felix Nigro, *Public Personnel Administration* (New York, 1959), p. 295.

The task of inducing high supervisory power, then, is more delicate than a mere reversal of gears toward the "spoils system" or advocacy of an administrative law of the jungle.

III. JOB DESIGN AND CIVIL SERVICE

Similarly, our civil service systems tend to limit the potential for increasing managerial effectiveness implicit in job design. The second primary goal noted above is the chief culprit, with strong support from the goal of "equal treatment." Their interaction in increasing managerial burdens can be illustrated in two ways, by considering specific job content, and by considering the place of the job in the broad organization structure.

In its doctrine about simplifying job content, particularly, the logic of scientific management makes difficulties for managing work effectively. As in industry, at low organization levels, the process of routinization often has been carried too far in the public service. The effects of "job enlargement" on employee performance, at least in business concerns,[15] suggest the contribution to effective management that may be gained by adding content to a worker's responsibilities. This may be accomplished by increasing the scope of jobs or by rotating individuals through several jobs.[16] The crucial factor does not seem to be the number of task-elements given to an individual or the complexity of these elements. Patently, a job could become too complex. Rather, the significant point seems to be that various techniques of job enlargement, when they work, work because they increase the worker's control over his job environment.[17] Hence the success of plans for increasing the employee's control over factors which are not in his flow of work, such as that often called "bottom-up management."[18]

The effects of "job enlargement" may be explained in terms of the earlier analysis. In Likert's study, as already noted, employees in high-producing units felt that they themselves exercised and desired more power over their work than did individuals in low-producing units. This is consistent with the favorable effects on output commonly reported in the "job enlargement" literature, while it suggests an apparent paradox. Note that Hi-Pro units ranked themselves *and* three levels of supervisors as higher on "power" than did Lo-Pro units. This might seem curious, but only if one assumes that there is only so much "power" to be had, so that what superiors gain subordinates must lose. The fact seems to be, on the contrary, that a high-power supervisor can afford to (and usually does) allow his subordinates to exercise greater power also.[19] A low-power supervisor is in such an insecure position that he can seldom bring himself to be so generous. The real paradox, then, is that the apparently most straightforward way of adding to one's power is often the most direct way of reducing it. The common mechanical conceptions of organized activity implicit in scientific management discourage such thinking.

The often marked consequences of job enlargement may be illustrated briefly. Machine operations in an industrial concern, for example, had been plagued by an array of difficulties: productivity and quality were falling; and tension between operators and inspectors was growing. The crucial factor was that the tool in this particular operation, when dulled to a certain point, would suddenly begin producing pieces which did not meet specifications. Inspectors were not always able to spot such sudden deteriorations in the product quickly, and operators (inspection not being *their* job) did not always cease work even when the quality was obviously unacceptable. Inspection reports helped little when they did come, the operators marking them down as "ancient history." The solution was easy. Simple gauges were given to operators to make periodic checks on their production, and the operators were allowed to decide when it was necessary to re-sharpen their cutting tools. The consequences: runs of defective products became shorter and less frequent; the nagging tension between inspectors and operators was reduced; and output zoomed.

Examples need not be confined to industrial operations. In a paperwork operation, similarly, a rather simple change increased output by 30

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[15] Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York, 1957), pp. 177–87, summarizes many relevant studies.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[18] William Givin, *Bottom-Up Management* (New York, 1949).

[19] The point has been amply demonstrated in experimental situations. See James G. March, "Influence Measurement in Experimental and Semi-Experimental Groups," *Sociometry*, Vol. 19 (March, 1956), pp. 26–71.



FIGURE 1A. Functional (Process) Organization with Narrow Span of Control.

percent and reduced employee turnover by 70 percent.[20]

Although the design of the job could be an important means of reducing the problems of managing work, however, our civil service systems do not encourage the exploitation of such techniques as job enlargement. Consider only one feature which has an inhibiting effect, the very detailed job descriptions common in the public service. That these are an important part of the mechanisms for guaranteeing equal treatment of employees and for developing a career service does little to encourage flexibility in job design. Employee unions and the civil service commission staff can make much of these job descriptions, even in cases in which employees solidly favor changes of a job-enlargement sort. The difficulty is not necessarily avoided by job descriptions which conclude: "or other duties the supervisor may designate." Custom, employee unions, and an overprotective civil service commission can void such open-end descriptions.

Perhaps, however, this leans too heavily on personal (and limited) experience. Some administrators no doubt pay little attention to detailed job descriptions, except for such purposes as convincing the civil service commission that an individual deserves a multi-step promotion. And it may be argued that the significant point is not whether detailed job descriptions exist, but whether strong employee unions exist. Even in such cases, however, the detailed job description is part of the institutional framework within which management and union must function.

In determining the place of the job in the broad organizational pattern, our civil service systems also increase the problems of managing work. Consider two characteristics which tend to dominate patterns of organization in the public service, a limited span of control and organization by function or (at lower levels) by process. These characteristics largely derive from the impact of scientific management upon public personnel administration. Analysis of these two characteristics is particularly useful because it demonstrates, among other features, their tendency to reduce supervisory power.

The analysis of these two characteristics is facilitated by some simplified graphics.[21] Figure 1A presents the orthodox organization of functions (or processes) A, B, C—which may be taken to be any components whose integration is required to perform some administrative task—under the condition of a limited span of control. Figure 1B presents the more unorthodox organization by product (or discrete sub-assembly), which permits a far broader span of control.

The functional model, with modest reservations, can be considered *the* pattern for government organizing. This does not do full justice to the diversity of actual organizational arrangements, admittedly. Various factors—size, pressure of work, geography, and the like—have encouraged significant deviations from the functional model. Thus the Justice Department long ago surrendered the fancy of having every government lawyer in the department. The functional model, however, is commonly encountered in practice and it is certainly the most commonly prescribed model in the literature, as in the Hoover Commission's *Report*

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[20] Peter F. Drucker, *The Practice of Management* (New York, 1954), pp. 291–92.

[21] The parent of this analysis may be found in James C. Worthy, *Big Business and Free Men* (New York, 1959), pp. 90–99.



FIGURE 1B. Product (Discrete Sub-Assembly) Organization with Broad Span of Control.

on the General Management of the Executive Branch.

The following contrast of the functional model with the product model, then, requires that two points be kept in mind. First, the functional model does not guide all public organizing, but it is nonetheless influential. Second, the product model will not always be a feasible alternative, although it often will be. The contrast, that is, has much to recommend it, although hardly everything. Thus, although the analysis may have an either-or flavor, many other factors would serve to soften the contrast in practice and would guide the choice in specific cases of the functional model, the product model, or combinations of the two.

These simple variations in the organization of jobs in larger structures can have profound consequences for the management of work. In general, the type of structure common in most public agencies (see Figure 1A) incurs substantial costs avoided by the less familiar structure in Figure 1B. These costs derive from three features associated with these two patterns of structure: job enlargement; the size of the "managerial entity"; and supervisory power.

First, to point up the obvious, Figure 1B is based upon job enlargement at all levels. Each employee at the work-level in Figure 1B performs all three components of the task, and each supervisor's responsibilities encompass all three. Figure 1A's emphasis upon routinization limits the scope, and perhaps thereby the effectiveness of the management of work. Of course, there are some limits on the functions or processes (A, B, C, . . .) that may be strung together. In general, however, the limits seem to be very broad indeed.[22]

Second, the "managerial entity" is vastly larger in Figure 1A than in Figure 1B. The size of the managerial entity can have profound consequences. It may appear, for instance, that the structure in Figure 1B puts too much strain on the capacities of management, because of the apparently greater demands it imposes upon the supervisors. In reality, however, structures such as that in Figure 1A often imply greater (and different) demands upon management talent. Figure 1B structures reduce in significant ways the management burden carried by M_{ABC} and the supervisors as well. The difficulties faced by M_{ABC} in structures like that in Figure 1A cause considerable problems for supervisors, for example, by tending to reduce their supervisory power. Many of the problems associated with sizeable organizations, more generally, derive not from the aggregate size of the organization, but from the size of its component managerial entities. Thus the manager in our hypothetical organization in Figure 1A directs the work of 99 employees and encounters the difficulties to be enumerated below; the manager in Figure 1B oversees the work of 195 employees, yet significant problems facing the management of work are reduced.

The "managerial entity" concept warrants further analysis. Worthy defines it in these terms:[23]

> The administrative unit can be no smaller than that portion of the organization falling within the jurisdiction of an individual who controls enough elements of the total process to make effective decisions regarding the total process.

A high-level managerial entity might be organized around some total product, for example, water resource development in the Kings River Valley. The processing by each of several competing teams of all categories of mail received by the Government Printing Office, with each team handling all correspondence from writers whose names begin with designated letters of the alphabet, illustrates the kind of discrete sub-assembly around which a low-level managerial entity might be organized.

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[22] The point is supported by the example in Drucker, *op. cit.*, p. 291. See also Argyris, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–87.

[23] Worthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–93.

At whatever level of organization, then, a "managerial entity" contains that parcel of process-components necessary for the performance of some discrete task. The areas enclosed by the heavy dotted lines in the two figures above symbolize "managerial entities." Interpretively, any S_{ABC} in Figure 1B can "get all the way around" our hypothetical administrative task. In Figure 1A, in contrast, only M_{ABC} can do this job. M_{ABC} in Figure 1A has a managerial entity which contains 100 individuals; that of S_{ABC} contains only 15.

Many of the problems in sizeable organizations derive from the failure to restrict the size of the organization's managerial entities. Haire's analogy seems apt in this connection. He suggested the mushrooming problems caused by the growth in the size of organizations *via* the "square-cube law" applied to the story of Jack and the Beanstalk:[24]

> . . . Jack had nothing to fear from the Giant. If he were, as he is pictured, ten times as large as a man and proportioned like one, Jack was perfectly safe. The Giant's mass would be 10^3 or a thousand times a man's, because he was ten times as big in every dimension. However, the cross section of his leg bones would have increased in only two dimensions, and they would be 10^2 or a hundred times as big as a man's. A human bone simply will not support ten times its normal load, and the Giant, in walking, would break his legs and be helpless.

In a similar way, arithmetic increases in the size of the managerial entity seem to generate exponential increases in the problems of the management of work. Meeting these increases in size within the framework of the type of organization structure in Figure 1A does nothing to reduce these difficulties.

This general position can be elaborated. The size of the managerial entity, in sum, is likely to affect such significant features of administration as: the time lag between the perception of a problem and action on it, which influences supervisory power; the style of supervision; the measurement and the motivation of performance; and the training of subordinates.

Patently, first, decisions will tend to be pushed upward in an organization such as that in Figure 1A; for only M_{ABC} oversees all of the components which require integration. As a result, delegation to supervisors is all but restricted to routine matters, that is, those which involve the single component supervised by any supervisor and only that component.

The separation of decision-making from the action level often has significant costs. Overloading upper levels may make time-pressure a very serious factor, the more so if the stakes are high. A shutdown in any of the sections in Figure 1A might cause output to drop as low as zero. The manager, then, is under great pressure to assure that A, B, and C are integrated, and he is likely to exert that pressure downward. This does not encourage upward communication, in turn, which is difficult enough in the "tall" organization described in Figure 1A. (Notice that Figure 1B, with 69 per cent more people, has one less organization level than Figure 1A.) The efforts of the manager to fight the daily battle of integration of the components of his operation and to get the information required for his job, finally, will tend to undercut any efforts by the supervisors to gain high power. The common development of large "staff" units complements this tendency.

In contrast, decisions in Figure 1B organizations would strongly tend to be forced down to the action level, and certainly at least to the level of S_{ABC}. Indeed, M_{ABC} may have no other reasonable alternative, given his broad span of control. Upward communication and supervisory power often will be affected favorably. M_{ABC}, consequently, should be freed from the unremitting pressure of integration implicit in a Figure 1A structure. Downtime at any work station, for example, will not cause difficulty throughout the managerial entity. Output would fall at most by 1/N. The manager therefore could devote himself to motivating superior performance, to training and counseling, and the like, rather than attempting to eliminate the possibility of error.

These comments on decision-making, second, suggest that the two types of structures encourage different styles of supervision. The structure in Figure 1A encourages "close supervision," *i.e.*, detailed instructions, persistent attempts to direct and observe performance, and the like. The limited span of control, of course, permits this, and the pressure for the integration of the task components may force it. The structure in Figure 1B encourages "general supervision," *i.e.*, monitoring performance in terms of results with considerable freedom for the employee so long as he is performing up to standard. Close supervision of janitors, for example, would require such directions as: "You will sweep from left to right, forty strokes per minute," and correspondingly close checks on performance. General supervision, in contrast, would assume competence and give such instructions as: "Sweep the floors in such time that you are able to get your other work done and so that the floor will reflect x units of light from a refractometer." The refractometer provides the check on performance. Acknowledgedly, this goes a little far. All of the components of general supervision are there, however, especially the measure of performance.

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[24] Mason Haire, ed., *Modern Organization Theory* (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp. 273–74.

Structures of the type in Figure 1A pay a heavy cost to the degree that they in fact do encourage close supervision. In one study, for example, less than 30 percent of the work teams whose first- or second-level supervisors practiced close supervision had high output. Nearly 70 percent of the work units receiving only general supervision had high output.[25]

The reader may suppose, third, that the manager and supervisors in a Figure 1B organization would face an impossible task in motivating and measuring performance. For general supervision must be based upon performance standards, and what will keep standards high if the supervisor "gets off their backs?" But the several units headed by an S_{ABC}, each performing the same task, obviously set the stage for a relative measure of performance. They are in competition with each other, which tends to keep performance high. This would complement the added contributions to be expected because of the job enlargement practiced in 1B-type structures. At the same time, reduced "line-staff" conflict seems implied by this potential for motivation and measurement, 'staff" development being in large part due to top-level management's difficulties in motivating and, especially, measuring performance.

Figure 1A organizations do not offer the same possibilities. One might try to encourage competition within, for example, some S_A unit, or between the S_A units and the S_B units. But competition of that sort, as experimental studies suggest, is not likely to aid performance on most tasks,[26] since the tasks themselves are not comparable, and may indeed be incommensurable. The point may be driven home by considering this proposition: Assembling all As (or Bs or Cs) in organizationally separate units encourages the restriction of output and invites substantial jurisdictional conflict when the responsibility for an error must be assigned. Much evidence supports this proposition.[27] Responsibility is far more difficult to assign in a 1A-type structure, for at least three inspections would be required to permit accurate assignment of praise or blame, one after each of the component operations. Figure 1B organizations would require only one such inspection. Such considerations, and there are many others, attest to the difficulties of motivating and measuring performance in Figure 1A organizations.

These features of Figure 1B organizations suggest a way out of the objection that public agencies are not guided by "profit" and that therefore performance measurement is difficult. In Figure 1A organizations, in business, the measurement of macroscopic profit does little to determine the often crucial measurement of the effectiveness of constituent units. Hence many business enterprises have approached the type of organization sketched in Figure 1B by establishing "individual profit centers" within (for example) a plant. Their services are then "sold" internally, sometimes with the useful provision that outside purchase is possible if price or quality are not considered appropriate by the "buyer."[28] This encourages self-discipline of both "buyer" and "seller." Comptroller W. J. McNeil worked for years to instal arrangements of this sort in the Department of Defense, for the provision of common procurement of goods and services, as a means of economy and of strengthening the Secretary's hand.

In any case, fourth, Figure 1B organizations seem to have a definite advantage in the training of subordinates. Patently, S_{ABC} faces training challenges not available to S_A (or S_B or S_C) in the normal course of events. Reasonably, then, organization structures such as that in Figure 1B should tend toward the early elimination of those without management ability, while it would attract the more able. Reasonably, also, high satisfaction and output should characterize Figure 1B organizations. These expectations, indeed, are supported by some research in the Sears, Roebuck chain[29] and elsewhere.[30]

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[25] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, 1953), esp. pp. 617–19.

[26] Robert T. Golembiewski, *The Small Group: An Analysis of Research Concepts and Operations* (University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 202–4.

[27] Eliot D. Chapple and Leonard R. Sayles, *The Measure of Management* (New York, 1961), pp. 18–45.

[28] W. H. Mylander, "Management by Executive Committee," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 33 (May, 1950), pp. 51–58.

[29] See William F. Whyte, *Man and Organization* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1959), pp. 11–16.

[30] Ernest Dale, "Centralization versus De-

Despite these (and other) advantages of 1B structures, our public personnel systems do not provide a congenial home for them. The dominant emphasis in these systems—and it is no doubt often a necessary emphasis—is negative rather than positive. As one observer with high-level experience in both government and industry noted:[31]

> . . . no matter how well briefed on federal service peculiarities the private business executive may be, one of the first things he notices in public administration is this emphasis on procedure and routine. This emphasis is admittedly necessary and desirable provided it does not make method an end in itself. When it does, over-organized bewilderment results. The newcomer to top management positions in the federal service frequently feels that the organization and methods set up with the laudable idea of keeping him from doing wrong actually result in making it excessively difficult to do right.

This emphasis, despite its legitimacy, seems to have been overdone at all levels. Overdone or not, it is something to know what it costs to preserve the emphasis in Figure 1A structures.

Generations of organization theorists have labored hard to preserve the fiction of the unity of command in our public affairs, this being the very slender thread by which we demonstrate that the electorate really does control the administration through its election of the president. One may judge the impact of this theory upon supervisory practices from the longevity of the logically consistent but unrealistic notion that "politics" and "administration" are somehow separate. This notion, of course, is the keystone of our civil service systems. Their failure to respect the realities of delegation hardly augurs for better treatment of this matter at lower organization levels. Comfortable as the fiction of unity of command may be to many, multi-line relations exist. We may chose to neglect this datum for various reasons, as the Hoover Commission did in arguing for a structure such as that in Figure 1A.[32] But this neglect may prove embarrassing,[33] and it is very likely that our theoretical simplicism has a high cost. Gaus long ago put the argument for a multi-line view in these convincing terms:[34]

> Such a theory . . . is the only one which fits the facts of contemporary delegation of wide discretionary power by electorates, constitutions, and legislatures to the administrators [who] must, of necessity, determine some part of the purpose and a large part of the means whereby it will be achieved in the modern state.

Finally, the accepted pattern of organization in public agencies (as well as in business concerns) is functional. This reflects the historic strength of the model sketched in Figure 1A and suggests the barriers which will restrain attempts to approach the Figure 1B model in organizing.

IV. JOB DESCRIPTION AND CIVIL SERVICE

It says worlds, while it avoids an enormous complexity, to note that our civil service systems typically are based upon a duties classification, as opposed to a rank classification. Public personnel specialists have gone in for a duties classification with a sometimes uncritical zeal. As Nigro explains:[35]

> In a duties classification, the beginning point is a detailed analysis of the tasks required in the individual position. In fact, the tendency in the United States has been to make fairly minute investigations of job content.

The emphasis need not be exaggerated, for the specialists have providently refrained from stressing the content of all jobs. The handling of secretarial positions—whose importance is usually measured by secretaries and bosses in terms of what the boss does rather than what the secretary does—is perhaps the most striking illustration of what has been called the "realistic" approach to classification.[36] But the bias of job description in this country has not moved very far from the classic expression it was given, for example, in the 1932 classification plan for Philadelphia. Nigro called this "one of the best books of specifications on record." It listed twenty individual classes of clerks, for each of which specifications had been developed. Specifications also were stated for thirty additional classes of principal and chief clerks in the various city departments.[37]

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centralization," *Advanced Management*, Vol. 21 (June, 1956), p. 15.

[31] Marver Bernstein, *The Job of the Federal Executive* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 34–35.

[32] Hoover Commission, *Report on the General Management of the Executive Branch* (Washington, D. C., 1949), pp. 1, 3–4.

[33] As, *e.g.*, in *Morgan vs. United States*, 298 U. S. 468, where the Secretary of Agriculture was rebuked for deciding a case he had not heard in person.

[34] In Gaus, Leonard D. White, and Marshall E. Dimock, *The Frontiers of Public Administration* (University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 91.

[35] Nigro, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[36] Julius E. Eitington, "Injecting Realism into Classification," *Public Personnel Administration*, Vol. 15 (March, 1952), pp. 31–35.

[37] Nigro, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–99.

The inspirations for this emphasis on job description in our public personnel systems seem clear enough. The logic and methods of scientific management—which encouraged the view of organization as a "delicate mechanism" of gear-like "positions" whose driveshaft was the line of command—clearly had their influence. Moreover, position classification provides the bases for equal treatment, general formal policies and procedures regarding recruitment, salary, promotions, and the like. Finally, position classification encourages the attempt to group similar jobs into a reasonable number of classes, sub-classes, and so on. This provided a ladder-like framework upon which a permanent career service could be built.

Despite its contribution to achieving the goals of our civil service movement, the American approach to job description has its unintended costs. Some obvious costs will be considered immediately; subsequent analysis will consider one less obvious set of costs in some detail.

Since one product of position classification was to be a manageable number of classes, first, this required a procrustean neglect of distinguishing job characteristics. The position approach, second, became the victim of its own imprecise terms. Consider the common observation that the "position" is the "universal building block of all organizations."[38] The observation has a certain validity, since all organizations contain positions. It tended to mislead the unwary, however, into supposing that "organization" is only a set of positions. The temptation to think of organization as some massive mechanical structure of positions linked by lines of authority was strong, since it apparently served to simplify the problems of personnel work.

The emphasis upon a duties classification, third, implies a substantial rigidity. Consider the difficulties of dealing with the many positions which have a kind of life cycle, with stages that impose varying demands on the incumbent. Developing an administrative role may be a very delicate task, while playing the role thereafter may be child's play. This phenomenon is difficult to accommodate within the framework of most of our public personnel systems. Some adaptations may be made quickly enough. But often it is necessary to waste a "big" man on a job too small for him or to give a "small" man a job too big for him. Similarly, the emphasis upon a duties classification makes it difficult to utilize positions for training purposes without the stretching of a point or two by the position analyst. The traditional question—What does the incumbent do?—is not appropriate for such positions, for he may, in fact, contribute little toward immediate task performance.

The abortive struggles toward a Senior Civil Service, and then a Career Executive Program, for the federal government, reflect the tenacity of the grip of these two types of inflexibilities.[39] For it was intended that the highly mobile and select corps of administrators in such programs would be used in both of the ways alluded to above, that is, as experienced "firefighters" and as trainees getting the "big picture." The rank-in-job bias in our civil service systems played not a little part in the lack of action.

Fourth and finally, the approach *via* a duties classification taken in this country is not the only available one. Indeed, in public administration, it appears that only Canada and Brazil follow our example closely. Many personnel systems—public and business—emphasize broad and general classes rather than narrow and detailed ones. Some of the spirit claimed for the British civil service, for example, is suggested by this open-end description of the few grades of "scientific officer" in Her Majesty's service:[40]

> It is not possible to define with precision the duties of the various grades but, broadly speaking, the duties of the grades above principal scientific officer include responsibility for the administration and direction of scientific work while the principal scientific officer and lower grades concentrate on the scientific work itself.
>
> . . . .
>
> But the posts of senior principal scientific officer and above may, with Treasury authority, be created for outstanding individual research workers.

Not infrequently, on the business side, executives will take the more extreme ground that they will not tolerate even an organization chart at their level, lest it force them into patterns of action which may become inappropriate, just as these patterns develop a vested interest in protecting personnel.

This general approach to job description has its virtues. For example, by all accounts, the

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[38] Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York, 1948), p. 28.

[39] Paul P. Van Riper, "The Senior Civil Service and the Career System," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 18 (Summer, 1958), pp. 189–200.

[40] Royal Commission on the Civil Service, *Introductory Factual Memorandum on the Civil Service* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1953), p. 54.

British achieve great flexibility, avoid the sometimes gross artificialities of more "precise" efforts, and (one supposes) increase the power of the supervisors whose discretion is obviously emphasized. Their approach also seems to avoid that situation which haunts position analysts and outside observers alike: that an Einstein would have the same grade as any other physicist doing "similar work."

These problems of the American approach are known well enough, although they do not prove the inferiority of a detailed approach to job description in the lower classifications. These problems may have profound consequences for the management of work. At its worst, taking the mechanical aspects of job description too seriously can disrupt the flow of work. Moderation on the part of both "line" and "staff" seems indicated. The decentralization of much personnel work in the federal service suggests that just such a mature moderation has set in.

Other factors encourage a diluted devotion to the methods and theory implicit in the duties classification in this country. Here let us consider only this feature: it is not obvious that the common attempts at precision are precise about all (or most) of the elements of work which are important. This should encourage a healthy skepticism in developing and administering duties classifications. For, first, the technology of duties classification cannot support great precision now, nor is it likely to do so in the immediate future. Second, if a duties classification purports to describe the behaviors required for the effective performance of an organization's work, existing efforts commonly miss many significant possibilities. If it merely codifies existing practices it may not be worthy of vigorous support, for duties classifications are at least implicitly prescriptive.

The specific dimensions which characterize tasks are but imprecisely known. The usual guidelines for classification—level in the hierarchy, formal authority and responsibility, funds administered, and the like—are not sufficient for doing the job tidily. For example, they do not take into account whether Supervisor X is the informal as well as formal leader of his work unit. It is impractical and unjust to treat Supervisor X's job as the same whatever the answer to this question. Moreover, if a job description is prescriptive, a supervisor's socio-emotional performance cannot be overlooked. We may fairly ask of an approach which preaches and seeks precision: Precision about what?

The question remains, what is significant in describing a task? It is a disarming question. Existing research does not suggest that it has an obvious or an uncomplicated answer. Factor analysis, a sophisticated mathematical technique, perhaps offers the most hope of developing a set of dimensions which will permit us to describe jobs precisely. A technical discussion of factor analysis hardly can be attempted here. In general, however, the technique permits an initial judgment as to the number of independent dimensions necessary to account for the variation in some batch of scores (*e.g.*, in rankings by several analysts of jobs in terms of the discretion they require incumbents to exercise). The technique has been utilized, for example, to isolate the various kinds of intellectual abilities measured by intelligence tests. There is no way to solve such problems *a priori*. Factor analysis, in sum, might well complement and direct the enormous amount of observation that normally goes into developing a duties classification and into keeping it current.

Applications of factor analysis to job description suggest the problems which must be met. The technique, for example, has been applied to the ratings of a very large number of characteristics of various jobs. Existing results do not suggest that a synthesis is imminent. A simple manual task, for example, required only a few factors to describe it in one study.[41] Another factor analysis of more complex tasks isolated twenty-three factors.[42] Yet only seven factors were considered necessary to describe the 4,000 jobs listed by the U. S. Employment Service.[43] Thus existing work does not suggest a clear pattern. To further complicate matters, there seem to be "families" of tasks for which individual sets of factor dimensions probably must be developed.[44]

Despite the inconclusiveness of such factor analytical work, two points seem clear. First, the dimensions isolated thus far do not closely resemble the guidelines implicit in much classification work. In fact, the factors need not have any obvious connection with "commonsense" notions.[45] Second, the isolation of such factors is only the initial step. Factor analysis provides a rough map of those things which are important descriptively. Successful prediction, however, is the crucial test. Such validatory work might take such a form: If the task has dimensions *a* and *d*, individuals with such-and-such training, proficiency, attitudes, and personality will prove to be high producers.

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[41] A. W. Melton, *Apparatus Tests*, AAF Aviation Psychological Program, Research Report No. 4 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).

[42] L. L. McQuitty, C. Wrigley, and E. L. Gaier, "An Approach to Isolating Dimensions of Job Success," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 38 (1954), pp. 227–32.

[43] E. J. McCormick, R. H. Finn, and C. D. Scherps, "Patterns of Job Requirements," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 41 (1957), pp. 358–64.

[44] Launer F. Carter, William Haythorn, and Margaret Howell, "A Further Investigation of the Criteria of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 45 (1950), pp. 350–58.

Even this preliminary factorial work has clear implications for our public personnel systems. Duties classification will have limited usefulness to the degree that task dimensions are not developed and the validatory work referred to above is not undertaken. The interim question of whether the pursuit of precision about characteristics—which may or may not be functionally important in describing the task—is worthwhile probably must remain open. The answer is not obviously in the affirmative. A fundamental reevaluation of the common approach to job description in this country seems required, while we await the scientific explanation which will permit great precision. It would seem useful to attempt to test whether general classification provides savings beyond the reach of the detailed classification.

If detail there must be in job description, many factors could fruitfully be included in the usual duties classification. One such is the style of supervision.

Different jobs seem compatible with different styles of supervision. On the available evidence, general statements under this head must be tentative, largely because we know so little about the dimensions along which tasks differ. An example, however, may be hazarded. Provisionally, jobs may be conceived as differing in the degrees to which their performance is programmed and to which their successful performance requires interpersonal cooperation. When a task is unprogrammed and requires high interpersonal cooperation, a permissive supervisory style has seemed most appropriate for those subjects tested. An authoritarian supervisory style will cause the least socio-emotional dislocation on tasks which are highly programmed and require little interpersonal cooperation.[46] These are general relations, indeed, and require much specification of intervening conditions. Similarly, individuals with differing personality characteristics tend to perform most effectively under different supervisory styles.[47] Meeting the needs of employees *via* an appropriate supervisory style probably would serve to increase the power of supervisors, or at least to provide supervisors with a favorable environment in which to seek high power.[48]

The specification of such factors as the supervisory style congenial to a job is particularly important because the logic of scientific management encourages the choice of a generally inappropriate style. Thus close supervision—which is consistent with this theory—seems to be associated with high output in only a minority of cases, as already noted. If one had to make a choice between the two types of supervision, then, it is not crystal clear that one would be well advised to obey the logic of scientific management.

This analysis can be extended. Close supervision, patently, is encouraged by a structure such as that in Figure 1A. Supervisory pressure would seem to be most directly applicable in this model, which in turn might suggest high supervisory power. Things, however, do not seem to happen this way often. Likert reports that the more "unreasonable pressure" reportedly exerted by a supervisor, the less the power attributed to that supervisor.[49] Moreover, evidence suggests that greater supervisory pressure serves to isolate the supervisor from his men by increasing the danger of communication.[50] In addition, pressure seems inversely related to output. For example, ten of eleven departments in Likert's study which reported little outside pressure to control the pace of work were above-average producers. Nine of ten departments reporting great pressure were below-average producers.[51] Reasonably, then, job descriptions might well profit from the specification of such job-relevant factors as the style of supervision.

This discussion of two approaches to job description—through those factors normally included, and through those factors which are often neglected—permits of simple summary. There seem to be very substantial costs of commission and omission in the job descriptions common in our civil service systems. These costs complicate the management of work, however nicely the systems fit the three core goals underlying the American approach to public personnel administration.

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[45] The naming of factors is not always an easy task, for any factor normally has "loadings" of several variables. Hence the sometimes exotic designations of factorial structures.

[46] Robert T. Golembiewski, "Three Styles of Leadership and Their Uses," *Personnel*, Vol. 38 (July–August, 1961), pp. 38–39.

[47] Allen D. Calvin, Frederick K. Hoffman, and Edgar L. Harden, "The Effect of Intelligence and Social Atmosphere on Group Problem-Solving Behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 45 (February, 1957), pp. 61–74.

[48] Likert, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.

[49] Likert, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–57.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

V. SUMMARY

Our federal Civil Service Commission has been accustomed to serve more than one master. As one commentator noted:[52]

> "For whom does the Civil Service Commission work?" We used to reply, "Well, we think it works first for its congressional committees, second for the status employees, third for the American Legion in support of veterans' preference laws, fourth for civil service employees' unions, and possibly fifth for the President." Since the end of World War II, the President has moved up in this list but it is difficult to tell just how far.

The analysis above, in essence, argues that yet another master requires service, the development of a work environment within which a professional manager can do his most effective job. Substantial revisions in traditional thinking and technique about our civil service systems will be required to that end.

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[52] Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON PARSONS ON FLORIDA POLITICS

TO THE EDITOR:

From my occasional browsing of articles on the history of science I judge that questions of "priority" of discovery and instances of "multiple" independent discoverers are both rather common happenings. With the steady growth in the size of the political science profession and the rapid proliferation of journals the difficulty of keeping up with the literature in any given specialty has increased markedly. Still, I think anyone even roughly familiar with the Florida political scene or with the not-so-extensive published literature on Florida politics would note some striking omissions, both substantive and bibliographic, from Malcolm Parsons' article on the Florida senate (September issue, pp. 605–615).

First, and to my mind most glaring, is Parsons' failure to make any reference at all to the various pieces by William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, who have previously pointed out virtually everything that Parsons has to say (and more—since they cover the lower house as well as the senate). Thus small-county control of the Florida senate presidency and of the major committees is discussed in their 1960 monograph, *Representative Government and Reapportionment: A Case Study of Florida* (Gainesville: Public Administration Clearing Service, 1960), pp. 61–67; and the deliberate "stacking" of committees is extensively analyzed in their article, "Committee Stacking and Political Power in Florida," *Journal of Politics* (February 1961), pp. 57–83. Although the Havard-Beth book on the Florida legislature, *The Politics of Mis-representation* (Louisiana State University Press, 1962) has only recently become available, their previous pieces have been in print for almost two years. They seem more relevant then references to A. Lawrence Lowell.

Second, to write of tension and conflict in the Florida senate without some serious consideration of the disruptive impact of the reapportionment issue is surely to produce *Hamlet* without the prince. Parsons notes that *none* of the sessions from 1947–1953 are even roughly comparable in terms of sectionalism to the pattern evident in *all* of the sessions from 1955–1961. The obvious question then is, what happened in 1954–1955 to change the whole nature of legislative politics? Population growth and "creeping Republicanism" have been going on for decades; what seemed to spark the conflict was the bitter duel between LeRoy Collins (governor from 1955–1961) and the dominant North Florida senate clique (generally referred to in the Florida press as "the pork-chop gang"). That reapportionment was the crucial issue and that the organization of the "pork-choppers" was the mechanism for achieving North Florida cohesion stand out clearly from such accounts as that by Virgil M. Newton, Jr., managing editor of the *Tampa Tribune*, in his *Crusade for Democracy* (Iowa State University Press, 1961). We should all guard against a sort of Gresham's Law which permits an enthusiasm for chi square tests to drive from political science the basic issues that "politics" is about.

Third, the pattern of sectionalism which Parsons presents in his map (p. 608, which unfortunately fails to show senate district boundaries) is a familiar one, used over the past ten years by virtually everybody writing on Florida electoral politics. Here I would cite only Herbert J. Doherty, "Liberal and Conservative Voting Patterns in Florida," *Journal of Politics* (August 1952); Donald S. Strong, "Presidential Election in the South," *ibid.* (August 1955), especially pp. 351–352; and my own book, *The Negro and Southern Politics* (New York University Press, 1957), pp. 93–102 (especially maps 4 and 5). On the substantive side I think a more sensitive index of change than Parsons' measure, which is two-thirds plain Republican vote, would point up some important distinctions *within* North Florida, especially between the generally stagnant area between the Suwannee and Apalachicola Rivers and the rapidly booming far Gulf coast. Since the state's overall rate of growth over the past decade was 78.7 per cent, counties which are below the state average are by no means all "stable" in population.

Fourth, the classification of districts as "urban," "mixed," or "rural" is made in a manner that results in some curious distortions. An "urban" district defined as containing at least *one* urban place with a population of 50,000 or over would be understandable. But how should we classify a multi-county district that has *several* smaller urban places, with an aggregate population of 50,000 or over? Parsons apparently calls it an urban district too. Thus footnote 16, page 611, notes the "urban"

Fort Myers district, although Fort Myers has a 1960 population of only 22,523. Since the existing legislative malapportionment gives North Florida more single-county districts than population warrants, but lumps numerous South Florida counties together into multi-county districts, the measure exaggerates the "urbanness" of South Florida and of some South Florida districts. Consider the classification of four counties, each with a town of 14,000. These would make four "rural" districts if each were a single-county district. It is hard to see why the identical inhabitants should be converted into urbanites by lumping the same four towns into a single multi-county district (which thus would have a total urban population of 56,000). Fort Myers plus Key West indeed have other 50,000 residents, but only prophecy could justify putting either of these charming little places, or the two together, into the same category with Miami and Jacksonville. Is a state senator representing several little county seat towns likely to be any more urban-oriented than one representing a single county?

Students familiar with the previously published literature on Florida politics will doubtless find some satisfaction in the additional confirmation of findings provided by Parsons' laborious check of senate roll-call votes. Teasing any conclusions out of such data is often a difficult task. It might be facilitated by making better use of the existing literature, and by picking up the analysis at a point calculated to build on what has already been done. Increasing sophistication in the study of legislatures is certainly to be applauded—at least with two cheers—but it should not be encouraged to proceed at the cost of divorcing the study of "legislative systems" entirely from the real-life world of politics.

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INSTRUMENTAL VALUES AND ULTIMATE GOALS

To the Editor:

In his article on "Values and Interests" (this Review, Vol. 56, pp. 567–576), Professor Van Dyke has provided a lucid and fruitful analysis of these concepts. Nevertheless, his interpretation leads to certain difficulties. I should like to point them out and to propose a solution.

According to the author, making a choice consists essentially of two successive steps: (1) selecting an "ultimate goal" (or "intrinsic value" or "independent interest"); and (2) determining the necessary means ("proximate goals" or "instrumental values" or "dependent interests"). Step 1 is logically and empirically arbitrary, since there is no objective way of determining what ought to be done for its own sake. On the other hand, the rationality of step 2 can be objectively ascertained by empirical science, since the relationship of means to end is one of cause to effect.

First of all, it is doubtful whether, as a matter of fact, actors in general and political decision makers in particular normally first "assume or postulate the goal values or independent interests that guide their behavior" (p. 569) and afterwards decide to use whatever means are necessary to such ultimate goals. Second, ultimate goals are usually too general and vague to allow for articulate disagreement. Nearly everyone is commited to the same intrinsic values, *e.g.*, mental health, the public good, the national interest. Yet, not everyone makes the same value judgments. Third, the more proximate the goal, the greater the probability of disagreement as to whether it ought to be pursued. On the basis of the author's analysis, such disagreements about means to an agreed end could only be factual, never valuational. Finally, while the author realizes that "the same thing may be both goal value and an instrumental value," (p. 372) he does not take into account that the same thing may be considered intrinsically disvaluable—*e.g.*, the expected losses in an attack—and yet a necessary means to an end—*e.g.*, victory. Are we to say that these losses constitute a proximate *goal*, an instrumental *value*, a dependent *interest?*

These four objections indicate the need for a more realistic model of rational choice than the author's underlying two-step theory—a theory supposing that predictions precede evaluations. A rational actor does not simply determine the causal relationships that lead from his contemplated immediate action *via* his intermediate goals to his ultimate end, "like rungs on a ladder or links in a chain." (p. 567) Rather, he must predict, as far as possible, the total outcome of the action, which includes side-effects and after-effects as well as the ultimate goal itself. (The picture of a network of causal relationships would therefore be more appropriate.) The actor must also determine what alternative courses of action are open to him in the given situation, and their respective outcomes as well. If the same goal can be reached by different means, that goal will be included in several of these possible outcomes. The actor's evaluations pertain, not to "goal values" in isolation, but to means and total outcomes, which may include elements that are intrinsically disvaluable to him. Furthermore, he does not make absolute value-judgments, but appraises the relative over-all desirability of each alternative outcome. The question then becomes: What is on the whole more valuable to me, the (probable) loss of so and so many lives *and* victory *and* ... etc.; or saving these lives *and* defeat *and* . . . etc.? I agree with the author's non-cognitivist value theory; there are no objective criteria for validating preferences among alternative outcomes. An actor's choice of a course of action is rational provided the expected outcome is, on the whole, more valuable to him than (or rather: at least as valuable as) the outcome of any available alternative; *i.e.*, if its net expectable utility is maximal.

Doing away with the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values or goals, and interpreting choices as *comparative* evaluations of alternative *total* possible outcomes, eliminates all the above-mentioned difficulties. This approach is also in line with recent developments in analytic philosophy.[1]

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[1] *Cf.* Richard Brandt, *Ethical Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1959), ch. 15; Carl G. Hempel, "Rational Action," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 1961–62 (Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1962).

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BOOK REVIEWS

Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity. By Lucian W. Pye. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Pp. 307. $7.50.)

Politics, Personality and Nation Building is a striking new effort to explain why transitional societies have such difficulty in modernizing. The answer, says Lucian W. Pye, lies in the psychic dimension of change, not in the lack of resources or foreign aid. Specifically, it is the spirit and calculations of the political elite that are the main barrier to progress. Taking Burma as an example, the author probes sensitively into the anxieties and self-doubts of her political leaders that inhibit purposive, cooperative action. The result is a subtle and deeply pessimistic account of frustration in the building of a modern state.

Pye's thesis is skilfully elaborated with the tools of psychology, political science and sociology. It is amplified with a good deal of empirical data on Burma, including long personal interviews with politicians and administrators. In fact, two thirds of the book is devoted to the political culture of the Burmese elite, as it has developed out of socialization processes begun in childhood and carried on through career experiences in colonial and post-colonial times.

The themes are of wider significance, however. They are set forth as a model to which most transitional societies are believed to conform today. Thus the book is a general study of the politics of modernization, with the Burmese case detailed to give concreteness and color.

The crux of the difficulty, the author argues, lies in psychological insecurities created in the minds of politicians and administrators by the diffusion of modern culture. Government is all-important; but its achievements are stultified because its leading actors are confused in their values and unsure of their capacities. As transitional people, they lack any confident sense of identity either for themselves or their societies. This makes for unpredictability, a sense of isolation, and mutual distrust in interpersonal relations. It robs them particularly of "the spirit of associational life" which is the *sine qua non* of organization building. A politics of personal intrigue and public fantasy becomes therefore an almost insurmountable obstacle to nation building. Unhappily the difficulty is not a temporary carry-over from tradition. It is a psychic dilemma built into the very process of acculturation that makes modernizing elements unfit for creative leadership.

The author's delineation of these subjective, irrational dimensions of Burmese politics is vigorously impressionistic. His argument is exemplified though hardly verified by the evidence assembled. It appears to illuminate many facets of elitist behavior in Burma and other transitional societies. And it offers plausible interpretations of the non-development, even retrogression, observable in many fields. The chapters on Burma give deft sketches, for example, of "backward-looking modernizers" in the bureaucracy, of rootless politicians who do not feel at home either with the peasant or the Westerner, of personal tensions growing out of religion and the family, of gentleness and violence in politics, of intentions valued above deeds, of the myth of omnipotence in the midst of incompetence, and so on. It is a pleasure to read a book so well designed and lucidly written.

Any thesis so selective in its facts, and so boldly presented, is bound to invite challenge. Sentiments about power in Burma are detailed, but not the actual power structure. There is much about public administrators, but little about administration. Public investment is mentioned as little more than a program for optimizing loyalty (p. 90), and development projects as virtually the private fiefs of politicians (p. 155). Questionnaire statistics are happily eschewed in favor of more subtle intuitions regarding personality and outlook. Yet this leads sometimes to judgments that seem rather strained. Can the political class of Burma be described as people highly tolerant of nonsense (p. 131) who see events as having neither antecedents or consequences (p. 167), and who believe that political action can neither greatly hasten nor retard economic development (p. 154)? Other observers, too, manage to construct for Burma a balance sheet of social progress not so negative as the one given here.

One suspects that the author may be trying to prove too much by giving an unqualified and inclusive priority to psychic tensions that are only one aspect of the Burmese scene. It is open to question, furthermore, how adequately the modernizing difficulties of China or Indonesia or Egypt can be summed up in the same formula. Yet no one familiar with such societies in transition can fail to be struck with the wide relevance and authenticity of Pye's insights from Burma.

Finally, profound doubts about foreign aid are implicit in this view of politics as the inhibitor of progress. Capital from abroad can hardly cure conspiratorial factionalism or a "paralysis of will" growing out of psychological insecurity. In fact, says Pye, the aid-giving nations are caught in a dilemma. Assistance on rational terms invites suspicion of foreign control. On the other hand, its suspension leads to charges of abandonment and betrayal. We are damned if we do, and damned if we don't.

The only solutions suggested are (1) "a grand ideological breakthrough," inspired by some charismatic leader, or (2) the slow growth of "communities of modernizers" gaining self-confidence from their mastery of new skills. But the first is unlikely—Martin Luthers come rarely—and the second is a long, slow process.

One is left then with a rather gloomy prospect, and a conviction that governments in the aid-giving business should pay more attention to a nation's subjective capacity to utilize external assistance. The author joins others today who call for a more realistic appraisal of political needs and consequences in the realm of foreign aid. Particularly, a more imaginative effort is required to build confident leadership and organizational capacities.

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Mastery of the Metropolis. BY WEBB S. FISER. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, Pp. 168. $1.95.)

In the literature of urban areas, we may identify two main streams among the metropolitan evangels. The first, and older, tradition was that of the structural reformers, who sought governmental institutions that were both efficient and expressive of "area-wide" considerations. Their allies were the civic actionists, who found that sweet reasonableness emerged when all interests could be induced to sit down together.

The impotence of this social gospel in worldly affairs became so evident that neo-orthodoxy was bound to emerge. Writers like Wood and Banfield demonstrated that sin abounds. Using analytical concepts that cracked the bonds of a strictly structural approach, these writers were led to the conclusion that the Metropolitan Kingdom was not likely to be achieved in this generation, and certainly not through the simplistic strategies of governmental reform. Buttressed with such new views of political relationships, political scientists have begun to approach the older literature with the same analytical treatment that contemporary theologians would accord Walter Rauschenbusch and "Acres of Diamonds."

During the rise of neo-orthodoxy, certain professional groups, who could not be expected to be *au courant* with the recent political science literature, began to be stimulated by the dramatic changes in American urban areas. Thus, a newer stream of metropolitan fervor became evident in other quarters. This might be called the good news according to *Architectural Forum*. The literature stemming from *Fortune* magazine has a similar tenor, but its emphasis on works is so strong that it occupies the same position with respect to much of the architecture-planning literature as *James* does in relation to the synoptic gospels.

From this standpoint, Professor Fiser's book is the first synthesis to appear; it is an interesting and not unsuccessful attempt to blend the old and the new evangelical traditions. Fiser is a man with a mission. As the title indicates, his major concern is with the conditions under which citizens of a metropolitan area can control growth and change for the "common good." The "basic proposition" is "the desirability of creating a base which will facilitate political and social adaptation."

The book is hortatory in character. Fiser builds his case on certain key evaluations of modern urban society: (1) Urban residents do not have available the wide range of choices in physical environment that modern technology has made possible; therefore, the quality of urban existence leaves much to be desired, (2) the nationalization of economic life has produced a crisis in local leadership, and (3) the central problems of urban life are so interrelated that an effective attack upon them cannot be mounted *seriatim;* the urban environment is a seamless web.

His suggested strategy contains three elements: governmental reorganization, citizens' organization, and public education. In his treatment of these three, Fiser implicitly acknowledges his debt to the older tradition of reform.

Specifically, Fiser most closely follows the structural reformers in his enthusiastic acceptance of that grand old term "area-wide-comprehensive-planning." Early in the first chapter he complains, "No one is responsible for making sure that all the federal programs which impinge upon the metropolitan regions make parts of a coherent whole. Nor is anyone responsible for making sure that all the state programs fit into a general scheme. Within the metropolitan region itself, no authority exists which has the power to harmonize local plans."

Now, in its original formulation, this sentiment usually referred to the need for area-wide capital programming, zoning, and other coordinative administrative mechanisms. For Fiser, however, the commitment to comprehensive planning is important for another reason, which is where the *Architectural Forum* stream comes in. Quite rightly, Fiser asserts that our technology has created a new condition of life: that is, our range of alternatives is so great that we can have the kind of cities we want. To Fiser, this means meeting the varied needs of urban populations so that the metropolis can become "an exciting, vital, and pleasing human experience." In turn, this objective requires a combination of public and private actions, which become geared together only through comprehensive community planning.

Fiser recognizes a fundamental change in city government in the past thirty years. He sees that the management of growth and change, rather than the simple provision of services, has become the touchstone of municipal policy. This recognition gives particular force to his chapter on urban renewal, which is the best section of the book.

Nevertheless, the appreciation of the complementary roles of public and private agencies is not carried far enough. Potentially, Fiser's chapter entitled "The Intermingling of Public and Private" is seminal. He succinctly summarizes the general trend: "In general this movement can be seen as a pattern: arising in the use of regulation to prevent certain abuses, progressing to inducements to achieve minimum standards, and finally culminating in a kind of public-private partnership in order to get the most out of the system." But Fiser's illustrations of his point—large-scale private suburban developments like Oak Park, Levittown, and Sterling Forest, central city renewal, and new zoning techniques—suggest only situations in which public policy allows a wider scope for purely private initiatives. What seems more significant is the further extension of the public role from being simply instrumental to an active concern with goal-setting and goal-implementation. A good current example is the covey of non-profit corporations set in motion in Philadelphia. These constitute the nearest approach of American cities to the activation of a polity.

It is this turning aside from the full implications of the intermingling of public and private that produces, in this reviewer's judgment, an inadequate treatment of two most important points. In the first place, Fiser does not cover at all the role of the professionals as innovators of policy. He berates planners for trying to sell their plans through public relations techniques, but he does not mention the increasing instances of professionals (not all "planners," and not always employed by public agencies) who furnish political leaders with the agenda of alternatives.

Second, Fiser's relative myopia about the implications of professional roles produces a curious contradiction. After arguing most forcefully for a wide variety of programs that do not directly coincide with the economic interests of business and industry, such as housing for the aged, central city renewal at pedestrian scale, and mass transportation, he concludes that "in the end the market will decide what kinds of neighborhoods and specialized units are most congenial to human survival and development." Such a conclusion neglects the obvious: that is, almost all of the programs Fiser considers good have been possible only because of active public intervention in the market to achieve ends which the market was incapable of promoting.

Since the book does not come to grips with fundamental problems of this type, it does not contribute to an understanding of the reasons for shifts in governmental roles, nor to the differential impact of these reasons in cities of varying sizes and types. Nevertheless, it does furnish a relatively neat summary of the rehabilitated tradition of metropolitan reform, appropriately tempered by some of the gradualism called for by the neo-orthodox writers. Although Fiser communicates rather breathlessly at times ("Gruen is to be congratulated for insisting that these dreams are practical"; "Mr. Bartlett and State Senator John Hughes moved from room to room breaking log jams"; "James Rouse inspired the delegates . . ."; "It will not do to be a man of little faith even if the obstacles are enormous," etc.), his goals for the metropolis are decent ones. The level of the audience conditions the book's utility. A packet of materials including this book, the CED publications, and *The Exploding Metropolis* should do very nicely as background reading for intelligent laymen.

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African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide. By Thomas Hodgkin. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1961. Pp. 217. $0.95.)

It is hardly necessary to argue today that Africa has a recorded and recordable past. For political scientists, the question is no longer the existence of that past, but its relevance to contemporary politics.

Africa not only has a history; it has a rich tradition of historical research, and the history of history in the Western Sudan alone has become a respectable and well-worked branch of African studies. Arab scholars a thousand years ago were speculating about this great region, and Sudanese studies have an almost continuous history from that day until this.

The practical concern of the Arabs with kings and rulers caused much of this early scholarship to emphasize African constitutions and governments. More recently, anthropologists have taken up this concern with political history, have learned to supplement the interview with the archive, and have added a further dimension to African political studies. But the study of political problems has always been important in African historical research.

Only the slightest shift in emphasis has been required in order to reach the radically new assumption that contemporary African politics can be comprehended only in the light of an ancient and continuous past. It is the distinction of Thomas Hodgkin that he not only embraced this assumption earlier and more enthusiastically than most Africanists, but also that he has superbly equipped himself for the double disciplines of pre-colonial historian and contemporary political analyst. Fluent in both French and Arabic (the two primary influences in the Sudan), almost ten years ago he was writing simultaneously about the medieval city-states of the savanna and political parties in contemporary Liberia, and now *African Political Parties* has appeared within a year of *Nigerian Perspectives*, a learned anthology of materials bearing on Nigerian history prior to 1900. The richness and excitement of Hodgkin's writing derive in large part from his ability to illustrate contemporary problems with incidents drawn from Africa's distant past; from his almost reckless enthusiasm, as he draws analogies between events fifteen hundred years apart; and from a relish for the problems of political style, sometimes at the expense of the hard questions of political power. Although Hodgkin states his intention, in the Introduction to the present book, to say little about political parties prior to about 1945 (and although he correctly emphasizes the recentness of African parties), he fortunately neglects to be bound too closely by his own rules. His mind is too filled with African history, and his approach is too eclectic, to be confined to any limitation in favor of the contemporary.

African historical research is now a thoroughly international discipline, and there are several distinguished African historians, but it was not long ago when the most important work (particularly on the Western Sudan) was being done by French scholars. The Arab historians, for example, were frequently translated into French, but not into English. The most important research on African politics, on the other hand, is now clearly American, and it has been interesting to observe the work of Hodgkin, once so obviously dependent upon the writings of the great French Africanists, fall under the influence of American scholars, and then under their guidance return to France, and to the model set by Maurice Duverger for the comparative study of political parties.

Duverger was concerned with party as a special phenomenon, distinct from its membership and its ideology, and his remarkable book is in the narrow sense a "natural history" of political parties. Hodgkin now presents us with a parallel natural history of African parties, and in some cases he actually follows the chapter headings of Duverger, which means that significant portions of this book are on organization and the analysis of pure types—on party morphology. Yet even Duverger was unable to avoid such labels as "left," "conservative," "socialist," and "monarchist"; the vocabulary of 19th Century European politics. In the case of Hodgkin, one suspects that his real interest lies in ideology, while the model of Duverger points in exactly the opposite direction. This study is not nearly so systematic and rigorous as that of Duverger, the statistical apparatus of Duverger is entirely lacking, and the conclusions are sometimes suggestive rather than exhaustive. This is the necessary outcome of Hodgkin's indifference to reconciling structure with ideology, his concern with practical questions, and his historicism.

Yet the result is an intricate and lively essay; original, entertaining, and enormously instructive. The illustrations are drawn from the entire continent, including the Maghrib, which Hodgkin has studied so deeply, but correctly excluding the European parties of Southern and Eastern Africa. The illustrations, moreover, are chosen for their political rather than their geographic appropriateness, so that in one paragraph one encounters, in this order, Gambia, Ghana, Uganda, Upper Volta, Guinea, Mali, and Somalia. No doubt one of the purposes which Hodgkin had in mind in writing this book was to give Africans a continental overview from which to interpret the politics of their individual nations.

Although this book may be written in part for African politicians, Hodgkin is a Renaissance man, with a strong feeling for the unity of scholarship and politics. This is a scholar's book, too, and it is filled with suggestions for research, on some of which work is already in progress. Aristide Zolberg, for example, is now working on local party branches, and Immanuel Wallerstein is working on the political theory of African parties, thereby plugging two of the gaps of which Hodgkin complains.

The Table of Contents is by itself a fascinating document, and many of the subheadings ("Legality and Illegality," "The 'Party within the Party,' " "Constitutional Action and Violence") point up the utility of African studies for the specialist in Western political parties. Inevitably, Hodgkin commences with a chapter on "The Setting," and equally inevitably, the first two parts of this Setting are on pre-colonial society and the "colonial situation." (This Marxist touch, within an essentially non-Marxist book, although quoted from the French sociologist, Georges Balandier, is a typical Hodgkin ornamental flourish.) Always allowing for exceptions (indeed, underlining the exceptions), he conceives that pre-colonial society carries over into contemporary parties in three ways: through the highly stratified "chiefs' parties," through parties which incorporate an ethnic renaissance, and through appeals to pre-colonial segments for the support of modernist, nationalist political parties. All of this, richly illustrated, constitutes the first three pages of the chapter on the Setting.

What is a party? This question, academic in countries where there is a competitive party system, is central to an understanding of African parties. Hodgkin treats the question as if it were an exercise in linguistic definition, which it certainly is not. On the one hand, there is a proliferation of competing political groups within many territories. On the other, there is the single effective party in Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Tanganyika, for example, which has become so powerful that the struggle for control must take place within its upper reaches, rather than within the apparatus of the state. In some of the countries of Africa, the primacy of party over state has become an article of national faith, and the party has set up its welfare agencies, its propaganda machine, and its police system, which sometimes dominate the equivalent agencies within the state. Is this a political party in any meaningful sense?

Hodgkin is still less concerned with the other side of the problem: the tendency of African parties to break along barely concealed tribal lines. The complexity of Hodgkin's analysis serves a good purpose, for he avoids such overworked categories as tribalism versus nationalism and unitary versus federal systems. When he does refer to such bald opposites, he makes clear that they are merely the extreme ends of a continuum. But this has the effect of obscuring the desperate seriousness of a struggle between modernist and tribal parties which would destroy most of the values for which both sides are contesting. It may be that this is the only alternative to single party rule.

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The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. By Samuel P. Huntington. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Pp. 500. $8.75.)

This important study is the product of sophisticated theory as well as prodigious research. Its purpose is not to propound defense policy but to dissect and ultimately to defend the pluralistic system that produces it. In pursuing this goal it provides a superb demonstration of how military data ought to be exploited by political science as a whole and by students of national government in particular. For this reason alone its audience should not and undoubtedly will not be limited to specialists in national security affairs.

At the heart of the book are five interrelated essays that analyze the foreign and domestic impacts on postwar defense policy, the relative influence of different participants in the policy process, the conflict between national security and other social values, the innovation of major strategic programs, and the competitive relationships among the partisans thereof.

One of Huntington's major theses is that decisions on defense *strategy* and *structure* are made in different ways. The formation of structural policy—and here he refers to military personnel, supply, organization, etc.—resembles the familiar processes of domestic legislation. The President takes the lead in developing an Administration position which is then reviewed closely by relatively concerned and informed Congressional committees. Decisions on strategy govern the nature and size of armed forces maintained for particular functions, for example deterrence or European defense. Here the attentive audience is smaller. Final power tends to rest with the executive branch, but the President, paradoxically, has relatively less influence over his subordinates. Why? Because the executive branch, as if some compensatory mechanism were at work, disposes of strategic issues by essentially legislative proceedings. At this point the President is only first among equals.

In the workings of both sub-systems of government Huntington finds evidence that should reassure those who fear an America dominated by militarists. The champions of national security have apparently been less influential than the champions of private consumption; on occasion they have even had to yield to claimants for domestic welfare expenditures. Civilians, not soldiers, usually initiated new departures in strategy. Military leaders tended to acquiesce in Presidential decisions about the total size of the defense effort, limiting themselves to debate over the sub-allocation of funds set aside for military purposes.

Conservatives may take comfort in the author's evident skepticism about sweeping institutional reform, in his temperate praise of the existing system, and in his positive affection for some of its complex or apparently illogical features. Strategic policy, he insists, must be acceptable as well as rational. Vague platforms unify joint chiefs as well as party chiefs. Logrolling, buckpassing, and service rivalry are appropriate and inevitable. Those who demand greater purpose, unity, and direction may stand in a tradition of liberal reform that dates back at least to Woodrow Wilson. But one cannot impose a "symmetrical and immaculate model of executive decision-making" on a pluralistic polity. "Madison not Bagehot wrote the Constitution." As a parting shot Huntington implies that the liberal ethos may impede our advance from security to the nobler and costlier goal of "preeminence in world politics." Readers of *The Soldier and the State* (1957) will be reminded of his earlier argument that liberalism interferes with professionalism and objective control of the military. But Burke doesn't win every round this time. Note, for example, the devastating rebuttal of Lippmann's strictures on public opinion.

Huntington's argument is intricate, replete with paradox, sometimes dogmatic, often brilliant, and always provocative. He places a perhaps inordinate emphasis on the concept of deterrence. More important, he tends to press his case so vigorously that possible objections are discounted too lightly or passed over in silence. To be sure, rivalry and bargaining are inevitable and often productive in administration; indeed, they are perhaps less peculiar to the process of developing strategic programs than Huntington suggests. But are they really *that* desirable or inevitable? The case against service rivalry, let us remember, is not primarily economic or aesthetic. It rests on the suspicion that service rivalry may corrupt strategic judgment. It may delay innovation. (Why is change so often initiated by outsiders?) It certainly undermines public confidence in military professionalism. (When military leaders attack each others' expertise, why shouldn't laymen follow suit?)

Again, if a President can fix or alter the overall magnitude of the defense effort decisively enough to satisfy Bagehot, and if his economy drives can force the cancellation of a supercarrier or jeopardize commitments to NATO, is it not important to record a rather large qualification to the proposition that strategic programs are argued out by essentially legislative processes? Finally, did conciliar structures loom so large in the Eisenhower years only because consensus is indispensable and because the President was by temperament addicted to compromise? Or did this also reflect a Whiggish readiness, rather marked in the Republican party since 1940, to put the presidency in commission? My guess is that Democratic Administrations will continue to find practical political reasons for relying more heavily on personal leadership even in the area of strategic decision-making.

LAURENCE I. RADWAY

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The Nature of International Society. By C. A. W. MANNING. (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1962. Pp. xi, 220. 30 s.)

For more than a quarter-century, C. A. W. Manning has been arguing persistently against treating the study of international relations as a bundle of academic specialties or as a mere collection of certain historical and legal topics. He has urged that, in teaching and training, the subject be viewed as a whole—in effect, as a special sociology. His readers have not always gained a firm impression of his meaning. Now Professor Manning has taken sufficient space to write down what he had in mind. The result is a systematic conception of what international relations is all about. A theory of international relations is presented, conversationally and at considerable length, and then fitted to a broad array of subjects.

The professional student of international relations who is accustomed to American practices may readily become impatient or be thrown off the track of Manning's presentation because of several characteristics of the book. One of these is the style. Manning would be likely to describe it as a "natural-history, idiographic, descriptive, ostensive, portrait-painting treatment . . ." (p. 208). A second quality is the sophisticated simplicity of a discussion that is intended to set forth what one should realize and appreciate *before* beginning a study of international politics. "It is not an XYZ book, but an ABC." (p. ix) and it is meant to be "An essay, then, for beginners" (p. x) on the subject of "Metadiplomatics." This is not an idea that is given much explicit pedagogical attention in the United States and, in any case, we are not accustomed to serious intellectual fare in such writing directed to undergraduate students.

The Nature of International Society is not really amenable to a summary statement of its contents. Much of its value lies in the clear illustrations and the wise side-comments. A few of the concepts in its basic theory will be given, however.

Manning puts heavy emphasis on the constructed nature of social reality. Under the heading of the "social cosmos" there is described eloquently the "notional" character—as contrasted to the "factual" character—of the "realities" by which men live in all societies. Both the structures and dynamics of human behavior are guided by Sorelian myths, belief systems, and abstract notions that have grown up over long periods of experience and that receive social and cultural blessings. In a sentence, men act according to those socially reinforced and perpetuated images of how things are "out there" in the world. "The social cosmos is a multi-cultural world, a mosaic of belief systems, a jungle, after all—of luxuriant myths" (p. 174). This is Manning's fundamental and much-repeated point.

The study of one particular set of rules, myths, and conventions is the special business of international relations. "Diplomatics" is another name for the study of the society of sovereign states and of actions directed by norms and rules that arose historically as if sovereigns once decided, "Let's play the game of sovereign states." International relations, then, is conceived as resembling a game having its own unchanging rules, not entirely unlike cricket or chess.

Connoisseurship, focused on what the game is about and how its abstractions and myths govern the evaluations of the plays is what the non-specialized and beginning student should aspire toward in studying international relations. Manning believes in the teaching of social science analysis which will help to break unthinking belief in the mythology of the game. He welcomes the "sophisticated realist" who will understand the artificiality of the system, yet who will resist "adolescent" skepticism and cynicism.

Student, practitioner, and connoisseur, alike, have need to grasp at more than an understanding of the "quasi-game" of the sovereign states and its rules contained in international law, however. The international system is not open to change by planned reforming actions—this system compares to the lily pads on the surface of the pond and not to the muddy roots. Below the surface in the "pondy depths" of particular cultures and sub-cultures are sources of influence in the game and, possibly, of long-term changes in the system. Thus, the man who would adjust his view to a Copernican outlook on the international system must take into account, as well as possible, the dazzling variety of the games concurrently being played inside national organizations and national cultures. Manning's discussion of the interplay of contemporary cross-national political influence provides a simple introduction to this particular complexity of international relations.

In a longer review, criticisms and objections to Manning's portrayal of the social cosmos and the international system might well be advanced but, in any case, it must be pointed out that his thinking is very much in tune with the "phenomenological approach" being espoused by a number of the new breed of American international relationists. This is so, despite the style and focus of the work and despite Manning's skepticism about American "Rocket-borne Researchers." The book seems to make the best for itself of both the old and the new. The question is whether or not this remarkable essay directed at the beginning student of international relations can be read and understood in American colleges and universities. The answer can come only by trying the assignment in the classroom.

CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND
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Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative. BY JAMES A. ROBINSON. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 262. $5.50.)

This honest and gracefully written book opens several new windows to the subject of legislative-executive relations on foreign affairs. Robinson marshals an unusual range of materials to describe these relations in recent years and to offer some factual and evaluative conclusions, especially as to the significance of communication between Congress and the Executive. This work should be of great interest to the specialist and to anyone who wants a feel for what has been going on in a superlatively important sector of national government.

A sketch of the book may suggest the range of its evidence. The first chapter uses some concepts of recent discussions of power and influence to restate the problems of who influences foreign policy *within* Congress and *between* Congress and the Executive. The second and third chapters document the decline of Congress's foreign policy role in terms of twenty-two cases over the past quarter century, including one that Robinson regards as a mild exception, the passage of the resolution sponsored by Senator Monroney leading to the establishment of an International Development Association. The fourth chapter offers some generalizations about factors influencing foreign policy actions of the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee from the legislative history of several hundred bills and resolutions within the jurisdiction of the Committee in the 81st through 85th Congresses. The fifth and sixth chapters utilize survey interviews to describe the contacts between Congress and the

Department of State and to propose several generalizations about the impact of these contacts on foreign policy action by Congress. The seventh chapter states some broad conclusions about the foreign policy role of Congress, ending with an interesting argument about the real or potential influence that several major Senate figures have had on the relations of Congress and Executive.

The proper use of these various kinds of evidence is a major, if implicit, theme of the book. Much of the discussion is purely descriptive. The author is not afraid, for example, to describe a week in the life of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, and the cases that constitute a good deal of the book's matter are heavily exploited for descriptive purposes. But Robinson obviously believes that more is needed to reach generalized knowledge and that such knowledge is the appropriate goal of his work. The cases are carefully sifted for factors that ought to be included in general conceptualizations of foreign policy making. And generalizations evolved in this way are tested, by what must at times have been prodigious labor, against a wider set of facts. The book will therefore be suggestive to students of public administration and of other fields in which the problem of generalizing from individual cases has arisen. Robinson's focus of explanation remains on Congress. But his underlying belief is that explaining the recent history of legislative-executive relations and predicting their future course requires some decent verified theory.

The twin theses of the book—that the modern role of Congress is to legitimate or amend foreign policy rather than to initiate it and that this limited role is the result of the incomparably greater information available to the Executive—are not new, though I doubt that they have been so impressively supported before. One might wish that the book had dealt more intensively with the reasons Congress has *remained* so much the prisoner of the Executive's information in identifying policy alternatives and calculating their consequences. Robinson evidently believes that the relative unwillingness of Congress to bureaucratize its intelligence function is a decisive factor. But *why* so unwilling? What is it in the motivations of the legislator or the structure of the legislative system that discourages the growth of differentiated intelligence arms? Why has the foreign policy role of Congress been influenced so much by the Sol Blooms, who are content to be notified of a decision before it reaches the newspapers, and so little by the Lyndon Johnsons, who have sought to create a bureaucratic staff structure that could rival the Executive in locating problems and proposing solutions. Robinson's interviews in Congress and the State Department presented a rare opportunity to explore the reasons for this contrast.

Quite new is the material linking the nature of communication between Congress and State Department to congressional support for Administration policy. Pursuing his broad interest in the role of information, Robinson uses interview data to show that adequate communication from the Department to Senators and Representatives enhances the likelihood of their supporting the Executive's policies, especially if they are of the opposite party. Robinson is cautious in stating this finding, and what emerges from his qualifications is a purely intra-psychic proposition— the more satisfied the legislator is with the Department's communication, the more satisfied he is likely to be with its policies—with all the pitfalls of causal inference to which such a relation is prey. Nonetheless, Robinson's finding is very suggestive and his discussion of the problem excellent. What he has done is certain to stimulate further work.

There is a good deal of respect, even affection, in Robinson's attitude toward Congress. A belief that proposals for expanding Congress's role ought to be taken seriously is implicit in much of the evaluative discussion of the final chapter. Robinson considers several proposals and endorses one for strengthening the majority party leadership of the House by transferring to the leadership the Rules Committee's present power to propose the terms under which a measure is to be debated. Although the discussion of reform is not closely integrated with the factual generalizations of earlier chapters, it reflects again the author's belief that verified general propositions are needed. "If the government of the United States is to master the future, it needs to know how to think about the future. It needs more explicit theory about the future . . . (p. 207)." Robinson might equally have written that the success of institutional change to expand the foreign policy role of Congress depends on our getting some better factual generalizations about legislative-executive relations. To this task the book is dedicated.

Donald E. Stokes

The University of Michigan

A Theory of Public Opinion. By Francis Graham Wilson. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. Pp. xii, 295. $7.00.)

This volume reflects Francis Wilson's lifetime interest in public opinion and political philosophy. *A Theory of Public Opinion* is neither aptly nor happily named, and is principally a history of usage and thought on the theme of public opinion. In this aspect, it can best be characterized as a hybrid between the well-known essays of Palmer and Allport in that it also adumbrates difficulties that have developed in the use of the term. The final portion of the book gathers together several related essays by Wilson—many of them previously appearing elsewhere—on particular aspects of public opinion in democratic society.

Professor Wilson's philosophical commitments lead him to an implicit definition of public opinion which is broader than that of most current practitioners. And there is little, indeed, said in these pages about empirical tabulations and the quantification of anyone's actual opinions on anything. In dealing with the more speculative aspects of the topic, he quite soundly argues for the legitimacy of such a posture in view of a tradition of serious questions raised by thinkers in the past—some of them by the empiricists themselves—and currently left unexplored in the light of present-day fashions in the social sciences. He shrewdly observes that epistemological inquiries—I would say methodological quests often indistinguishable in practice, though different in intent—have regained respectability today. Wilson, however, wishes to range far beyond this to questions of values and judgments systematically considered.

Unfortunately, his framework is not well suited to his aim. His bold, broad questioning transforms the questions of "public opinion" into problems of majority rule, the ethical rights of minorities, the rationality of man and its limits, and other transcendental, though immediately pressing, moral issues.

To attempt to deal with these problems primarily through the vehicle of authors who have centered their thought upon the concept "public opinion" is extremely difficult. Many of the issues with which this volume deals have been treated with far greater precision and depth by writers other than those who have speculated on "public opinion." The author allows himself wide latitude in this respect, but there are limits. Plato, to be sure, can be readily treated—the images of the cave, for example—but Freud is introduced chiefly through a discussion of Edward Bernays. Similar examples could easily be multiplied. The result is an inevitable fuzziness and an impression of incomplete delvings into the discussion of the key issues. Even Professor Wilson's own strongly-held conservative views tend to be asserted more in passing than through systematic examination.

A word, too, seems to be in order about his attitude toward the contemporary researchers who have taken over the term "public opinion," presumably to its detriment. On the whole, Professor Wilson seems to wish to avoid debate with them. Indeed, in the Introduction his disagreements are said to be only over details; yet throughout the volume he gives evidence of rather deeper disagreement, and even ventures occasional specific criticisms of such work as Stouffer's. In general, though, he, if anything, shows an exaggerated respect for work in the field: his criticisms tend to be tangential, or in some instances are unexceptionable. Nevertheless, this book makes a small beginning—it criticizes without stridency and irrationality—toward restoring the dialogue between theorists and practitioners in political science. If political theory is, as a recent committee of the Association again asserted, the core of our discipline, it deserves to be restored to relevance for the periphery.

SAMUEL KRISLOV
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The British Cabinet. BY JOHN P. MACKINTOSH. (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1962. Pp. xi, 546.)

British Parliamentary Democracy. BY LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH. (London: Asia Publishing House, 1962. Pp. vii, 99.)

There are formidable difficulties facing a scholar who attempts to write an informed book about the operation and influence of the British Cabinet. In the first place, there are stylized ways of thinking about the Cabinet—to Bagehot, it was the "buckle that binds"—and even so astute a political practitioner as Lord Morrison has resorted to stereotypes when he characterizes the Prime Minister as *primus inter pares*, a coordinating minister whose position differs only in degree from any other non-departmental minister. Further difficulties arise because inquisitiveness in the operation of the Cabinet is not encouraged. The British Cabinet is a collegiate body which is expected to show a united front on policy, not the fissures of indecision and of opposition, and it carries on its activities behind a protective hedge of semisecrecy. One may occasionally get a peep at the maneuvers and procedures of the Cabinet when things go wrong and there is an official inquiry, or a minister reveals the schisms on policy in a speech of resignation, or political memoirs are published in a Sunday supplement, or when the Opposition forces the Government to make an indiscreet admission or disclosure, but all of these occasions are not normal proceedings; they are an extra bit of frosting on the cake, a further revelation of the spiciness of British politics, but continuous, reliable material on the workings of the Cabinet is not information to which the British has a solid claim. Moreover, the law itself supports the confidential nature of Cabinet procedures, and the Official Secrets Act prohibits the publication of any Cabinet memorandum or the disclosure of information which officials or politicians have come by in the course of their duties.

In this lucid, well-informed, and original study of the Cabinet system, Professor Mackintosh has admirably circumvented the handicaps of traditional explanations and of protective secrecy. When did the cabinet develop? When did it acquire its present status? In the historical sections of the book (culled from printed sources, manuscript collections, and archival material) he attempts to show the development of the constitutional conventions which have given the Cabinet its unique position in the British political system. He is less interested in the organization of the Cabinet than in the question of the power and place of the Cabinet in each period of government.

The functions now exercised by the Cabinet have been acquired over an extended period of time, and the relationship between the Cabinet, Parliament, and Crown has constantly changed. In the early seventeenth century, for instance, there was a need for maintaining harmony between an increasingly independent Parliament and the Crown, and one sees the development of the convention that the King's ministers should include those members of the legislature who were most likely to command its confidence. In the modern period, the complex external relationship of his Cabinet extends also to the Civil Service, the Parties, the Electorate, the Press, and Interest groups.

The latter half of the book discusses the function of the Cabinet in the period since 1914. Much of the archival information for this period is not yet available for scholars, and relevant material has been supplied by letters, diaries, and interviews with ministers and officials who have had the opportunity to observe the Cabinet at work. Permission was given to use this material, providing the source was not acknowledged.

In the modern period, the functions of the Cabinet have changed so markedly that the traditional picture of the Cabinet system as it developed in the nineteenth century is no longer strictly accurate; some might find this section the most rewarding part of the book, and the pages on the expanding role of the Prime Minister are especially well done. Political theory has not kept up with the changing times and has offered little guide to the operation of political institutions. Professor Mackintosh is critical of what he calls "the widespread retreat from the idea that public discussion and decisions made with some participation by those concerned are desirable." Professional and business sections, he says, "may be interested in certain reforms but it is generally accepted that they should come from within the organization." The electorate "does not want to be bothered" and pressure groups "prefer to pursue their interests without anyone asking them to justify their priorities and explain their methods." He blames the political theorists, in part, for this condition, and finds it surprising that academic thinkers have "encouraged the community to overlook this retreat from democracy."

Professor Mackintosh is now teaching at the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, and it is to be hoped that he will find time to write a companion volume on the transference of the Cabinet system to Nigeria.

In India, the successful transfer of the parliamentary system is one of the proud achievements of the Commonwealth, and recently Lord Morrison was invited there to give a series of lectures under the Dorab Tata Foundation to explain in popular terms the operation of British political institutions. These lectures have now been published under the title, *British Parliamentary Democracy*.

The result is a personalized explanation of British history and politics by one of the most perspicacious leaders of the Labour Party, who after many years of dedicated public service (as Mr. Herbert Morrison) was recently translated to the House of Lords as a Life Peer. We are taken by the hand, as it were, and permitted to see the operation of local government in the London County Council; the expression of party conflict in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords (Lord Morrison recently told the Lords, "You know, it would not really be a bad thing if your Lordships would have a dust up now and again."); and the operation of the Cabinet system as observed by Lord Morrison as a minister in the Macdonald, Churchill, and Attlee governments. The lectures are reflective, light-hearted, good humored, and pleasantly opinionated.

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BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Tocqueville and the Old Regime. By Richard Herr. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962. Pp. 142. $3.50.)

Professor Herr has written a short but pithy account of the writing and arguments of Tocqueville's *Ancien Régime et la Révolution.* In the first part of his task, detailing the circumstances and evolution of the book, he has succeeded admirably; in the second part, analysing its import, his achievement is, if stimulating, yet more questionable. According to Herr, the work is not merely an attempt to trace the growing centralisation of French administration or the decline of the French aristocracy. Nor even is it limited to showing how these changes contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution. Its basic theme is the growth of democracy in France. In consequence, it marks a return to the concerns of *Democracy in America.* This root meaning, claims Herr, "has seldom been hinted at by critics." It is perhaps true that some commentators need this reminder; it is a frequent if gross misinterpretation of this work to see it as simply an essay in eighteenth century French history, just as *Democracy in America* is sometimes seen as simply a description of American government and society. But the mistake is by no means as universal as Herr supposes; and some commentators, Dicey and Laski for example, have warned us specifically against it. Nor are the generality and continuity of Tocqueville's purposes hidden, for he quoted at length from his earlier book in the introduction to the later.

Nevertheless, Herr argues, there were significant changes in Tocqueville's outlook. His earlier confidence in his own generation's responsibility for deciding between liberty and servitude was in the 1850s submerged under the gloomy certainty that their character and history rendered Frenchmen incapable of freedom. Political recommendations were replaced by the doctrine of historical inevitability, the politician by the historian. In Herr's words, "France could never long be free. This fatalism is the main ingredient of *Old Regime* that distinguishes it from his earlier works." If this were true, Tocqueville would be open to more serious charges than those Herr brings, inconsistency and ambiguity. The *Old Regime* would then mark the abandonment of the value he always claimed as supreme, for, rightly or wrongly, he insisted repeatedly that a belief in liberty could never be reconciled with fatalist doctrines. However, Herr does not prove his case. He produces little solid internal evidence for his view, and the external evidence (such as Tocqueville's passionate attack on fatalism in his letters to Gobineau) is given only as proof of inconsistency. Tocqueville never believed that descriptions of social tendencies precluded political choices. They were useful, not in showing what was inevitably to be, but in sketching the environment in which decisions were to be made. Doubtless he was more pessimistic in the 1850s than earlier, for he thought that wrong decisions were being made. But a pessimism springing from a belief in the wrongness of present decisions is not the same as, is indeed incompatible with, fatalism. That the *Old Regime* was a tract for the times, as Herr realises, is a disproof of his main conclusion.

A number of subsidiary themes can also be criticised. According to Herr, Tocqueville moved from approval of royal centralisation as the means of assuring French territorial integrity (expressed in *Democracy in America*) to disapproval of it as the cancer of liberty (expressed in the *Old Regime*). To support the first branch of this argument, Herr uses Tocqueville's claim that a federal system would be harmful in France as a proof of his approval of royal centralisation. This, however, is to misunderstand what Tocqueville was saying. Federalism, or "governmental" decentralisation, was impractical in France, but "administrative" decentralisation was both possible and desirable. In *Democracy in America* as in *Old Regime,* administrative centralisation was taken to be the major trend of eighteenth century royal government; and Tocqueville disapproved of this trend in the first as much as in the second.

Again, Herr argues that Tocqueville adopted Montesquieu's notion of republican virtue, the idea that a democracy requires a greater willingness to subordinate private concerns to the public good than any other political form. In fact, Tocqueville implicitly rejected this view by preaching the necessity of accepting the notion of enlightened self-interest in a democracy.

It is clear that this reviewer would quarrel with many of Herr's conclusions. Nonetheless, this is a valuable book. If there is, as the dust-cover claims, a Tocqueville Cult, it has been a cult singularly free of systematic theology. Professor Herr has raised discussion of Tocqueville to a more rigorous and serious level.—Jack Lively, *University College of Swansea, Wales.*

Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946–1959. By Harold Swayze. (Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. ix, 301. $5.95.)

There was quiet satisfaction among lovers of literature in this country when Robert Frost was invited to read a few stanzas of his verse at the last Presidential inauguration. Russian poets cannot complain that the State takes no interest in their affairs. Most of them, in fact, would no doubt be happier if the State took *less* interest in poetry. But almost since the beginning of the Soviet regime, men of letters have been leading a politically precarious existence somewhat reminiscent of a crude caricature on the role assigned to them in Plato's *Republic*. The Communist regime treats the novelist, the dramatist, the poet and the critic as very important people. They are highly respected, very well paid—and closely supervised. Mr. Harold Swayze, a political scientist from the University of Michigan, has now brought out a most thoroughly documented study of political controls of Soviet Russian literature during the crucial years from 1946 to 1959, i.e., from the beginning of the "Zhdanov era," now chiefly remembered for its "anti-cosmopolitan" witch-hunts, through the period of relative freedom following Stalin's death, to the rather recent Third Congress of the Union of Soviet Writers. Mr. Swayze gathers impressive evidence to support the thesis that in the USSR literature is not allowed to be merely a neutral observer of life, that in the USSR, in the words of the versatile Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov, "the first and main criterion for evaluating literature is the contribution it makes to our Communist cause" (p. 18). Similarly, Mr. Swayze's view that without stringent political controls Soviet literature would become ideologically "subversive," and his pessimistic predictions of the *political* future of Soviet literature, are all convincingly argued.

The non-specialist reader of Mr. Swayze's book is likely to be overwhelmed by the hundreds of unfamiliar names and references to Russian sources, while the specialist is likely to question seriously a number of Mr. Swayze's basic assumptions. In the first place, he attempts to trace the origins of Soviet literary policies to Marx and Engels, and ignores completely their infinitely more important native Russian forefathers—the so-called "revolutionary democrats" of the nineteenth century, men like Chernyshevskii, Dobroliubov and Pisarev (for an excellent discussion of this problem see Rufus W. Mathewson, Jr., *The Positive Hero in Russian Literature*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958). Further, one is astonished by the fact that a book devoted to the problem of political controls over Soviet literature makes no mention of *Glavlit*, the Soviet censorship agency. *Narodnost'* (literally, "popularity" or "folksiness") is *not* synonymous with *partiinost'* ("party-ness," or Communist partisanship), as some Soviet critics and Mr. Swayze would have us believe. *Narodnost'* has serious esthetic connotations, some of which could be traced to Tolstoy's *What Is Art*; its requirement that the work of art be "popular" and "accessible" to the masses makes experimentation in Soviet literature and the arts all but impossible, since innovators rarely meet with immediate public acclaim. One may have the right *partiinost'* but fail to be accepted by the Soviet pundits for deficiencies in *narodnost'*. Picasso offers perhaps the best recent example: the only work of his known to broad strata of Soviet citizenry is the famous "dove of peace." Recent attempts by Ehrenburg to gain acceptance for those who sin against *narodnost'* have, so far, produced no results.

Mr. Swayze's book also suffers from poor editing. Certain words are italicized on one page and not on another; the transliteration is both unsatisfactory and inconsistent; a number of names —including this reviewer's—is misspelled.

There can be no questioning, however, the book's value as a thorough chronicle of Soviet political polemics clad as literary criticism. Fortunately, some Soviet literary critics occasionally succeed in producing scholarship of a higher order than that which Mr. Swayze had to quote because of the specific nature of his project. —Maurice Friedberg, *Hunter College*.

Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets. By Maurice Friedberg. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. xiv, 228. $4.75.)

Much attention has been given in recent years to the Soviet regime's efforts to regiment the thoughts and emotions of its citizens by controls on the literary output of authors. This depressing tale, once told, inevitably provokes tantalizing and difficult questions about the place of the classics of prerevolutionary Russian literature in Soviet society. What is the attitude of Soviet authorities toward this rich and diverse literary heritage? What is the role of a body of works which convey ideas and values that are indifferent and even alien to the claims of Soviet ideology? These are among the questions examined in this balanced and informative study.

The bulk of Mr. Friedberg's study is devoted to an analysis of the methods by which the Soviet regime attempts to make political use of the greater and lesser classics of Russian literature. In the early chapters of the book, Mr. Friedberg describes in detail how the Soviet government has attempted to harness prerevolutionary belles-lettres to the changing political demands of the moment through the selection of authors and titles for publication and the size of individual editions. While Mr. Friedberg believes that "on the whole" the Soviet reader has been "well supplied with a wide variety of the better-known works of prerevolutionary Russian fiction," he also offers evidence which indicates that selective publishing and limited editions have still left a large unsatisfied demand for pre-Soviet literary works.

Especially revealing with respect to the political uses of prerevolutionary fiction is Mr. Friedberg's lengthy analysis of the treatment of nineteenth-century literature in Soviet literary scholarship. In tracing the changing interpretations of Russian nineteenth-century writers, Mr. Friedberg demonstrates how closely Soviet literary criticism—particularly that intended for the broader reading public rather than the more scholarly studies appealing to the smaller group of intellectuals—is tied to the shifting internal and external political needs of the Soviet government. Mr. Friedberg's treatment of this subject is replete with examples, at once depressing and amusing, of reversals in Soviet evaluations of particular authors, re-writing of history, and crude distortion. It is somewhat disappointing that this section of the study, which focuses primarily on changing Soviet assessments of writers' general ideological positions, was not broadened to include illustrations of Soviet exegeses of specific literary works; for such exegeses—particularly in textbooks intended for use in schools and universities—are surely an important aspect of the regime's effort to limit and direct Soviet readers' responses to the content of prerevolutionary literary works.

The two final chapters of the book are the most suggestive with respect to the broader implications of the Soviet government's policy of publishing the classics. After demonstrating convincingly that the preference of the Soviet reading public is for prerevolutionary, as against Soviet, fiction, Mr. Friedberg speculates on the reasons for this and on its implications. Although much that the author says on these points must, owing to the very nature of his subject, remain hypothetical, the evidence that he adduces strongly suggests that the Russian classics continue to exercise a "subversive" influence—in the peculiar sense that imaginative writing may be said to be subversive—with respect to the tenets of official Soviet ideology.

This is a careful and useful study of an intrinsically interesting topic, and it is regrettable that its occasional redundancies and rather uninspired language bear witness to its origins as a dissertation.—Harold Swayze, *University of Michigan.*

Groups in Theory and Practice. By Peter Loveday and Ian Campbell. (Melbourne C-1: F. W. Cheshire, 1962. Pp. 98. 15 shillings.)

With this monograph the Department of Government and Public Administration of the University of Sydney inaugurates the Sydney Studies in Politics. Three other volumes are announced and others are to come. This one contains two essays: one by Peter Loveday entitled "Group Theory and Its Critics" and a second by Ian Campbell entitled "Groups, Parties and Federation." Both are evidence that Australian political science has accomplished its "take-off." As these studies demonstrate, the mixture of British and U. S. skills produces excellent results.

Loveday's essay is a contribution to the fray that has developed about the group theory of politics. He writes incisively, demonstrates a massive knowledge of the literature and, what is better, wends his way through it with intelligence. He shows that the critics have not usually faced the questions raised by Bentley, and that some who criticize Bentley have not understood his position. He also points out that the supporters of the group view have not adequately dealt with these critics. Loveday clarifies some of the ambiguities that Bentley incorporated into his delineation of the political process; ambiguities that have confused his followers and have also provided a basis for his critics. As a result Loveday leaves the group theory in a better intellectual position than it has been heretofore, and the critics in the future will need to be better than they have had to be in the past. Group theory survives as the sound approach to the study of politics, and Bentley's contribution is more adequately assessed.

Mr. Campbell's essay accomplishes two results: 1) it shows how the Australian parties developed into organizations independent of pressure groups, and 2) how governmental structure influences the organization and activities of pressure groups. Both parts of the study trace the relations between parties and the pressure groups of particular interests. Conclusions of a general character are formulated and the study should stimulate other essays applying the hypotheses in different political systems and under different circumstances.—Charles B. Hagan, *University of Illinois.*

The Nationalist Movement: Indian Political Thought from Ranade to Bhave. By D. Mackenzie Brown. (Berkeley: University of California, 1961. $1.50, paper)

This useful volume presents a collection of polemic writing by key Indian political activists. It serves as counterpoint rather than as a sequel to the earlier, more philosophically-oriented group of selections of Indian thought edited by Mr. Brown under the title, *The White Umbrella.*

To provide a setting for his excerpts, Mr. Brown *briefly outlines the Indian nationalist ferment as it* moved from an emphasis upon social and religious reform to the all-consuming desire for political independence. Yet so intertwined are these two impulses that all of the Indian leaders presented reflect them. It is precisely this dual nature of Indian nationalism which has fascinated and beguiled foreigners. Western ideas did not merely engender a demand for political freedom; by then they had already penetrated deeply into the conglomerate of Hindu thought. Thus the familiar pattern of a Westernized elite contending with cultural traditionalists so often met in newly independent countries is recast in the Indian context to include Westernized religious leaders and cultural reformers. No wonder, then, that much of *Indian political thought deals with the role of* religion and morality in politics. No wonder also that such doctrines as *satyagraha* and *sarvodaya* have received world-wide notice, often at the expense of other detailed knowledge concerning contemporary India.

Mr. Brown's new book provides a good introduction to a greater understanding of Indian political thought in its own milieu. It is a pity that the author persists in referring to Muslims, incorrectly and unacceptably, as Mohammadans. Nonetheless this volume, like its predecessor, is certain to be widely used as collateral reading in introductory area courses and should be of interest to non-specialists as well.—Irene Tinker, *Howard University, Washington, D. C.*

Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs. By Percy W. Bidwell. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 215. $5.00.)

Those who cultivate the sacred soil of the policy sciences frequently see their interest in foreign affairs reflected in the eyes of their students. They may also associate the concerns of departmental majors in international problems with those of students *en masse.* Hence it is both instructive and compelling to be reminded of the casual role education in foreign affairs plays in most colleges, and the ease with which the average student can run the academic hurdles without being exposed to a serious course in international problems.

For three years under a grant from Carnegie Corporation, Percy W. Bidwell studied the state of undergraduate education in foreign affairs in American colleges. The results of his study hardly call for any great rejoicing. In fact, when a representative group of college seniors can barely answer half of the questions (55%) of a carefully constructed test on foreign affairs, it is a cause for alarm if not a motion toward the panic button. Moreover, excluding the better liberal arts schools and the high-grade tax-supported institutions, it *is generally conceded that the mood of college* students toward foreign affairs is one of apathy or, at best, sufferance.

The reasons behind the lack of student interest are multiple—inadequate background, stemming from the home or the high school, or both; the orientation of the college campus along other lines; and the curriculum itself. The specialized courses in international relations attract few students, and, more grievous still, virtually all of the survey courses in Economics, American Government, American History and Social Science Survey give foreign affairs only a lick and a pat. In addition language teachers generally do not regard the teaching of cultural empathy as a basic part of the course. Literature which should *undergird international understanding seldom* serves as a gateway to foreign cultures. Knowledge and understanding of international relations should be an integral part of a college education. To this end, the author recommends: (1) expanding the knowledge base of international affairs in the survey courses and lower division courses; (2) opening broad, conceptual courses in foreign affairs to lower division students; (3) staffing R. O. T. C. courses dealing with American history and international relations with civilian teachers appointed by academic authorities; (4) improving instruction in the introductory courses and enlarging the scope of language and literature courses; (5) supplementing the academic program with significant extracurricular activities; and (6) appointing a campus coordinator for studies and activities in international affairs. Above all, however, is the need to create a college atmosphere which stimulates and encourages interest in foreign affairs.

Undergraduate Education in Foreign Affairs is not only a good report, it is the only comprehensive study of this subject which has been made so far. A copy of this book should be on the shelves of every political scientist interested in pedagogy or concerned about the American future. For unless we now develop widespread understanding and intelligent dialogue on problems in foreign affairs, it may not matter what we teach later on. —James A. Burkhart, *Stephens College.*

Local Political Surveys. By E. E. Schattschneider and Victor Jones. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962. Pp. v, 229, appendix. $3.75.)

Local Political Surveys is intended "for use by students, teachers, businessmen, civic groups, politicians, labor leaders, [and] public officials" (p. 1). Its main objective is to inform a reader about "the great wealth of raw materials" that are available in seeking a better understanding of his own community.

The volume is essentially a limited-focus sequel to the author's earlier *Guide to the Study of Public Affairs* (1952 with Stephen Bailey). The illustration-packed pages of the paper-bound volume present tables, maps, charts, graphs, and sample pages from widely distributed sources, e.g., Bureau of the Census publications, Democratic (and Republican) party manuals, *The Municipal Yearbook*. The catholicity of sources and the types of data presented succeed in showing the mines of raw materials that aid in understanding the economic, social, demographic, and geographic characteristics underlying governmental structure, functions, and political behavior in the local community. The reader is assisted in mining the resources through textual discussions and bold-faced hand-written comments in the margins and/or across the illustrative materials.

Two additional descriptive points bear mention. The local community focus may be on a city, county, metropolitan area, or congressional district in a metropolitan area. Survey denotes an approach broader than, although not excluding, sample surveys; it aims at documenting and interpreting the community "as an economic enterprise and social structure." What John Gaus has called "the study of political ecology" aptly summarizes the point of view which guided the selection of materials. Furthermore, a local political survey extends to local manifestations of state and national politics which, based on the materials presented, appear to influence local decisions largely through the structure and activities of the political parties.

The volume will not be very valuable to the reasonably sophisticated political researcher; the authors acknowledge it is for the "non-specialist." But because the volume is most likely to be used by novice and non-professional researchers a caveat mentioned by the authors needs double emphasis. Any amount of "raw material" readily available and easily marshalled, will be limited and perhaps meaningless or misleading unless some prior research requirements are met, e.g., precise operational statement of a significant problem, rigorous methodology, and careful interpretation of findings. For gold-rush miners with a political bent who consult the many out-croppings of ore presented in *Local Political Surveys*, a sign emblazoned "Miner Beware!" needs to be posted lest the diggers mistake a thin vein for the mother lode.—Deil S. Wright, *State University of Iowa*.

Studies on the Civilization of Islam. By Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Pp. iii, 344. $7.50.)

Scholars in many fields will appreciate this volume, for it collects articles by this eminent author written over a span of nearly 40 years. The first of three parts focuses upon the expansion of mediaeval Islam. Here we find not only the author's fundamental interpretation of the growth of the Islamic empire, but also more specialized articles on Arab-Byzantine relations, Saladin's army, and Arabic historiography. Part two collects Gibb's views on various theories of the caliphate, on Arabic literature, and his article on "The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam." The final section, "Contemporary Intellectual Currents," includes his work on the impact of western culture and machine civilization upon Moslem literature and institutions. The writer says of his four literary studies that " . . . written about 1930 they reflect something of the optimism and assurance of that period"; while the "Reaction against Western Culture in the Near East," published some 20 years later, demonstrates "the rapidity of changing moods and phases in modern Arab society."

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Urban Social Structure. By James M. Beshers. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962. Pp. 207, $5.50.)

This study seeks to explore whether or not there is an urban social structure and an overall network of social relationships among urban inhabitants. The author's theoretical orientation comes from the works of Max Weber, Radcliffe-Brown, Lewin and Asch. Beshers' main points emphasize: (1) that extension of present social theory is needed to cope with urban facts; (2) that social classes, ethnic groups, and racial groups are integral parts of American urban social structure that cannot be meaningfully treated in isolation to each other; (3) that historical research, census tract research, survey research, and observational research must be integrated into an effective analysis of urban social structure; and (4) that rigorous development of theory, specifically mathematical formulation, can clarify issues presently confused.

Professor Beshers limits his analysis to the correlation of residential proximity and marriage, social class/caste structures and occupational status using census tract data, official registrations of residence on marriage licences to corroborate sociological hypothesis. The most interesting aspect of the study is the construction of a theoretical model for urban social structure which stresses the relationship among marriage, symbols and power in the community. An appendix of mathematical aspects is added at the end of the study and the probability formulas serve as illustrations for testing.

The book should be of interest especially to those interested in community power structure as it provides a good summary of recent sociological works in this area. The author concludes that power structure may tend to be "authoritarian" and under other conditions may be "democratic" or even "anarchistic." The actual power structure prevailing in a particular community, the author feels, must be regarded as a result of such conditions, "not as a distinctive and permanent feature of the community."—Maurice E. O'Donnell, *University of Maryland.*

The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas. By Luther Halsey Gulick. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Pp. 167.)

Anything Luther Gulick writes about public administration is worth reading. From the time he left Oberlin in 1915 with a master's degree and spent the next two years as a student in the Training School for Public Service of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, he has been teaching, studying, practicing the art—or science—of public administration (if one wants to get into the argument) that he—as much as anyone—started. He has consistently striven to understand how government executives get their work done and how they might do it more efficiently. Always he has tried to frame observation in the light of theory.

Here, in five lectures delivered at the University of Michigan he sees the metropolitan problem within the framework of American theory. As usual, he pricks some conventional solutions to the problem. Such answers have failed, he says. "In every big city the slums are spreading faster than they are being cleared up. Circulation of people and goods is becoming less and less satisfactory and more and more costly. Even the delightful expansion of suburban life is beginning to run into difficulties as the suburbs 'fill in'; and the service and control jobs are so big that the local governmental units involved are unequal to the tasks they face."

Two of the chief elements of the traditional approach have failed to cope with metropolitanism. One is the "market mechanism," or private enterprise checked, when necessary, by government. The other is "local municipal action."

The first change needed in a new theory of metropolitan government, Dr. Gulick says, is to discard the notion that the problem is the city. "We are not dealing with a 'city' at all! We are dealing with people, industries, shops, offices, community institutions, recreations, methods of transport and easy communication, and a maze of urban services, both public and private, which focus on many centers. . . ." The next change is to decide that all the historic elements of government, federal, state, and local, must be involved in the solution of the metropolitan problem, and no one government can solve it alone. Then new assignments can be made to the various governments.

Dr. Gulick develops his analysis and solution in more detail than can or should be revealed in a review. Each topic gets bold, inventive treatment. As one example, he says it is too late for city governments to take the lead in reaching their own salvation. Only the President, who leads the most comprehensive constituency in metropolis and who is now elected by urban voters, can start the change.

This is a readable, provocative, disturbing book. Readers will be jolted. If they are devoted to the failing solutions, they will be upset, perhaps angered. But if they are seeking new ways, they will find good sense. The dean is going as strong as ever.—James L. McCamy, *University of Wisconsin.*

Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership. By Alex Gottfried. (University of Washington Press, 1962. Pp. xiii, 459. $7.50.)

Anton J. Cermak is in one respect a unique figure in American politics. For a period of thirty years he held both elective public office and party office in the nation's second major city, emerging in 1932 as Mayor of Chicago and Democratic boss of the city, of Cook County and of the State of Illinois. Few political bosses have ever ventured to expose themselves to the hazards of election campaigns except perhaps in comfortably one-sided areas. Here is a man who ran for election successively (and in all but two cases successfully) as state representative (4 terms), alderman (4 terms), bailiff, sheriff, county commissioner, U. S. Senator and Mayor. Yet he never relinquished his party position as boss, first of his ward, then of a cluster of wards, then of the city organization and finally of the state in the crucial year 1932 when the Democrats finally returned to power in the nation.

In other respects Cermak's career is by no means unique. As a son of poor immigrant parents who could afford him scant education, he may be compared to Al Smith or Fiorello LaGuardia. Cermak became the leader and symbol of the Czechs as Smith was of the Irish and LaGuardia of the Italians. Like them, Cermak voiced for all minority groups the opposition to prohibition as an imposition of the rural nativists and a threat to the liberties and cultural habits of the urban immigrants. For Cermak, as for Smith and LaGuardia, the prohibition issue provided a powerful and unifying rallying cry. All three became protagonists not only of their own people but generally of the newer immigrants in their aspirations for recognition and power.

But here the similarity abruptly ends. Cermak was singularly lacking in the wit and warmth that made Smith and LaGuardia legends in their own lifetimes. Cermak, as Dr. Gottfried's careful examination reveals, was a tough, taciturn figure. Where Smith accepted the party machine and used his knowledge and influence to improve its public image or LaGuardia fashioned his own image fighting the dominant machine and rejecting and out-manuevering the party leaders who supported him, Cermak alone sought to both create and dominate party organization. Both as party leader and as office-holder, he was autarchic, if not autocratic.

Even as Mayor, the image of Party Boss was dominant. Gottfried suggests that "Cermak's performance in the complex roles of this office has been ignored or dismissed by otherwise competent observers, chiefly owing to their belief that he was 'the biggest crook of the lot,' or 'the most ruthless and acquisitive man in Chicago politics' or 'a spoils politician' or simply that he came under that wonderfully all-inclusive anathema 'Boss.' These descriptions are fairly accurate."

But are they, by Dr. Gottfried's evidence, either "fair" or "accurate"? *Boss*, "A. J." certainly was. He held, and held tautly, the reins of official and party power. *Acquisitive*, Cermak was, of power. But if acquisitiveness suggests, as with many political bosses it surely does, that he used his political power to acquire personal wealth, Dr. Gottfried's own painstaking research demonstrates that the suggestion is false. Certainly it would be neither *fair* nor *accurate* to call Cermak a "crook" or "the biggest crook of the lot."

In the first place, Cermak had parlayed a kindling wood business into a real estate operation and had become a successful small businessman before he first ran for public office in 1902. Politics, to be sure, never hurt his business but politics with "A. J." always came first. In the rough and tumble of Chicago in the thirty years that saw such figures as the Carter Harrisons, father and son, Roger Sullivan, George Brennan, Al Capone and Big Bill Thompson, Cermak was not above political or patronage deals that would enhance his political fortunes. But whether it was caution or because he was comfortably circumstanced, he never used his political opportunities to build up a private fortune. His dominant urge—and as Dr. Gottfried demonstrates, he could be ruthless about it—was the quest for political power. Gottfried quite properly calls him "a power seeker"; no other needs or desires competed with the demand for political power and prestige.

Great as was his skill as "a peerless party organizer" he was no less competent as a public executive. Gottfried stresses "Cermak's habit of giving a minimum of effective administration in every elective office." He seems rather to have given a *maximum* of effective administration. He was as aggressive and dominant, as tireless and indefatigable as a public officer as he was as a party organizer. He was, says Gottfried, of the "bull whip" school of administration. His cabinet officials, Gottfried tells us, admired him but had no affection for him; the rank and file employees "feared and hated him." "No Chicago Mayor surpassed him in detailed knowledge of the intricacies of administration, including operation at the lowest ministerial level." This last, of course, was true of Al Smith in respect to New York State and F. H. LaGuardia in regard to the City of New York. Unlike them, Cermak, however, had "the social philosophy of the businessman," particularly that of the small, self-made businessman. He was the "rugged individualistic, laissez-faire entrepreneur." Gottfried is, therefore, surprised to find him an early champion of great government programs of assistance. But what "depression" mayor who had known poverty in childhood and had himself emerged as the spokesman and champion of the urban immigrant masses, or, for that matter, what politician in intimate touch with the needs of these people, could, in 1931 and 1932, have clung stubbornly to the tradition of laissez-faire?

It might be interesting—but hardly fruitful—to speculate how Cermak five years later might have reacted to the New Deal. In 1932 he rejected Roosevelt as not "wet" enough and went down fighting for Al Smith, who was. But an assassin's bullet intended for Roosevelt brought martyrdom and an abrupt end to Cermak's career at his moment of maximum power.

Here then, is a career full of fascination for the student of politics and government. Dr. Gottfried has combed the newspapers of the period and sought out the dwindling group of Cermak contemporaries. But "A. J." was a man of few words and fewer records. The 20th Century politician commits little to paper. His most important arrangements are oral, with few witnesses and fewer still who are likely to talk. This was no less true of Al Smith or F. H. LaGuardia. But they at least were lively personalities. Tony Cermak, despite the power he wielded, was not.

The scant records of our political figures make the task of the historian of the 20th Century a difficult one. Dr. Gottfried has tried to write more than a history of A. J. Cermak. He seeks to discover the kind of power "A. J." sought, how he used it and the sources of his power. He has provided one Appendix on the Chicago in which Cermak lived, and even another devoted to Psychosomatic Analysis. He has tried, at least, to bring the insights of the sociologist and even of the psychoanalyst to answer the questions which the political scientist must raise about this potent, enigmatic man.

There are no amusing anecdotes to liven Dr. Gottfried's narrative. "A. J." was always in deadly earnest, concentrated and close-mouthed. He had few friends; no intimates. It would be hard, I dare say impossible, to penetrate his deep reserve, to bring him to life as an engaging personality.—JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK, *Professor of Political Science, Queens College.*

The Economics of the Political Parties. BY SEYMOUR L. HARRIS. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962. Pp. 349. $7.00.)

The distinguished Littauer Professor of Political Economy at Harvard has given us a partisan testament in crisp, hard hitting prose, hopefully directed to a wide audience. Professor Harris describes the differences between the Democrats and the Republicans on every major economic issue of the day and the GOP fares badly at every turn.

In a nub, the Republicans have failed to grasp the basic tenets of modern (i.e., Keynesian) fiscal policy. They have made a fetish of the balanced budget, refused to relate debt to G. N. P., revere the stable dollar at the expense of growth, and generally regard government expenditures as nonproductive.

Republicans are also guilty of deprecating the role of academics in government and of appointing to key posts officials whose previous records reveal downright hostility to the programs they are to administer. The historical attempts of Republicans to emphasize the role of state and local governments gloss over their regressive tax systems.

The Democratic party, or at least its center of gravity, stands for the obverse of these. Dedicated to full employment and growth, Democrats seek a balanced economy, rather than the balanced budget. While many Democrats still have much to learn, Harris holds that the leadership of the party is fully conversant with the necessary economic tools to meet its responsibilities. When it fails to act, or acts improperly, the reason is political reality, i.e., the lack of popular understanding of elementary economics.

Harris' great fear is that the Republican position will not permit the nation to solve "the central issue" of establishing national priorities in the allocation of resources. If our resources are dissipated in self-indulgence and only what is left over is directed to our needs, we cannot win the Cold War. The historical Republican equation of consumer sovereignty with democracy is, then, a threat to our survival.

Political scientists, while probably in agreement with most of what Harris says, would probably point out the difficulties posed by the "language of politics." For example, GOP orthodoxy did not prevent the use of Keynesian measures in 1953–54, yet in August, 1962, the chairman of the Republican National Committee, as well as the Republican congressional leadership, stated its opposition to any tax cut which was not accompanied by a cut in non-defense spending. Would Republicans in power be equally vehement?

President Kennedy may be a sophisticated economist, but did candidate Kennedy help the cause by his frequent campaign parry, "Never before in the history of the United States did any administration in peacetime have a larger deficit than this administration in 1958, $12 billion. They would have had an increase in the debt of more than $10 billion except a Democratic Congress in the last six years cut the budget requests . . . by $10 billion."? And so, on to a Yale commencement, clutching a copy of Samuelson.

While Harris notes that a Democratic congress is still conservative and that a Javits outlook is hardly a Halleck approach, not enough attention is given to the economics of the congressional parties and the pressures which fall on individual members.

When a majority of Republican congressmen describe a $900 million publics works bill as a boondoggle and two of them, one a candidate for governor, the other a candidate for U. S. senator, cross the aisle, the problem of congressional voting behavior is obviously more complex than Professor Harris suggests. Neither ignorance nor cupidity is the sole answer.

Harris' thesis is sometimes dulled by overzealous assertions such as " . . . a reduction in the appropriations for the Weather Bureau in fiscal 1955 was followed by a hurricane that probably cost the nation more than a billion dollars." And one must also wonder if Professor Harris feels the Communications Satellite Bill was part of the New Frontier or a latter-day example of Eisenhower orthodoxy.

But as long as most Americans, college students included, feel that balancing the Federal budget is like dealing with a personal checking account writ large, Professor Harris' labor of partisan love deserves the widest circulation.—SIDNEY WISE, *Franklin and Marshall College.*

Design of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and Governmental Planning. BY ARTHUR MAASS, MAYNARD M. HUFSCHMIDT, ROBERT DORFMAN, HAROLD A. THOMAS, JR., STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, GORDON MASKEW FAIR, AND OTHERS, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962, Pp. xviii, 620, $12.50.)

On the first page of the book the senior author, Arthur Maass, declares his independence of a conventional approach; *Design of Water-Resource Systems* "differs basically from the many volumes on water resources published in the last decade, which have been concerned mainly with governmental organization for development of resources, the economics of project evaluation, and the collection and evaluation of basic data." (p. 1) The purpose of this study, the product of the joint researches of the Harvard Water Program, is quite different. Put boldly, but simply, it is to devise techniques of water-resource system design sufficiently sophisticated to permit identification of the one best design for any physical environment on the basis of specified objectives. With such a goal the book is aimed at an audience of "engineers, economists, and administrators," named in that order by the authors. (p. 10) The details of the techniques examined and explained will be of interest to some political scientists, specialists in the resource field; for a larger number, however, far more interest will attend the implications that the findings carry for the more traditional study of administrative organization, both within resource development and in other program areas.

Put differently, the purpose of the book is to provide a mechanism for the automatic conversion of social objectives through engineering techniques to detailed plans and implementation. Maass distinguishes four steps in system design, "identifying the objectives of design; translating these objectives into design criteria; using the criteria to devise plans . . . that fulfill the criteria in the highest degree; and evaluating the consequences of the plans that have been developed." (p. 2) From the first step, the rest follow. "Once the objective has been determined, our methodology leads to the selection of that combination of structures, levels of development for different water uses, and operating procedures that will best achieve the objective." (p. 3) The scope of this claim is suggested by another: "We have undertaken to translate into a design criterion any reasonable objective." (p. 9) Although the process of system design is easier when the single goal is economic efficiency, the same procedures can be employed to plan for a combination of objectives including efficiency, income redistribution, or even non-economic goals.

All this carries overtones of the classic dichotomy between policy and administration, but the authors are too experienced to fall into such simplification. Recognizing the necessity of interplay between policy-makers and planners, they see three types of situations within which planning may take place. 1) In the absence of objectives clear enough to lead to the identification of a single best design, the project planners have sought to maximize physical development, using economic data only to justify rejection of excessively costly projects. Individual projects have then been subjected to spasmodic review, strongly influenced by the local interests most directly involved. This has in practice been the most common procedure within the federal government. 2) The planners have designed their systems around the single goal of economic efficiency, seeking to maximize the contribution to economic development. Other objectives, if desired, have been incorporated into the design by *ad hoc* modification. 3) With sufficiently detailed design criteria, elaborate techniques can be employed that will determine the best plan to maximize all objectives, in the internal priority rank assigned in advance. If modifications in objectives are made after the preparation of the plan, they can be made under circumstances in which the cost of each change is known in terms of reduced capacity to accomplish other goals.

Not surprisingly, the authors offer their own work as a vehicle to reach the third type of relationship. The advantages would be twofold: by incorporating the multiple objectives in the original criteria, consideration of sufficient alternatives to ensure an optimal combination of benefits would be guaranteed; such a procedure would discourage the setting of policy objectives within a parochial atmosphere focused on specific projects, and would encourage the establishment and maintenance of national standards for resource development. Consistent with this emphasis on the rational resolution of problems, Maass develops in the last chapter a model of constitutional democratic government that rejects interest group theories of politics in favor of an emphasis upon community consensus.

Two obstacles would appear to stand in the way of the full accomplishment of this method of planning. As the authors modestly acknowledge, their procedures do not as yet permit the incorporation of all potential variables. In the design of a system for an artificial river-basin, created for research purposes, the planners were forced to exclude consideration of alternative means of accomplishing objectives other than control of water in the channel, e.g., flood plain zoning, pollution controls, etc. The design procedure likewise excludes ground water sources. Further work by economists and engineers will be necessary to elaborate and extend the techniques here developed.

The second difficulty, most directly of concern to political scientists, concerns the problems involved in reducing many development objectives to the form of design criteria. These difficulties are set aside by the authors; for any specified objective, gross benefits equal "the willingness of beneficiaries to pay" or "how much the beneficiaries of a system output would purchase at successive prices if the output were sold in a market." These concepts are difficult to apply, however, to willingness to pay for continued opportunity to enjoy a scenic view, for relief from the stench caused by pollution, for protection against loss of life by flood, or for the sense of honor that comes from the knowledge that treaty obligations to Indian tribes—whether or not enforceable in the courts—are still being observed. These problems of measuring benefits are not ignored by the authors; they are defined out of the scope of a study concerned with other matters. They remain for continued exploration. This volume is a distinguished beginning toward the development of procedures that may serve to further rationalize policy formation in resource development and may, by analogy, lead to the application of comparable techniques in other program areas.—FRANK MUNGER, *Syracuse University*.

Render Unto Caesar. The Flag-Salute Controversy. BY DAVID R. MANWARING. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. viii, 321. $5.50.)

A particular decision of the Supreme Court of the United States often brings renewed interest in previous decisions which set the stage or broke the ground for the new one. In light of the present controversy over prayers in the public schools, Manwaring has, through the coincidences of history and the docket of the Supreme Court, produced a particularly timely study of the long legal struggle of the Jehovah's Witnesses against the compulsory flag salute in public schools. Last year such a study of events of twenty years ago might have been tardy rather than timely.

The book is concerned with the flag-salute controversy during the 1930's and 40's, when the Supreme Court in *Gobitis* first ruled for a compulsory salute and three years later, in *Barnette,* ruled against the compulsory salute. The Jehovah's Witnesses are the stars of this drama; the Supreme Court of the United States is the arena; and various groups such as the American Legion, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association, and the United States Department of Justice are the supporting actors. This setting has the makings of judicial-political drama at its finest, but in some respects the script falls short.

The book jacket describes the flag-salute controversy as "a classic example of interest-group involvement in constitutional litigation" and credits the author with tracing "the strategies of the various interest groups through every step in the proceedings of both *Gobitis* and *Barnette.*" That is what this reviewer had hoped Manwaring would do. But while there is a tiringly detailed account of the legal briefs presented by the various interest groups there is an almost complete absence of any consideration of the extra-judicial activities of these participants. The stuff of interest-group representation includes far more than the presentation of legal briefs in judicial tribunals, yet a careful reading of this account of the Jehovah's Witnesses' troubles before the courts fails to reveal the non-judicial, political, processes of interest-group representation. While the author is not guilty of suggesting that the filing of legal briefs is the sum-total of interest-group strategy, his overly extensive consideration of the courtroom gymnastics engaged in by the various groups, while serving perhaps to demonstrate to an introductory student the process whereby litigation is carried on, at the same time over-emphasizes the judicial as opposed to the political activities of these interest groups.

Perhaps more annoying than important are several mechanical shortcomings of the book for which the reviewer is inclined to blame the publisher rather than the author. The book, which began as a doctoral dissertation and still bears the unmistakable earmarks of its origin, is written in outline form complete with A's, B's, 1's, and 2's, a form which this reviewer finds distracting. It is, as most dissertations tend to be, profusely annotated and referenced to the point of absurdity. In eleven chapters with a total of 253 pages of text there is a grand total of 1,403 notes, which, however, do not occur at the bottom of the page but are grouped together in 59 pages at the end of the volume. The mere number of notes, their atrocious location at the end of the volume, and the indiscriminate mixing of references with annotations and explanatory material were enough to make this reviewer marvel at the publisher's skill in interfering so handsomely with the enjoyment of an otherwise well-done commentary. This admixture of notes and references was particularly bothersome in Chapter 2, for instance, when a neophyte in religious orders finds to his dismay that some of the most interesting and pertinent parts of the Witnesses' theology are discussed not in the text but in notes over 240 pages removed (see notes 10, 16, and 23, pp. 260–61). The extremely detailed accounting in Chapter 7 of the number of favorable and unfavorable articles in magazines, journals and newspapers in reaction to the *Gobitis* decision and the inclusion of three graphs and one table relative to the incidences of persecution of the Witnesses are rather labored efforts at systematization and appear both unnecessary and insufficient in themselves to establish any critical point. They detract seriously from the readability of the study.

These annoyances are minor, however, and this is a thoroughly worthwhile volume. It will serve as an excellent case study for undergraduate students with which to illustrate the trial procedures of major constitutional questions. It likewise demonstrates effectively the process—often engaged in but rarely quite so openly admitted—whereby the Court changes its mind within a very short period of time. But perhaps the greatest value of this volume is that it will serve as excellent food-for-thought on the past treatment of children—including forceable separation from their parents and commitment to correctional institutions—just because they refused to salute the flag. Also, the violence against the Witnesses, here vividly portrayed, frightened this reviewer. That such treatment of a minority is possible in this country underscores the need for a re-evaluation of the real meaning of freedom and tolerance, not from the standpoint of constitutional right but from the more important standpoint of the potentiality of mob action and mass deprivation of rights through passion and irrationality. Manwaring has here, then, caused at least one person to reflect on the provocative question of the relationship of legal rights to the social and individual behavior of others with whom we differ.

—Gerald Rigby, *University of Southern California.*

The Contours of American History. By William Appleman Williams. (World Publishing Co. 513 pp. $7.50.)

Surveying the American past, William Appleman Williams finds a single dominant motif—the dollar sign. The pursuit of private gain, he laments, has seduced Americans away from the noble ideals of their beginnings and brought them to their present unhappy state. Fragmentation, alienation, and purposelessness reigns within; nuclear destruction looms without. But his purpose is more than simply to trace the path by which the republic has come to this pass. *The Contours of American History* is a jeremiad warning the American people to repent before Armageddon. Accompanying this warning is a message of hope. A saving alternative remains, Mr. Williams proclaims. Socialism will build a humane world in which all men can live freely and happily as brothers.

The story presented by Mr. Williams is a tale of decline. The founding fathers of the republic had a glimpse, partial and limited to be sure, but a glimpse nonetheless, of the meaning of a true community. All, even Jefferson, remained within the mercantilist *Weltanschauung*, with its sense of social responsibility, its belief in state action to promote the general welfare, its goal of a diversified and balanced economy, and its vision of a Christian corporate commonwealth. This American mercantilism came of age during the presidency of the younger Adams. Yet its very success in fostering economic growth whetted men's appetites to exploit the new opportunities without restraint. The new spirit, Mr. Williams believes, triumphed with Jacksonian democracy, and with this triumph came the ascendancy of the new *Weltanschauung* of laissez nous faire.

Laissez faire retained its spell over the public mind until the end of the century. By the 1880's, however, the giant corporation had become the dominant force in American life. With the advent of the age of corporate capitalism, Americans came increasingly to see their society as composed of different groups—farmers, workers, and businessmen—and to look to achieve the good life by balancing these groups one against the other. Twentieth-century reformers from T. R. to

F. D. R., Mr. Williams declares, have not challenged this "functionalist-syndicalist system," but have merely sought to remove its worst abuses and promote a fairer balancing of forces—all without undermining private property.

Their ability to do so, Mr. Williams holds, has depended—and continues to depend—upon the continuing expansion of the market. In response to the depression of the 1890's, American leaders concluded "that overseas economic expansion provided the *sine qua non* of domestic prosperity and social peace" and "consciously initiated a broad program of sophisticated imperialism." The United States began the Spanish-American War to "establish firm control of the Caribbean; and proceed with expansion into Asia." Wilson led the United States into World War One because he feared that Germany was this country's "main competitor for economic empire." F. D. R. fought the Second World War to safeguard "America's recovery-and-prosperity-through-expansion campaign" from the Axis challenge. Coming to the present, Mr. Williams warns that the continued acceptance in the postwar years of this "frontier-expansionist outlook" has led to the impasse of the cold war with its threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The job of the historian, Mr. Williams avers in his introduction, is to clear away myths about the past so that men can better understand the present. Unfortunately, he himself has merely replaced one set of myths with another—those arising from his attempt to force the whole of the American experience into the straitjacket of an economic interpretation of history. Take, for instance, the quotes Mr. Williams features from American business and political leaders bemoaning the "spectacular gains" made by Hitler Germany in the markets of the world. Was the Third Reich no more than a trade rival of the United States? Simply to ask the question is to reveal the shallowness of Mr. Williams's approach.

Or let us examine Mr. Williams's account of the background of Pearl Harbor. He starts by showing the importance of American trade with *Asia.* This trade, he goes on to say, revived "the old idea that *China* (italics mine) was the next American frontier." To protect that frontier, "Japan had to be forced to withdraw from China." The weapon was the embargo on oil, steel, and other war materials. But this strategy backfired when Japan refused to retreat and war followed. Now let us look at the facts. While trade with Asia was important, American trade with Japan was four times that with China—a fact not mentioned by Mr. Williams. The available evidence indicates that most American businessmen active in China sympathized with the Japanese, while most American business journals echoed the plaint of the *Magazine of Wall Street,* "It would take more than the Orient appears to offer us in economic advantages to induce the United States to risk war." The Roosevelt administration acted in China more from a stubborn adherence to principle than from any master plan to save the Chinese market for American business. The truth is that American policy in the Far East may be more justly assailed as Quixotic than as Machiavellian.

Perhaps we should judge Mr. Williams not as a historian but as a prophet leading the American people to salvation. Unhappily, Mr. Williams is no sounder a prophet than he is a historian. He exults that the Bolshevik Revolution reasserted the ideal of a true commonwealth. But what do we find in the Soviet Union of today? A ruthless, self-seeking dictatorship. The melancholy record of human frailty should warn us against the seductive appeal of his millennial faith. Given the imperfections of mankind, the most we can hope for is a rough approximation to justice from the balancing of rival self-interests—and this the present "functionalist-syndicalist system" in the United States performs to the satisfaction of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

Even more naive and wrongheaded is Mr. Williams's faith that this country's embracing socialism would end world tensions and prevent nuclear war. This faith rests upon two premises—both patently false. First, that economic rivalries are the prime cause of wars. Second, that the drive for overseas markets by American corporations backed by the State Department is responsible for the cold war. The cold war is, for Mr. Williams, "very largely the result of the conflict between the expansion of those corporations and the opposition to them manifested by vigorous and militant rivals." The conflict between East and West involves, in short, no more than a struggle for the world's markets. Such thinking at this date can only reflect willful blindness not simply fuzzy-mindedness.—JOHN BRAEMAN, *Brooklyn College.*

Morale in the Civil Service: A Study of the Desk Worker. By NIGEL WALKER, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1961. Pp. viii, 302.)

It has been said that a major function of statistics is to strengthen what one already knows. To a considerable extent that comment characterizes the contribution made by Nigel Walker's *Morale in the Civil Service.* At the outset of this brief review, it should be noted that although the study is concerned with English civil service clerical grades including administrative officers and some technical personnel, much of the data and conclusions are applicable to their American counterparts.

The author examines in some depth the concept of morale and its "effect" upon the individual and group, using two government agencies, and two private firms for this purpose. The methods employed are the questionnaire (a sample of which is supplied in the Appendix) and followed up by interviews wherever necessary. Both the questionnaires and the interviews were directed to a carefully selected sample. The questionnaires were returned in 70% of the cases.

The reader is given to understand quite early that the term morale has little operational use, and is not quantifiable as a concept and is of little use in studying efficiency, which the author takes to be the goal of morale. Considerable emphasis is given to American studies of the industrial worker which disclosed that while productivity of workers could be increased by greater mechanization, better working conditions, time study and incentive payments of various kinds, it also depended on the worker's attitudes towards their management and to their immediate supervisors, on the values which people seem to attach to their work and on other scuh psychological factors.

This legacy from the contributions of scientific management and the more recent insights which the industrial psychologists and sociologists have given us as to motivation and group behavior, currently vie for attention and application both in industry and the government service.

Since Leonard D. White's ground-breaking studies of prestige, and to some extent, morale in the public service appeared in 1929 and 1932, much has been written about the importance of morale and how to improve it. Actually, little has been produced of substantive value about this elusive factor in employee relations. The usual cause-and-effect reasoning has run as follows: A given personnel technique pleases employees; the result is improved morale; and improved morale will lead to better personnel relations and greater efficiency. Mr. Walker has, in effect, subjected this plausible chain of reasoning to analysis using careful methods of inquiry to substantiate or reject the myths which have developed.

To summarize: As the author was unable to find a useful and measurable element to morale as such, he found through his analysis that a composite definition would lend itself much more adequately to this technique. He indicated the following factors as important and quantifiable to a significant extent: 1. Productivity or efficiency. 2. Job satisfaction. 3. Pride in the working group. 4. Cohesiveness.

Data secured from questionnaires and interviews amply reproduced in the text seemed to bear out the author's contentions in the main that the factors noted could be measured. Other questions examined by the study involved a wide variety of subjects such as absenteeism, turnover rates, leave, promotion policies, pensions, wage rates, job security and the like.

Efficiency and job-satisfaction are the components which the author found the most significant as an indication of "high morale." One of the fallacies, he points out is that of diagnosing "low morale" in an organization without comparing its symptoms with those of other organizations. Quite apart from the doubtful utility of the whole concept of "morale," comparison of this kind might well show that what seemed to be pathological symptoms were in fact equally frequent in all offices of the same kind.

In the final analysis, this book is a description of a problem, not the prescription for a remedy, as Nigel Walker notes. There is thus no grounds for arguing that increasing the enjoyment of the work for the employee will help in increasing production. The author does cautiously admit, however, that increasing job-satisfaction is linked with efficiency.—LOUIS L. FRIEDLAND, *Wayne State University.*

City Managers in Politics: An Analysis of Manager Tenure and Termination. BY GLADYS M. KAMMERER, CHARLES D. FARRIS, JOHN M. DEGROVE, ALFRED B. CLUBOK. (University of Florida Monographs, No. 13, Winter, 1962, U. of Florida Press, Gainesville. $2.50, 93 pp.)

The purpose of this study is two-fold: to catalogue the discrepancies between the "classical" doctrine of council manager plans and the "reality" of manager behavior, and to make some recommendations, consistent with the authors' commitment to programmatic democracy, regarding institutional improvements in city manager plans. In their comparison of seventy-six manager cities in Florida, the authors focused on two dependent variables: at the community level, the average tenure per city of managers since 1945; and, at the personal level, variations in tenure of individual managers. Employing a pluralistic framework they tested hypotheses about tenure in the light of institutional-structural differences in councils, especially the manager's authority over personnel; political factors in the community such as its political style (monopolistic, oligopolistic or competitive); nonpolitical factors such as the size and rate of growth of the city; and individual factors of managers such as their career patterns and degree of professionalization.

It should come as no surprise to the political scientist that hypotheses with political factors as independent variables are the more accurate predictors of tenure. As was expected, the city manager is a more politicized animal than the International City Managers' Association (and most local government textbook writers) would have us believe. The degree of politicization (e.g., the extent to which the manager initiates policy) of this "administrative" position is directly related to its vulnerability to the effective political forces of the community. At the community level of analysis a hypothesis tested and confirmed was that tenure tends to average longer in stable than in unstable communities. In assessing the reasons given for involuntary terminations, the authors found that electoral or public opinion considerations predominated in cities with a competitive political style, while "palace" considerations, trouble with the boss or mayor, predominated in monopolistic situations.

Though the many hypotheses were subjected to rigorous testing, and the study reports useful findings, this reader felt that an unduly narrow theoretical scheme prevented full exploitation of the data. For example, in handling the personal tenure data, had the authors been more explicit about their latent role-theory, the material could well have led to generalizations about role-types and degree of vulnerability in differing political situations. At the community level, an implicit theoretical assumption that local politics are to be explained primarily in terms of conflict situations prevents what might have been useful statements regarding consensus patterns.

Nevertheless, the study carefully accomplishes its stated purpose in demonstrating that the behavior of city managers is not consistent with council-manager doctrine, and, in the process, turns up data and reports findings which should be welcomed by the student of local politics. The well-argued prescriptive addendum does not interfere with the study and merits the attention of the practitioner.—KENNETH PREWITT, *Stanford University.*

The Government of Missouri, 7th ed. BY ROBERT F. KARSCH. (Columbia, Missouri: Lucas Brothers Publishers, 1961. Pp. 199.)

The present text started out more than 10 years ago as a brief exposition of Missouri's government. It was prompted at that time by the need for a handbook to assist in fulfilling a statutory requirement that the Missouri constitution be taught in state colleges and universities. Now, six editions later, the work has been enlarged into a substantial text and has become a standard reference guide to the structure and organization of Missouri state government.

A large number of treatises on the governments of individual states have appeared in recent years. The American Commonwealths Series inaugurated by the Crowell publishing firm a decade or so ago optimistically envisioned a text for each state. Other publishers have selected areas, such as Texas and California, where legal requirements or custom result in widespread teaching of courses on the government of particular states. Most works which have appeared in this genre are legally and institutionally oriented. They describe comprehensively the formal structure of the state's government, review the wide range of functions it performs, and set forth many of the legal provisions pertaining to political parties, voting, reapportionment, powers of the governor and legislature, and similar matters. Seldom does one find more than passing reference to the informal structure and operations of the governmental and administrative machinery or to the political realities that permeate the system from top to bottom.

The *Government of Missouri* conforms to the traditional pattern. It is excellent on description but short on the informal functioning of the state's administrative and legislative organs. The student who masters it will have broad knowledge of the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of Missouri government but little feel for its politics or the manner in which the public business of running the commonwealth is actually carried out. However, a text must be judged by its purpose; and Professor Karsch's objective is to supply college students in Missouri with a carefully written and documented handbook outlining the state's executive, legislative, and judicial structure, and the legal basis for its operations. Knowledge of this kind must obviously precede a more sophisticated approach to state government.—HENRY J. SCHMANDT, *University of Wisconsin.*

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

La IVe République et sa Politique Extérieure. By Alfred Grosser. (Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1961. Pp. 438.)

With the present publication Alfred Grosser, favorably known by his work on Germany, enters a field which is both important and not yet well charted. *The 4th Republic and its Foreign Policy* deals primarily with the domestic political factors influencing the making of foreign policy decisions. In the first of two parts of almost equal length he presents the network of official and unofficial institutions, groups, and persons contributing to the end products of French foreign policy. The second part narrates, in a chronological fashion, how the various decisions were arrived at in the most important issues facing the IVth Republic. To the great delight of his readers the author sticks to the pattern of his previous books: the work carries an immensely valuable *bibliographie raisonnée*, providing short but judicious characterisations of the labyrinth of source material in the field.

Among the countless insights provided in the first part of the book we find a subtle and well documented analysis of the manifold elements entering into the relations between foreign office personnel and politically responsible ministers. Grosser also elaborates upon the techniques tried by parliament to keep some influence on the shaping of foreign policy; he gives interesting explanations on how the impreciseness of coalition contracts constantly militate against the maintenance of effective parliamentary control. Very rarely has the influence of the French clergy's permissive-attitudes on the emergence of pluralistic political behavior patterns have been as clearly recognized as in the present study.

In the second part the reader will find a forceful elaboration of the tortuous course of decolonization and its foreign policy repercussions including the (by now) classic pattern of how the 1954 Indo-Chinese crisis situation led to Mendès France's temporary leadership. While the author shuns the elaboration of a formalised thesis about the relative importance of institutional, situational and personal factors, he leaves the reader in no doubt as to the varying effectiveness of Bidault, R. Schumann and Mendès-France in various phases of their careers.—O. H. KIRCHHEIMER, *Columbia University.*

The States in West German Federalism: A Study in Federal-State Relations. BY ROGER HEWES WELLS. (New York: Bookmann Associates, 1961. Pp. 148. $4.00.)

Professor Wells, whose earlier studies of German state and local government are well known, here presents within an institutional framework a short and pithy description of the functioning of German federalism. He builds not only on the studies he edited for the US High Commission, but on a good acquaintance with recent German and English-language literature and discussion. In touching on territorial organization, state elections and legislatures, Federal-*Land* relationships, *Land* administration and the *Länder*'s role in cultural affairs, he covers quite a bit of ground, and hence he had little opportunity to develop subtle details or to add local color. But extremely ample references to relevant materials are given in thirty pages of notes, and the main text includes enough illustrative data and examples to enlighten, and not so much as to confuse. It is hence very suitable for assignment for students, even under-graduates, who will find it an excellent tool for developing a comparative perspective on American federalism.

There is little doubt that the *Länder* have been able to remain more significant centers of power than many observers had thought likely. Responsible for this development in recent years have been the decisions of the Constitutional Court (though the "Television" decision came down too late for its repercussions to be examined in this book), the SPD's interest in protecting its power position in the *Land* capitals, and the strong financial position of the *Länder* as against the *Bund.* The relative increase in the power position of the interest groups vis-a-vis the parties has probably also indirectly served to shore up the *Länder*'s general bargaining position as against Bonn.

But how do the *Land* politicians and bureaucrats participate in the decision-making process on the Federal level, which to such a very great degree sets the framework for what can be done on the *Land* level. Mainly through the Bundesrat, suggests Professor Wells, and he claims that the Bundesrat "has become a more powerful second chamber than the constitutional fathers had envisioned." But only ten percent of West Germans know what the Bundesrat is, and a two-year public relations campaign over the radio failed to spread knowledge of its role. So the Bundesrat remains a sort of hydra-headed *eminence grise* which exercises power and influence throughadministrative channels and the network of links between civil servants in Bonn and the *Länder.* But quite aside from the German voters, what do political scientists know about how the German administrative process really functions? Precious little, for books such as that of Professor Wells are able to build on few substantial investigations in this area. The German discussion has largely centered on the relationships between interest groups and civil servants, but very little attempt has been made to investigate the decision-making process within the administration. It is to be hoped that German political scientists, now that they are ensconced in some three dozen political science chairs, will feel sufficiently established to undertake some initiatives in this direction.—ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, *University of Florida.*

Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain. BY WILLIAM B. GWYN. (London: The Athlone Press, 1962. Pp. 256. 35 s net.)

Winning consent to govern is the core of political democracy. The process operates at the crossroads where capitalism and popular government meet. The tangled networks of economic and political factors crisscross so closely it is difficult to isolate the separate threads into intricate patterns. Since political democracy evolved in Great Britain, a genetic study of the rise and growth of the interactions is very important. Professor Gwyn has here made a penetrating and illuminating investigation of the interrelation between wealth and politics in the development of the much admired British party system.

Politics, like sin, proliferates in an infinite variety of ways. The electoral franchise in England originated as a species of feudal property. Mr. Gwyn observes (Page 4): "During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, public office once achieved took on the aspect of private property, and at no time was the latter more hallowed." As property it could be bought and sold. It is little wonder that as capitalism evolved commercialism at first placed a price upon the vote as a kind of incorporeal legacy connected with the land. The great landowners who inherited their peerages exercised indirect ownership in the House of Commons. Elections to Parliament took on many of the characteristics of a pseudo-free market. Candidates paid the costs of holding elections, including the salaries of returning officers who took advantage of their monopoly to charge what the traffic would bear.

It sears democratic souls to read that the newly enfranchised voters under the Reform Act of 1832 (many of them fairly well-to-do middle class people) sold their new franchise at the highest possible price. The urge for participation in citizenship was less strong than the cash motive, or "treating," the civic incentive which came from the pubs at candidates' expense. Alcohol frequently incites enthusiasm but nowhere more effectively than in politics. It is comforting to know that the good citizens of Eastern Kentucky who corrupt political leadership by taking advantage of free enterprise competition to raise the price of votes on election day are following in the tradition of their Anglo-Saxon ancestors. The freshly emancipated and enfranchised ex-slaves in the South during and after Reconstruction who were willing to sell their votes for a consideration had ample precedent in England among the founders of representative government.

"Nursing a constituency" became an expensive pastime, more costly even than maintaining several mistresses, setting up a large stable of horses and hounds, or owning a yacht. In fact, the costs became so great that reform, in the shape of indirect governmental price control, was brought about by Tories joining Whigs to cut down the expense of this luxury. Gradually, as the state intervened, the legislature assumed the costs of holding elections and paid returning officers. As the electorate increased, and its processing became more costly, the state regulated competition by setting up expenditures limits for candidates and by providing that the better corporate managerial accounting techniques should apply. Each candidate had to have an agent who was responsible for keeping an account of the income and outgo. This was evidence of the existence of a new ethos, and the British wisely placed enforcement of the new rules in the hands of judges with independent tenure instead of leaving the decision to a partisan legislature. The national party organizations as such are free to spend without interference but must account for grants-in-aid to candidates.

Democracy and the Cost of Politics is an analytical and historical study little troubled by the statistics and graphs which are the stock in trade of current American publications. Probably more illumination of the electoral process has been produced here than could have been gotten from a larger display of what people say when questioned by interviewers.

A heartening note for believers in democracy is that electoral results have come to be more revealing of opinion and less a measure of candidates' expenditures. That a new ethic grew up—important for political science—is perhaps Gwyn's most significant finding, notwithstanding the view of some political scientists that ethics should be outlawed from the discipline as too "un-scientific." More studies in the twilight zone between politics and economics would contribute very valuable information to a viable political science, a discipline which is more than a pale collection of facts put together by electronics and financially underwritten by tax-evading foundations in the name of scholarship.

There is much in the Gwyn volume to confirm the findings of Graham Wallus a half-century ago, namely, that politics is cultural and not biological. Democracy must be learned, its processes acquired, not inherited. Gwyn's valuable study, adds greatly to our detailed knowledge of money and politics while at the same time throwing a revealing light upon the whole nature of government. In perspective, *Democracy and the Costs of Politics in Britain* illuminates the way toward a more effective democracy. The volume deserves serious attention.—Jasper B. Shannon, *The University of Nebraska.*

The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries. By John J. Johnson (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.)

Several years ago, when the headlong rush into independence had not yet engulfed much of Asia and Africa, a number of nationalist leaders at a Mediterranean conference discussed the problems of training and equipping the armed forces in their countries. One observer listened patiently for some time and then put the question: "Why do these nations need armies, anyway?" After an awkward silence and an exchange of uncertain glances, one delegate responded with a rhetorical question of his own: "Why do gentlemen wear neckties?" His logic was compelling; just as the absence of a necktie might shed doubt on the social quality of the human male, the absence of an army would reflect on the claims to sovereign independence of the ex-colonial societies. In addition to serving as the badge of political virility, what is the role of the military establishment in the newly emerging societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? In the conference sponsored by the Rand Corporation, which led to this collection of essays, we get an excellent idea of that role.

As must all brief reviews of anthologies, this one will suffer seriously from incompleteness. Therefore, rather than attempt a superficial summary of the chapters, this reviewer will merely note them and then dwell at some length on the two more theoretical and general opening chapters, and then terminate with a note on methodology. There are three papers on Latin America: John Johnson, the volume's editor, examines the military as a politically competing group in that region; Edwin Lieuwen and Victor Alba each provide us with historically oriented papers, and in the process remind us how different is the role of the military in Latin America as contrasted to its role in Asia and Africa. Next, three papers focus on South Asia: Guy Pauker on Indonesia, Lucian

Pye on Burma, and David Wilson on Thailand. Then Manfred Halpern examines the behavior of Middle Eastern armies in general, while Ben Halpern looks at Israel in particular. The volume is closed by James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice in an appraisal of the military in Sub-Saharan Africa.

To this reviewer, the separate regional papers were a constant source of fascinating information and provocative ideas, and in that respect they fulfilled one of the major functions of such a symposium. Further, there is for no need for the standard reference to "uneven quality." As political, social, and historical essays, all were of excellent quality: coherent, organized, literary, and as far as discernible, accurate. Turning then to the more general papers, there are first the two prefatory essays on the general nature of political development, by sociologist Edward Shils and political scientist Lucian Pye.

The opening essay by Shils is a wide ranging and comprehensive *tour de force*, constituting a happy choice for the stage-setting role. Though more of a check list than a formal model, Shils' essay is by no means theoretically unsophisticated, and while almost devoid of hard empirical data, it is full of information. His emphasis is on the struggle for modernization and the role of the elites within the changing social structure. For Shils, modernization implies egalitarian democracy, representative government, technological progress, economic planning, efficient and honest administration, and perhaps most important, national autonomy and status in the international system. Modernization also implies Westernization without dependence upon, or subservience to, Western nations. If these are the characteristics of the society to be built, the society that now exists tends to be traditional, rigidly heirarchical, technologically backward, inefficiently and dishonestly administered, and often independent in name only.

Whether or not those who strive for modernity will prevail against the *ancien régime* depends, according to Shils, on closing the gap between the rich few and the poor masses, the educated and the uneducated, the city dweller and the villager, the cosmopolitan and the provincial—the gap between the ruler and the ruled. As civilian elites falter in closing that gap, the military will tend to move in and assume that function. Among the possible outcomes of the effort to close this gap, Shils sees six different political forms, ranging from *bona fide* to tutelary democracy through modernizing, traditional, or totalitarian civil oligarchies, to modernizing military oligarchies. As to the assets and liabilities of each form, Shils offers a number of cogent and telling epigrams, and concludes that the totalitarian oligarchy would have the best chance of remaining in power once there, but that some form of tutelary democracy "offers a more realistic settlement with the slowly tractable realities. . . ."

Just as Shils is markedly influenced by his familiarity with (one might even say affection for) the Indian post-independence élites, Lucian Pye in the second general paper reflects his special concern with Southeast Asia in general and Burma in particular. As a student of comparative politics, however, he carries us further into our discussion of the military's role than does the opening paper. Pye begins by reminding us that the prevailing prediction, until quite recently, was that "the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties." The key role of the military was largely unanticipated.

Pye seems to feel that certain shortcomings in traditional Western thought account not only for our failure to anticipate this role, but for our attitude toward military regimes *per se*. Among these shortcomings, two come in for critical comment. First, we have—in contrast to Communist theoreticians—no appropriate doctrine which, "in lieu of tested knowledge," indicate the socio-political requirements for the transition from traditional and authoritarian to democratic and representative society. This leads to an over-emphasis on the utopian goal rather than the complex process, producing in turn a premature and unjustified sense of failure on the part of the would-be modernizers. Secondly, Pye observes that we are essentially Sumnerians (my phrase) and hence prone to view political institutions (stateways) primarily as the *consequence* of social forces (folkways) rather than as levers by which fundamental societal change may be brought about. This model, he argues, is inappropriate for nations whose "indigenous values" have been far less instrumental than externally-imposed institutions in the shaping of their society.

He then turns to two central queries: (a) what are the major characteristics of armies in the underdeveloped countries? and (b) what is their modernizing role? As to the first, Pye concludes that these armies are *not* organized or staffed to wage war, and that their officers and men are even further apart than in most military organizations. On the other hand, they do reflect the tendency of all armies to apply international and non-parochial standards to their own societies, they are "relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day-to-day basis." Because of their remoteness from their societies they tend to minimize its central problems and assume that these can be overcome "if the right orders are given." The army's modernizing role, the author emphasizes, depends upon the degree to which it provides an acculturation process for its recruits which is very different than that experienced by the civilian villager. Not only does the process enhance the psychic and material security of the inductee, and provide for social mobility, but it provides considerable training in both technology and citizenship; all of these are seen as assets. The chapter concludes with a very relevant warning against stereotyping the military. On the one hand, we must recognize that *military* aid may well be indirect *economic* aid, and on the other we had better be careful not to assume that military rule is any guarantee of either political stability or resistance to the internal or external Communist threat.

Having praised both the introductory and the detailed papers, I must register a serious reservation. First, Hans Speier's preface might have led one to expect a "serious and sustained effort to study the role of the military in the underdeveloped countries *on a comparative basis*." This study is comparative in only the most casual sense of the word. Secondly, and in the same vein, my appraisal of the papers—because it is essentially personal and intuitive—may be readily challenged by another reader, and there will be no way to decide the issue. This is the price we pay as long as our data are anecdotal, our selection and classification implicit, and our theory invisible.

In other words, until political science and history "go operational" (as have much of sociology, psychology and economics) there will be no visible and objective criteria by which our research may be evaluated. Admittedly, the early stages of operationalization in any given field are painful, awkward and only partially productive. But without it, we will never get any empirical generalizations which are susceptible to disproof, and in the absence of such data-based propositions, our "theories" will remain merely models. Given the talent that went into this symposium, and the fascination—not to mention the importance—of its subject matter, it is too bad that all we have to show for it is a collection of first-class essays.—J. DAVID SINGER, *Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan.*

Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941–1945. BY EDMOND PARIS. (Chicago, American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961. Pp. 306. Price $5.00.)

Between Nazi Germany's conquest of Yugoslavia, in April, 1941, and the end of the war more than 700,000 men, women and children were massacred in one area of the partitioned land, Axis-sponsored "Independent State of Croatia." They were killed by their Croat countrymen in the cause of a Croatian nationalism which demanded racial and religious uniformity in the new state. Croatian death-squads also murdered about 60,000 Jews and 20,000 Gypsies; the ratio of victims to the total population of "Independent Croatia" makes this perhaps the worst example of genocide in the Second World War.

The post-war establishment of a unified Yugoslavia, dominated by its Serbian plurality, threw the Croat nationalists, who had hoped for a state of their own, into opposition. This opposition found expression in an underground organization of "Ustashi" (Rebels), headed by Ante Pavelich and patronized by Fascist Italy and Hungary. The complicity of Pavelich and the Ustashi in the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles, in 1934, was established by a French court; Pavelich was sentenced to death *in absentia* after Mussolini refused a request for his extradition to France. On the day that Hitler attacked Yugoslavia, Pavelich broadcast to Croatia: "Croatian soldiers, take up arms against the Serbian officers and soldiers! From now on we shall fight side by side with our new allies, the Germans and Italians." A week later he entered Zagreb with an escort of Italian tanks. After Yugoslavia's surrender the country was partitioned by the Axis powers and on Easter Day, in Zagreb Cathedral, the Roman Catholic Archbishop Stepinac proclaimed the "Independent State of Croatia" with Pavelich as its "Poglavnik" (Führer). The Pavelich government declared war on Hitler's enemies. The Poglavnik himself appeared with Mussolini before cheering crowds and was received in private audience by Pius XII; a papal representative in Zagreb was treated as dean of the diplomatic corps; Stepinac sat in the Croatian Diet as one of eleven representatives of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and was later appointed "Head of Military Chaplains" *sine titulo* to the Ustashi army.

Soon the massacres began, perpetrated by the Ustashi with the collaboration of certain Franciscan priests and monks. The intentions of the regime were clarified by the Minister of Education: "We shall kill one part of the Serbs, we shall transport another, and the rest of them will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic religion." Fascist Croatia extended the policy of genocide to the Croatian Jews; the journal *Katolichki Tyednik* declared on June 15, 1941, that "the Serbs are the greatest enemies of the Croats, while the Jews and Masons are the greatest enemies of all Europe." During the four years of Axis Croatia about 240,000 Serbs were "converted," whole villages at a time. The Serb who clung to his Orthodoxy had to wear an armband like the Jew; the latter, being "non-Aryan," was not allowed to save himself by conversion. The

Orthodox cathedral at Bihach was dynamited; about 300 Serbian churches were destroyed. On October 31, 1943, Stepinac stated: "the [Roman Catholic] Church does not agree with the injustices committed against the Jews and the Serbs"; he added that "we cannot be responsible for some of the dare-devil fanatics in the ecclesiastical ranks." After the war a Yugoslav Communist court found Stepinac guilty of treason and responsibility for the massacres and forced conversions. Sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment, he served five. The Vatican promoted him to Cardinal.

As Nazi Germany collapsed, its Croatian allies ran for their lives. Pavelich, after being caught by the British and released under obscure circumstances, fled to Rome disguised as a priest; he then moved to Argentina and ultimately to Spain, where he died in 1959, having received the personal benediction of John XXIII. Pavelich's Minister of the Interior escaped to Los Angeles, via Switzerland and Ireland; his name cropped up at the trial of Adolf Eichmann when a witness testified it was "common knowledge" that the official had carried out "anti-Jewish measures on orders from Germany"; his extradition to Yugoslavia was refused by the United States. Former Ustashi officials and sympathizers have organized many propaganda centers in the United States and elsewhere which appear to enjoy lavish financial support. They continue to preach hatred of the Serbs and Yugoslavia; completely distorting the history of Pavelich's Croatia, they portray it as a crusade for independence and against Communism.

This tragic story is thoroughly supported by source material drawn largely from Ustasha and clerical publications appearing during the four years of the "Independent State of Croatia," and by a large bibliography in numerous languages. An appendix lists the names of 171 Serbian Orthodox priests and 47 rabbis who were murdered by the Ustashi; a collection of photographs shows the Ustashi leaders, their Nazi-Fascist allies, and their victims. The author of this book, a French anti-clerical, writes with sympathy and anger; the translation is often awkward and sometimes ungrammatical, while Serbo-Croatian words are neither transliterated nor supplied with diacritical marks. These flaws do not detract from a stark portrayal of what can happen when nationalist ferocity and religious intolerance conclude an unholy alliance.—JOHN CLINTON ADAMS, *Dartmouth College.*

The British Parliament. By ROLAND YOUNG. (London: Faber and Faber, 1962. Pp. 259. $4.20.)

A new book on parliament has been needed for some time as Sir Ivor Jennings' classic work *Parliament* (1939) has become outmoded. Studies of such special aspects as question time, private bill procedure, delegated legislation, the role of the House of Lords, control of public expenditure, and detailed accounts of the passage of individual items of legislation have appeared in recent years and would help to provide the background. Professor Young is to be congratulated on attempting a new synthesis, but the result is disappointing.

It is not quite clear what this book is trying to do. It might have simply set out to describe parliament, and it does contain long accounts of personalities and debates. For most students of politics the key questions are evident. How much power does parliament exercise over the government? What other functions does it perform? And how is power distributed within parliament? Professor Young touches on these points without making a resolute attempt to answer any of them and his conclusions are blurred into mere suggestions by a constant use of the conditional "it can be said that" or "it might be argued that. . . . "

The general impression left is of an overemphasis on the importance of parliament but the imprecision of the book has the same effect on any attempt at assessment. For instance it asserts that "parliament is sovereign in the sense that if its consent is required and there is a conflict of wills, the will of Parliament prevails. Parliament has the final word." Legally this is true but how often in the last fifty years has there been a "conflict of wills"? And how far can Parliament be said to have a will of its own apart from that of the Government? There is, for instance, no attempt to draw a distinction between the influence of government and of opposition back-benchers. Professor Young says the opposition can insist "on accountability and full discussion" but as his own later examples show, the government often flatly refuses to disclose or discuss large areas of defence, foreign and colonial policy. The reader is told that "some Conservative members have remarked that since the development of the committee system there has been a trend towards debating and deciding controversial matters within the confines of the party and off the floor of Parliament." Yet is is hard to reconcile this statement with one six pages later that "the great political drama is unfolded on the floor of parliament. This is where the game is played." As an example of Commons' control over legislation the Bill to Repeal Restrictions on the Use of Cars in Elections (1958) is chosen but it is not in any way typical. The point at issue was small, understood by every M. P., and the object of intense partisan passion. A more accurate picture would have been derived by studying one of the highly complex bills involving many changes in administrative practice where only a handful of members even understand the provisions. On the power of the purse Professor Young says "we would miss the main impact of parliamentary control if we limited our observations to the formal procedures only" but there is no account of any informal methods whereby MPs might control taxation or expenditure.

It is a pity that an American study of parliament does not employ any of the techniques that have only recently begun to be imported into the U.K. One would like to have a systematic survey of the reasons for the withdrawal of many able MPs from parliament, and for the decline in the prestige of politics as a profession—which makes it so difficult to offer MPs anything like a reasonable salary. Too little is known about attitudes to parliament though the decline in reports of debates (almost a cessation in the case of the popular press) is a pointer. It is becoming accepted in Britain that Parliament is no longer the forum of the nation but why and how this has happened still requires investigation.—JOHN P. MACKINTOSH, *University College, Ibadan, Nigeria.*

South Africa 1906–1961: The Price of Magnanimity. BY NICHOLAS MANSERGH. (New York: Praeger, 1962. Pp. 104. $3.50.)

"Radicalism was a more potent force than humanitarianism in early twentieth century liberalism," writes History Professor Mansergh (Cambridge) in this analysis of the establishment of the Union of South Africa. " . . . It is not the English way to govern white men as a subject race . . . " said Liberal Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman during the Boer War, and more than anyone he was responsible for the evolution of a united South Africa. The unification of the two defeated republics and two British colonies in 1910 was an act of generosity toward the vanquished Boers.

In some ways, the title of this slim volume is misleading, for it concentrates heavily upon the period 1906 until 1910, while there are frequent references to the period between 1899 and 1905 as well as the years of Union in South Africa. The author deals with two major topics: first, what considerations led to the South Africa Act, and second, the effects of this magnanimous gesture upon the well-being of the non-white and English-speaking sectors of the South African population, sectors that later came to be ruled by a fanatically supremacist Afrikaner nationalist minority. Both subjects are covered extremely well, the first perhaps somewhat more effectively than the second.

Professor Mansergh writes objectively, fairly and in an impeccably scholarly fashion about issues which all too often become shrouded in emotionalism. Tracing the decision-making processes that led to the South Africa Act, he shows that Liberal policy was neither one of blind and sudden impulse nor one without precedent. Quoting extensively and absorbingly from correspondence files, the Colonial Office Records and the Public Record Office, he proves that Union in South Africa was carefully considered, and that the price to be paid was forecast by several eminent critics (Milner, Schreiner, Graham and others).

In considering the price of Liberal generosity to non-Afrikaner South Africans, the author faced difficult obstacles. It is easy, for instance, to create the impression that in pre-Union days (as well as during Union) the English-speaking resident of South Africa was the real liberal, with the interests of the non-white at heart. Professor Mansergh reminds the reader that the decision not to adopt the Cape native franchise throughout united South Africa was arrived at by English-speaking as well as Afrikaner whites. To quote Botha: " . . . a great number of people in the Transvaal, English as well as Dutch, are quite prepared to wreck the Union on this question. . . . " On these and other, similar matters, the author proves his intimate knowledge of South African affairs while avoiding all bias in his writing. In dealing with so vast a subject as the woes of South Africa, there is obviously a need for selectivity, and the author appears to assume some knowledge on the part of the reader of the nature of *apartheid* and its architects. Throughout, the work retains its high-level, academically sound approach.

South Africa 1906–1961: The Price of Magnanimity is an important contribution, which will retain its value long after the current storm of writing on Africa has abated—and has been largely forgotten.—HARM JAN DE BLIJ, *Michigan State University.*

Portugal's Stand in Africa. BY ADRIANO MOREIRA. (New York. University Publishers. 265 pp. $3.95.)

Portugal is in deep trouble in Africa. Nationalists of Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Moçambique have established headquarters at Conakry, Leopoldville, and Dar es Salaam to pursue their common goal of freedom from Portuguese rule. Border incidents in Portuguese Guinea and the uprising in northern Angola are visible evidences of this resistance.

Portugal's Stand in Africa is an attempt of the Salazar regime to defend her position in these countries. The book is a collection of eleven addresses delivered in the years from 1958 to 1961 by Adriano Moreira, a lawyer, professor of law at the Lisbon Center for Political and Social

Studies, and since 1961, Portugal's Overseas Minister. All of the addresses were delivered in Portugal and cover a wide range of subjects, from a report on the conferences at Bandung and Cairo to a treatise on Portugal's contribution to the progress of man in its overseas regions. The book also contains a preface addressed to the American people and the text of three decrees of 1961: the repeal of the Native Statute in Portuguese Africa; the decree setting up Provincial Settlement Boards to aid in the European colonization program for Angola and Moçambique; and the decree to review existing legislation to give a new impulse to create municipal institutions in Portugal's African empire.

In the addresses the author attacks the neutralist ideology of the Afro-Asian group, laments the ignorance of her western allies of the basic issues involved in Africa, defends her policy of cultural assimilation, and confirms the mission of Portugal in Africa from the days of Vasco da Gama to the present. Throughout the addresses one dominant theme prevails: the distinctiveness of the Portuguese way of life, the fundamental code of which is the equality of the human race. Applying this principle to Africa, Mr. Moreira states that "between the North of Africa, which discriminates against the white man, and the South, which discriminates against the black man, the Portuguese way of life assures a zone in which prevail the universal values from which all benefit and to which many may eventually have to resort in order to remedy the errors which are presently accumulating."

Unfortunately, the history of Angola and Moçambique give very little substance to Mr. Moreira's exposition of Portugal's philosophic, political and juridical doctrines of peaceful assimilation in her overseas colonies. Portuguese occupation of her African territories was violent, evidenced by the Angolan wars of the Dembos in the north, Bailundu in the central area, and Cuamato in the south. Moreover the parent-child relationship inherent in the Portuguese colonial policy makes a mockery of its pronouncements regarding the equality of all races. Under this concept, equality is applied within a fraternal relationship between the master and all of his dependents, the Portuguese assuming the role of the master. As long as Mr. Moreira and his government hold to the position that "our politics of today are the politics of yesterday," there will be continued resistance against Portuguese rule in Angola, Moçambique, Portuguese Guinea, and the Islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé, and Príncipe.—THOMAS OKUMA, *Boston University.*

Africa South. BY HARM J. DE BLIJ. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962. Pp. vii, 399. $5.95.)

Africa South can be recommended highly to the general reader. Professor de Blij's purpose to provide the basic social and economic data as well as historical background for understanding those political entities under substantial white rule has been fulfilled. A major portion of this book is devoted to the Republic of South Africa; however, the descriptions of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland, Angola and Moçambique are also of high quality, and only a slight reservation is noted below regarding the treatment of the Central African Federation.

The "Wind of Change," as Prime Minister Macmillan called the urge to African independence, provides the theme of this book. During the ten years that geographer de Blij lived in South Africa he taught, worked for a newspaper, participated in civic organizations, and became acquainted with all shades of African opinion and life. He explains that his expectation of tragedy will not be agreeable to many of his acquaintances. He emphasizes the importance to the Republic of continued white domination of the buffer dependencies under Portuguese and British control; however, even the lack of rigidity of the assimilation and partnership policies are viewed as threats to apartheid, not to speak of the growing African nationalism beginning to bear fruit in the High Commission Territories. Apartheid also faces grave domestic economic and political obstacles; apparently, the Africaner is not willing to pay the price for carrying through this policy. On the other hand, the author warns that the ability of the political leaders of the Republic should not be underestimated.

Specialists may find controversial de Blij's judgment on the assimilation policy, that "Portuguese Africa can present a semblance of real harmony, progress, and good will." However, this view is very much qualified. "Portugal's African provinces have one or two show cases . . . but they are rare instances in an ocean of isolation and deprivation." The discussion of the Central African Federation can be criticized because it underemphasizes the role of Christians and missions, especially in Nyasaland. Not only have missions been important in developments here, but church groups in Britain have helped prevent this white dominated federation from becoming independent.

The author is to be commended for his short and useful bibliographies following each chapter, for his helpful maps, and for his beautiful descriptions of the land and the people who live on it. This is the best general treatment of this area presently available.—RICHARD W. TAYLOR, *Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.*

The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. BY SIR HARRY MELVILLE. (London:

George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 200. $4.00.)

Her Majesty's Customs and Excise. By Sir James Crombie. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1962. Pp. 224. $4.80.)

These are the latest volumes in the New Whitehall Series published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. The stated purpose of this series is to provide authoritative descriptions of the present work of the major departments of British central government. Among the eight volumes previously published are those on the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office. Four volumes now in preparation include those on the Treasury and the Ministry of Agriculture.

Modern Swedish government. By Nile Andrén. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961. Pp. 252. Sw.kr. 19.50.)

The aim is to present a comprehensive introduction to modern Swedish government, mainly on the national level. The Swedish Constitution of 1809, which sets the pattern, is the oldest European constitution still in force. The author has had ten years experience in teaching Swedish government at the International Graduate School for English Speaking Students at the University of Stockholm. The work has been published with a grant from the Swedish Council for Social Science Research.—J. B. C.

Wir sind die stärkste der Partei'N! Eine Bibliographie zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. By the Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED. (Leipzig, Verlag für Buch und Bibliothekswesen, 1961. Pp. 67.)

The annotated and classified bibliography of some three hundred titles was prepared for the 15th anniversary of the SED by that party's chief scientific institute. The selection is of course limited to publications which have appeared in German in the German Democratic Republic. Most of the publications included appeared through the Dietz Verlag in Berlin. There are some references to periodicals and newspapers. Understanding and analysis of the material collected here might furnish a key to the present party development in the DDR, and the aims it is trying to hammer home on that jurisdiction in the present unsettled world.—J. B. C.

European elections by direct suffrage, a comparative study of the electoral systems used in Western Europe and their utility for the direct election of a European parliament. By Wolfgang Birke. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1961. Pp. 124. European aspects, series C. Studies on politics, no. 5.)

The study was prepared at the College of Europe at Bruges under a grant from the Council of Europe at Strassbourg to assist in the consideration and determination of a uniform electoral system for the common European Assembly. It contains a brief treatment of the electoral system of each of the countries as well as a comparison of the different features. There is a draft of articles for a European electoral law.—J. B. C.

Senegal, A Study in French Assimilation Policy. By Michael Crowder. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. x, 104. $1.25.)

The author, editor of *Nigeria* magazine, has presented an excellent case study of the growth, application, and consequences of one aspect of French colonial policy. He traces the idea and practice of assimilation in Senegal from its earliest manifestations at the turn of the nineteenth century to Senegal's independence in 1960; his study concludes with an examination of the impact of assimilationist doctrine on contemporary Senegalese politics and policies. Mr. Crowder is also the author of *The Story of Nigeria*, London: Faber, 1962, probably the first comprehensive history of Nigeria.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION

What Price Coexistence? A Policy for the Western Alliance. By Sir John Slessor. (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. 153 Pp. $4.50.)

If political knots could be untied by the logic of military analysis, Sir John Slessor would have made a significant contribution to the reduction of East-West tensions. A Marshall of the Royal Air Force, the author was Chief of the Air Staff, Commandant of the Imperial Defense College, and Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command, during the Battle of Britain. He has written extensively on military strategy and political policy. Many of the ideas in the present volume are taken from his earlier works.

Sir John seeks an acceptable way out of the present stalemate which would combine Western toughness and strength with greater flexibility, based on mutual and balanced concessions. He desires to decrease the present terrible risks and wasteful costs by approaches which will increase confidence on both sides in peaceful coexistence. He believes the Russians still hold fast to their goal of world communism and to their strategy of nibbling away at the non-communist world by subversion and Pavlovian psychological warfare. Sir John is convinced, however, that the Soviet leaders are unwilling to risk nuclear war to achieve their objectives, and that they are as aware as are our Western leaders of the danger of the process of escalation in limited war. His long-range object is a world government with limited responsibilities to enforce disarmament and insure world order through some form of an international police. However, this work is concerned primarily with first steps, and he believes these should be taken in Europe on Western initiative.

No possibility of a rapid or spectacular change in the communist system is deemed feasible. Thus, the West must not overtly try to destroy the communist camp if it wishes to establish a *modus vivendi* under which increased contacts and the slow influence of various internal and external factors may change Soviet practice. On the side of toughness, Sir John warns against expecting too much from negotiations with the communists, although the West should always stand ready to negotiate. He advocates pacts with the communists whose validity should not, as far as possible, depend upon communist good faith. He proposes a hard policy to counter the nibbling processes of subversion and intervention.

On the side of flexibility, Sir John advances the policy of disengagement in Europe, starting with Germany. Eventually, a cordon of buffer states should be erected from Sweden to the Black Sea. The immediate objective is to get the Red Army back within the present Soviet borders. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will not start a war over Berlin but will use the situation in that city for bargaining purposes. Sir John hopes for the eventual reunification of Germany and by this process the solution of the Berlin problem, but he offers no support for the recovery of Germany's former territories in the East. The first step in his program is to be an agreement for Russian and Allied withdrawal from Germany. German arms will remain, and while Germany might then withdraw from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it would continue its ties with the West. The military forces of the United States would remain in some strength in Western Europe and in Britain.

There is a long discussion of the possibilities for making the military arrangements of NATO more effective. Sir John advocates the abolition of tactical nuclear weapons and warns that military plans must not aggravate fear. He is opposed to having NATO become a fourth nuclear power.

Sir John casts about in all directions in his discussion. He calls for aid to the developing countries but regards them with obvious contempt. Regarding disarmament he makes the point that nuclear weapons should be the last weapons to be abolished, since it is they that make war obsolete. Immediate admission of Communist China to the United Nations is urged, but so is a United Nations trusteeship for Formosa, a proposal unacceptable to Communist China. A chapter is devoted to "the American obsession" with anti-colonialism, which Sir John believes to be the most disruptive force in the Atlantic Alliance.

There is much bluff and superficiality in this book. Such aspects of the main subject as the ability of the present Soviet leadership to make concessions, the position of De Gaulle, and the acceptability of disengagement to both the Russians and the Germans are not examined. Despite such pronounced flaws, the book has the merit of presenting a provocative, if not wholly original, plan for Western initiative in easing cold war tensions.—ALFRED FERNBACH, *University of Virgina.*

The Eternal Triangle? Communist China, the United States and the United Nations. BY SHELDON APPLETON. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 1961. xiv, 274 pp. $5.95.)

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on December 1, 1961, Adlai E. Stevenson presented with new eloquence U. S. arguments against the seating of Communist China in the world body. Many people, who had expected Ambassador Stevenson, in light of earlier statements before joining the Kennedy Administration, to be rather luke-warm in his presentation, were surprised at the force with which he expressed his views. But it was, after all, merely a reflection of the emphasis on security considerations which holding responsible office had brought, as well as his access to classified material and awareness of interrelationships that cannot be talked about openly by Administration spokesmen.

Such considerations are generally missing from Professor Sheldon Appleton's study of the United States and the question of the admission of Communist China to the U. N. He has researched the literature diligently, carried out some enterprising interviewing, and attempted to isolate the important components of the problem. His major research is summarized in six chapters sandwiched between a summary history of the question and a final "Summing Up." In these chapters he examines the legal and procedural aspects of the question, backgrounds of the two Chinese governments, significance of the representation issue, voting record of the U. N., U. S., policy, and the relation of American public opinion to that policy.

Appleton finds that "the history of the question in the United Nations to date makes it clear enough that political rather than legal factors have been, and will continue to be, decisive in determining U. N. action in the matter." (32–33) Nevertheless in a weighing of political factors and with only a cursory glance at the international security and power considerations, he concludes "the seating of Peking in the U. N. would probably yield more advantages than disadvantages to the United States." (103) His position in support of seating Communist China is buttressed by an imposing array of statistical analysis of past U. N. voting records, public opinion surveys, and projection of trends. On the basis of public opinion surveys, for example, he finds that "there is much greater support for seating Peking among American elite and leadership groups than in the population generally." (217) The same could, of course, have been said with regard to the rationalization of the policies of Stalin in the 1930s.

The title of this study is an accurate reflection of its major shortcoming. By concentrating attention on the United Nations representation issue Appleton tends to ignore some of the political and military power realities of the problem. The China representation issue has become a highly-charged political issue and one which simply cannot be isolated from other international problems in the manner attempted by Professor Appleton. Although he does present many of the complexities of the China problem, his concentration on the United Nations as the center of world attention and concern leads him to overplay the extent to which various governments consider the U. N. or the China question as an issue to which other questions are subordinate. It also leads him to overlook many aspects of U. S. foreign policy. In discussing the importance of seating Peking to the overseas Chinese communities, for instance, he comments that the U. S. might "attempt . . . to utilize the influence available to it in Southeast Asia to persuade local governments there to pursue policies which would encourage the gradual reorientation of overseas Chinese toward their country of residence." (119) This has long been a major U. S. policy on which able diplomats have already spent many agonizing years.

Events have dated Appleton's efforts. The explosion in U. N. membership, budgetary problems, and such issues as the Congo operation have provoked responsible U. S. and NATO leaders to raise reservations which throw the whole China representation problem into different focus. Again, as long as Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek are firmly committed that only one China will be represented at the U. N., the diligence and effort behind much of the statistical analysis and detached projections are hardly likely to be of lasting certainly not "eternal" significance. The book can serve as a handy reference work on the past history of the China problem at the U. N., but unfortunately its use for reference purposes is marred by the fact that the author has not seen fit to provide an index.—Richard L. Walker, *University of South Carolina.*

Southeast Asia Today—And Tomorrow. A Political Analysis. By Richard Butwell. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. Pp. x, 176. $4.25 cloth, $1.75 paper.)

Political developments in Southeast Asia have covered so much ground in the last fifteen years or more that it is nearly impossible to follow them with any semblance of precision. In recent years research in Burma, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and less so in Cambodia and Laos, has begun to produce fragments of an understanding of what is happening in the area. But we are obviously still very far away from confidence in discussing the politics of any one of these states. To discuss them all together in one brief book is quite a task, and one that only a few scholars have tried so far.

Mr. Butwell's book is a recent attempt to throw some light on all of Southeast Asia. Having spent several years studying this area, sometimes in the field, he sets out in this book "to describe and assess the record of the lands of Southeast Asia in governing themselves after a decade of independence; to offer some suggestions, based on this examination, concerning the nature of government in this part of the world; and to chart the probable course of future development." He devotes a chapter each to pre-independence background, the governmental system each state began with after independence, later adjustment of the political systems, the political process, development of government policies, changing policy patterns and directions, Communism (The Communist Challenge), foreign policy; and he concludes with a very brief comment on some problems of the future.

A few of Mr. Butwell's observations are debatable—among them his reasoning that neutralism must necessarily benefit the Communists. But a majority of knowledgeable readers will not disagree with most of his conclusions.

The primarily descriptive and comparative approach of this book seems at first glance to be promising, but its content is not satisfying. Covering as much as he does, the author necessarily sketches and over-simplifies most of his descriptive material. This certainly reduces the value of the book for area experts, who require rather meatier detail. And there is not sufficient depth and precision of analysis to compensate for this. On the other hand, the beginning student, who is not likely to have more than an odd bit of information about Southeast Asia at his disposal, may find it hard to weather the apparent flood of countries, systems, and leaders that comes at him as he goes from section to section in the book.

However, Mr. Butwell has provided the reader with some information of more recent date—into 1961—than other books available at this time. It may therefore have limited value as supplementary reading, especially the chapter on "the search for the appropriate political system." A short selected bibliography will be useful to the general reader.—DANIEL S. LEV, *Cornell University.*

Latin America between the Eagle and the Bear. BY SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962. Pp. xiv, 192. $4.50.)

In conception and intent, this is a good book. In execution, it is at best mediocre. Sketching the dangers which hem Latin America in its position between the American eagle and the Soviet bear, Sr. de Madariaga considers the various pertinent influences: Spanish, American, and Soviet-Chinese. The obvious intent is to enhance the reader's comprehension of Latin America and its Communist threat, and with such a goal no one can quarrel.

But with execution one cannot be as well satisfied. The Table of Contents expounds a neat organization, but the text is often rambling and diffuse. One learns some things with which he was not previously familiar: that Spain's rule over the Latin American countries was not really "colonial," and that Spain did not, as so often thought, practice a selfish, extractive, gold-hungry policy. Other matters are only too familiar. North American students of hemispheric relations hardly need to be told of the evils of dollar diplomacy, economic imperialism, fraternization with Batista- and Trujillo-type dictators, and similar shortcomings of our Latin American policies; this tale has been told many times, and often far better than in the present volume.

Questions of balance are not answered to the satisfaction of this reviewer. No one could cover this subject matter intensively in the fewer than two hundred pages used here, but one can look askance at the judgment exercised when the author spends fourteen pages discussing details of party organization and program in various countries, while agrarian reform, by his own statement one of Latin America's very most pressing problems, is dismissed in one superficial twenty-line paragraph. Sr. de Madariaga sensibly maintains that international non-intervention is indeed practically impossible, but nevertheless repeats the stock Latin criticisms of United States intervention. The United States is advised, among a great many other things, to improve its image in Latin America—and surely most of us will agree with this suggestion despite the fact that the bloom of youth has long since faded from its cheeks—but this perennial admonition is offered in such a fashion as to cause at least one North American to wonder whether Latins have ever considered improving their image in North America. This one American has grown weary of this warmed-over diet, even when served by so distinguished an author.—HOLLIS W. BARBER, *The University of Illinois, Chicago.*

The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960. BY J. LLOYD MECHAM. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Pp. xii, 514. $7.50.)

In this lengthy and extensively documented study of hemisphere relations Professor Mecham has examined so many questions of inter-American interest within so broad a range of history that it is difficult to do justice to his work in a short review. He has produced a useful and informative book to which the reader, once exposed, will in all probability return again and again.

As the title suggests, the author's basic approach to inter-American relations is historical, but his treatment actually goes beyond the dates specified. An early chapter deals with the "old" Pan Americanism, the phase of limited cooperative efforts among Spanish-American nations between 1826 and 1888. Later chapters bring the story of continental politics down through 1960. Synthesis, or at any rate skillful management, of the vast historical detail of a century and a quarter seems to be achieved largely through four key concepts which dominate the book.

The first of these is *security*, which is generally assessed as the preservation of national independence through cooperation among the several nations. At various points in his narrative Mecham dwells on the recurrent problem faced by the small Latin American state: is national independence generally favored or hindered by the type of regional security arrangement that has evolved in the Western Hemisphere? Recognizing the validity of the question, the author makes a convincing case for the regional organization as a guarantor of national independence in Latin America, and he cites distinguished and discriminating Latin American sources in support of his case, (for example, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo).

A concept that is immediately related is, of course, the special power of the United States in the inter-American system. "Twenty mice and a cat" has been a glib and cynical description of the twenty-one member OAS. There is nothing cynical in Mecham's more thoughtful appraisal: "Although nominally a regional arrangement of twenty-one juridically equal and sovereign states, the Organization of American States is actually an association of one Great Power with twenty small weak member nations in which evidences of United States predominance are readily apparent." The realities of United States power, its hazards and benefits, are constantly acknowledged throughout the work.

No comprehensive treatment of the Inter-American scene can avoid involvement with those two perennial ideas of *regionalism* and *universalism*. As everyone knows there have been "regionalists," ready to wall off the American hemisphere from contagion with a wicked world, who have been opposed by champions of a universalism which denies any validity to the hemispheric concept. Mecham's contention is that "there is no inherent contradiction between universalism and regionalism, for neither is an exclusive principle." In the chapters dealing with World War II and the integration of inter-American security into UN he makes an excellent case for the compatibility of the two principles.

This reviewer would have welcomed a somewhat more extended treatment of a fifth concept, namely, nationalism in Latin America. The relevance of nationalist sentiments to specific questions of hemispheric security is suggested in various sections including those which pertain to challenges from international communism. Yet, in other important parts of the story, at the eve of World War II for example, the full force of nationalism as an element in the security equation appears to be underrated.

Mecham's direct concern, however, is not with the *isms* and other abstractions. The concrete acts of specific governments, managed and controlled by beings of flesh and blood, absorb his interest and stimulate his appreciation of the steps by which the Western Hemisphere nations have moved, whether clumsily or adroitly, toward a regional security system which, he believes, can contribute to the peace and well-being of the world at large. A vital and important book is the result of this appreciation.—JOHN J. KENNEDY, *University of Virginia.*

Urbanization in Latin America: A UNESCO Survey. PHILIP M. HAUSER, ed., (New York: International Documents Service. 1961. Pp. 331. $4.50.)

The growth of the social sciences in Latin America has been slow not only because of the centuries-long emphasis given to professional training at the university level, but also because of widespread political, religious, and ideological impediments. Until very recently the serious consideration of social matters was a labor only of humanistic essayists—some of high quality indeed, but still "scientists of the spirit," a phrase which many of them continue to use to defend themselves against the onslaught of the "operationalists" and "nose counters." The present slow but persistent spread of empirical sociology, following a quite rapid expansion of modern economics dating in some countries from the mid-'thirties, still has not been accompanied by more than an isolated vocation here and there for the ministry of political science. As a result Latin American political sociologists and political economists, joined by a few daring denizens of law schools, are doing the only relatively disciplined work on the political process other than the sporadic efforts of visiting foreign scholars. An important role in the encouragement of sociological and economic studies has been taken by the United Nations through such of its agencies as UNESCO, UNESCO-Western Hemisphere, and the Economic Commission for Latin America. These institutions have engaged in such formally promotional activities as the underwriting of research and interchange, training, and the calling of many international meetings which have served to establish communications and create a certain feeling of community among scholars from different countries. An unanticipated result has been to clothe certain Latin American professors with an international repute which has cushioned them from a measure of discomfort at home. In this context, it is ironic and unfortunate, although probably necessary, that the international agencies should so cautiously skirt both political issues and political science in the work they choose to sponsor in Latin America.

Urbanization in Latin America is a competently condensed collection of the proceedings of a seminar sponsored by four U. N. agencies and the Organization of American States in 1959 in Santiago de Chile, Latin America's Geneva. The volume, another in the Technology and Science Series of UNESCO, can profitably be paired with a preceding volume, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East,* to reveal some of the special characteristics of Latin America's problems of development. Some of these contrasts are pointed out in the *rapporteur's* presentation which opens the book, a section implicitly containing some well considered theoretical ideas with exciting research implications. The general conclusions of the seminar following the opening summary hardly even mention the problems of decision and power involved in public action to grapple with the difficulties and promises of rapid urbanization. Indeed, the conclusions list demographic, economic, employment, educational, and administrative aspects of urbanization, as well as a few others, but nowhere is city government as such discussed, let alone pressure groups, parties, political values, styles, ideologies, or the leadership-followership relation. The last chapter, entitled "Some Policy Implications of Urbanization," belies its generous title in its first sentence by restricting itself only to the "socio-economic policy implications of the rapid growth of cities in Latin America." One would think that a U. N. with Korea behind it and the Congo all around it could muster the courage to face political research with a little more determination, especially when dealing with Latin American cities, the incubators of the region's nationalistic politics of development.

The eleven selected seminar papers presented in the book are by and large interesting and sometimes even piquing, and will serve to introduce the American reader to some of the more important Latin American social scientists. While common sense precludes accepting certain of the statistical material as being rigorously and meticulously reliable (a pretense no contributor to this book makes), the general outlines indicated are often of a high level of sophistication, and the analysis sometimes subtle and richly suggestive. These comments are especially true of the studies of slum and working class sections of Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. It should also be emphasized again that some of these studies were written by persons quite new to this kind of research; even since this quite recent effort, most of them have demonstrated their continuing intellectual and technical growth. Even though this review, then, has voiced the discontent of a political scientist, it would be unjust not to end on the happier note that this book is not only "useful"—pallid word!—but is informative on several planes about both Latin America and Latin American scholars, and constitutes a prod to further research despite the officialese in which the summary and conclusions are couched. This volume suggests that the day will yet come when we shall be able to judge a book about Latin America on its intrinsic merits, and not shade our remarks with considerations of the weakness of data, the insufficiency of researchers, and the lack of intellectual company. The international agencies warrant our thanks for their encouragement, despite their belief that the entire discipline of political science is composed of experts in public administration.—K. H. SILVERT, *Dartmouth College.*

Yugoslavia and The New Communism. BY GEORGE W. HOFFMAN AND FRED WARNER NEAL. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. Pp. xvi, 546. $8.00.)

This book, which seeks to present a sympathetic treatment of the Titoist system, is difficult to evaluate. It attempts too much; in addition to history, politics and economics, the authors also devote some space to geography, anthropology, demography and linguistics, with uneven results. Much of their work covers old ground, already gone over by others (including a previous book by one of the authors), adding little that is new. The chapters on the economy, however, particularly those on Industrial Growth and Resources Base and Foreign Economic Relations, are good, although the unquestioning reliance on official Yugoslav statistics is open to criticism. Perhaps the book's main contribution is to be found in its recounting of the various forms of experimentation that the Yugoslav Communists have undertaken in their attempt to create a workable state-directed economy. Since the publication of the book, however, certain of their actions demonstrate that they are still seeking an answer to the question of how to decentralize an essentially centralist system.

The authors engage in a prodigious effort to "prove" that the theoretical foundations of Titoism are radically different from those of the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Yet they admit that "there is an essential core of theory which is the same . . . both ideologies have their roots in the theories advanced by Lenin" (p. 156). Elsewhere they assert that the "concept of the state under socialism is one of the most significant points of theoretical difference: . . . The Yugoslavs [hold that] the state must begin to 'wither away.' " (One wonders if the authors have read *State and Revolution*). Moreover, the "concept of 'independent paths to socialism' is the main theoretical pillar" in Yugoslav theory, which "is to claim for Yugoslavia and all other states what Stalin and his successors have claimed for the Soviet Union." (How is all this radically new?) In talking about the Titoist system, the authors use a plethora of words such as "novel," "new," "unique," but have not the Russians too reorganized their party apparatus any number of times, and are they not still experimenting with different techniques in their search for a workable state-directed economy?

Time after time, it is evident that the authors want to present the Tito regime in as good a light as possible, often at the expense of historical accuracy. The chapter entitled "The Climb to Statehood" is incredibly poor, vague, and full of historical errors and questionable assertions. Its burden, seemingly, is to prove, that the Yugoslavs have had no experience with democracy. No scholar with even a rudimentary knowledge of this area could so contend. In the brief treatment of the Mihailovich-Tito struggle and the Communist seizure of power, the Mihailovich side does not get a fair hearing, although the authors unintentionally pay Mihailovich a compliment by citing information that he was right all along about Communist intentions. Moreover, the authors say nothing about Tito's admissions that he had no intention of living up to the Tito-Shubashich Agreement. Further, the assertion that the Partisans "liberated most of the country themselves" is questionable. Even if one discounts the not insignificant actions of Soviet forces in Yugoslavia in 1944, and if one forgets about Western aid to Tito (also not insignificant), there is still the fact that *even when Berlin was falling,* large areas of Yugoslavia were still not in Tito's grasp. Also, the assertion that Western foreign offices were "befuddled" by the Cominform Resolution is simply not correct. To the best of this reviewer's knowledge, there is no proof of a Yugoslav Politburo decision not to bear down on the peasants (prior to 1948) and a great deal of evidence to the contrary.

Along with their desire to present the Tito regime in a favorable light, the authors seemingly have a compulsion to hedge. This often creates the impression that they cannot make up their minds. For example: "The voting [in 1945] took place without obvious intimidation" (p. 80), but "Communist strong-arm tactics, already tried out in the 1945 election. . . . " (p. 91). Also: "Almost from the first [there was] a sort of collective leadership," but "the only really top Communists who ever seriously challenged Tito . . . went to prison." (p. 499). Frequently they talk of new democratic forms in Yugoslavia, but at one point conclude that "although there may be more parliamentary 'debate' in Poland than in Yugoslavia, the result is the same: what the Communist Party proposes is enacted." (p. 461)

In a final section, the authors find that the influence of Titoism abroad is nil except perhaps in the new underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa, but they do not examine the implications of the latter statement. In the final chapter, the authors do some speculating about what will happen after Tito, without reaching any firm conclusions. This speculation is preceded by a return to some dubious assertions to support their position that the present regime is a significant improvement over the past, and is accompanied by other declarations that demonstrate that the authors have not really penetrated the thinking of the average Yugoslav citizen.—ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University.*

International Protection of Human Rights. BY MANOUCHEHR GANJI, (Geneva: Droz, 1962, pp. xvi, 317.)

Manouchehr Ganji's survey of the international protection of human rights is divided into seven chapters dealing respectively with (1) humanitarian intervention (2) the post world war II minorities treaties (3) slavery (4) the U. N. Charter (5) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (6) the draft Covenants on Human Rights (7) the European Convention on Human Rights A little more than half the work is devoted to the last two chapters; rightly so since the historical evolution of the protection of individual human rights and of minority rights is already well covered by the literature. The book is completed by useful appendices.

The author gives unity to his analysis by adhering to the thesis that world wide international instruments should codify only those human rights already recognized as universally acceptable and applicable. For the present, Manouchehr Ganji proposes the following list of basic rights: "freedom from deprivation of life save in the execution of a court sentence; freedom from subjection to torture, physical mutilation, cruel or inhuman punishments; freedom from being held in slavery or subjected to the performance of compulsory labour unless provided as punishment duly imposed by a competent judicial tribunal, or required as a temporary public service equally incumbent upon all; freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile; the right of "habeas corpus"; the right to compensation in case of unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty; freedom from the application of *ex post facto* laws; freedom from being restricted in the exercise of civil rights or deprived of judicial personality (except in the case of: (a) minors; (b) persons convicted of crime for which this penalty is provided by law); the right to emigrate; the right to freedom of religion, conscience and belief, and the right to practice and to propagate one's religious belief, the exercise of this right being qualified only by the provisions of laws passed in the interest of humanity, of morals and public order, and to protect the rights and freedoms of others; the right to constitute associations for the promotion and protection of legitimate interests and of any other lawful object." He also proposes to include the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture and to use their own language, but he excludes the so called socio-economic rights and in particular the right to own property.

To supplement a basic universal instrument the author puts his hope in regional agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, made by countries of similar culture and politics which may, consequently, offer wider and more specific protection.

The author decided, and such a decision is perfectly legitimate, to exclude from his study the examination of political or sociological factors which underlie the attitude of states on the question of the international codification of human rights. He tends to give at times, however, what this reviewer considers is undue importance to the official reasoning presented by governments wanting to justify their own positions.

There are minor mistakes such as the date of the treaty of Oliva (p. 16) or the equating of "national origin" with "nationality" (p. 209) but they detract from what is a careful and well organized analysis. More regretable are certain ommissions. The Genocide Convention receives only passing reference and the Trieste Settlement of 1954, one of the more interesting of the post World War II minorities treaties, has been left out of the study. Considering that the work originated in a Swiss University one may also be surprised by the lack of German language material in the bibliography. —JEAN A. LAPONCE, *Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, B. C.*

Foreign Affairs and You! BY ANDREW BERDING. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1962. Pp. 264. $4.50.)

President Eisenhower's assumption of blame for the U-2 flights "ended in disaster" for the United States, cancelling one of the "greatest opportunities in our diplomatic history"—Eisenhower's scheduled trip to Moscow. A staff meeting of the Secretary of State resembles "a king holding court of his feudal lords," each zealous to prevent any trespassing within his private dominion. "To some White House advisers there is something irresistibly fascinating about foreign affairs," a lamentable fact placing still another hazard in the way of State Department efforts to steer a true course in foreign affairs. The State Department, however, has been too addicted to "negative reciprocity" in dealing with the USSR—that is, in invoking a tit-for-tat policy of restructions upon Russians in America whenever prohibitions are placed on Americans in Russia.

These are but a few random judgments advanced by Andrew Berding, whose concern with foreign affairs began over thirty years ago as a newspaper reporter. Subsequently, he accepted a State Department appointment under Truman and became Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs under Eisenhower. In the light of his experience, concern for the role of public opinion in foreign policy is therefore natural. His book is intended for the layman. Its description of the machinery and substance of foreign policy seldom rises above the elementary, on the theory perhaps that even on this level public understanding of the foreign policy process remains rudimentary. The specialist is thus likely to find the analysis commonplace, not to say in some instances (when the author ventures outside his own area of expertise) naive.

Consider his evaluation of summit conferences and other techniques associated with "open diplomacy." The liabilities of such diplomacy are too well-known to require repetition here, yet Berding advances two principal conclusions. One is that summit conferences are probably inevitable. The other is that they may have more value than critics suppose. Citing Eisenhower's trips abroad, he reasons that such appearances often make a lasting impression upon foreign officials: "If they believe the President has won the hearts of their public they are likely to be more amenable. . . . " If there exists any creditable evidence for such reassuring verdicts, the author does not supply it.

In the realm he knows best—propaganda and the "public relations" of foreign policy—the treatment is more convincing and illuminating. The author points out, for example, that *revolution* remains a popular concept throughout Latin America. How much more effective, therefore, for propagandists in America to talk about the revolutionary movement *against* Castro than about *counter*-revolutionary activities in Cuba! Similarly, he dwells upon the unnecessary problems the United States sometimes creates for itself by citing the history of foreign aid. How can citizens at home and abroad generate enthusiasm and support for the agency administering such aid, much less understand its complex administrative structure, when *five* different agencies have administered foreign aid within the last thirteen years?

Commendable as it may be to focus public attention on such problems, politically literate readers are likely to question a number of Berding's simplistic judgments. What informed student of Asian affairs, for example, would agree that the *major* difficulty with America's recent policies toward Quemoy and Matsu was the way they were explained to the American public? Or, after reading the author's plea for greater American understanding of the "neutralist" mentality, what competent observer would accept the assertion that when Washington also advocates "peaceful co-existence" it automatically does Khrushchev "a favor"? Again, after deploring the dominant anti-communist theme in much of contemporary American policy, does it really help to suggest that as a substitute "our output" ought to be more "pro-American"?

Highlighted as it is with the author's first-hand experiences, *Foreign Affairs and You!* can serve as a useful introduction to an increasingly complex subject. If it arouses further interest and a desire to probe deeper—if only to examine critically some of Berding's own assertions—then it will have achieved one of the author's primary objectives.—CECIL V. CRABB, JR., *Vassar College.*

The Imperialism Reader. EDITED BY LOUIS L. SYNDER. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962. Pp. xvii, 619. $8.50.)

Professor Synder's editorial efforts have produced the first anthology of materials related to the subject of imperialism. The 178 readings include eyewitness reports, travel accounts, historical disquisitions, contemporary essays and arguments, treaties, historical commentary, and excerpts from newspapers and magazines. The volume is divided into ten sections; the most useful are those (parts 5 through 9) collecting representative materials dealing with the context and content of imperialism in Africa, the Far East and Southern Asia, the Near and Middle East, American imperialism, and with the "Twilight of Western Imperialism." Of doubtful polemic value are items collected under the rubric "The Emergence of Communist Imperialism." The pointed inclusion of the latter group of readings do not, however, detract from the usefulness of the rest.

The bibliographical section that has customarily appeared at this point, covering articles and documents on international relations, law and organization, will be resumed in the March 1963 number.

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NEWS AND NOTES

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President-elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council. Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Jack Peltason, University of Illinois, Chairman; Weldon Cooper, University of Virgina; John Lewis, Oberlin College; Rupert Emerson, Harvard University; J. Austin Ranney, University of Illinois (after February 1, University of Wisconsin); Robert Scalapino, University of California (Berkeley). The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1963.

1963 PROGRAM

Since the notice in the June issue, John D. Montgomery, Boston University has been appointed Chairman for the Special Topic sessions on Problems of the Developing Countries; and Allen S. Whiting, Department of State, has succeeded Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is on leave, as Chairman for Politics of the Soviet Bloc.

The 1963 Program, as in 1962, will include sessions for brief contributed papers, to be selected on a competitive basis of merit from those offered. Typescripts of papers for consideration should be submitted by May 1, 1963. Accepted papers will be read by their authors, either in special sessions or in regular panels, as the Program Committee determines. Prospective authors are invited to correspond with the Chairman for Selected Papers, Professor J. David Singer, Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:00 A.M., September 4, 1962, in the Virginia Room of the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C. with President Charles S. Hyneman presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1962, and former presidents of the Association were present: William Anderson, Franklin L. Burdette, Byrum E. Carter, Lawrence Durisch, William O. Farber, Carl J. Friedrich, Alfred de Grazia, John Hallowell, H. Field Haviland, Jr., Alexander Heard, Pendleton Herring, V. O. Key, Jr., Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Joseph La Palombara, Robert E. Lane, Ruth Lawson, John D. Lewis, Harvey C. Mansfield, Ithiel de Sola Pool, C. Herman Pritchett, Emmette S. Redford, Leo C. Riethmayer, Lester G. Seligman, Richard C. Snyder, Harold H. Sprout, Kenneth W. Thompson, Vernon Van Dyke, Dwight Waldo, Robert E. Ward, John D. Williams, Bryce Wood.

Prior to the meeting the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member reports from the Executive Director, Editor of the APSR, Representative to ACLS, Representative to AAAS, Treasurer, Auditor, Committee on Standards of Instruction. These reports were the basis of Council discussion in the morning session.

The Executive Director reported continuing cooperation with other social science organizations and improvement in the status of political science with the National Science Foundation. In response to questioning, the Director noted that the National Science Foundation has made several grants for political science projects in the past year: to Karl Deutsch and Harold Lasswell for a data assembly and analysis program and to Duncan MacRae for a study of the use of computers in election analyses. The Director's Report stressed the extension of working relations with Congress: the expansion of the Congressional Fellowship Program to include federal career executives ("the first planned attempt to create mutual understanding among employees of the legislative and executive branches"); the establishment of the Senate Youth Program, financed by the William Randolph Hearst Foundation, which will bring two outstanding high school students from each state to Washington in January, 1963, "for an intensive introduction to the Federal Government"; the promotion of an in-service training program for staff members of congressional committees. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council accept the Report of the Executive Director.

Carl Friedrich reported on the recent agreement between the APSA and the Atherton Press. This agreement is on an annual renewal basis and can be terminated at any time by the APSA. Under the contract, the Atherton Press now has priority in the publication in book form of papers presented at the annual meetings of the Association. The Program Committee this year was acquainted with the agreement. In response to questions, Mr. Friedrich indicated that the new publication arrangement does not cover all, but only a selected number of papers. It is anticipated that the professional journals and reviews will continue to publish some of the best papers. The APSA is not subsidizing publication. As to royalties, the Atherton Press will offer the usual contractual relationship to authors but APSA may expect some monetary returns for its editorial services in selection of manuscripts. In connection with the program, the Atherton Press is establishing a prize for outstanding scholarly monographs.

The Managing Editor of the REVIEW, Harvey Mansfield, reported that, due to personnel problems, the September and December issues of the REVIEW will not carry the international relations bibliography, and that a decision on its resumption is in abeyance pending expressions of demand. On recommendation of the Editor, Rowland Egger and Andrew Hacker will replace Alexander Heard and Wallace Sayre, retiring members of the Editorial Board. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council accept the Report of the Managing Editor.

Max Kampelman, summarizing the Treasurer's Report, noted that "the financial picture of APSA is a healthy one." The endowment fund has grown to $100,000, an increase of $25,000 over last year. During the past five or six years $2,000,000 in grants has been received for special projects administered by the Association. The Council requested that letters of appreciation be sent to those who gave gifts or grants to the Association during the past year. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the budget be approved as it appears in the Treasurer's Report.

Under general announcements, the Executive Director noted a good response to the new group accident insurance plan for members, which becomes effective October 1, 1962; also that the World Tour Seminar is growing, with eighty-seven people already signed up for the tour, scheduled August 1 to September 10, 1963.

Mr. Friedrich reported that the IPSA would meet September 8 in Freudenstadt, Germany, with several members of APSA attending. Topics for discussion at this meeting would include "Political Role of the Courts" and "The Theory of Constitutionalism." A meeting of IPSA has been proposed at Oxford in 1963 and at Geneva in 1964.

The APSA members on the Board of Directors for SSRC this year were David Truman, James Coleman, and Roland Pennock. President Hyneman appointed David Truman for a second term on the Board.

Byrum Carter, reporting on the status of political science in elementary and secondary schools, pointed out that a number of states have enacted statutes that require courses about communism to be taught in the public schools. He announced the preparation of a study guide with an annotated bibliography by Carter and Alfred Diamant under APSA auspices. The guide discusses "the Soviet Union as a going system."

The afternoon session was given over to general discussion of three interrelated topics: relationship with the elementary and secondary schools, the status and prospects of the profession of political science, and the concern of APSA for "the democratic process." The continuation of discussion on Byrum Carter's report led to a motion, seconded and passed:

> that the Association undertake a major review of the framework of inquiry and the teaching methods in respect to political and civic topics in elementary and secondary schools (comparable to those undertaken in mathematics, physics, and economics) and take appropriate steps to modify and improve inquiry and teaching in these fields. As measures to this end, the Council urges continuing attention by the Executive Committee to the recommendations of the Fellman Committee as well as consideration of the following specific actions: (a) developing and encouraging pamphlets to supplement textbook materials; (b) preparing lists of suggested reading materials, audio-visual, and other teaching aids; (c) encouraging establishment of summer programs for teachers in this field; (d) enlisting the cooperation of regional political science associations; (e) consulting directly with the appropriate groups and agencies; (f) promoting professional interest and concern in selection and adoption of textbooks in government; and (g) making a systematic survey

of legal requirements, administrative regulations, and political practices in the choice of social studies materials.

On the status and prospects of the profession, President Hyneman reported that "the Lasswell Document" now in preparation will be ready in November. Ithiel de Sola Pool reported that the Committee on Science has been exploring "the politics of science" with a view to securing greater recognition for the science of politics. Mr. Kirkpatrick commented on the status of the Millett Report, a statement by the Committee on Standards of Instruction which appears in the June, 1962, issue of the REVIEW.

Discussion of the third topic, APSA concern with the effective functioning of the democratic process, focused on a resolution brought to the Council in person by James M. Burns, preliminary to its introduction at the general Business Meeting. This resolution proposes the establishment of a commission to assess the election and organization of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government and the relation between the two branches, with power to make recommendations. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council approve in principle the resolution submitted by Mr. Burns and recommend it for consideration by the Association at its Business Meeting.

It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Council send Sigmund Neumann, a member of the Council, a telegram expressing concern for his illness.

The Council adjourned at 5:00 P.M.

MARIAN D. IRISH, *Secretary*

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Charles Hyneman in the Grand Ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 4:30 P.M., September 5, 1962.

The minutes of the Council meeting of September 4, 1962, were read by Secretary Marian Irish and upon her motion, the minutes were approved as read.

Harvey Mansfield, Editor of the REVIEW, commented briefly on his report which had been distributed to the members prior to the meeting. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Editor's report be accepted.

Evron Kirkpatrick, the Executive Director, made a brief report on Association activities. In particular, the Director called attention to the new Atherton Press Agreement. The main provisions of this agreement call for the publication of selected papers presented at the Annual Meeting, a monograph series, and the establishment of a $1000 prize to be given each year for the best original manuscript in the field of political science. The prize was awarded for the first time at this year's Annual Meeting. A letter giving the details of this agreement with Atherton Press will be sent to the members by the Director. The Director mentioned that the new group accident insurance program and Senate Youth Program showed promise of being highly successful during the coming year. In conclusion, the Director expressed his appreciation to the officers of the Association and particularly to the President for their generous and cooperative efforts. Written reports of the activities of the Office of the Executive Director were distributed at the meeting. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Executive Director's report be accepted.

Max Kampelman, Treasurer, discussed his report which had been distributed to the members prior to the meeting. He reported that the financial affairs of the Association are in healthy condition, reviewed briefly the income and expenses for the past year, called attention to the numerous foundation grants, and reviewed the proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Treasurer's report be accepted.

J. Roland Pennock, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, recommended the following slate of officers and council members for 1962–1963:

President-elect: C. Herman Pritchett (University of Chicago)
Vice Presidents: Alexander Heard (University of North Carolina); John D. Lewis (Oberlin College); and Wallace S. Sayre (Columbia University)
Secretary: Ruth Lawson (Mt. Holyoke College)
Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.).
Members of the Council for two years: Franklin Burdette (University of Maryland); Charles B. Hagan (University of Illinois); H. Field Haviland, Jr. (Brookings Institution); Joseph La Palombara (Michigan State University); Robert E. Lane (Yale University); Ithiel de Sola Pool (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Harold H. Sprout (Princeton University); and Sheldon S. Wolin (University of California).

Mr. Pennock moved approval of the slate. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

James Titus appeared briefly before the meeting to express appreciation to the Senate and the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information for preparing and publishing the materials on the 1960 presidential campaign.

Charles D. Hounshell, National Representative, Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship

Foundation, presented the following statement to the meeting:

> The Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation attracts men and women to the profession of college teaching by annually awarding fellowships to 1000 prospective first-year graduate students. We have just received $27.5 million from the Ford Foundation to carry on our work through 1968.
>
> It has been estimated that the number of full-time teachers of political science needed annually will rise during this decade from 450 to 600, while the present annual production of Ph.D.'s in political science is approximately 200, a large percentage of whom do not go into college teaching.
>
> You will be interested in knowing that 558 of the seven thousand Wilson Fellows have been political scientists. In the early years of the program 19 per cent of the Wilson Fellows were political scientists, but in recent years this figure has dropped to about 7 per cent.
>
> There are two new aspects of the Wilson program designed in part to reduce the time span between entering graduate school and earning the Ph.D. First, the Regional Selection Committees will give preference to candidates who are fully prepared for graduate study, including the possession of competence in foreign language.
>
> Second, the Wilson Foundation has launched a Dissertation-Year Fellowship Program which seeks to demonstrate that all Ph.D. requirements can be met within a four year period. Deans of graduate schools may nominate former Wilson Fellows for the 200 dissertation-year awards. Selections will be made by committees in each of the disciplines. I am pleased to announce that Professor Edgar S. Furniss of Princeton University has agreed to serve as chairman of the committee to select political scientists for the dissertation-year awards.
>
> The specific task of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation involves the general problem of the effective allocation and utilization of intellectual talent in a free society. We would be glad to hear from any of you who have a research interest in this area.

James Burns appeared before the members to present the following resolution:

> Be it resolved that:
>
> This Association recommend to the President and Congress the establishment of a commission to examine and evaluate the election and organization of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, and the relations between the two branches with power to make recommendations;
>
> Be it further resolved that:
>
> This Association proffer its full cooperation in the work of such a commission.

It was moved and seconded that the Association adopt this resolution. After some discussion, a motion was made to table the motion but this was later withdrawn. The motion to adopt the resolution was then put to a vote and passed.

President Hyneman expressed his appreciation to the officers and council members for their generous cooperation and excellent assistance during the past year.

President Carl Friedrich took the chair as the new president. He expressed the Association's gratitude to President Hyneman for his fine work during the past year.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:00 P.M.

MARIAN D. IRISH, *Secretary*

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The XIIth International Congress of Administrative Sciences, held in Vienna 16–20 July, 1962, attracted over 500 participants from 75 countries and 15 international organizations. New Officers elected for three years are: Herbert Emmerich (USA), President; Henri Matton (Belgium), Gustavo Martinez-Cabanas (Mexico), Raymond Nottage (U.K.), and Nikola Stjepanovic (Yugoslavia), Vice-Presidents.

Seats on the Executive Committee are held *ex officio* by chairmen of standing committees, elected as follows: Administrative Practices, Erik Pers Lassen (Denmark); Scientific, Henry Puget (France); Contracts, Andre Molitor (Belgium); Editorial Board, Laureano Lopez Rodo (Spain); Comparative Administrative Cases, G. A. van Poelje (Netherlands). Six alternate members of the Executive Committee were elected: T. B. Balta (Turkey); Hans Krauthausen (West Germany); Edwin Loebenstein (Australia); Tahar Mekouar (Morocco); V. K. Menon (India); Ten That Trach (Vietnam).

Under the revised statutes, confirmed by the General Assembly at Vienna, the next Congress will take place in 1965. There will be a smaller Round Table in 1964, but 1963 is left free for regional conferences. (The representatives of Mexico reported they were considering a hemispheric conference for the Americas in 1963.)

A leading element in the Vienna Congress was a series of sessions, attended by nearly 150 persons representing schools and institutions concerned with training for public administration. An *ad hoc* steering committee, chaired by Donald C. Stone (USA), presented for consideration by the Executive Committee a program whereby IIAS could meet the felt needs of some 80 such national institutions by serving as a clearing house, to promote the provision of more effective teaching materials, etc.

The themes selected for study and debate at the next Congress are: participation of the citizen in the conduct of public administration; new techniques of budget preparation and management; the internal administration of public economic enterprises.

There were over thirty participants from USA, many on mission in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Sudan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Philippines, Italy, Thailand. The leaders of the U. S. group were Elmer B. Staats and Stephen B. Sweeney, past president and president of ASPA. G. W. Lawson, Jr., was U. S. member of the Committee on Administrative Practices; Walter Gellhorn, U. S. member of the Committee on Comparative Cases; Charles S. Ascher, U. S. member of the Contracts Committee.

The new officers of the American Society of International Law are: Dean Rusk, honorary president; Hardy C. Dillard, president; James N. Hyde, Brunson MacChesney, Marjorie Whiteman, vice-presidents; Edward Dumbauld, Secretary; Monroe Leight, treasurer.

The International Studies Association, a group of teachers, researchers and others devoted to the interdisciplinary approach to the study of international relations, recently held its third annual meeting at Portland State College, Portland, Oregon. The topic of the meeting was "The Developed Nations of the Free World: Problems and Prospects."

The following new officers of the organization were elected: Fred A. Sondermann, The Colorado College, president; Charles McClelland, San Francisco State College, first vice president; Karlin Capper Johnson, Lewis and Clark College, second vice president; Charles LaCugna, University of Seattle, treasurer; Mark Cannon, Brigham Young University, secretary; John Pustay, U. S. Air Force Academy, assistant secretary. Josef Korbel of the University of Denver, and Minos Generales, San Diego State College were elected to the executive board of the group. Colonel Wesley Posvar of the U. S. Air Force Academy joins the executive board as the out-going president.

The ISA plans next year to expand its membership and coverage on a nation-wide basis, to publish a journal devoted to recent trends in interdisciplinary research in the international field, and to sponsor professional meetings for members of various disciplines. Inquiries and other communications are invited. Please address these to Dr. Fred A. Sondermann, The Colorado College, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The 20th Congress of the Institut International de Sociologie, originally scheduled for September 1962 at Cordoba, Argentina, has been postponed to 1963, to coincide with the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the founding of the National Iniversity of Cordoba. The date and program will be announced later.

The United States Department of State and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University are publishing jointly: "A catalogue of files and microfilms of the German foreign ministry archives, 1920–1945." This catalogue, consisting of three volumes, will list for the period 1920 to 1945 all files from the political archives of the German foreign ministry that were seized by the American and British armies at the end of World War II. It will continue and complete the work of the catalog of German foreign ministry files and microfilms, 1867–1920 which was published by the American Historical Association in 1959. The catalog will include the title, number and date of all files contained in the archives, and the corresponding serial and frame numbers of those files that were microfilmed. It was compiled and prepared for printing by Dr. George O. Kent of the historical office of the department of state and its publication and distribution will be financed by the Hoover Institution. Volume I is scheduled to be published in the summer of 1962. The remaining volumes are scheduled to appear, respectively, late in 1962 and in 1963.

GORDON E. BAKER, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has been awarded a faculty research fellowship by the Social Science Research Council.

RICHARD D. BAKER, instructor in government at the University of Oklahoma, has been granted a two year leave of absence to accept an assignment with the University of Tennessee under grants from AID to set up a political science program at the University of Panama.

SAMUEL H. BARNES, political science department, University of Michigan, will be on leave in 1962–63 on Fulbright grant to lecture at the University of Florence, Italy.

CHESTER L. BARROWES retired as professor and chairman of history and government at Adelphi College, effective July, 1962.

OLIVER E. BENSON, professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, will become the director of the bureau of government research, in September, 1962.

EDWARD M. BERSHTEIN of Purdue University has been granted leave of absence in order to permit him to serve as Counsel on the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women in Washington, D. C.

GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD, professor of political science at Syracuse University, has accepted an assignment to serve as Syracuse representative at the Administrative Staff College, Lahore, Pakistan, for the coming year.

WILLIAM W. BOYER, associate professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh has been granted a leave of absence for two years to become advisor to the University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan to develop a doctoral program in public administration.

R. WALLACE BREWSTER, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University, will serve as visiting professor of political science at Haverford College during the academic year 1962–63.

HERBERT W. BRIGGS of Cornell was elected a member of the International Law Commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

GEORGE BRINKLEY of Notre Dame is spending a year in Russia.

FRED G. BURKE, assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University, will be on leave of absence for the coming year for research in East Africa.

FRANKLIN M. BRIDGE has resigned the position of assistant director of research projects of the bureau of governmental research and associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado, to become chief of local government research in the office of local government services of the state of New York.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI of the department of public law and government and director of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University, will be on leave during the academic year, 1962–63.

PHILIP H. BURCH, JR. has been appointed as assistant research specialist in the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, University of Maryland, has been appointed by the governor to the chairmanship of a state commission on legislative reapportionment in Maryland.

PAUL CASTLEBERRY, Washington State University, has been awarded a research scholar's grant under the Fulbright Act and will spend the 1962–63 academic year in Turkey.

GEORGE ANDREWS CONDON, acting instructor in political science at Washington State University has been awarded a Congressional Fellowship for 1962–63 by the American Political Science Association.

ALFREDO PAREJA DIEZCONSECCO has been appointed in political science at the University of Florida to work with the University of Florida Portuguese-Spanish Area Studies Institute, which has been established under the federal national defense program funds.

BEATRICE DINERMAN, formerly public administration analyst, bureau of governmental research, University of California at Los Angeles, has been appointed director of a three-year Ford Foundation project to be conducted under the auspices of the Welfare Planning Council of Los Angeles.

ROBERT B. DOVE will serve as assistant professor of political science at The Citadel for 1962–63, as a replacement for Donald Fairchild who will be on leave.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH will be on an overseas assignment to Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey for 1962–63 under the auspices of Vanderbilt University.

WILLIAM B. EDDY, Michigan State University, has joined the faculty of the University of Missouri, working with the graduate program in public administration.

HARRIS I. EFFROSS has been promoted to assistant research specialist in the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

RAYMOND ENGLISH will spend 1962–63 year on sabbatical in England. During his absence S. R. McGowan will serve as acting chairman of the department of political science at Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio.

VERNON L. FERWERDA will be on leave during the 1962–63 academic year from his position as chairman of the department of government, Trinity College, to serve as director, U. S.-U. N. Interpretation, for the department of international affairs of the national council of churches.

EDWIN FOGELMAN, associate professor at the University of Oklahoma, and presently visiting associate professor at the University of Minnesota, will be at the institute for behavioral sciences, Palo Alto, during 1962–63.

RUSSELL O. FUDGE, who for the past three years was course director at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for international relations and United States foreign policy, has retired from the regular army to become an associate professor of political science at Howard Payne College, Brownwood, Texas.

BERNARD K. GORDON has been given a leave of absence from Vanderbilt University during 1962–63 to join the staff of the institute for defense analysis.

DONALD J. GRADY will serve as instructor in the department of political science at the University of Washington during 1962–63.

Malbone Watson Graham retired June 30, 1962 after forty-two years. Speaking to his career and retirement at a farewell sendoff on May 25 were Homer Durham, president, Arizona State University; Malcolm C. Moss, Rockefeller Foundation; and H. Arthur Steiner, professor of political science, UCLA.

David H. Gurbbs, assistant professor of political science at the University of Tennessee is on loan to the Tennessee state planning commission for a two year period beginning September 1962 where he will serve as director of research.

Vincent W. Hauge has been given a one-year appointment as instructor of government at Purdue, effective June, 1962.

Ruth R. Hawkins, formerly assistant professor at West Liberty State College, has been given a one-year appointment as assistant professor of government, effective September, 1962 at Purdue University.

Samuel P. Hayes has been appointed as president of the foreign policy association as of September, 1962.

Clinton S. Herrick will serve as assistant professor of political science at the Citadel for 1962–63 as a replacement for Paul J. Kingston who will be on leave.

Joseph Jiang and **Yung-Min Kim** of Indiana University have been appointed research assistants in the institute of advanced projects at the University of Hawaii's east-west center for the year 1962–63.

Roy Jumper, associate professor of political science at Wake Forest College, spent the spring semester, 1962, in South Viet Nam as a consultant with the agency for international development. He will continue on leave during 1962–63 to serve as consultant in public administration for the Ford Foundation in Beirut, Lebanon.

George McT. Kahin of Cornell University, department of government, will be on leave 1962–63 at the University of London.

Boyd R. Keenan, assistant professor of government at Marshall University, has accepted the associate directorship of the committee on institutional cooperation with headquarters at Purdue University. In addition, he will teach in the government department.

Young C. Kim, Hobart and Smith College, is serving as visiting assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University during 1962–63.

Hans Kohn is serving as John Hay Whitney visiting professor emeritus for the academic year 1962–63 with the department of international relations and the department of history, University of Denver.

Enver M. Koury, formerly lecturer in government and politics program of the University of Maryland, has been transferred to the European program of the University of Maryland.

Morton Kroll, University of Washington, will be on leave 1962–63 to serve under a Smith-Mundt award as visiting professor of political science at the University College at the University of British West Indies.

Ruth C. Lawson, professor of political science and chairman of the department at Mount Holyoke College has been granted an American society of international law research fellowship.

Avery Leiserson is taking a year's research leave (1962–63) from Vanderbilt University to spend as senior fellow of the social science research council.

Werner Levi, of the University of Minnesota, is visiting professor at the University of Hawaii during the 1962–63 school year.

Charles E. Martin, University of Washington, retired in June 1962 after having served the political science department since 1924. He has accepted apppointment as professor of American studies at the University of Philippines, effective in July.

George Mauer has been appointed on a full-time basis as assistant director of the bureau of government research at the University of Oklahoma.

Vernon McKay, professor of African Studies, the Johns Hopkins University school of advanced international studies, has been elected chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African affairs.

Edward W. Mill, department of political science, Long Island University, has accepted a new position as chevalier professor of diplomacy and world affairs at Occidental College in Los Angeles.

Gerhart Niemeyer, Notre Dame, is spending a year at Munich on a Fulbright Scholarship.

Stanley Perry, C.S.C. of Notre Dame, is spending a year at Munich.

O. William Perlmutter will be visiting professor of political science at the University of Minnesota during the academic year 1962–63.

Richard H. Pfaff, assistant professor of political science, University of Colorado, is spending the 1962–63 year in Iran and other countries of the middle East, under a Fulbright research award.

Laurence I. Radway, chairman of the government department at Dartmouth College, is on leave for 1961–63 to serve on the faculty of the National War College.

Ernest C. Reock, Jr. has been promoted to associate research specialist and director of the bureau of government research at Rutgers University.

Ross R. Rice of Arizona State University is visiting professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for 1962–63.

John P. Roche, of Brandeis University, has been appointed visiting professor of political science and of the social sciences in the college at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1962–63.

George K. Romoser of the University of New Hampshire, has been appointed Fulbright professor at the University of Mainz, Germany, for the academic year 1962–63.

Victoria Schuck, professor of political science, Mount Holyoke, has been appointed a member of the state advisory committee for Massachusetts, to the United States commission on civil rights.

Walter R. Sharp has been appointed Ford research professor in public affairs at Yale University for the year 1962–63.

Mulford Q. Sibley of the University of Minnesota will be visiting professor in the department of government during the 1962–63 academic year at Cornell.

Franklin Smallwood of the government department at Dartmouth College is on leave for 1962–63.

Herman M. Somers, professor of political science at Haverford College, will be serving as counsellor to the international labour office in Geneva during the academic year, 1962–63.

John W. Spanier, assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida, will be visiting assistant professor of political science at Haverford College, 1962–63.

David Spitz, professor of political science at the Ohio State University, is serving as visiting Fulbright professor at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University in Bologna, Italy, 1962–63.

William S. Stokes, senior professor of comparative political institutions, Claremont Men's College, is spending the year 1962–63 as professor of foreign affairs at the National War College.

Robert S. Sullivant of DePauw University has been appointed visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago for the academic year 1962–63.

Thomas Landon Thorson, assistant professor of political science, received the William H. Kiekhofer Award of $1000 for distinguished teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He will be on leave in Europe during 1962–63 on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.

Pio Uliassi of the United States State Department has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University.

S. P. Varma, university professor of political science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India, has accepted an appointment as visiting professor of political science in the University of Oregon for the academic year 1962–63.

Kenneth N. Vines of Tulane University is serving as visiting associate professor of political science at Vanderbilt University.

Nicholas Wahl, assistant professor of government, Harvard University, is on leave in 1962–63 as a visiting research fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford University.

Louis Wasserman, professor of government and philosophy, San Francisco State College, is in Denmark for the 1962–63 academic year.

Donald Zagoria of the Rand Corporation has been appointed a senior fellow of the research institute on communist affairs, Columbia University.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Thomas R. Adam will be acting head of the all-university department of government and international relations at New York University for the academic year 1962–63.

Minoo Adenwalla of Lawrence College has been promoted to associate professor and is spending the academic year of 1962–63 in London under a grant from the Lawrence College Asian studies program and from the Howard Foundation.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment for 1962–63 as instructor in social sciences at Southwest Texas State College, San Marcos, Texas.

ALAN A. ALTSHULER, formerly of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of government, beginning in the fall term of 1962, at Cornell.

STEPHEN ANDERSON has been appointed instructor in the government department at Boston University.

MORLEY AYEARST has been promoted to professor and will be chairman of the department of government and international relations, Washington Square College, New York University.

JOHN H. BADGLEY, who has just returned from Burma, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Miami University.

HOYT B. BALLARD, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas.

WILLIAM F. BARBER, retired foreign service and department of state officer has been appointed lecturer in international affairs in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

RICHARD W. BARRON, who has been lecturer in political science at the University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of political science at Longwood College.

JAMES BARROS of Columbia University has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

PHILIP BEACH has been appointed instructor of political science at Washington State University.

GEORGE D. BEAM has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at University of Michigan.

THOMAS J. BENNETT, has been appointed instructor of political science at Marquette University.

HERMAN G. BERKMAN, formerly professor of land economics at the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed professor of planning, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

HOWARD J. BIDDULPH has been appointed instructor in political science at Rutgers University.

ALLAN D. BLOOM, formerly of Cornell, has been appointed visiting assistant professor at Yale University.

VIRGIL C. BLUM, S.J. has been named chairman of the department of political science at Marquette University.

SHARON BOEN has been appointed instructor in political science at Northern Michigan College.

LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN has been appointed assistant professor of government at Denison University.

J. CUDD BROWN has become professor of political science and chairman of the social science division, Sonoma State College, Cotati, California.

D. MACKENZIE BROWN, professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has been appointed acting chairman of the department for 1962–63.

DONALD J. BROWNETT has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic Program of the University of Maryland.

CLAUDE BURTENSHAW has been appointed dean of students at Utah State University in Logan, and professor of political science.

ELEANORE BUSHNESS has become full professor in the department of history and political science at University of Nevada.

ROBERT S. CAHILL of the University of Oregon has been appointed assistant professor of political science at University of Hawaii.

DAVID P. CALLEO of Yale University has been promoted to assistant professor of political science. He is also director of undergraduate studies in political science.

WESLEY D. CAMP has been named professor and chairman of the history and government department at Adelphi College, effective July, 1962.

PHILIP CHAPMAN of University of California, has been appointed instructor of government at Lawrence College.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH has been promoted to associate professor at Ohio State University.

CHARLTON F. CHUTE, formerly director, institute of public administration, has been appointed professor of public administration, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

Tadeusz Cieplak, formerly of McGill University, has been appointed an assistant professor at San Francisco State College.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr. has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University and executive officer of the South Asia committee of the Maxwell center for overseas operations.

Joyotpaul Chaudhuri has been appointed an instructor in government at the University of Oklahoma.

Wilder W. Crane, Jr., has resigned at Vanderbilt University to accept a position as associate professor at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

Don M. Cregier has accepted an appointment as assistant professor to the history and political science department at Keuka College.

Richard Dale, Princeton University, has been appointed instructor at the University of New Hampshire.

Vincent Davis, Dartmouth College, has been appointed as assistant professor of international relations and staff member of the social science foundation, University of Denver, beginning September, 1962.

Vera Micheles Dean, formerly director of research, foreign policy association and professor of international relations at University of Rochester, has been appointed professor of international development, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

Clare Denton, formerly of the University of California at Berkeley, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

Martha Derthick of the MIT-Harvard Center for urban studies has been appointed visiting lecturer in the government department at Dartmouth College.

Bruce B. Dexter has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic Program of the University of Maryland.

Robert H. Dix has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

John D. Donnell of the institute of international studies of the University of California at Berkeley has been appointed assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College.

Marion Doro has been appointed visiting lecturer for 1962–63 at Connecticut College.

Joseph C. Dougherty has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

Thomas R. Dye, has joined the University of Wisconsin, department of political science, University extension division as an assistant professor.

Edgar Shlomo Efrat, formerly at the University of Texas Middle East Institute, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Victoria, College, Victoria, British Columbia.

Rowland A. Egger has been appointed acting dean of faculty at the University of Virginia.

JeDon A. Emerhiser has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor at Utah State University.

Frederick C. Engelmann, formerly of Alfred University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta, Calgary, effective September, 1962.

John Eriksen has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

Richard A. Falk has been appointed associate professor of international law at Princeton University.

Robert A. Faulkner has been appointed instructor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

James W. Fesler has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Yale University.

William S. Flash has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont.

Joseph P. Ford, Harvard University, has accepted an appointment as an instructor at the University of New Hampshire.

Wayne L. Francis, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University.

Robert C. Fried has been appointed assistant professor at Connecticut College.

Harry J. Friedman has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Hawaii.

Charles G. Gati has been appointed resident lecturer in government at the Kokomo campus of Indiana University.

Robert S. Getz has been appointed an instructor in political science at Rutgers.

Robert Gilpin, Jr., formerly associate director of the council for atomic age studies at Columbia University, has been appointed as assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University.

Harvey Glickman, assistant professor of political science at Haverford College will be on leave 1962–63.

Ralph M. Goldman, formerly of Michigan State University and the University of Chicago, has accepted a full professorship at San Francisco State College.

Stephen Gorove, college of law, University of Akron, has been appointed professor of international relations and law and member of the staff of the social science foundation, University of Denver. He is on a joint appointment with the College of law.

Deon C. Greer has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

Brent Gubler, formerly of Syracuse University, has been named instructor in political science at Harpur College.

Horace V. Harrison has been appointed director of graduate studies in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Robert W. Hattery, resigned as assistant professor of political science in the extension division of the University of Wisconsin to become director of the bureau of public education in the extension division and assistant professor in the department of government at Indiana University.

Harry A. Holloway, assistant professor at the University of Texas has been appointed as an associated professor of government in the field of political theory at the University of Oklahoma.

Jack Holmes has become associate professor and acting director of the bureau of governmental research at the University of Nevada.

James E. Holton, Washington State University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Abraham Holtzman has been promoted to professor of history and political science at North Carolina State College.

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., has joined the department of political science at Duke University as assistant professor.

John M. Hunger has joined the University of Wisconsin, department of political science, university extension division as an assistant professor.

Dan N. Jacobs has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of government at Miami University (Ohio).

Walter Darnell Jacobs, former lecturer in the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland has been appointed assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

James D. Johnson has been appointed instructor in the department of government at the University of Oklahoma.

Robert S. Jordan was appointed assistant to the President of the George Washington University, effective July 1, 1962. He was appointed associate professor of international affairs in 1961.

Richard E. Johnston, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Louisiana State University.

Ellis Katz has accepted an appointment as instructor at Temple University.

Stanley Kelley, Jr., has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the deparment of politics, Princeton University.

Young Whan Kihl, formerly of New York University, has become instructor in political science and history at Juniata College.

David C. Knapp has been promoted from associate professor to professor at the University of New Hampshire.

Kenneth K. Kofmehl has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Purdue University.

Richard J. Kozicki, formerly of Mansfield State College, has been apppointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Harvey Ira Leifert, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

Nathan Leites, of Rand Corporation, has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Leon N. Lindberg, instructor at University of Wisconsin, has been appointed an assistant professor.

Duncan MacRae, Jr., of the University of Chicago, has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

Vasyl Markus has joined the department of political science at Loyola University, Chicago, as assistant professor.

Arthur Marlow, formerly of St. Louis University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Marquette University.

Rex Martin has been appointed assistant professor of government at Purdue University.

Roger D. Masters of Yale University has been promoted to assistant professor of political science.

W. J. Matthews has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Vermont.

Theodore H. McNelly has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Maryland.

Richard L. Merritt has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

Henry L. Merry, who was visiting associate professor at Northwestern University, has been given a one-year appointment as assistant professor of government at Purdue University.

Charles Micaud, University of Virginia, has been appointed professor of international relations and member of the staff of the social science foundation, University of Denver, beginning September, 1962.

Kenneth Miller has been promoted to associate professor of political science and appointed as department chairman at the Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers. He will be on leave during 1962–63 while he is in Denmark as a Fulbright research scholar.

Andrew Milnor has been appointed instructor in the government department at Boston University.

John D. Montgomery has been named research professor of government and associate director of the African studies program at Boston University.

John A. Morgan has joined the department of political science of Duke University as an instructor.

Donald C. Mundinger, associate professor of government, Valparaiso University, has been appointed assistant dean of the college of arts and sciences. He will continue on the staff of the department of government.

Frank Munger has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Syracuse University. He succeeds Guthrie S. Birkhead, who is on a university assignment in Pakistan.

Larry D. Nachman has been appointed instructor in political science at Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers University.

Wladimir Nalezękiewicz has been appointed assistant professor at Marquette University.

Dick Netzer, formerly vice president, Federal reserve bank, Chicago, and economic consultant to the regional plan association, has been appointed associate professor of metropolitan finance, graduate school of public administration, New York University.

Louis E. Newman, former Assistant Director has been appointed Executive Director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, Inc. of New Orleans.

R. J. Novogrod, Ph.D. candidate at New York University, has been appointed acting chairman of the Long Island University political science department.

Edwin E. Olson, recently a research assistant at the Brookings institution center for advanced study, has been appointed an instructor in political science at the University of Southern California.

Arthur M. Osteen has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Syracuse University, and will also serve as executive director of the Africa-Asia program of the Maxwell overseas center. He succeeds Robert Heussler who has gone with the Ford Foundation on a project concerned with Latin American relations.

Dennis Palumbo has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Hawaii.

Kirk R. Petshek, urban development and economic coordinator, Mayor's office, Philadelphia, has resigned to join the University of Wisconsin as professor of commerce and coordinator of its urban research-action program in Milwaukee.

Larry Pippin has become instructor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

Joseph Planinsic is now a member of the department of political science at Duquesne with the rank of assistant professor.

Gerald M. Pomper, formerly of City College, New York, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Rutgers University.

Mojmir Povolny of Lawrence College has been promoted to associate professor and elected chairman of the department of government.

H. Douglas Price, formerly of Columbia University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Syracuse University.

Robert E. Reordan has been appointed assistant professor of government at Stonehill College.

Gerald Rigby, formerly of the University of Wyoming, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of Southern California.

Charles M. Rehmus has been appointed associate professor of political science and co-director of institute of labor and industrial relations, department of political science, University of Michigan.

Yosal Rogat of the center for the study of democratic institutions of the Fund for the Republic, has been appointed assistant professor of political science and of the social sciences in the college at the University of Chicago.

Richard N. Rosecrance has been promoted to associate professor at UCLA. He is currently serving as coordinator of the national security studies program at UCLA.

Walter Rosenbaum has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Florida.

Bruce M. Russett, formerly at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Yale University, and is also serving as director of the political data program at Yale.

John W. Ryan resigned as associate professor at the University of Wisconsin to become secretary to the president, University of Massachusetts.

Elie A. Salem, formerly of Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed associate professor in the department of political science and public administration at the American university of Beirut.

Leon Salamon has been made instructor of government at Trinity College.

Walter F. Scheffer, associate professor of government, has been appointed chairman of the department of government at the University of Oklahoma.

Edward V. Schten is serving as acting chairman of the University of Wisconsin department of political science, university extension division, while James R. Donoghue is on leave in Nigeria.

Valerie Shinavar has become instructor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

Otis H. Shao, formerly of Moravian College, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. formerly of Harvard University, has been appointed associate professor of politics, Princeton University.

J. David Singer has been promoted to research political scientist in the mental health research institute at the University of Michigan.

Jay B. Sorenson has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

Charles S. Spencer has been promoted assistant professor of political science at the Citadel.

Robert J. Steamer, formerly of Louisiana State University, has been appointed professor of government and chairman of the department at Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, Illinois.

E. W. Steele, Jr. has resigned from the staff of the department of political science at the University of Vermont, as of September 1, 1962.

Albert Stillson, formerly of Montana State University, has accepted appointment as assistant professor of political science at Wake Forest College for 1962–63 academic year.

Herbert J. Storing, of the University of Chicago, has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

Carl F. Stover has been appointed senior political scientist in the economic development division of Stanford research Institute.

Albert L. Sturm, formerly of West Virginia University, assumed his new duties as director of the institute of governmental research and professor of government at Florida State University in September.

Richard N. Swift of New York University has been promoted to full professor and is serving as a visiting lecturer in political science at Yale University during 1962–63.

JIVIAN R. TABIBIAN of Princeton University has accepted appointment as instructor in political science at Wake Forest College.

THOMAS F. THOMPSON resigned as assistant professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin Fox Valley extension center, to go to Western Michigan University.

VICTOR A. THOMPSON, formerly of the Illinois institute of technology has been appointed professor of political science at Syracuse University for the coming year. He will serve as director of the East Africa program of the Maxwell overseas center.

EMORY T. TROSPER has been appointed lecturer in government and politics in the Atlantic program of the University of Maryland.

DAVID B. TRUMAN becomes Dean of Columbia College in January, 1963, succeeding John G. Palfrey, who resigned to become a member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

TANG TSOU of the University of Chicago has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

WARREN M. TSUNEISKH, curator of the Far Eastern collections and research associate at the Yale University library, has been appointed lecturer in political science for the year 1962–63.

ROBERT C. TUCKER, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed professor of politics at Princeton University.

HENRY A. TURNER has been advanced to the rank of professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is on leave for the academic year 1962–63 to serve as a visiting professor at the University of Khartoum in the Republic of Sudan under a program sponsored by the department of State and by the African studies center of the University of California, Los Angeles.

SIDNEY VERBA has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

WILLIAM R. VIZZARD, assistant professor of government at the University of Oklahoma, resigned to accept a position as command historian with the Fifth Air Force, Tokyo.

ERIC WALDMAN, who spent the academic year 1961–62 at the University of Munich on a Fulbright research fellowship, has been promoted to professor of political science at Marquette University.

MICHAEL WALZER, formerly instructor in government at Harvard University, has been appointed assistant professor of politics at Princeton University.

WALTER WEIKER, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Newark College of arts and sciences of Rutgers University.

EUGENE WEINSTEIN, formerly with the department of interdisciplinary studies at the University of Minnesota, has been appointed an instructor at San Francisco State College.

DAVID WELBORN, formerly of the University of Texas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas.

W. HARDY WICKWAR has been appointed to the staff of the graduate school of public administration at New York University.

ANN R. WILLNER of the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor at Harpur College.

FRED H. WILLHOITE has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Florida Presbyterian College.

H. H. WILSON has been promoted to the rank of professor in the department of politics, Princeton University.

JOHN W. WOOD has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of Oklahoma.

TAKEHIKO YOSHIHASHI of the American University has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of international relations and to a newly created post of associate dean of the school of international service.

The 1963 meetings of the Western Political Science Association will be held in San Diego, March 21–23, at Vacation Village Hotel. Albert Lepawsky (University of California, Berkeley), Vice President of the Association, is in charge of the program; and W. Richard Bigger (San Diego State College), in charge of local arrangements.

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

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
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

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

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